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Abstract 
Climate change is as much an economic phenomenon as an environmental or moral one. 
Therefore, discussion of climate change mitigation needs to include the finance sector. 
Banks, in particular, are economic gatekeepers. Their day-to-day activities offinancing. 
lending, investing, trading and advising bring them into .frequent and direct contact with 
large corporations that are responsible for intensive global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions as well as the development of low-carbon technologies. This has two 
consequences, both of which make banks key players in the transition to a low-carbon 
economy. First~ nearly all economic decisions made by banks will have indirect 
environmental impacts - for better or worse. Second, banks are optimally placed to enrol 
other corporate actors in GHG mitigation efforts. 
However, little research exists concerning whether, to what extent, or why banks would 
seek to facilitate climate change mitigation, especially when not compelled to do so. What 
makes this subject particularly important is that despite regulatory uncertainty on climate 
change at international and national levels, early-moving private sector banks are making 
voluntary climate-related changes to their business practices. Yet it remains unclear why 
they are doing so, and whether or how such 'enlightened' practices might become 
mainstreamed in the industry as a whole. 
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, it answers the question of why early-
moving private sector banks are adopting climate-related practices. It does so taking 
account of but going beyond the relevant literature on 'why companies go green', which is 
conceptualised through intra-organisational (micro), inter-organisational (meso) and 
socio-cultural (macro) theoretical lenses. In so doing, it employs a multiple case design 
and analyses interview data.from seven early-moving or 'leading' banks to provide insights 
about internal and external influences on corporate environmental behaviour. Second, this 
dissertation draws implications from the empirical .findings for: (a) the mainstreaming of 
'enlightened' banking practices in the industry as a whole,- and (b) effective climate.finance 
policymaking. 
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The findings in this dissertation demonstrate that the mesa-level literature on the business 
case provides the most convincing explanation as lo why early-moving bank'i are 'going 
green '. In so doing, a new taxonomy of corporate 'reputation' is proposed, which includes 
a new classification of 'client service reputation' with the established 'social reputation' as 
twin drivers of corporate greening. Equally as important, this dissertation demonstrates 
that ethical or 'corporate social responsibility' motivations do not drive corporate 
greening in the banking industry. Finally, this dissertation yields jurisdictionally-specific 
.findings on how regulatory contexts shape corporate decision-making on climate change. 
In drawing implications .from these findings, this dissertation shows that mainstreaming of 
purely voluntary 'leading' bank practices will probably occur over time incrementally, 
which will not assist the transition to a low-carbon economy fast or jar enough. Therefore, 
this dissertation recommends that government regulatory intervention at the 
national/regional level is required, regardless of international agreement. Theories of 'new 
governance' and 'nudge economics' are used to suggest that indirect 'steering' regulation 
can expand clean energy markets while harnessing the business case imperative of banks to 
assist timely transition to a low-carbon global economy. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.0 "It's the Economy, Stupid" 
The imperative of climate change mitigation is to urgently cap global wa1ming at two 
degrees Celsius (2°C) in order to prevent catastrophic global change. We know that the 
solution is expeditious reduction of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly 
carbon dioxide (C02). 1 Yet we do not seem to know how best to mobilise this solution. To 
date, scrutiny has been directed at the likelihood (or otherwise) of an international 
agreement beyond the Kyoto Protocol2 and the activities of high GHG-emitting industries 
such as the fossil fuel sector. Little consideration has been given to the facilitative role of 
financial intermediary actors in addressing climate change. This is a curious oversight 
because mitigating GHG emissions will not only require behavioural and technological 
changes; it will also require lots of money. 
Climate change is as much an economic issue as an environmental or ethical one. Global 
GHG emissions must peak no later than 2015 3 and then drop by one third by 2020 relative 
to business as usual if we are to stay within the 2°C guardrail. 4 In order to finance these 
GHG reductions globally, a total of €65-100 billion annually is required over the period 
1 C02 represented 77% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2004. Annual emissions of C02 
have grown between 1970-2004 by approximately 80%, primarily due to human energy supply, 
transport and industry: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups J, II and !If to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, Geneva, 2007) (hereafter IPCC 2007 
Synthesis Report), 36 (Figure 2.1 ). For human influence on climate change, see IPCC 2007 
Synthesis Report: 36-41. For an overview of basic 'greenhouse effect' science, see C Hepburn and 
N Stem, 'A New Global Deal on Climate Change' (2008) 24(2) Ox.ford Review of Economic Policy 
259, 259-260. 
2 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998) 37 lLM 22. 
3 B Metz, 'The Climate Financing Problem: Funds needed for Global Climate Change Mitigation 
Vastly Exceed Funds Currently Available' in RB Stewart, B Kingsbury and B Rudyk (eds) Climate 
Finance (New York University Press, New York and London, 2009), 42. 
4 Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bank 's Commitment to Addressing Climate Change (Deutsche Bank, 
Frankfurt am Main, undated), 3. Metz estimates that global GHG emissions must drop by half by 
2050 (from 1990 levels), ibid. 
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2010-2020. 5 As such, climate change mitigation will involve one of the largest market and 
economic transitions in modern society. It is analogous to past transitional phenomena, 
such as the rise of computers or the Internet, where technology has advanced or consumer 
needs have changed. 6 But even more than changing market preferences, addressing climate 
change will require a global economic transition from a fossil fuel-based existence to a low-
carbon one. Such a massive transition requires financial input and facilitation on an equally 
grand scale. 
Given this reality, more attention needs to be paid to the finance sector's role in assisting 
emissions reductions and the transition to a low-carbon global economy. Specifically, 
private sector banks are global economic gatekeepers and financial intermediaries, which 
makes them a potentially critical actor in the transition to a low-carbon economy. This 
potential is summarised by Deutsche Bank: 
As an asset manager we can steer investments into low-carbon companies, as a 
trader we provide liquidity in the carbon market, and as a capital markets participant 
we can raise debt and equity capital to fund clean tech companies and projects and 
provide solutions to all clients who face the inevitable impact of climate change. 7 
Moreover, in their roles as asset managers, traders, and participants in capital markets, 
banks have a unique capacity to influence their corporate network, which includes clients, 
suppliers and competitors. As stated by Lundgren and Catasus: 
Banks have large contact nets on all levels of society .. . [and] may intentionally, or 
unintentionally, affect other actors ... in terms of attitudes toward the environment 
and environmentally responsible management. 8 
Y ct, until recently, banks have been virtually invisible and silent. They are not nation 
states; they are not even big polluters. Consequently they have gone largely unnoticed by 
academics and policy-makers who have given little attention to their potential to facilitate 
climate change mitigation. This dissertation contends that we need to start paying attention 
now. The fact is that banks' day-to-day activities - financing, lending, investing, trading 
5 These figures also capture the costs of meeting the adaptation needs of developing countries: 
Metz, ibid. 
6 A.T Hoffman, 'Climate Change Strategy: The Business Logic Behind Voluntary Greenhouse Gas 
Reductions ' (2005) 47(3) Cal!fornia Management Review 21, 23. 
7 Deutsche Bank, above n 4, 2 (emphasis added). 
8 M Lundgren and B Catasus, 'The Banks' Impact On the Natural Environment - On the Space 
Between 'What Is' and ' What If' (2009) 9 Business Strategy and the Environment 186, 189. 
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and advising - bring them into frequent and direct contact with large corporations that are 
responsible for not only intensive GHG emissions but also low-carbon solutions. This has 
two consequences, both of which make banks key players in our transition to a low-carbon 
economy. First, nearly all economic decisions made by banks will have indirect 
environmental impacts - for better or worse. Second, banks are optimally placed to enrol 
other corporate actors in GHG mitigation efforts. 
However, it must be acknowledged that banks appear an unlikely candidate for a gold 
medal in good corporate citizenship. Although banks have rarely been loved, they are 
increasingly perceived as 'bad actors' since the advent of the 2008/2009 global financial 
crisis (GFC). This has precipitated sweeping legislative changes to banking regulation in 
several jurisdictions, 9 and increased social pressure around the world for 'responsible' 
banking practices. Moreover, the GFC has impacted the viability of the banking industry in 
North America and Europe, with the result that even 'too big to fai l ' commercial and 
investment banks have merged, been taken over, or collapsed entirely. 10 G iven the adverse 
impact of the GFC on certain banks' financial stability and on public confidence in the 
industry generally, are banks able (let alone willing) to engage in climate change mitigation 
efforts? 
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) provides a ready gauge of industry concerns and 
opportunities on this issue. 11 Recent CDP reports 12 reveal that while some banks have been 
9 These jurisdictions include the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and 
Europe; and legislative changes (actual and threatened) are detailed in Chapter 7. 
10 Egs: BNP Paribas and Fortis merged to form 'BNP Parabis Fortis' in May 2009; ABN AMRO 
was bought out by Royal Bank of Scotland, Banco Santander and Fortis in 2007; and Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt and infamously collapsed entirely in 2008. 
11 The CDP comprises 551 international investors with combined assets over US$71 trillion. The 
CDP sends an annual information request questionnaire to nearly 6000 of the world's largest 
companies, requesting disclosure of their carbon output, carbon mitigation and management 
measures, and perceived climate risks and opportunities. Since 2009, resulting CDP reports have 
been divided into sector reports, which include the 'financials sector report' comprising responses 
from finance sector companies in the Global 500, S&P 500 and FTSE 350. The most recent report 
was published in 2011. See <http://www.cdproject.net>. 
12 Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), Carbon Disclosure Project 2009: Global 500 Report (CDP, 
London, 2009) (hereafter 2009 CDP Report); and Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), CDP Global 
500 Report 2011: Accelerating Low Carbon Growth (CDP, London, 2011) (hereafter 2011 CDP 
Report). 
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unwilling or unable to engage with climate change due to short-term market conditions, 13 
other banks recognise that climate change is near the top of their stakeholders' agendas for 
the long term, 14 and that it presents lucrative opportunities in carbon trading and renewable 
energy markets. 15 Moreover, banks that are cautious due to the GFC arc now more likely to 
conduct environmental, social and governance (ESG) due diligence to mitigate climate-
related risks. 16 Importantly, climate change may present an opportunity for banks to 'make 
good' in the wake of the GFC. 
Despite regulatory uncertainty on climate change at national and international levels, early-
moving private sector banks around the world are making voluntary climate-related 
changes to their business practices. There is clear importance in investigating the d1ivers of 
actions by these early-moving banks in order to theorise about implications for whole-of-
industry change, particularly about whether and how mainstreaming of 'enlightened' 
climate-related banking practices can best occur. This, in tum, has broader implications for 
industry, policy makers and the timely (or otherwise) global transition to a low-carbon 
economy. 
1.1 Objective, Scope and Aims of Study 
Objective and Scope of this study 
This dissertation contends that we need to better understand what drives the climate-related 
behaviour of banks given their importance to one of the biggest economic transitions for 
modern human society. What makes them 'tick' in relation to climate change? How can 
13 High-risk areas such as project finance and emerging-market investment have been impacted by 
the economic downturn. Eg, in 2009 the Royal Bank of Scotland Group declared that it would 
reduce its project finance transactions so that its risks "including those associated with climate 
change, will gradually diminish over the coming years": 2009 CDP Report, ibid, 90, 92. 
14 2011 CDP Report, above n 12, 43; 2009 CDP Report, ibid, 92. 
15 201] CDP Report, ibid, 42-43; 2009 CDP Report, ibid, 94. See also W Sun, J Stewart and D 
Pollard (eds), Reframing Corporate Social Re5ponsibility: Lessons.from the Global Financial Crisis 
(Critical Studies in Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability, v.1 , Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited, Bingley UK, 20 l 0). 
16 F Tung, 'Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate 
Governance' (2009) 57 UCLA Law Review 115, 121. The recent transformation of financial 
regulation in the USA will also affect private lenders' operations and monitoring procedures . 
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they help? Will they help of their own accord, or do they need regulatory enticements or 
even coercion? If regulatory intervention is required then what is its optimal form? 
This dissertation posits that we can ' follow the leader' by investigating early-moving banks 
that are leading on the issue of climate change. What are these banks doing about climate 
change and, more impo1tantly, why are they doing anything about it at all when they are not 
compelled to do so? Once drivers for the uptake of climate-related practices by leading 
banks can be identified, they might be leveraged to mobilise the industry as a whole. 
Accordingly, the central research question to this dissertation is: 
(1) Why are early-moving banks voluntarily making climate-related changes to their 
business practices? 
Two additional research questions contextualise and lend gravity to this central research 
question, namely: 
(2) How can banks assist climate change mitigation? Specifically: (a) what climate-
related business practices are being adopted hy early-moving banks; and (b) what 
is the facilitative potential of the industry as a whole? 
(3) What implications can be drawn from the .findings on research question (1) for: (a) 
the mainstreaming of 'enlightened' climate-related practices in the banking 
industry as a whole,· and (b) effective climate finance policy-making? 
By investigating these three research questions, the scope of this dissertation is necessarily 
contained. Specifically, this dissertation will focus on private sector banks not public banks 
such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) or World Bank. 17 'Private sector 
banks' include investment banks and brokerages, diversified commercial banks, private 
banks, and retail banks. The nature and activities of these banks are described in detail in 
17 Much has already been written on public banks and environmental sustainability. For a thorough 
list of sources see WL Thomas, 'The Green Nexus: Financiers and Sustainable Development' 
(2001) 13(4) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 899, 904 (n 12). 
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the next chapter. Also, this dissertation focuses on the potential of private sector banks to 
facilitate climate change mitigation not adaptation 18 recognising the urgent need to halt and 
reduce GHG emissions in order to stay within the 2°C guardrail. Nonetheless, the 
importance of mobilising finance for adaptation measures, particularly for developing 
countries, is acknowledged. Adaptation will become increasingly important as we approach 
the tipping point of dangerous global warming. 
Aims of this study 
Using Tracy' s categorisation of 'significant contribution' as a criterion for excellent 
qualitative research, 19 this dissertation seeks to make the following original contributions. 
First, it aims to be "theoretically significant" by bui I ding on past research and providing 
new conceptual understandings that emerge from the data analysis. 20 In particular, this 
dissertation seeks to contribute to scholarship in two spheres: business and law. 
ln relation to business scholarship, the empirical research and analysis in this dissertation is 
an effort to fill gaps in our knowledge about what motivates voluntary climate-related 
uptake by early-moving banks. Consequently, this dissertation endeavours to make 
contributions to two business literatures. First, the data and analysis aim to contribute to the 
business strategy literature by helping to unpack and clarify 'hard' and 'soft' factors that 
comprise the business case for climate-related uptake, with particular attention to the 
concept of ' reputation'. Second, the data and analysis aim to contribute to the business and 
society literature by helping to elucidate the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and ethical motivations on corporate behaviour, notions of legitimacy, and the self-
perceived role of banks in society. 
18 In brief , the difference between mitigation and adaptation is that mitigation focuses on reducing 
GHG emissions in order to slow and stop climate change, whereas adaptation focuses on altering 
human circumstances, services and products to acconunodate and minimise the impact of climate 
change on humans. 
19 SJ Tracy, 'Qualitative Quality: Eight 'Big-Tent' Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research' 
(20 L 0) 16(10) Qualitative lnqui1y 837, 845-6. 
20 !bid, 846. 
22 
Furthermore, this study aims to make a theoretically significant contribution to legal 
scholarship by using the empirical findings in combination with extant regulatory theory to 
provide recommendations for effective climate finance policy-making. Gunningham et al. 
note that environmental regulatory improvements can be made "when policy-makers have a 
detailed understanding of how and why firms go about addressing environmental issues".21 
Yet they also caution that: 
there is considerable uncertainty as to whether environmental regulation is 
successfully motivating enterprises or targeting the key environmental decision-
making ' pressure points' within them.22 
This dissertation intends to make recommendations for accurate leveraging of banks' 
'pressure points' by policy-makers and civil society. Jn this way, it is hoped that a 
"practically significant" contribution can also be made by this dissertation, specifically 
through phronetic research which enables "practical wisdom and space for 
transformation". 23 
Finally, this dissertation seeks to have "heuristic significance" by providing substantive and 
interesting suggestions for future research. 24 
1.2 Dissertation Structure 
The remainder of this chapter provides the background to this study. lt demonstrates the 
urgency of global climate change and outlines current legislative mechanisms for 
addressing climate change, showing that national and international regulation is variable 
and unce1tain. As such there is immediate need for a multi-sectoral approach to GHG 
emissions reductions, which includes not only governments but also cities, civil society, 
non-government organizations (NGOs), and the corporate sector. This chapter highlights 
the lack of attention to the finance sector's important role in assisting climate change 
21 N Gunningham, R Kagan, D Thornton, Shades of Green: Business, Regulation and Environment 
(Greenleaf, Sheffield, 2003), 2. 
22 !bid. 
23 Tracy, above n 19, 846. 
24 !hid. 
23 
mitigation, and hones in on the banking industry as the least-researched finance sector actor 
with this facilitative potential. 
Chapter 2 reveals the relationship between banks and climate change. It addresses Research 
Question 2: 'how can banks facilitate mitigation of corporate GHG emissions?' 1t starts by 
outlining the different types of banks and their function in a market economy before 
reviewing the current (but limited) literature on how climate change and banks impact each 
other, and describing the climate-related actions that early-moving banks are taking. It 
depicts risks and opportunities that climate change presents for banks, the most significant 
of which are indirect and relate to banks' unique business practices in risk mitigation, 
financing/investing, and brokering. Importantly, it postulates that the banking industry has 
'network change potential ' to facilitate climate change mitigation. That is, banks have 
influence on the GHG emissions of other corporate actors (clients and suppliers) via 
decision-making processes and product/market innovations. As such, 'enlightened' climate-
related banking industry practices have potential to facilitate exponential GHG emissions 
reductions through corporate networks in an ever-widening web. 
Chapter 3 provides theoretical background to Research Question 1: 'why are early-moving 
banks voluntarily adopting climate-related practices?' In so doing, it reviews relevant 
literature and theoretical approaches to 'why companies go green '. The literature is 
conceptualised ' trichotomously', using intra-organisational (micro), inter-organi sational 
(meso) and socio-cultural (macro) lenses of focus. This chapter posits that all three levels 
can provide insights about the internal and external influences on corporate environmental 
behavior. Focus at the mesa level is devoted to business case and CSR motivations for 
voluntary corporate change as presented in the business strategy and the business and 
society literatures. Attention is given to institutional theory at the macro level, particularly 
isomorphism and mimetic behavior as institutional processes of corporate change. Finally, 
the chapter reviews theories about micro level managerial deci sion-making as an internal 
driver of corporate behavioral change. The chapter concludes that there is little real 
understanding of what motivates banks to adopt climate-related strategies despite the 
plethora of theory about why companies do and should 'go green'. 
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Chapter 4 details the research methods used to address the research questions m this 
dissertation. It outlines why a qualitative research method was chosen for this study, and 
describes the theoretical framework which is informed by Layder's adaptive theory. lt also 
details the multiple case study design and data sources, and how data was collected and 
analysed. This chapter concludes by describing the practical or 'modest' approach taken to 
theory-testing and theory generation in this dissertation, which focuses on conceptual 
clarification and construction. 
The first of two empirical chapters is presented in Chapter 5. Using interview data, this 
chapter answers Research Question 1: 'why are early-moving banks voluntarily adopting 
climate-related practices?' First, it confinns the business strategy and 'it depends' 
literatures by evidencing that climate-related initiatives of early moving banks are driven by 
business case logic. Second, it informs the business strategy and business and society 
literatures by: (a) revealing a deeper and more complex conceptual understanding of 
corporate 'reputation' as a powerful 'soft' motivator of bank behaviour; and (b) elucidating 
the role of regulatory contexts (which includes government and civil society interventions) 
that shape bank decision-making of climate change as a risk or opportunity. Third, it 
disconfim1s the extant CSR literature that posits that ethical conceptions of ' doing the right 
thing' drive corporate greening. In so doing it informs the business and society literature by 
deconstructing the role and meaning of CSR as a non-driver of climate-related corporate 
change, and reveals important insights about the limited ability of CSR to mobilise 
corporate change in 'real life'. 
The second empirical chapter is presented in Chapter 6. This chapter answers the first part 
of Research Question 3 by considering the implications of the data and findings for 
mainstreaming of climate-related practices in the banking industry. Jt asks the following 
sub-questions: Is it likely that mainstreaming will occur given certain limitations to 
business case logic? If so, how might mainstreaming occur organically? And can 
mainstreaming occur fast enough and help take us far enough toward a low-carbon 
economy? This chapter evidences that climate-related changes by leading banks are 
conservative due to banks' obsession with enhancing and protecting client service 
reputation and profits, and the current limited size of clean energy markets. When this 
reality is combined with isomorphism theory, it is clear that mainstreaming through purely 
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voluntary means will be modest and incremental, not rapid and transformational. The 
chapter concludes that the 'network change potential' of the banking industry cannot be 
realized without something more. 
Chapter 7 provides recommendations and conclusions arising from the findings, extant 
theory and new concepts generated from the data. It begins by summarising the findings 
and theoretical contributions of this dissertation to business scholarship. Then the 
implications of the findings are discussed and recommendations are made for policymakers 
on 'climate finance' regulation. It is here that the second part of Research Question 3 is 
answered and the dissertation delivers theoretical and practical contributions to legal 
scholarship. Specifically, this dissertation recommends government intervention and 
canvasses both direct (coercive) bank regulation and indirect (nudging) climate regulation. 
The third section delivers the dissertation's heuristic significance by addressing the 
generalisability of the findings and considering fecund areas for further research. Final 
remarks are made in the fourth section, which concludes this dissertation. 
1.3 Background to this Study 
1.3.1 The Reality and Rapidity of Climate Change 
It is now known that our climate change trajectory is far beyond even the "worst case" 
scenario depicted by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Stem 
Review in 2007. 25 With GHG emissions increasing three times faster than initially 
predicted, 26 the 2009 Copenhagen Synthesis Report has emphasised that we are already 
25 The TPCC mapped out several cautious climate scenarios, with the 'worst-case' climate scenario 
based on C02 growth limited to a range of 2.0-2.5% per year: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007 (AR4) (IPCC, Geneva, 
2007) (hereafter IPCC AR4), 45. Similarly the Stem Review, released that same year, employed the 
second highest of the four scenarios as a model for assumptions about future emissions, for which it 
was criticized as being overly pessimistic: N Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern 
Review (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 2007), ch 6. 
26 This is due primarily to rapid development in China and India. See: R Gamaut, S Howes, F Jotzo 
and P Sheehan, 'Emissions in the Platinum Age: the Implications of Rapid Development for 
Climate-Change Mitigation' (2008) 24(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 377; Hepburn and 
Stern, above n 1, 263. 
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moving beyond "the patterns of natural variability within which contemporary society and 
economy have developed and thrived". 27 It is projected that at the current rate of GHG 
emissions, average global temperatures will rise by 5°C above pre-industrial level s by the 
end of the century. The results would be cataclysmic. 
Although we know that the planet has experienced previous extremes m climate, the 
difference now is that it is happening in a much shorter time frame and is human-
exacerbated. 28 As Weiner notes: "[t]he story of life is punctuated by Ice Ages, volcanic 
winters, meteoritic collisions, mass dyings. And at the moment it is punctuated by us."29 It 
is generally accepted that for some of the worst risks of climate change to be avoided, the 
average rise in global temperatures must be kept to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels. 30 This means that mitigation of climate change requires a more urgent and multi-
sectoral effort. 31 
1.3.2 A Multi-Sectoral Approach 
The most vis ible option for tackling climate change is nation-state negotiation of an 
international treaty beyond the Kyoto Protocol. However, this process has been s low and 
uncertain to date as exemplified by the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, 32 the 2010 Cancun 
27 International Scientific Congress, Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges & Decisions -
S(.nthes is Report (Copenhagen 2009, 10-12 March) (hereafter Copenhagen Synthesis Report), 6. 
2 There is scientific consensus that the ' natural ' greenhouse effect has been and is being 
exacerbated by anthropogenic activities: IPCC 2007 Synthesis Report, above n 1, 30, 39. This is 
due to human activity such as burning of fossil fuels, deforestation of large portions of the planet, 
massive expansion of modern agricultural methods, industrialisation of developed nations, rapid 
development of India and China, increasing world population and commensurate consumption of 
carbon-based products. 
29 Per Jonathan Weiner quoted in D Suzuki, The Sacred Balance: Rediscovering our Place in 
Nature (Oxford University Press, Vancouver, 1997), 143. 
:io Once global warming reaches a certain point, carbon uptake from the land and oceans begins to 
lessen and even break down so that more carbon is released to the atmosphere, which causes 
additional warming so that more carbon is released to the atmosphere, and so on in an unstoppable 
chain of positive feedback loops. 
31 Copenhagen Synthesis Report, above n 27, 6. 
32 A non-binding document: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of 
the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session. held in Copenhagen.from 7 to 19 December 
2009, FCCCICP/20091111 Add. I (30 March 2010), Decision 2/CP.15 (hereafter Copenhagen 
Accord). 
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agreements, 33 and the 2011 Durban Report, 34 none of which specify binding individual or 
aggregate emission reduction targets beyond 2013. Indeed the lack of progress in this 
regard has led some commentators to opine that "imperial dreams of a [top-down] global-
level comprehensive solution to climate change" are no longer realistic. 35 Attention is 
turning to more plural, decentralized approaches. 
In addition to climate-related actions of cities, NGOs and civil society, 36 focus has now 
turned to national/regional climate change regulation and the mitigation actions by the 
corporate sector. Even international bodies have acknowledged the need for nation-states to 
identify market-based opportunities to "enhance the cost-effectiveness of and to promote 
mitigation actions" at the national/regional levels. 37 
Currently, national and regional regulation comprises a narrow band of interventions which 
can be grouped broadly into four categories. 
1. Regulation that incentivises energy efficiency and investment in or usage of renewables. 
For example, the United Kingdom (UK) Low Carbon Transition Plan which includes up to 
£120 million investment in offshore wind and an additional £60 million in marine energy, 
33 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Report of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Sixth Session, held in 
Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/ Add. I ( 15 March 
2011), Decisions l/CMP.6 and 2/CMP.6 and Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Sixteenth Session, held in Cancun/ram 29 November to JO December 2010, 
FCCC/CP/201017/Add.l (15 March 2011) Decision l/CP.16 (hereafter Cancun agreements). 
34 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Report of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its seventh session. held in 
Durbanfrom 28 November to 11December2011, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.l (15 March 
2012), Decisions 1/-5/CMP.7 (hereafter Durban Report). 
35 EW Orts, 'Climate Contracts' (2011) 29 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 197, 234. Orts 
advocates for "non-comprehensive climate contracts" as a "less grand alternative forrn" to an 
overarching international agreement on climate change: 234. Orts also defines such contracts as the 
"many kinds of legal, economic and political agreements involving many institutions - not just 
nation states" such as non-profit organizations, business finns and consumer groups: 198. 
36 An excellent overview of climate actions by these entities is provided by Orts, ibid, 224-233. 
Specifically, cities are acting individually and collectively on climate change. For example, the 
Cities for Climate Protection Campaign is a prime example of collective action: it was launched out 
of the first Municipal Leaders Summit on Climate Change in 1993 and has been described as "the 
instrumental tool to initiate local mitigation and adaptation actions in both developed and 
developing countries": per International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives at 
<http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id'°'800> viewed 9 August 2012. 
'7 
' Copenhagen Accord, above n 32, item 7. 
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and the UK Renewable Energy Strategy which sets a legally-binding target of 15% of 
energy to come from renewable sources by 2020. 38 Government price support schemes 
such as feed-in-tariffs (FITs)39 and tax-credits40 are key measures to incentivise activity in 
renewables and low-carbon technologies. 
2. Regulation that mandates compulsory monitoring and reduction of internal corporate 
GHG emissions. For example, the Australian Energy Efficiency Opportunities Act 2006 
(Cth) pursuant to which corporate groups that use more than 0.5 petajoulcs of energy must 
assess and report publicly on their energy use and also implement identified energy saving 
. . 41 
opportumt1es. 
3. Regulation that discourages or prohibits intensive GHG-emitting projects. An example of 
the former is the 2007 majority resolution of the European Parliament that called for "the 
discontinuation of public [financial] support, via export credit agencies and public 
investment banks, for fossil fuel projects" .42 Prohibitive regulation is yet to fi nd favour 
with national governments. 
38 HM Government, The United Kingdom Renewable Energy Strategy (2009), 
<http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/uk%20energy%20supply/energy%20mix/ 
renewable%20energy/renewable%20energy%20strategy/ I_ 20090717 120647 _ e _@@_ theukrenewa 
bleenergystrategy2009.pdf> viewed 16 August 2012. See also Australia 's Renewable Energy Target 
(RET) which sets renewable energy generation at 20% of Australia's total electricity generation by 
2020: <http://www.orer.gov.au/lret-sres-updates/index.html> viewed 16 August 2012. 
39 FITs are a guaranteed price for generators of renewable electricity at a higher premium than 
energy produced from fossil fuel generators. Germany and Spain have adopted strong tariffs. 
Specifically, the German Renewable Energy Sources Act of 25 October 2008 (Federal Law Gazette 
I p. 2074) as last amended by the Act of 11August2010 (Federal Law Gazette Ip. 11 70) (hereafter 
Renewable Energy Sources Act 2008) applies feed-in tariffs to hydropower, landfill gas, sewage 
treatment, biomass, geothermal, wind, and solar photovoltaic and thermal: Renewable Energy 
Sources Act 2008, s 3(3). FITs are di scussed in detail in Chapters 5-7 below. 
40 The United States has introduced a production tax credit (PTC) and investment tax credit (ITC), 
which reduce the federal income taxes of qualified tax-paying owners of renewable energy projects: 
http://www. wri .org/publication/bottom-line-series-renewable-energy-tax-credits viewed 20 August 
2010. The American Recove1y and Reinvestment Act (2009) (Pub Law 111 -115), also known ac; the 
United States economic stimulus package, extends the duration of 30% tax credits for solar energy, 
fuel cells and microturbines to 2017 and establishes new 10% tax credits for small wind-energy 
systems, geothermal heat pumps, and combined heat and power systems. Tax credits arc discussed 
in detail in Chapters 5-7 below. 
41 Eligible corporations must be registered under the Energy Efficiency Opportunities Act 2006 
(Cth), which sets out assessment and implementation standards. 
42 European Parliament, Resolution of29 November 2007 on Trade and Climate Change 
(2007/2003(1NI)) at [29]. 
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4. Regulation that puts a price on carbon. The predominant mechanisms are carbon taxes 
and emissions trading schemes (ETS), with the latter being more conspicuous to date.43 The 
most active carbon market at the national/regional level is in Europe where the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) began in 2005. 44 Notably, the UK commenced 
a mandatory cap and trade scheme in April 201045 and Australia recently followed suit with 
an ETS set to commence in 2015.46 Equivocation remains in a number of other jurisdictions 
at the federal level, including the United States of America (USA). 47 
There are benefits and shortcomings of these national/regional regulatory mechanisms. A 
clear benefit is their impact upon the corporate sector to penalise high GHG-emitting 
behavior and incentivise low carbon initiatives. This is important because the corporate 
sector is not only a major emitter of GHGs but also has the capacity to invest in mitigation 
technologies. However, a conspicuous shortcoming is that national/regional climate change 
43 ETSs are specified in the Kyoto Protocol as a means to assist Parties' implementation of their 
reduction targets: Kyoto Protocol, above n 2, art 17. Scandinavian nations have the most extensive 
energy taxes: A Bruvoll and BM Larsen, 'Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Norway: Do Carbon Taxes 
Work?' (2004) 32(4) Energy Policy 493, 493. In 2001, the United Kingdom also introduced a tax 
on non-renewable energy consumed by the public sector and industry: The Climate Change Levy 
(General) Regulations 2001 No 838 (United Kingdom). 
44 The EU ETS moves into Phase III in 2013-2020 with more stringent emissions targets to keep on 
track for a 60%-80% reduction by 2050: 
<http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/emissions/eu _ ets/phase _iii/phase _iii.aspx> viewed 20 
August 2012. 
45 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme targets low energy-intensive users and covers both public 
and private sector organizations to affect 25% of total business sector emissions within the United 
Kingdom. The new UK Scheme will not capture emissions that have been captured by the EU ETS 
and Climate Change Agreements. See 
<http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_ we _do/lc _ uk/crc/crc.aspx> viewed 15 August 2012. 
46 Australia's Clean Energy Legislative Package commences on l July 2012 as a carbon tax before 
becoming an ETS on 1 July 2015. The package comprises the following federal Acts: Clean Energy 
Act 2011 (as amended by the Clean Energy Legislation Amendment Act 2012), Clean Energy 
Regulator Act 2011, Climate Change Authority Act 2011, and the Clean Energy (Consequential 
Amendments) Act 2011. For procedural legislative changes that deal with the way in which charges 
are paid under the mechanism, see: <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/en/govemment/clean-
energy-future/legislation.aspx> viewed 14 August 2012. New Zealand's ETS commenced two years 
earlier on 1 July 2010: see Climate Change Response Act 2002 and Climate Change Response 
(Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008. The NZ ETS will cover all sectors and all GHGs by 
2015: <http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/about/intemational-
examples.html> viewed 16 August 2012. 
47 Cap and trade regulation has been enacted at the state-local level in California, Colorado, Florida, 
New Jersey and New York. For climate-related efforts at the state-local government levels, see 
Orts, above n 35, 221-223. 
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regulation is still emerging and quite variable, with some jurisdictions yet to legislate a 
carbon price and/or inccntivise low-carbon technologies. 
Moreover, existing climate policy that targets the corporate sector tends to either regard that 
sector as an aggregated whole or to focus specifically on carbon intense actors, such as 
fossil fuel, manufacturing, transport and chemical industries.48 Far Jess attention has been 
given to the role of intermediary financial corporate actors, such as private sector banks, as 
facilitators of climate change mitigation. 
1.3.3 The Finance Sector, Sustainable Development and Climate 
Change 
The finance sector is comprised of the insurance (including re-insurance), asset 
management (including institutional investment), and banking industries. 49 Historically this 
sector has not been recognised by the academy or policy-makers as relevant to climate 
change. 50 The finance sector has minimal direct environmental impact: it does not engage 
in extractive or manufacturing activity or produce high-polluting services and products. 51 
Nonetheless, in recent years it has become apparent that the finance sector is impacted by 
climate change and has a key role to play in a low-carbon economic transition. 52 As 
48 Chung and Parker also make this point in relation to environmental strategy and reporting 
research: LH Chung and LD Parker, 'Integrating Hotel Environmental Strategics with Management 
Control: a Structuration Approach ' (2008) 17 Business Strategy and the Environment 272, 272. 
49 Worldwide Fund for ature (WWF) and Allianz, Climate Change and the Financial Sector: An 
Agenda for Action (lead authors: A Dlugolecki and S Lafeld) (WWF and Allianz, Gland, 
Switzerland, 2005) (hereafter WWF/ Allianz). 
50 The dearth of finance sector and climate change material within the academy has been noted by: 
M MacLeod, Forging Private Governance of Climate Change: The Power and Politics of Socially 
Responsible Investment, (Oikos, Oikos PhD summer academy, 2007) (cited with author approval); 
M Macleod, 'Book Review: R. Falkner "Business Power and Conflict in International 
Environmental Politics" (2008)' (2009) 37(3) Millennium: Journal of International Studies 813; P 
Dobers and R Wolff, 'Competing With 'Soft ' Issues - From Managing The Environment To 
Sustainable Business Strategies' (2000) 9 Business Strategy and the Environment 143; 
WWF/Allianz, above n 49. 
51 The FTSE4Good index rates the finance sector in the mid-impact socio-environmental category: 
C Lins, DWajnberg, U Steger and A fonescu-Somers, Corporate Sustainability in The Brazilian 
Banking Sector (IMD International, IMO 2008-07, Lausanne, 2008), 10. 
52 This is largely due to industry reports on the subject. The seminal WWF/Allianz report was one 
of the first publications to comprehensively address the relevance of the finance sector to climate 
change and give concrete examples of business initiatives that some financial leaders were 
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highlighted by Lord Stern, financial institutions have a "central role" to play in climate 
change efforts because "reducing emissions and adjusting to climate change involve 
investment and ri sk". 53 
The role of financial capital in climate change mitigation becomes clear by examining its 
relevance to sustainable development and 'the environment' more generally. Financial 
support for projects and technological innovation will almost always have environmental 
effects of some kind whether adverse or beneficial. 54 Richardson provides a useful 
appraisal of how the finance sector impacts upon environment and sustainable development 
generally, noting that wholesale decisions regarding future development arise in the finance 
sector and as such this is where future pressures on the environment begin. 55 He opines 
that: " [i]f sustainable development is understood to imply, among other things, 
maintenance of natural and human-made capital for posterity, the role of capital markets 
must be recognised as pivotal to this goal."56 
Indeed, the concept of 'sustainable development' was created from the realisation that 
economic growth and environmental degradation are interrelated within a globalised 
implementing: WWF/Allianz, above n 49. United Nations Environment Programme Finance 
Initiative (UNEPFT) publications have further elucidated the connection: United Nations 
Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI), Climate Change and the Financial Services 
Industry: Threats and Opportunities (UNEPFI, Geneva, 2002); United Nations Environment 
Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI), CEO Briefing: Carbon Crunch: Meeting the Cost (UNEPFI, 
Geneva, December 2007a) ; United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI), 
Green Financial Products and Services: Current Developments and Future Opportunities in North 
America (UNEPFI, Geneva, 2007b); United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative 
(UNEPFI), Climate Change Working Group, Adaptation and Vulnerability to Climate Change: The 
Role of the Finance Sector (UNEPFI, Geneva, 2006); and United Nations Environment Program 
Finance Initiative (UNEPFl) , Climate Change and the Financial Services Industry: Threats and 
Opportunities (UNEPFJ, Geneva, 2002). See also P Mudde and A Abadie, From Principle to 
Action: an Analysis of the Financial Sector's Approach to Addressing Climate Change (Sustainable 
Finance Ltd, London, 2008). 
53 per Lord Stem quoted in UNEPFl 2007a, ibid, 2. 
54 BJ Richardson, 'Sustainable Finance: Environmental Law and Financial Institutions' in BJ 
Richardson and S Wood (eds) Environmental Law for Sustainahility (Hart Publishing, Oxford UK, 
2006) 310. Richardson notes that markets play a vital role even in a 'strong' version of 
sustainability (which eschews substitution of human for natural capital) by influencing the demand 
and price for, and hence exploitation of, natural capital. 
55 Ibid, 309. 
56 Ibid. 
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world. 57 The World Commission on Environment and Development provided the standard 
formulation of the term 'sustainable development' being development that "meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs". 58 This term acknowledges that 'new' environmental problems, such as climate 
change, are global concerns that require concerted multi-sectoral effort and innovation to 
solve. As stated in the Brundtland Report: "[ e ]conomics and ecology bind us in ever-
tightening networks."59 
Importantly, the United Nations General Assembly declared sustainable development to be 
a guiding principle for private sector organisations, not just governments. 60 This call was 
answered by 30 banks working with the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to 
create the "Statement by Banks on the Environment and Sustainable Development" prior to 
the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. 61 Three years later the number of signatories had grown to 74 
banks, and in May 1997 the statement was revised to become the "UNEP Statement by 
Financial Institutions on the Environment & Sustainable Development", which embraced a 
broader membership of 'financial institutions'. 62 Since 2011 it has been re-titled the 
"UNEP Statement of Commitment by Financial Institutions (Fl) on Sustainable 
57 Also poverty and population growth: M Jeucken, Sustainability in Finance: Banking on the 
Planet (Eburon Delft, Netherlands, 2004), 2. 
58 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, 
transmitted to the General Assembly as an Annex to document A/421427 - Development and 
International Co-operation: Environment (1987) (hereafter the Brundtland Report). The Brundtland 
Report definition of 'sustainable development ' was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly: United Nations General Assembly Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (NRES/42/187) 11December1987. The World Commission on Environment and 
Development, also known as the Brundtland Commission after its Chair Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
was established by General Assembly Resolution NRES/38/ 161 19 December l 983, with the 
mandate to research and submit a repoit "on environment and the global problematique to the year 
2000 and beyond, including proposed strategies for sustainable development": A/RES/42/ 187 ( 11 
Dec 1987). 
59 Brundtland Report, ibid, ch 1, par 4 . Indeed, some commentators stress the importance of 
sustaining the environment as a pre-condition for economic activity as well as the survival of 
humankind. See eg Jeucken, above n 57; RA Bucholz, 'Corporate Responsibility and the Good 
Society: From Economics to Ecology' ( 1991) 34( 4) Business Horizons 19, 29-31. 
60 United Nations General Assembly Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, above n 58. 
61 S Schmidheiny and F Zorraquin, Financing Change: The Financial Community, Eco-Efficiency 
and Sustainable Development (MIT Press, Cambridge MA, l 996), 106. 
62 !bid. 
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Development" (hereafter UNEP Finance Statement on Sustainability)63 and there are now 
over 200 signatories. 64 
All members of the UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEPFI) must adhere to the UNEP Finance 
Statement on Sustainability, which " represents the backbone" of UNEPF!.65 Specifically, 
signatories " regard financial institutions as an important contributor towards sustainable 
development". 66 In so doing, signatories acknowledge that "economic development needs 
to be compatible with human welfare and a healthy environment'' and they are "committed 
to working cooperatively (with government, business, individuals] toward common 
sustainability goals." 67 The UNEP Finance Statement on Sustainability expressly 
recognises climate change in its sustainability commitments. 68 
Specifically, finance sector actors can play at least three roles in relation to climate 
change. 69 First, they are capital providers that supply or facilitate finance for GHG intense 
projects as well as clean technology initiatives. Secondly, they act as valuers that price risks 
and predict company profitability and investment preferences in an increasingly carbon-
constrained world. Thirdly, they are lenders and shareholders that exercise influence over 
corporate management and climate-related corporate governance. Actions and decisions 
taken (or not taken) by finance sector industries will impact on climate change either to 
facilitate reduction of GHG emissions or to assist their increase. 
63 The UNEP Finance Statement on Sustainability is available at 
<http ://www.unepfi.org/statements/statement/index.html> viewed 19 May 2012. Explicit mention 
of the 'environment ' has been excised from the current title and the text. 
64 See <http://www. unepfi .org/signatorics/index.html> viewed 19 May 2012. 
65 See <http://www.unepfi.org/statements/indcx.html> viewed 19 May 2012. 
66 UNEP Finance Statement on Sustainability, above n 63 , item 1.3. Whilst the text has been 
changed in several pl aces from the original statement, it appears to retain the original sentiment, 
namely that the finance sector/banks commit to sustainable development in their business practices 
(items 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 2 .1 - 2.6), to developing products and services that promote sustainable 
development (item 2.7), publishing statements of their own environmental and social po licy and 
implementation (item 3.1) and, through the sharing ofinfonnation and knowledge, encourage 
customers (item 3.2) and other financial institutions (3.5) to strengthen their own capacity to 
promote sustainable development. 
67 Ibid, preamble. 
68 
"We recognize that the sustainable development agenda is becoming increasingly inter-linked 
with humanitarian and social issues as the global environment agenda broadens and as climate 
change brings greater developmental and security challenges": ibid, item 1.5. 
69 This is adapted from Richardson's categorisation in the context of cnvirorunental management 
more generally: Richardson, above n 54, 309. 
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International and industry bodies are increasingly recognising the relevance of the finance 
sector to climate change 70 despite the Jack of attention by academics and policymakers. 
Most attention by these bodies has centred on insurers and institutional investors. As early 
as 1995 leading insurers around the world were speaking openly of the threat of bankruptcy 
due to unpredicted and unmanageable catastrophic losses from wild weather. 71 They are 
among the first to be impacted by climate change due to risks they accept as underwriters 
and investors of premiums. 72 The industry is now advocating a preference for adaptation 
by, for example, recalibrating premiums to reduce risk exposure and collaborating with 
governments to ensure construction quality and sound land use planning. 73 
Institutional investors on the other hand have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of 
members by maximizing returns. As such, they are being urged to consider the long-term 
implications of climate change on investment decisions by using socially responsible 
investment (SRI) strategies.74 Some commentators have also highlighted how institutional 
investors might leverage corporate governance changes that emphasise good environmental 
70 It has been recognised by the IPCC, the Carbon Disclosure Project, and the United Nations 
Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI) Climate Change Working Group. See eg: 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group II, Climate Change 200i: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (IPCC, Geneva, 2001), ch 8 ' Insurance and Other Financial 
Services'; 2009 CDP Report, above n 12, 94; United Nations Environment Program Finance 
Initiative (UNEPFI), Declaration on Climate Change by the Financial Services Sector (June 2007), 
available at <http://www.unep.org/pdf/CC_Statement_for%20launch_June4.pdf> viewed 21 April 
2012; UNEPFI 2006, above n 52; and UNEPFI 2002, above n 52. 
71 SC Jagers and J Stripple 'Climate Governance Beyond the State' (2003) 9 Global Governance 
385, 390. 
72 A Dlugolecki, 'Climate Change and the Insurance Sector' (2008) 33 Geneva Papers on Risk and 
Insurance: Issues and Practice 71. See also M Paterson, 'Risky Business: Insurance Companies in 
Global Warming Politics' (2001) 1(4) Global Environmental Politics 18. 
73 See eg: WWF/Allianz, above n 49, 27-28, 31; E Mills, 'A Global Review of Insurance Industry 
Responses to Climate Change' (2009) 34(3) Geneva Papers on Risk and insurance: Issues and 
Practice 323; C Herweijer , N Ranger and RET Ward, ' Adaptation to Climate Change: Threats and 
Opportunities for the Insurance Industry' (2009) 34(3) Geneva Papers on Risk and insurance: 
issues and Practice 360; and J Linnerooth-Bayer, K Warner, C Bals, P Hoppe, I Burton, T Loster 
and A Haas, 'Developing Countries and Climate Change' (2009) 34(3) Geneva Papers on Risk and 
insurance: Issues and Practice 381. 
74 See eg: Macleod, above n 50; BJ Richardson, 'Climate Finance and its Governance: Moving to a 
Low Carbon Economy Through Socially Responsible Financing?' (2009) 58(3) international & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 597; BJ Richardson, Socially Responsible investment Law: Regulating 
the Unseen Polluters (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008); and A Harmes, 'The Limits of 
Carbon Disclosure: Theorizing the Business case for Investor Environmentalism' (2011) 11 (2) 
Glohal Environmental Politics 98. 
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management and GHG mitigation strategies. 75 The potential of this influence is due, in part, 
to the enormous wealth holdings of institutional investors and their status as universal 
owners with di verse stock portfolios. 76 
Yet, little attention has been given to the banking industry and its connection to climate 
change. This oversight is curious given that the role of banks in facilitating sustainable 
development generally has been recognised. 77 This gap is detailed in the next section. 
1.3.4 The Banking Industry: Unanswered Questions 
Where the connection between banks and climate change has been identified, there has 
been a twofold focus. First, emphasis has been placed on the role of banks as implementers 
of government policy by financially supporting Kyoto Protocol projects and facilitating 
trading of Certified Emission Reductions. 78 Secondly, there has been growing discourse on 
banks as autonomous business entities that need to minimise risks and maximise 
oppmtunities created by climate change. 79 Recent reports have evinced that more banks 
need to alter their operations to integrate climate change-related practices, 80 yet 
75 C St Anne, 'Super Funds Have Role in Climate Change', !nvestorDaily (27 March 2007) ; Tung, 
above n 16. 
76 Eg, in 2005 total assets of institutional investors in the OECD area amounted to more than 
US£40.3 trillion or, in context, 162.6% over OECD GDP that year; and financ ial assets of US 
institutional investors in 2007 equated to 211.2% over US GDP: E Gonnard, E Jung Kim and 1 
Ynesta, Financial Market Trends: Recent Trends in Institutional Investors Statistics (OECD, Paris, 
2008), 3-4. 
77 Egs: UNEP Finance Statement on Sustainability, above n 63; Jeucken, above n 57; M Jeucken, 
Sustainable finance and banking: the financial sector and the .future of the planet (Earthscan, 
London, 2001); JJ Bouma, M Jeucken and L Klinkers (eds), Sustainable Banking: The Greening of 
Finance (Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, 200 I); Schmidhciny and Zorraquin, above n 61; Thomas, 
above n 17; and Lins et al, above n 51. 
78 Thomas, ibid, 924-937; J Janssen, ' Implementing The Kyoto Mechanisms: Potential 
Contributions by Banks and lnsurance Companies' (2000) 25 Geneva Papers on Risk and 
Insurance 602; J Mandt, 'Managing Risk in Kyoto Projects' ( 1999) 1 (2) Environmental Finance 23; 
UNEPFT 2005 , above n 52; J Lin and C Streck C, 'Mobilising Finance for Climate Change 
Mitigation: Private Sector Involvement in International Carbon Finance Mechanisms ' (2009) 10(1) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 70; and P Newell and M Paterson, Climate Capitalism: 
Global Warming and the Tran.~formation of the Global Economy (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 20 10). 
79 WWF/Allianz, above n 49. 
80 Mudde and Abadie, above n 52. 
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documentation of actual practices or industry trends remains limited to date. 81 
Many questions regarding climate change and banks remam unanswered. For example, 
what is the relevance of climate change to the banking industry and vice versa? How can 
banks facilitate mitigation of corporate GHG emissions? What are pro-active or early-
moving banks doing about climate change? Of the banks that are making changes, why are 
they doing so? What would it take for the industry to mobilise en masse? What are the 
implications for policy-making and the shift to a low-carbon economy? 
This is a new area of inquiry with many of the positive actions taken by proactive banks 
occurring only since 2006/2007 "especially in regard to disclosures, internal emissions 
management and financial support for clean energy". 82 The lack of literature is redolent of 
poor understanding by industry and regulators of the role that banks can play in mitigating 
climate change and facilitating the shift towards a low-carbon global economy. This gap is 
remedied in the next chapter. 
81 Two recent reports have evaluated and ranked the world's largest banks on the strength of their 
climate-related practices: DG Cogan, Corporate Governance and Climate Change: The Banking 
Sector (Ceres, San Francisco, 2008) (hereafter Ceres Report); and B Furrer, M Swoboda, V 
Hoffman, Banking & Climate Change: Stumh/ing into Momentum? An Analysis of Climate 
Strategies in more than JOO Banks Worldwide (SAM, ETH, ZHA W, 2009) (hereafter SAM Rep011). 
Findings of these reports are elucidated in Chapter 2. However, both reports have limitations: their 
data pre-dates the GFC; and they do not investigate drivers for early mover banks or the prospects 
for whole-of-industry uptake. 
82 Ceres Report, ibid, i. Indeed, the Ceres Report, published in January 2008, was the " first-ever" 
ranking of big banks on climate change: CSR wire, 'Press Release: HSBC, Other European Banks to 
Receive Top Scores in First-Ever Ranking of 40 Leading Banks on Climate Change Strategies' , 
CSRwire ( l I January 2008). 
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Chapter 2 Climate Change and Banks: A 
Unique Relationship 
2.0 Overview 
The Introduction pinpointed the finance sector as a little-considered intennediary actor with 
an important role in facilitating GHG mitigation strategies. Specifically, this dissertation 
focuses on the banking industry as the least-researched finance sector actor that has 
potential to facilitate GHG emissions reductions and the transition to a low-carbon global 
economy. 
Accordingly, this chapter asks 'how can banks facilitate mitigation of corporate GHG 
emissions?' It begins by outlining the activities and various types of banks, and their role in 
a market economy. Then it reviews the current (but limited) literature on the relationship 
between climate change and banks, and focuses on climate-related actions that early-
moving banks are taking. It also touches upon the question of why early moving banks are 
motivated to engage with climate change. However it will become apparent that the 'why' 
aspect is merely glimpsed in the limited literature. This gap is addressed in subsequent 
theoretical and empirical chapters. 
2.1 The 'Money-Go-Round': Types and Functions of 
Private Sector Banks 
The previous chapter outlined the intermediary role of the finance sector, which comprises 
the banking industry. Yet, of all the finance sector actors, banks in particular have been 
termed "the most important financial intermediaries in the economy". 83 This is due to two 
83 Jeucken, above n 77, 56. 
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intermediating bank activities that help to perpetuate properly functioning markets. First, 
banks bring together and link savings and investments (money as an asset) and lenders and 
borrowers (equity capitalisation). 84 Doing so promotes an increased flow of funds because 
savers (households, businesses and governments) can structure their savings according to 
their needs in order to create wealth, which then provides an increased pool of investment 
capital that can be used, again, by households, businesses and governments to increase the 
productive capacity of an economy and so generate economic growth. 85 Secondly, banks 
play an important role in allocating money across industry sectors, which indirectly 
influences the nature of economic growth. 86 Accordingly, Jeucken notes that the influence 
of banks on the economy is not only quantitative but also qualitative. 87 
In order to carry out these functions, multiple types of private sector banks exist. Table 2. 1 
summarises and classifies the activities of different types of private sector financial 
institutions, which includes banks. However, it must be acknowledged that borders between 
activities are often blurred for the reasons described below. 
In classifying activities, it is useful to distinguish between two broad groupings of financial 
institutions, being 'depository' and 'non-depository'. 88 Depository institutions create 
money by lending out large sums of the funds entrusted to them in the form of loans and 
mortgages. There are several main sub-categories of depository institution. Predominantly 
they are 'commercial banks', 'retail banks' and/or ' private banks', which use funds to 
extend loans to large corporate clients and/or civil society customers and/or wealthy private 
individuals. They distribute profits back to shareholders. Depository institutions also 
include: 'mutual savings banks', which specialise in attracting savings and extending home 
financing, and distribute surplus profits to customers; and ' cooperative banks' and 'credit 
unions', which are owned by their members and focus on providing credit to customers and 
retaining any profits. 
84 Ibid, 56-7. 
85 OS Kidwell , M Brimble, A Basu, L Lenten, and D Thomson, Financial Markets, Institutions & 
Money (John Wiley, Milton Australia, 2011), 6-7. 
86 Jeucken, above n 77, 55. 
87 Ibid, 52 
88 Ibid, 53-54. See also: A Saunders, Financial Institutions Management: A Modern Perspective 
(McGraw-Hill, Boston MA, 2000), 2-83 ; and RG Hubbard, Money and the Financial System and 
the Economy (Addison-Wesley Publishing, New York, 1994), 272-296. 
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In contrast, non-depository institutions do not create money; they finance their activities 
through client fees and by issuing shares, bonds and other securities. There are three main 
sub-categories of private sector non-depository institution. 89 First, 'securities market 
institutions ' arc involved in capital market transactions and advisory services with large 
corporate clients, institutional investors, and governments. These include investment banks, 
brokers, and traders. Secondly, 'investment institutions' invest in higher-risk securities and 
loans than commercial and retail banks usually find acceptable. These include mutual 
funds, and also finance companies (including venture capital). And thirdly, there ex ist non-
depository institutions, which include ' contractual savings institutions', namely insurers 
and pension funds. 
These areas of activity are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, by reason of conglomeration 
(which was popular pre-GFC) and merging and acquisition (popular post-GFC), many large 
banks are involved in multiple areas concomitantly. Some banks specialise in certain 
activities only. For example, Morgan Stanley was a pure investment bank until 2008 at 
which time it restructured into a hybrid commercial and investment bank; it does not 
engage in retail banking. Conversely, some banks are involved in all of the above areas. 
These are known as ' universal banks ' and are typically organi zed around three main 
clusters of activity being retail banking, investment banking, and asset management. 90 
Notable examples include HSBC, Deutsche Bank, and Credit Suisse. 
89 Public multilateral banks and governmental financial institutions are also non-depository 
institutions: Jeucken, above n 77, 54. 
90 ibid. They may also be involved in insurance and/or leasing. 
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Table 2.1 Classification and Activities of Different Types of Private Sector Financial Institutions91 
Depository Institutions Non-depository Institutions 
Services Commercial Retail banks Private Investment Mutual Finance Pension Insurance 
banks banks banks funds companies funds companies 
Transaction x x x 
accounts 
Savinqs x x x x x x 
Consumer x x x x 
(civil society) 
lending 
Corporate x x x 
lendinq 
Project x x x x 
finance 
Mortqaqes x x x x 
Commodities x x x x 
trading 
Asset x x x x x x 
manaqement 
Insurance x 
91 Table adapted from Jcucken, above n 77, 62. 
By appreciating the key functions and various types of private sector banks, their effect on 
" the development and direction of the economy" 92 becomes clear. Through their different 
incarnations as retail, investment, commercial and/or private banks, they tran.~form money 
in market economies. They do this not only by scale and risk, but also by time (short term 
versus long term investments), by space (such as allocating money to a borrower in 
Indonesia from a lender in New York) and even by temporality (facilitating money 
transfe1nl between generations). In other words, if money makes the world go round, then 
banks help to make the money go round. 
For these reasons, the intermediating decisions by banks about where money (as an asset, 
debt or equity) comes from and where it flows to via sourcing, allocation, and advisory 
processes, make banks key to any discussion about climate change mitigation and the shift 
to a low-carbon economy. In short, due to their unique business practices and their 
influential role on other corporations, banks have 'network change potential ' to facilitate 
climate change mitigation. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to evidencing and 
exploring thi s contention. 
Table 2.2 summari ses the relationship between banks and climate change. lt depicts risks 
and opportunities that climate change presents for banks, the most significant of which are 
indirect and relate to banks' unique business practices m risk mitigation, 
lending/financing/investing, and brokering. lt also identifies banks' influence on the 
business practices and GHG emissions of other corporate actors (clients and suppliers) via 
deci sion-making processes and product/market innovations. This table is elaborated upon in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 that follow. 
92 !bid, 52. 
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Table 2.2 Climate Change and the Banking litdustry: Mutual Impacts93 
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE IMPACTS OF BANKS 
CHANGE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
ON BANKS 
DIRECT Asset damage Own (internal) emissions 
INDIRECT 
On corporate clicnls: Through corporate cl icnls and 
suppliers: 
{ 
• companies vulnerable lo • bank decision making processes: 
climate change (wild weather); -··climate risk" a~sessmcnts; 
Risk creating •high GHG emilting companies - financing, lending and investing: 
(govcrnmcnl regulation and GHG intense projects vs renewables 
market preferences). and low-carbon tech. 
{ • innovative climate-related • new market entry and brokering Opportunity products and services. opportunities. creating • new lucrative markets. • c limate-related products and 
services. 
2.2 Banks' Business Practices and Climate Change 
In summary, the unique business practices of banks enable them to be important climate 
actors and to influence climate change outcomes in three main ways. First, they assess ESG 
risk to which banks are vulnerable from clients and investments. As awareness of the 
impacts of climate change increases, banks are broadening their risk assessments to include 
'climate risk', which comprises credit, investment, reputation and litigation risk. Early 
moving banks have responded to climate risk by enhancing due diligence processes and 
reducing the emissions rate of their energy-lending portfolios.94 Second, banks are capital 
providers that supply or facilitate finance for GHG intense projects as well as clean 
technology initiatives. The role of banks in mitigating climate and environmental 
degradation through financing decisions is recognised in certain international soft law 
codes, namely the Equator Principles, the Carbon Principles, and the Climate Principles. 
93 Table from M Bowman, 'The Role of the Banking Industry in Facilitating Climate Change 
Mitigation and the Transition to a Low-Carbon Global Economy' (20 I 0) 27 Environmental and 
Planning law Journal 448, 452. 
94 Eg, Bank of America, Climate Change, at <http://environment.bankofamerica.com/policies-and-
practices/climate-change.html> viewed 19 August 2012. 
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Third, banks are brokers or 'middlemen ' in lucrative global carbon markets and 
renewable/low-carbon technology investments. Early moving banks are already active in 
these markets. 
2.2.1 Banks as Risk Assessors and Risk Managers 
Given their relatively low environmental impact, banks are not directly vulnerable to 
climate-related risks. However, the ESG-related activities of clients and investments expose 
banks to indirect risk. Since the 1980s banks have had to consider 'environmental risk ' in 
lending, investing and fi nance decisions due to legal obligations that created lender liabi lity 
for contaminated land. 95 For examp le, application of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act 198096 (CERCLA or Superfund) in the USA 
triggered a number of high-profile court cases in which some banks were held liable for 
cleanup costs of contaminated land, even though they did not "own" the land for the 
purposes of the Act. 97 Other OECD countries have similarly introduced tough 
environmental legislation that mandates strict liability for contamination. 98 As awareness of 
the impacts of climate change increases, banks' are broadening their risk assessm ent and 
management to include ' climate risk'. This includes ' regulatory risk ' and ' material climate 
ri sks ' . Neuhoff defines the former as uncertainty about the level of stringency and the exact 
rules under which carbon markets and related policy might be implemented. 99 Regulatory 
risk is the most difficul t risk for companies to mitigate. ' Material climate ri sk ' on the other 
hand, can be more readily managed and mitigated ~ it includes credit, investment, reputation 
and litigation risks, each of which are detailed below. 
95 Thomas, above n 17, 905. 
96 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 1980 (US) Pub L No 
96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (hereafter CERCLA). 
97 For a discussion of CERCLA li tigation, see JR Burcat, 'Environmental Liabil ity of Creditors: 
Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and Other Deep Pockets (1986) 103 Banking Law Journal 509. 
98 However, there are usually exceptions for secured creditors not involved in corporate operations. 
For nation-speci fic lender liabi li ty regulation, sec Richardson 2008 , above n 74, 35 1-352. 
99 K Neuhoff, ' Investment Decisions Under Climate Policy Uncertainty: Based On Workshop 
Discussions And Interviews With Sector Participants' (University Of Cambridge Working Paper, 
Electricity Policy Research Group, 6 July 2007), 2. 
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Material climate risk includes credit and investment risk from companies that are exposed 
to increased regulatory pressure and to changes in market demand. 100 Two categories of 
corporations create credit risk for financiers. 101 First, organisations that are in 'climate-
vulnerable' sectors such as real estate, agriculture, forestry and tourism, 102 which are 
directly affected by wild weather. Secondly, intensive GHG-emitting corporations in 
sectors such as oil, gas, coal, heavy manufacturing and transport that are competitively 
affected by government policies that put a price on carbon, such as carbon taxes 103 and 
ETSs. 104 This latter group also presents investment risks to banks that are equity investors 
for two reasons. First, companies that are competitively disadvantaged in the market due to 
increased costs from climate change will produce lower investment and shareholder 
returns. 105 Secondly, increasing litigation against GHG intensive industries detrimentally 
affects market confidence in those companies. 106 The key for banks is to explicitly 
internalise climate change into credit and investment ri sk assessments. 107 
Changing market factors also create credit risk. For example, in February 2010, the United 
States (US) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released the world's first guidance 
on climate change disclosures that public companies should provide in financial filings. 108 
100 Mudde and Abadie, above n 52, 5. See also Newell and Paterson, above n 78, 43-44, 71-73. 
101 WWF/ Allianz, above n 29, 33. Credit risk can be defined as "the risk of non-payment or non-
timely payment of the principal or interest of a loan by the borrower to the lender": Mudde and 
Abadie, ibid, 27. 
102 And even the oil industry, with Richardson noting that many refineries in Louisiana were shut 
down due to the impacts of Hurricane Katrina in 2005: Richardson 2009, above n 74, 604. 
103 An increase in tax burdens can impact upon cash flows and reduce a company's ability to service 
its loans. 
104 A 2009 empirical study into the pricing effects of an Australian ETS indicated that the stock 
market would penalise companies with the highest carbon emission outputs, making the ETS an 
important risk management issue: ' Pricing the Market' Australian Financial Review BOSS (March 
2009), 53. 
105 D Austin and A Sauer, Changing Oil: Emerging Environmental Risks and Shareholder Value in 
the Oil and Gas Industry (World Resources Institute, Washington DC, 2002). 
106 To date there have been several public nuisance actions in North America against power 
companies and automobile manufacturers alleging they are liable for creating climate change. Eg, 
Lockyer v General Motors No 3: 06. Civ 05755 (ND California, filed 20 September, 2006) in which 
six vehicle manufacturers were sued in tort by the State of California for allegedly causing public 
nui sance and injury to it due to GHG emissions from the manufacturers' vehicles. For further cases, 
see: WWF/ Allianz, above n 49, 3 J, 34; Richardson 2009, above n 74, 604 (nn 34-40); and 
Dlugolecki, above n 72, 79. 
107 Mudde and Abadie, above n 52, 26-34. 
108 United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 'Press Release: SEC Issues 
Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Related to Business or Legal Developments Regarding Climate 
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1t does not create new legal requirements but extends existing SEC disclosure requirements 
to include material regulatory risks and opportunities and also physical risks due to climate 
change and water shortages. lt affects US companies, international companies that operate 
in the USA, and overseas supply chains. 109 This is merely the first step in escalating market 
pressures on corporations 110 and portends international changes in other jurisdictions. 111 It 
evidences a changing global landscape in relation to market awareness of 'climate risk' and 
the consequences for corporations operating in a carbon-constrained economy. Climate 
risk, in turn, will influence bank practice. 
Risk to reputation or brand is the third type of indirect climate risk for banks. Put simply: 
"Reputation is crucial for financial institutions" 112 and, as Leo Johnson of the Wall Street 
Journal explains, trust is the key to a bank's social license to operate: 
Forget credit risk or legal risk. Let's look at the brand. What holds a great bank 
together? What is the one emotion you as the depositor must feel toward your bank? 
In a word, trust. When you give a bank your savings, you are puttin¥ your life in their 
hands. What's more, they are unverifiable; you can't kick the tires. 11 
Previous bank studies highlight that a key policy issue for banks is risk to reputation 
through association with environmentally risky (or 'dirty') borrowers. 11 4 A particular 
source of reputational risk for banks is public 'naming and shaming' campaigns by NGOs 
in response to financing of dirty companies that perpetrate environmental harm. This is a 
relatively new area of concern for banks. Traditionally, they have been invisible: with no 
Change ', www.sec.gov (27 January 20 l 0), <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/20 I 0120 l 0-15.htm> 
viewed 20 August 201 1. The move was mo ti vatcd by repeated petitions from institutional investors 
in the United States that represent US$ l .5 trillion in assets, with support from additional European 
and United States' investors representing US$6.5 trillion in assets. 
109 J Coburn, 'SEC Climate Guidance Could Increase Supply Chain Scrutiny', GreenBiz.com (26 
July 2010). 
110 Ibid. 
111 For example, the Ontario Securities Commission has conunitted to issuing environmental 
disclosure guidance by December 2010: ibid. 
112 per John Tobin, Head of Sustainability Affairs, Credit Suisse, quoted in D Enskog, 'International 
Banks Address Climate Concerns', Online Publications (13 October 2008). 
113 L Johnson, ' Open Season' Wall Street Journal online (5 July 2007). 
114 Eg: P Watchman, Banking on Responsibility. Part 1 of Freshflelds Bruckhaus Deringer Equator 
Principles Survey 2005: The Banks (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, London, 2005); Oekom 
Research, 'Global Sustainabil ity Rating of Financial Services Providers: Australia Gets Gold, USA 
is Eliminated' , Industry News (Oekom Research, Munich, 2006); G Cooper, ' Room for 
Improvement on Banks' Green Risks' (2002) (October) Environmental Finance 7; Lundgren and 
Catasus, above n 8. 
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extractive or manufacturing activity, and services and products that do not create direct 
environmental impacts, banks are not considered a frontlinc environmental threat. 115 
Unsurprisingly, NGO campaigns have tended to target polluters, a memorable example 
being the 1995 Greenpeace campaign against Shell UK for its planned disposal of the Brent 
Spar oil tanker at sea. 
However, in the late 1990s NGOs started focusing attention on financial institutions in the 
private sector, particularly for their financing of large oil, gas and dam projects in emerging 
economies. O'Sullivan and O' Dwyer document a growing realisation by NGOs that 
"private [sector] banks had been able to operate in relative anonymity" while holding "the 
real power" over 'unsustainable ' projects and companies. 116 In particular, private sector 
banks had begun financing projects previously vetoed by multilateral financial institutions 
on the basis of socio-environmental concerns, such as the Three Gorges Dam in China. 117 
This realisation prompted not only extensive campaigns by individual NGOs but also, since 
2003, coordinated NGO campaigns under the auspices of the Collevecchio Declaration 118 
and BankTrack. 119 
Accordingly, banks have become visible in the past decade due to heightened scrutiny of 
their financing decisions and indirect socio-environmental impacts. Most recently, scrutiny 
has extended to banks' climate-related activities. An example is the 2007 campaign 
mounted by the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) against financiers of Texas Utilities 
115 Indeed, the FTSE4Good index rates the finance sector generally in the 'mid' socio-
environmental impact category: Lins et al. , above n 51, I 0. 
116 N O'Sullivan and B O'Dwyer, 'Stakeholder Perspectives on a Financial Sector Legitimation 
Process: the Case of NGOs and the Equator Principles' (2009) 22(4) Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal 553-587, 562, quoting a Rainforest Action Network interviewee. This notion 
of 'unseen polluters ' is central to Richardson's book on SRI: Richardson 2008, above n 74. 
117 JM Conley and CA Williams, 'Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators?: The Equator 
Principles' (2011) 33(4) Law & Policy 542, 543-44. 
l IR This coalition of NGOs includes Friends of the Earth, the Rainforest Action Network, and WWF. 
The Declaration calls upon financial institutions to incorporate six commitments (being 
sustainability, ' do no harm', responsibility, accountability, transparency, sustainable markets and 
governance) into alt financial operations: BankTrack, Collevecchio Declaration: the Role and 
Responsibility ofFinancia/ Institutions (Banktrack, Nijmegen, Netherlands, 2003). 
11 9 BankTrack is a global network that tracks the operations of the private financial sector and "its 
effect on people and the planet": per <http://www.banktrack.org/show/pages/about_ banktrack> 
viewed 11 May 2012. It was formally established in 2005 subsequent to the Collevecchio 
Declaration and comprises both individuals and NGOs, including Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth. 
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(TXU). 120 TXU planned to build 11 "cleaner" coal-fired plants; the estimated annual 
increase in C02 emissions due to the power plants was 78 million tons. Citigroup, Morgan 
Stanley and Merrill Lynch were mandated to arrange financing for construction. They were 
targeted by RAN, which issued formal letters to 54 financial institutions requesting that 
they withhold finance for the project. The approval process by the Texan Governor was 
also litigated and the proposal became a magnet for deleterious media and public 
attention. 121 Eventually, TXU was bought out by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Texas 
Pacific Group, pursuant to which TXU agreed to build only three coal-fired power plants, 
to invest in 'green' energy technology, and to invest US$400 million into new initiatives 
such as alternative energy sources and technologies. Apparently the deal helped to prevent 
the release of 56 million tons of C02 emissions each year. Such campaigns can be effective 
in securing greener outcomes, but they can also cause "brand suicide" for banks by 
undermining the trust and reputation so crucial to their operations. 122 
In addition to NGOs, shareholders are also giving increasing attention to climate-related 
matters. The Investor Network on Climate Risk reported that North American companies 
received 50% more shareholder resolutions in 2010 that sought increased disclosure and 
action on climate-related risks than in 2009. 123 Of particular concern to banks is 
shareholder mobilisation against environmentally risky projects which, similar to NGO 
campaigns, can create adverse market and public reactions to a bank's brand. A prominent 
Australian example was the proposed financing of the Gunns Ltd pulp mill in Tasmania in 
2009. ANZ bank, Gunns Ltd's long term financier, retreated as lender to that project 
reportedly due to the culmination of bad press, public outcry and shareholder activism 
against the bank's support of the mill. Specifically: 
120 For details of the campaign, see Mudde and Abadie, above n 52, 14. 
121 Plaintiffs were the Environmental Defense and Sierra Club and also Texans Protecting our 
Resources & Environment, which fil ed injunctions against the fast track approval process. Several 
lawsuits challenged the permit process on a variety of bases but primarily separation of powers: 
ibid. 
122 Johnson, above n 113. 
123 Investors withdrew half of those resolutions because the company took steps to address the 
demands. The resolutions that went to a vote achieved an average vote of nearly 25%. See: 
Editorial, 'Investor Activism on Climate Shows No Sign of Slowing' , GreenBiz.com (8 July 2010). 
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over 40,000 Australians wrote letters urging [ANZ bank] not to finance the mill; 
over 2000 shareholders wrote letters urging them not to finance the mill ; over 1000 
customers visited their branch to complain in person. 124 
Moreover, shareholder resolutions were proposed at the annual general meetings of the ' big 
four' banks in Australia to prevent them from investing in corporations that log old growth 
forests. These resolutions were not successful; however, the resolution at the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia was supported by nearly 25% of its shareholders making 
it "the largest support for a shareholder resolution in Australia's corporate history". 125 
Finally, financiers now face litigation risk for their perceived role in facilitating GHG 
emissions. As noted earlier in this section, common law actions in public nuisance were 
aimed first at power and utilities companies and automobile manufacturers in the USA. 
However, US federal courts have been reluctant to recognise such claims due to the 
difficulty of attributing blame among multiple emitters and the declaration by the Supreme 
Court on 20 June 2011 that federal legislation to regulate emissions displaces federal 
common law claims. 126 Nonetheless, this declaration has not deterred plaintiffs; instead 
they have begun filing claims in State courts attempting to sue utilities for increased 
insurance premiums due to climate change. 127 As such, claims for damages are being based 
on increased risk rather than actual harm, which has obvious implications for financiers. In 
2007, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the US Export-Import Bank were 
sued by Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the City Council of Oakland, and four more US 
cities. The lawsuit claimed that the defendants were liable for climate-change impacts on 
the litigant cities due to their financial support for projects that account for 8% of the 
124 The Wilderness Society, GetUp!, and Bank Track, 'Gunns Pulp Mill, Tasmania: High Risk 
Investment?' The Australian (6 May 2009). 
125 The Wilderness Society, 'Historic Support for Commonwealth Bank Shareholder Resolution on 
Old Growth Forests' Wilderness.org.au (7 September 2003). 
126 American Electric Power Company, Inc., v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. (2011). See also 
L Hurley and G Nelson, 'Climate: High Court Blocks States ' Lawsuit Over Coal Plant Emissions' 
www.eenews.net (20 June 2011). 
127 For example, the class action complaint Comer v. Murphy Oil USA Inc. (case l: l 1-cv-00220-LG 
-RHW), filed on 27 May 2011 in the Southern District Court of Mississippi, alleges the following: 
"Insurance companies have begun to incorporate the risks associated with global warming into their 
premiums, which has dramatically increased Plaintiffs' insurance costs. Thus, Defendants are 
directly responsible for the increased risk [of wild weather damage] to Plaintiffs' property as well as 
the concomitant increases in costs to insure Plaintiffs' property": 19, par 38. 
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world's GHGs. 128 Although these banks are public, it sets a dangerous precedent for private 
sector banks, especially those operating in the USA. Such litigation, or fear of it, may grow 
until "climate change is ' mainstreamed' into business, professional and administrative 
[bank] practice". 129 
It is clear that concern for climate change, and its impacts on corporate viabili ty, is 
growing. As such, banks that support carbon-intense projects and companies are 
increasingly vulnerable to credit, investment, reputation and litigation risks. Early mover 
banks recognise this connection and "are addressing climate change as a risk management 
issue as they would other credit, operational and reputation issues". 130 
2.2.2 Banks as Lenders and Financiers 
Flowing on from a bank 's role as risk assessor and manager is its rol e as financier and 
lender. Banks decide whether or not to finance major projects or to lend to corporate clients 
and, if so, on what terms. This aspect of banking practice embodies a gate-keeper function: 
which projects 'get the green light'? Banks are in a position to decide whether to provide 
full finance, conditional finance or an outright refusal to finance major projects. These 
projects might create high GHG pollution or, conversely, progress innovative solutions in 
renewable energy, low-carbon technology, energy efficiency and/or ' green' infrastructure. 
These financing decisions impact upon GHG emissions and the transition (or otherwise) to 
a low-carbon economy. 13 1 
128 The Federal Court for the Northern District of California allowed the lawsuit to proceed. For 
details see Johnson, above n l l 3. 
129 In a carbon-constrained economy, banks (as well as institutional investors, fund managers and 
financial analysts) also face the risk of litigation for failing to take climate change into account in 
investment allocations: Dlugolecki, above n 72, 79. 
13
° Ceres Report, above n 81, 2. 
131 Richardson provides an analysis of the extent of corporate reliance on external finance and states 
that "financial sponsorship is intimately etched into the 'cause' of corporate activities harming the 
environment": Richardson 2008, above n 74, 346. However, Coulson contends that banks have little 
ability to influence botTowers in a competitive market where they are competing with each other 
and also self-financing by multinational corporations: AB Coulson, 'How Should Banks Govern the 
Environment? Challenging the Construction of Action Verses Veto' (2009) 18 Business Strategy 
and the Environment 149, 154. From a legal standpoint, the issue of "cause" raises contentious 
implications as, traditionally, liability attaches to the entity that directly causes damage, as 
illustrated by the ' polluter pays principle' . Yet climate change is a global and ubiquitous problem 
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The relevance of corporate loans and project finance to climate change is recognised in a 
suite of recent international voluntary codes, namely the Equator Principles, the Climate 
Principles and the Carbon Principles. A brief synopsis of each is outlined below. 
The Equator Principles have been in force the longest: they were created in 2003 and 
subsequently reviewed and updated in 2006. 132 A third iteration, labeled 'EPIII', is 
available in draft form with expected finalisation within the first qua1ter of 2013. 133 The 
Equator Principles currently cover project finance only, which comprises approximately 2% 
of an average bank's financing activities; however, project finance is still relevant to 
climate change because it is applied frequently to electricity, oil and gas, and mining 
deals. 134 They require that financiers screen all projects worth more than US$10 million 135 
for potential ESG impacts in accordance with standards set by the IFC. Screening leads to a 
classification into one of three environmental risk categories: high, medium and low. 
Medium- and high-risk projects must complete a comprehensive Social and Environmental 
Assessment, and comply with a risk mitigating Action Plan or be declared in default. The 
Equator Principles Signatories are also required to assist clients to quantify, monitor and 
manage their C02 emissions if the project is C02 intensive (over 100,000 tons C02 
equivalent per year). Over 70 financial institutions around the world (predominantly banks) 
for which there are multiple 'sources' and so this principle is inadequate. Regulators and 
complainants may well sta1t to look elsewhere for succour, as they have done in the US with 
CERCLA and are doing now with climate litigation. 
132 See <www.equator-principles.com> viewed 20 May 2012. 
133 See <http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3> viewed 5 February 2013. However, this 
timeline is "tentative and may be extended by the EP Association as appropriate": 
<http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/process-and-timeline> viewed 5 February 2013. It 
was extended during 2012 to the chagrin of some NGOs: see, eg, J Frijns, 'Equator Principles III 
better be good: Launch New Equator Principles Again Postponed; Expectations Rise on What New 
Principles Will Deliver" BankTrack.org (29 March 2012). 
134 BankTrack, Close the Gap: Benchmarking Credit Policies oflnternational Banh (Banktrack, 
Nijmegen, Netherlands, 20 I 0), I 03. Moreover, "the world's biggest 15 banks" have been pushing to 
have the Equator Principles extended to corporate finance: P Jenkins, 'Pushing its Way on to 
Boardroom Agendas', Financial Times: Sustainable Banking - Special Report (3 June 2010), I . In 
May 2011 revisions to the underlying IFC Social and Environmental Perfonnance Standard were 
announced, which expand it to cover financial advisory products. Some commentators suggest that 
the potential ambit of the Equator Principles may soon be expanded as well: see eg, Conley and 
Williams, above n 117, 546. 
135 The threshold was US$50 million prior to the 2006 review. The Equator Principles were also 
designed to have effect primarily in developing countries. However some banks, such as ANZ and 
Westpac, apply the principles to all projects regardless oflocation or monetary size. 
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have adopted the Equator Principles, covenng over 85% of the global project finance 
market. 136 
The Climate Principles were finalised in December 2008 as a product of the Climate 
Group, an NGO, in dialogue with approximately 20 financial institutions. The Climate 
Principles guide signatories in minimising operational (internal) GHG emissions, 
integrating climate change into business activities to reduce risks and enhance 
opportunities, assisting clients to do likewise, and encouraging sound climate regulation. 137 
The Climate Principles apply to all financial services offered by banks including insurance, 
corporate and investment banking, project finance and asset management. 138 Six financial 
organisations have adopted these Principles to date, namely BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, 
F&C Asset Management, HSBC, Standard Chartered, and Swiss Re. 139 
The Carbon Principles were adopted in February 2008 by six financial institutions (Bank of 
America, Citi, Credit Suisse, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo) in 
consultation with power companies and environmental groups. 140 The Carbon Principles set 
procedural standards for advisers and lenders to power companies in the USA. They were 
created to address potential investment risks due to uncertain regional and national climate 
change policy. 141 Signatories encourage their clients to invest in energy efficiency 
initiatives, renewable energy and low-carbon technologies, and advocate for regulation that 
encourages such investment. Signatories also acknowledge that "conventional energy 
generation" will be required in addition to renewable and efficient energy and they agree to 
136 Eg see ANZ, Corporate Responsibility: Equator Principles, <http://www.anz.com/about-
us/corporate-responsibi l i ty /customers/responsible-business-lending/ eq uator-princ i p Jes/ > viewed 2 7 
August 2011. 
137 See <http://www.tbeclimategroup.org/programs/the-climate-principles/ > viewed 30 August 
2012. 
138 The Climate Principles, ibid, commitment 2.0. 
139 Munich Re was an initial adopter but, as at 11 May 2012, it is no longer listed on the Climate 
Group website: ibid. The Climate Group has conceded that the adoption rate is disappointing, 
asserting it is due to the GFC: J McCabe, 'Back to Business as Usual?' Environmental Finance (I 
June 2009). 
140 See <http://W\¥w.carbonprinciples.org> viewed 27 October 2011. 
141 The Carbon Principles, 'Press Release: Leading Wall Street Banks Establish The Carbon 
Principles: Guidelines to StTengthen Environmental and Economic Risk Management in the 
Financing and Construction of Electricity Generation' carbonprinciples.org (4 February 2008). 
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encourage government policy that facilitates carbon capture and storage. To date, the 
number of signatories is still six. 142 
A detailed analysis of the efficacy or otherwise of these three Principles is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Suffice to say that it is the topic of scrutiny by academics 143 and 
NGOs, 144 paiticularly in relation to whether or not these codes help to achieve 
environmental and sustainability objectives. This particular concern is explored in Chapter 
6 as it relates to the empirical data. What is relevant here is that none of these soft law 
instruments stipulate an absolute prohibition on financing ' dirty' or high GHG polluting 
projects. 145 Yet debate exists as to whether or not banks should refuse to finance high 
polluting projects, which is relevant to the questions of what might drive or impede 
voluntary uptake of climate-related practices by banks. 
Watchman surmises that banks take a ' mitigation of harm ' as opposed to a ' do no harm' 
approach to the environment through their lending activities, whereby banks attempt to 
142 Initially it was expected that other banks would adopt these principles soon after: Mudde and 
Abadie, above n 52, 38. 
143 Academic research has tended to focus on the Equator Principles, which have been in practice 
the longest. See eg: Conley and Williams, above n 117; R Macve and X Chen, 'The 'Equator 
Principles ': A Success for Voluntary Codes?' (2010) 23 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal 890; K Miles, 'Targeting Financiers: Can Voluntary Codes of Conduct for the Investment 
and Financing Sectors Achieve Environmental and Sustainability Objectives?' in K Deketelaere, JE 
Milne, LA Kreiser and H Ashiabor (eds), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation - Volume V 
(Oxford University Press, London, 2008); O 'Sulli van and O'Dwyer, above n 11 6; BJ Richardson, 
'The EPs: The Voluntary Approach to Environmentally Sustainable Finance' (2005) 14(1 1) 
European Environmental Law Review 280; P Watchman and C July, 'A New Environment' (2006) 
(Feb) Legal Week: Insolvency, Banking and Finance 24; C Wright, Why Have Most Emerging 
Market Banks Not Adopted Lhe Equator Principles? Exploring the limits of Private Environmental 
Governance (paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 28 
February-3 March 2007). 
144 BankTrack is an NGO that has published on all three Principles. Eg: BankTrack, Bold Steps 
Forward: Towards Equator Principles that Deliver to People and the Planet (BankTrack, 
Nijmegen, Netherlands, 20 I 0); Bank Track (2009) Meek Principles/or a Tough Climate: Why the 
Carbon and Climate Principles Will Not Stop the Melting of the Ice (Banktrack, N ijmegen, 
Netherlands, 2009). See also Rainforest Action Network (RAN), The Principle Matter: Banks, 
Climate & the Carbon Principles (RAN, San Francisco, 2011). See also: PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP, Climate Principles Progress Review (The Climate Group, London, 20 I 0). 
145 NGOs are advocating strongly for such a prohibition in EPHI : "we expect a categorical exclusion 
of the financing of climate destructive projects as coal mining, coal power plants and oil exploration 
projects - especially tar sand operations-. The risks posed by these projects [to humanity] cannot be 
mitigated": Frijns, above n 133. 
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reduce or manage harm as opposed to avoiding projects per se. 146 Coulson debates this 
generalised approach. 147 She states that some banks do veto (or, in bank parlance, ' redl ine ') 
certain investments, 14 8 other banks veto investments in certain industries only, 149 and yet 
other banks are actively opposed to redlining and seek to work with potential borrowers to 
improve environmental performance and mitigate harm. 150 
Richardson asserts that banks would baulk at denying loans to companies that fail to meet 
set environmental criteria. Banks would become "surrogate environmental regulators" and 
" most banks would loathe such a scenario" , 15 1 regarding themselves as being too remote 
from borrowers' operational decisions and lacking relevant environmental expertise. 152 
However, in relation to climate change, banks appear less concerned in practice about a 
lack of experti se - indeed some leading banks are claiming climate/carbon expertise as a 
point of differentiation. But they do seem concerned to avoid usurping a government 
regulatory role, as demonstrated in a 2007 UNEPFI report: 
Calls are being made in some quarters for financial institutions to act more 
aggressively by simply cutting off finance to high carbon emission activities . 
However these calls do not account for the broader economic and business context 
in which financial institutions operate. They are in effect asking the fi nancial 
institutions to take a hand in determining economic policy. Financial institutions 
make the investment decisions, but it is national governments that set the rules for 
the markets in which they invest and operate. 153 
Of course, there is another factor in thi s discussion of ' to fund or not to fund ' , which goes 
beyond distaste for quas i policy-making. The fact is that the fossil fuel sector is still a 
lucrative investment and clientele base. 154 Currently, it is not in banks' business interest to 
146 Watchman, above n 114, 36. 
147 Coulson, above n 131 , 154. 
148 Examples include the ABN AMRO Forest investment Policy which went further than IFC 
policies to exclude loans for projects in old-growth forest, and the United Kingdom's Co-operative 
Bank's ethical screening criteria. 
149 For example, Credit Suisse Group and ING. Although banks do not publicise which industries, 
Coulson suggests that nuclear energy may be one: Coulson, above n 131, I 54. 
15
° For example, Westpac, Barclays, HSBC, and Lloyds TSB. 
151 Ri chardson 2008, above n 74, 353. 
152 Ibid. 
153 UNEPFI 2007a, above n 52, 12. 
154 Richardson 2009, above n 74, 600; N Lansbury, Socially Responsible Climate Change? Fossil 
Fuel investments of the Socially Responsible investment Industry in Australia (Mineral Policy 
Institute, Perth, 2002) 30. 
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redline this sector and avoid it entirely. Indeed, some banks that are leading in clean 
technology and renewables finance have stated that they will continue to work with fossil 
fuel and carbon intense clients in the immediate term. 155 
However, ce1tain banks have decided to veto unsustainable projects. Examples include 
ANZ's refusal to finance Gunns Ltd's pulp mill, Bank of America's decision to reduce the 
emissions rate of its energy-lending portfolio, 156 and separate decisions by six American 
banks to limit their relationships with companies that practise mountain top removal (MTR) 
coal mining. 157 In the absence of government policy to dictate a whole-of-industry 
approach, banks will individually decide how to approach the funding of GHG intense 
projects. 158 Qualitative research is needed to understand what motivates banks to make 
these changes: is it driven by senior management, by business case factors, and/or external 
pressure such as NGO naming and shaming? 
The soft law mechanisms cited above demonstrate that early mover banks have identified 
the connection between industry practices and climate change in terms of risk and 
opportunity. It is clear that finance and lending issues flow on from climate change as a risk 
management issue. Yet finance and lending also highlights how banks can capitalise on the 
opportunities that climate change presents. These opportunities include reputation 
enhancement as well as profit and value increase through bank activity in carbon and 
renewable energy markets. These markets could become competitive with fossil fuels as a 
lucrative financial target and are garnering keen banking interest, as discussed below. 
155 For example, Westpac has declared that "Over the medium term fossil fuel energy generation 
will continue to play a major role in the economies where we operate ... [so] Westpac ... will 
continue to support clients in the fossil fuel based energy sector for the immediate term", even 
though Westpac is simultaneously committed to facilitating development of renewable and efficient 
energy: Westpac, Westpac Climate Change Position Statement: Financing the Transition to a low 
Carbon Economy (Westpac, Sydney, undated), I 0. 
156 Bank of America, above n 94. 
157 These are the Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Credit Suisse and Morgan 
Stanley. Credit Suisse has rcdlined such lending outright. This form of coal mining is legal but 
highly controversial as it " requires blowing the tops off of mountains and dumping the debris into 
nearby streams and valleys": Rainforest Action Network, ' Wall Street Backs Away From 
Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining: Top 4 US Banks Curb Loans for Destructive Practice; Cut 
Financing for Massey Energy' ran.org (I 1 August 2010). 
158 Coulson further notes that for banks to act in unison to veto investment or lending could be 
construed as a breach of anti-monopoly policy: Coulson, above n 13 1, 155. 
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2.2.3 Banks as Profiteers and 'Middlemen' 
It is axiomatic that banks must provide shareholders with maximum return in a capitalist 
economy. Although the avarice of banks has come under recent scrutiny, it could be 
harnessed to assist the transition to a low-carbon economy. This is because climate change 
presents lucrative business opportunities, with 'global climate revenues ' reaching a record 
high of US$567 billion in 2010. 159 Banks are aptly placed to exploit these opportunities 160 
in their roles as brokers in global carbon markets, and as financiers and investors in 
renewables and clean technology markets. 
Trading in carbon globally was valued at US$ I 0 billion in 2005; it tripled one year later to 
reach US$30 billion in 2006. 161 Despite the GFC, industry repo1ts in 2009 estimated that 
trade could reach US$3 trillion by 2020 162 and will eventually total US$ I 0 trillion a 
year, 163 which would make it the largest commodity market in the world. 164 Many of the 
large banks are already established in carbon markets and are responsible for much of the 
traded volume within the EU ETS. 165 Despite the lack of international agreement on 
climate change, there remains an industry expectation of regionally linked and national 
carbon markets 166 with profitable brokering and arbitrage opportunities for banks. 
A concurrent global market in renewables and clean technology similarly presents lucrative 
opportunities for banks. For the pe1iod 2007-2010 more than US$1. l trillion was invested 
159 HSBC Global Research, Climate Change -Septemher 2011 Annual Index Review (HSBC, 
London, 2011 ), 1-2. 'G lobal climate revenues' comprise Low Carbon Energy Production, 
Water/Waste/Pollution Control, Energy Efficiency and Management, and Climate Finance, as 
evaluated by the HSBC Climate Change Index. 
160 Newell and Paterson, above n 78, 71-75 
161 UNEPFI 2007a, above n 52, 5. 
162 Per New Carbon Finance, quoted in M Carr, 'China, Greenpeace Chall enge Kyoto Carbon 
Trading', Bloomberg. com ( 19 June 2009). 
163 Per Climate Exchange Pie: ibid. 
164 Commissioner Bart Chi lton, head of energy and environmental markets advisory committee of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Moreover, a variety of carbon fu nds have been 
created by the finance sector, the value of which increased by approximately 50% from September 
2006 to March 2007 to total US$1 I .8 billion: UNEPFI 2007a, above n 52, 5. 
165 2009 CDP Report, above n 12, 92. 
166 Ibid. See also Deutsche Bank, Investing in Climate Change 2010: A Strategic Asset Allocation 
Perspective (Deutsche Bank, New York, 20 I 0), l 0. In 20 I 0, it was estimated that the US carbon 
market alone would reach US$ l .3 trillion by 2020: M Doyle, 'Carbon Trading Faces a Make-or-
Break Year', Financial Post (8 January 2010). 
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privately in 'renewable energy', which compnses private technology development, 
equipment manufacturing, project finance, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity. 
This was followed by 'efficiency and green construction ' at over US$2.2 billion and then 
'clean technology', including Smart Grid, at more than $US1.6 billion. 167 Recently, 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance reported that clean energy investments climbed five 
percent in 2011 to US$260 billion, with solar topping the list. 168 
These markets create opportunity for " large investment banks that have the financial 
firepower to unleash mature [green] technologies globally". 169 Joel Makower, editor of 
GreenBiz.com, notes that this role is not new for banks, and that financiers provide 
important support where governments lack. He writes: 
As the financial heft of national governments hit their limits, we'll need the big 
financial machines - which funded the Internet, cellular networks, highways, 
bridges, water systems, and mass transit systems - to make clean technology part of 
the global fabric. 170 
Indeed, 1T companies have described the financial opportunity of the Smart Grid as " l ,000 
times as large as the Internet" 171 and early moving banks are positioning themselves 
accordingly. For example, since 2009 Wells Fargo has committed US$600 million to 
companies that develop smart grid applications, as well as renewable energy technologies 
and energy efficiency solutions. 172 
Some industry commentators describe these developments as an "important milestone in 
measuring the increasing economic viability of the CleanTech universe" 173 and "tangible 
evidence ... [that] momentum is building for a green economic transition". 174 Early moving 
167 These are aggregate figures for 2007-20 I 0 of private investment only; they do not include 
investments from national governments: Ethical Markets, Green Transition Scoreboard (30 July 
20 I 0) at <http://www.greentransitionscoreboard.com/ > viewed 20 August 20 I I . 
168 K Foroohar, 'Santander Proves Greenest as No. 2 Bank of America Becomes Solar', Bloomberg 
Markets Magazine (30 March 2012). 
169 J Makower, 'Financing Our Cleantech Future' GreenBiz.com ( 18 January 2010). 
170 !bid. 
171 Per Cisco: ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Per Stuart Valentine, president of Iowa Progressive Asset Management, quoted in Editorial, 
'Private Investment in Green Business Tops $1.6T Since 2007' GreenBiz.com (4 August 20 10). 
174 Per Timothy Nash, Ethical Markets' Senior Advisor and Director of Sustainability Research: 
ibid. China is also part of that transition due to its current five-year plan pursuant to which it is 
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banks are already active in these markets, however the banking industry as a whole faces 
"an immense but as yet largely untapped opportunity to enter new markets and develop 
more efficient and environmentally sound industries". 175 Ceres opines that doing so "wi ll 
benefit generations to come, while preserving [banks' ] longstanding leadership role in 
wealth and capital fo1mation". 176 
Accordingly, there is a clear role for banks to assist our trans ition to a low-carbon 
economy, and it is a role that banks have played in previous major economic transitions. 
Moreover, doing so presents pecuniary and reputational opportunities for banks. 
Environmental soft law mechanisms such as the Climate Principles and Carbon Principles 
highlight these opportunities and focus on banks ' capacity to facilitate the 'greenness' of 
other corporate actors. Indeed, this influential capacity of banks is key to their role in 
assisting corporate GHG emissions reductions and the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
2.3 Banks as Influencers on Other Corporate Actors 
As evidenced above, banks are relevant to climate change (and vice versa) through their 
business practices as risk assessors, financiers and lenders, as well as profiteers and brokers 
in new lucrative climate-related markets. This section will address how banks have the 
potential to assist mitigation of climate change and facilitate the global shift to a low-
carbon economy through their influence on other corporate actors' business practices and 
GHG emissions. 
The influential capacity of the finance sector genera11y is recognised in environmental soft 
law instruments. For example, the aim of the Climate Principles is a "common global 
standard of best practice not only to assist the finance sector in managing its own climate 
impact but also to assist the sector in supporting its clients and stakeholders in managing 
expected to set up carbon trading by 2015 alongside massive expansion in hydro, solar, wind and 
nuclear power: C Ryan, 'People's Republic of Consumption' Aus1ra/ian Financial Review (27 July 
2010) J 8. 
175 Ceres Report, above n 8 1, ii. 
176 Ibid. 
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their own impacts". 177 That the industry is self-aware of its influence is illustrated by 
Westpac's statement that: "The role of the leader is not just to look at themselves but to 
also look outwardly at who they can influence. As a bank we arc in a good position to do 
that because nearly all businesses have a banking relationship." 178 
To a large extent, changes that banks make to their own business, as discussed above, will 
impact upon clients and other businesses. That is, corporate governance and business 
activities of corporate clients are influenced by bank risk assessments and finance/lending 
conditions that account for carbon intensity and C02 mitigation strategies. For example, 
Conley and Williams note that when banks "operat[e] with their own risk" in caITying out 
ESG risk assessments, then "they can exercise a moderating effect on the most destructive 
aspects of unconstrained finance and development." 179 
Further to this, banks are in a position to influence corporates through their roles as 
creditors, investors, advisers and heads of supply chains. Of course, some limitations to 
banks' influence must be acknowledged here, particularly in light of increasing competition 
in a global financial economy. Specifically, multinational corporations have a growing 
capacity to self-finance, which minimises influence from bank lenders. Moreover, some 
non-bank financial intermediaries, such as money market funds, hedge funds, and 
structured investment vehicles, provide credit and other services similar to traditional 
commercial banks. This phenomenon is known as the shadow banking system; however, 
private sector banks can and do still operate within it. For example, shadow banks can 
facilitate credit in financial markets by becoming part of a chain that involves mainstream 
banks; and investment banks may conduct much of their business in the shadow banking 
system, including the use of hedge funds and special purpose entities to enhance client 
returns on investment (see Chapter 5). 
177 The Climate Principles, above n 137, preamble. 
178 Per Graham Paterson, Head of Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability (now Corporate 
Sustainability and Community) at Westpac, quoted in A De Lore, 'Leaders of the Pack Unite to 
Inspire Others: A Network of High Achievers is Showing the Way', The Age: Special Report on 
Corporate Responsibility Index (20 May 2008), 2. See also Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8. 
179 Conley and Williams, above n 117, 571. They make the contrasting point that, as shown by the 
sub-prime crisis, when banks "are profiting from other peoples' risk, they exacerbate the 
instabi Ii ties of modem financial markets": at 571. 
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Moreover, as stated by Westpac above, private sector banks are influential even when they 
are not engaged as lenders or creditors. Section 2.3.2 (below) details how banks set ESG 
standards for their suppliers and provide advice to corporate clients as well as governments 
and local communities on climate change mitigation strategies. These advisory and 
benchmarking activities have non-linear flow-on effects to a range of actors outside the 
direct purview of banks. 
In summary, the influential role of banks is evidenced in the following ways: by early 
moving banks' environmental/climate benchmarks for bank Sustainable Supply Chain 
Management networks; by the rise of bank advisory desks/depaitments in relation to carbon 
trading and government policy advocacy; and through pervasive bank influence in board 
governance of borrower and investee companies. These developments are discussed below. 
2.3.1 Banks as Creditors and Investors 
Traditional corporate governance theory in market-oriented financial systems (such as the 
US) contends that banks do not have control over borrowers' management other than at 
times of distress. Standard "shareholder influence" accounts of corporate governance 
conceive of creditors as outsiders to firm management while shareholders are active 
monitors of the firm. 180 
However, recent empirical evidence reveals that banks routinely and pervasively influence 
firm managerial decision-making at much earlier points in the creditor-debtor relationship 
than at the point of borrowers' distress. 181 Tung terms this influence " lender governance'', 
contending that it rivals conventional governance mechanisms and is comparable to boards 
of directors ' influence. Tung contends that bank creditors have significant influence over 
managerial decisions and monitor financing, investment, and operational decisions of 
180 Eg: DG Baird and T Henderson, 'Other People's Money' (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1309, 
1343; DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ' Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance' (2006) 154(5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1209, 1215; Tung, above n 16, 
11 7- 119. 
181 Tung, ibid, 11 8-119. 
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investee companies. Banks not only constrain managerial decisions but also dictate them, 
even the hiring and firing of a firm 's chief executive and board. 182 
Similar empirical evidence has been adduced regarding the influence of banks as investors. 
In bank-centered jurisdictions like Germany and Japan where investors are permitted to 
have large equity stakes in companies, 183 it is accepted that the relationship between 
company and banker is quite close. Conversely, in market-oriented financial systems such 
as the USA and the UK, where large equity stakes arc not permitted, the traditional view is 
that a bank's influence on investee corporate governance is relatively limited. 184 However, 
Holland has evidenced that financial institutions exercise "private corporate governance 
influence" over investee companies and that they do so even when the company is 
performing well. 185 This influence affects a range of internal company matters from 
corporate governance in relation to board composition and top management recruitment to 
accountability issues regarding wealth creation. 186 
The empirical research of Tung and Holland shows that banks as creditors and investors are 
motivated to influence the corporate governance of their companies to improve financial 
performance. 187 This implies that banks can exercise influence regarding GHG emission 
mitigation and management strategies, especially if to do so were to affect a company's 
bottom line in a carbon-constrained economy. Specifically, much bank lending is for long 
terms of 20-40 years. Within the lifetime of loans granted today, climate change will have a 
profound impact on operations of bank clients and also corporate investments. The fact that 
182 Tung, ibid, 11 9-120, citing the example of how lenders effectively decided the question of 
Wamaco's CEO. Tung draws on Baird and Rasmussen ' s conceptualisation of private lender power 
as the "missing lever" of corporate governance: Baird and Rasmussen, above n 180, 121 5. 
183 Schmidheiny and Zorraquin, above n 61 , l 0 I. Mallin et al. also note that banks that lend to 
SMEs and 'Mittelstand ' companies in Continental Europe traditionally play "a major role in 
corporate governance through equity-holdings, cross-shareholdings and reciprocal board 
membership": C Mallin, A Mullineux, and C Wihlborg 'The Financial Sector and Corporate 
Governance: the UK case' (2005) 13(4) C01porate Governance 532, 536. 
184 And much Jess than that of institutional investors: Schmidheiny and Zorraquin, ibid, 10 I . See 
also Mallin et a l. , ibid, 536. 
185 J Holland, Tinancial Institutions, Intangibles and Corporate Governance ' (200 l) 14( 4) 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 497. 
186 Ibid, 5 14. 
187 Holland writes that the primary focus of financial institutions in company meetings was on 
valuation and investment decisions: ibid, 514-515. 
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climate change will affect the pecuniary interests of a bank as creditor, lender and investor 
could motivate heightened involvement by banks in the climate-related corporate 
governance of other companies. 
This bank influence would precipitate corporate changes to accounting, mitigation and 
management of carbon, with the potential for exponential GHG emissions reductions. The 
potential for exponential change is due to the pervasiveness of the banking industry: private 
lending is the single largest source of external financing for public corporations 188 and 
private credit agreements are maintained by 80% of public companies. 189 This 'flow on' 
influential capacity of banks is also seen in their roles as advisers and heads of supply 
chains. 
2.3.2 Banks as Advisers and Heads of Supply Chains 
Banks provide advice on issues within their expertise and of concern to their stakeholders, 
which include clients, local communities and governments. Climate change has become a 
relevant issue for research and dissemination by banks. Some banks acknowledge that part 
of their role is to help the transmutation of corporate clients to become low-carbon emitters 
and to succeed in a carbon-constrained economy. 190 Their advisory ro.le is discursive and 
involves a partnering or mentoring mentality through which banks can influence corporates 
in a more subtle way than by setting benchmark standards or imposing finance conditions. 
As Westpac has stated: "Today [we] recognize the benefits of working with industry to 
improve sustainability standards and genuinely believe we'll get further by sharing 
information." 191 
188 Larger than public debt and equity combined: Tung, above n 16, 121. 
189 G Nini, DC Smith, and A Sufi, 'Creditor control rights and firm investment policy' (2009) 92 
Journal of Financial Economics 400. 
190 Some examples include: "[t]he most significant role we can play in tackling climate change is to 
assist our broad customer base transition and adapt [sic] to a low carbon environment" per Westpac, 
above n 155, 1 O; and "thought leadership requires us to strengthen awareness of climate change 
issues with all our clients and advise them on strategic opportunities and challenges": Deutsche 
Bank, above n 4, 4. 
191 Westpac, Embracing The Corporate .Journey Into Sustainability: Stories From Westpac 's Supply 
Chain (Westpac, Sydney, 2008), 1. For Westpac, this includes working with fossil fuel sector 
clients to "identify the emerging carbon risks as well as the opportunities to reduce their carbon 
intensity and improve environmental outcomes": Westpac, above n 155, 10. 
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For some banks, their advisory capacity extends to sharing knowledge with local 
communities "to further advance ... understanding of potential [climate change] impacts 
and issues". 192 It can also include dialogue with governments regarding policy formulation 
on climate change. For example, banks have made submissions to national governments on 
the introduction of ETSs, 193 and assisted with the work of UNEPFI. Similarly, banks may 
partner with business and/or NGOs to commission and disseminate research that influences 
policy-makers as well as corporate actors. For example, the Australian Business 
Roundtable on Climate Change, which comprises the Australian Conservation Foundation 
and six large businesses including Westpac, commissioned research in 2006 that revealed 
there is an economic (or ' business case') imperative to move on climate change. 194 
As heads of supply chains, many banks acknowledge that the goods and services they 
procure and that are supplied to them by other businesses impact upon their own social and 
environmental performance. As such, some banks have instigated Sustainable Supply 
Chain Networks (SSCNs), which benchmark social and environmental standards for bank 
suppliers. The SSCN process is likely to involve a risk assessment, a checklist of 
compliance with minimum standards, a remedia l action plan to remedy any gaps, and a 
Certificate of Compliance valid for a limited time. 195 For some banks, suppliers must be 
192 Westpac, above n I 55, 12. 
193 For example: Westpac advocated to federal government and the Gamaut Review for an 
Australian ETS, stating it was " the policy cornerstone" of emissions reductions and economic 
competition: Westpac, ibid, 9- 10. Sec also Ci ti 's declaration that "[ w]e believe that the United 
States must act now to create a national climate change policy to avoid the economic, social , and 
environmental damage that will result if GHG emissions are not reduced": Ci ti, Position Statement 
on Climate Change (Citigroup, New York, undated). 
194 The Roundtable commissioned both CSIRO to determine climate impacts on Australia and the 
Allen Consulting Group to model the economic effects of producing a 60% reduction on year 2000 
emissions by 2050. From this research, the Roundtable created a report which showed that such 
reductions are possible while maintaining strong economic growth: Australian Business Roundtable 
on Climate Change, The Business Case for Early Action (Australian Business Roundtable on 
Climate Change, Sydney, 2006). A US example is the HSBC Climate Pa11nership, a US$ I 00 
million partnership launched in 2007 by HSBC with The Climate Group, Earthwatch Institute, and 
Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute: <http://theclimategroup.org/programs/hsbc-climate-
partnership> viewed I 0 August 2012. 
195 Eg, the Westpac certificate is valid for one year and any changes must be communicated to the 
bank: Westpac, Sustainability and Community: Governance (Westpac, Sydney, undated). 
63 
compliant with their SSCN code to be eligible for a tender 196 or to remain or become a 
bank supplier. 197 
The relevance of an SSCN to climate change mitigation comes from environmental 
minimum-standards set out in bank SSCN Codes. Standards may include reducing carbon 
emissions of a car fleet or, given that IT operations contribute significantly to corporate 
environmental footprints, selecting highly-efficient IT hardware. 198 Minimum-standard 
compliance is not only significant for a bank's emissions but also those of other 
corporations. As stated by ANZ: "With a supplier network of over 9,000 we have an 
opportunity to influence the social and environmental practices of a range of businesses". 199 
Similar to their advisory role, banks with SSCN codes will often work together with 
suppliers to assist their improvement of SSCN perfonnance and reporting. Importantly, 
some banks stipulate that their suppliers must communicate these standards onward to their 
own corporate suppliers and customers. 200 
Accordingly, banks have influence over the climate-related practices and policies of other 
corporate actors in their capacity as advisers and heads of supply chains. Banks have this 
influence by setting and communicating ESG standards for corporate clients and suppliers 
of banks. Moreover, this practice of setting ESG standards has flow on effects to a range of 
other corporate actors outside of the banks' direct purview. As with their influence as 
lenders, creditors and investors, thi s flow-on could be exponential and not just linear. It 
informs the significance of the relationship between banks and climate change. 
196 Eg, ANZ, Supplier Sustainability Code of Practice, (ANZ, Melbourne, undated). 
197 Eg, Westpac, SSCM Code o.f Conduct (Westpac, Sydney, undated). 
198 Eg, Westpac, Pact: Sustainability and Community News from Westpac (Issue 4, May 2008), 2. 
199 ANZ C R ·b ·1 · , orporate esponsz z zty 
<http://www.anz.com.au/about%2Dus/corporate%2Dresponsibility/supply%2Dchain/approach/> 
viewed 30 July 2012. 
20
° For example, Westpac suppliers "must adopt similar principles to these in dealing with their own 
key suppliers": Westpac, above n 191. NCR (a Westpac supplier) states that: " It is sati sfying to 
know that our efforts are helping our customers in their own strategic initiatives improve the impact 
that we all have on the planet": Westpac, above n 191. Similarly, ANZ's property and facil ities 
manager Jones Lang LaSalle (J LL) "has replicated ANZ' s supply chai n management model for 51 
of its own suppl iers who are involved in A Z business and have a significant impact on ANZ's 
energy, waste and recycling footprint": ANZ, Corporate Responsibility: Engagement - Supplier 
Relationships, 
<http ://www.anz.eom.au/about%2Dus/corporate%2Dresponsibility/supply%2Dchain/engagement/> 
viewed 30 July 20 11. 
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2.4 Where to Next? Leadership and Industry Evolution 
Arguably there is enonnous potential for what the banking industry, acting as a whole, can 
achieve in mitigation of climate change and the move to a low-carbon global economy. 
Through the banking industry's own practices and its influence on other corporate actors 
there is the possibility of more than just linear flow-on effects from banks to clients and 
suppliers. There is also the potential for exponential change through client and supplier 
networks as more businesses set benchmarks not only for their own corporate governance 
climate strategies but also for their clients and suppliers, which then set such standards for 
their own clients and suppliers, and so on in an ever-widening web of corporate change. 
This phenomenon can be captured in the phrase ' network change potential '. In terms of 
GHG emissions reduction, this unique and subtle potential for network change could be 
more effective than targeting a carbon-intensive entity, such as a coal-fired plant or oil 
company. 
As a whole, the banking industry is just now beginning to understand the impacts and 
opportunities of climate change on banking business and policy. The majority of banks are 
still in the information-gathering stage. 201 The Ceres Report and the SAM Report evidence 
that a growing number of banks, particularly in Europe, Australia and the USA, are taking 
action in response to climate change202 by not only setting internal reduction targets, but 
also boosting financing for clean energy projects and climate-related equity research. 203 
However, in those reports, only a few of the banks evaluated had started integrating climate 
risks into their core business of lending. Moreover, many banks had "done little or nothing 
to elevate climate change as a governance priority" such as board involvement in climate 
change, adoption of ri sk management policies or lending procedures that address climate 
201 Ceres Report, above n 81 , i. 
202 SAM Report gave "total climate scores" as follows: Oceania 86, Europe 77, North America 65, 
South America 55, Asia 49: above n 8 I, 23, 29. The four highest-scoring banks were ANZ, 
Westpac, UBS, and HBOS, followed by Citigroup and Santander. The Ceres Report did not 
investigate Oceania banks. The five highest scoring banks in the Ceres Report were all based in 
Europe (HSBC, ABN AMRO, Barclays, HBOS, Deutsche Bank), followed by five American banks 
(Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley): Ceres Report, 
above n 81, i. 
203 Ceres Report, ibid, ii. 
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change in a systematic way, formal calculation of carbon risk in loan portfolios, and 
reduction or avoidance of lending or investment in carbon-intensive projects. 204 Based on 
the clear relationship between banks and climate change, the Ceres President has stated that 
the industry "must do more to move the economy away from fossi l fuels and high-carbon 
investments that are exacerbating climate change". 205 
However, by 'following the leaders ' and focusing on the practices of early mover banks we 
may glimpse what is yet to come. The reason to do this is evidenced by the transformation 
of the global banking industry toward sustainable development. Jeucken's empirical 
research showed that banks did not account for sustainable development or environmental 
considerations in the 1980s as they "were not interested in their own environmental 
situation or that of their clients". 206 Yet, from 1990 to 1995 risk management issues such as 
lender liability raised bank industry awareness. From 1995 focus moved from risk 
assessment to "internal environmental care" to the development of environment-related 
policy, products and departments. 207 From the late- l 990s, early mover banks started 
innovating on the basis of sustainability to develop new products, such as green investment 
funds. 208 
In 2001 Jeucken asserted that "though the banking sector has been slow to pick up the 
challenge of sustainability, change is underway"; however he was clear in stating that the 
sector as a whole was lagging behind the 'pro-active banks' or leaders. 209 He opined that 
" [t]he main herd of the banks" at that time was "largely inactive'', with the business case 
204 Ibid. Likewise, the SAM Report found that very few banks in the sample had: ( I) 
"comprehensively integrated" climate-related aspects into their business processes; and (2) assigned 
responsibility for climate-related issues to board level, although a number of banks indicated that 
they would endeavour to integrate climate-related aspects into their business processes: above n 81 , 
8, 35. The CDP also urged the financial sector to prioritise climate change: SAM Report, above n 
81, 89, 93. 
205 Mindy S Lubber, Ceres President, quoted in CSRwirc, 'Press Release: HSBC, Other European 
Banks to Receive Top Scores in First-Ever Ranking of 40 Leading Banks on Climate Change 
Strategies' csrwire.com (1 1 January 2008). 
206 M Jeuckcn, 'Banking and Sustainability: Slow Starters are Gaining Pace' (2002) 11 Ethical 
Corporation Magazine 44, 44. See also Jeucken, above n 77, 62-63. 
207 Jeucken 2002, ibid. 
208 Jeucken, ibid. 
209 Ibid, 48. His empirical evidence revealed that "front runners" or proactive banks equalled 30% 
of his data source, "followers" equated to 18% and "stragglers" at 53%. 
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for sustainable development policy and practice still needing to be proved to them.210 He 
noted that many banks did not see the role that they could and perhaps should play towards 
sustainable development. Eleven years on, it can be argued that environmental and social 
considerations have become mainstreamed into banking business and industry frameworks. 
Evidence includes creation of sustainability indices such as the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Group Index and the FTSE4Good Index Series, sustainability-oriented banking products 
such as venture capital and hedge fund products for environmental innovations, 2 11 and 
industry awards such as the Sustainable Banking Awards for which mainstream banks are 
now shortlisted alongside niche ethical banks.2 12 
This evolution of banks and sustainable development creates a precedent that mobilisation 
of the banking industry is possible, even probable, in relation to climate change. It is a 
logical progression given that climate change comes under the umbrella of 'sustainable 
development' and, as depicted throughout this chapter, has indirect impact on fundamental 
aspects of banking business. Indeed, it can be argued that the analogy is already playing 
out. Initially, from the mid-l 990s to the early half of last decade, banks had no or little 
regard for climate change deeming it not relevant to their operations. Since then, early 
moving banks have taken a lead on the issue and started to break away from 'the herd' to 
account for climate-related risk and opportunities. As described throughout this chapter, 
they are doing so by developing climate-related risk assessment and 
lending/financing/investment practices, creating innovative products and services, and 
participating in markets that are dedicated to carbon reduction. Integrating climate change 
into banking business practice may yet become an industry norm. The question is what 
would it take for this to happen? 
At present we live in a time of regulatory uncertainty regarding climate change. There is no 
international agreement set to take the place of the Kyoto Protocol, and national/regional 
210 Ibid, 44. 
21 1 Also microfinance and voluntary projects in local communities: ibid, 44, 47-48. 
212 These awards are co-sponsored by the Financial Times and the IFC: Jenkins, above n 134. 
Undoubtedly banks can do more to facilitate sustainable development. The point is that very few 
banks exist today that do not account for environmental and social factors in their own business 
practices and the practices of their corporate clients and suppliers that could impact upon bank 
business. 
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climate change regulation is emerging and variable with some jurisdictions yet to legislate a 
carbon price and/or incentivize low-carbon technologies. Despite this regulatory 
uncertainty within and between jurisdictions, early moving banks have voluntarily made 
changes in recent years by uptaking and outputting climate-related practices and products. 
There is clear importance in investigating the drivers of climate-related actions by these 
banks in order to theorise about implications for whole-of-industry change. The next 
chapter begins this investigation by reviewing extant literature on 'why companies go 
green'. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review: 'Why Do 
Companies Go Green?' 
3.0 Overview 
Two points are evident from Chapters 1 and 2. First, "[c] limate finance is an essential part 
of the solution to global wam1ing", 213 and second, early moving banks are voluntarily 
entering climate-related markets and adopting climate-related products and practices. 
The key question is why are early-moving banks making these changes voluntarily? 
Through an investigation of this question we can better understand the drivers for and 
barriers to climate-related uptake, and the potential implications of these motivations for 
mainstreaming 'enlightened' practices in the banking industry. This chapter and Chapter 5 
will endeavour to answer that question from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. 
This chapter provides a review of relevant literature and theoretical approaches to 'why 
companies go green'. Chapter 5 will present empirical data and analysis on the specific 
question of what drives early moving banks to adopt climate-related practices. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation conceptualises theory into three lenses of focus. It posits that literature at 
the intra-organisational (micro), inter-organisational (meso) and socio-cultural (macro) 
levels can provide insights about the internal and external influences on corporate 
environmental behavior. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the following bodies of 
literature. First, the risks and opportunities identified in Chapter 2 suggest that a meso level 
business case drives climate-related action by early moving banks. As such, the largest 
portion of this chapter, and the focus of this dissertation, concerns the business strategy and 
213 Richardson 2009, above n 74, 624. 
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the business and society literatures that give particular attention to business case and CSR 
motivations for voluntary corporate change. Second, at a macro level, institutional theory 
goes beyond business case theorising to highlight the importance of rules and norms in 
shaping the behavior of corporate actors. This sub-section focuses on isomorphism and 
mimetic behavior as institutional processes of corporate change. Finally, the chapter 
reviews theories about micro level managerial decision-making as an internal driver of 
corporate behavioral change. 
It is acknowledged that these theoretical lenses or levels are not neatly self-contained or 
mutually exclusive. Previous scholars have noted that levels are "nested" within each 
other214 and can influence each other, 215 and that therefore there is merit in integrating 
different levels of analysis and theoretical perspectives to enrich our understanding of 
change processes. 216 This dissertation acknowledges the value of integration given that, for 
example, individual preferences (micro) are often shaped by socio-cultural influences 
(macro) and/or firm policy (meso). In terms of drivers, there may be multiple levels 
operating simultaneously. This dissertation will highlight salient multi-level interactions 
identified in the literatures and the data. However, due to its necessarily limited scope and 
acknowledging Scott's statement that "no one study attempts to comprehend all meanings 
and levels", 217 particular attention is given to meso level drivers with some discussion of 
micro and macro level influences on corporate behaviour and change. 
214 WR Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Foundations for Organisational Science (Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008), I 93. 
215 For example, institutional pressures can be filtered and interpreted by organizational factors and 
individual decision-makers: MA Delmas and MW Toffel, Institutional Pressures and 
Organizational Characteristics: implications for Environmental Strategy (Harvard Business School 
Working Paper I 1-050, 2010). 
216 Eg Bansal and Roth, who demonstrate that "a firm's ecological responsiveness is directly related 
to the ecological, inter-organizational , and individual levels of analysis": P Bansal and K Roth, 
'Why Companies Go Green: A Model of Ecological Responsiveness' (2000) 43( 4) Academy of 
Management Journal 717, 733. See also Parker, who states that the "wide spectrum of world views 
and theoretical lenses that operate at the macro and micro level s" can enrich knowledge: LO Parker, 
'Social and Environmental Accountability Research: A View From the Commentary Box' (2005) 
18(6) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 842, 856. Also Adams and Whelan, who 
opine that the promotion of one theoretical explanation to deny the explanatory power of other 
approaches has the potential to obfuscate understanding: C Adams and G Whelan, 'Conceptualising 
Future Change in Corporate Sustainability Reporting ' (2009) 22(1) Accounting, Auditing & 
AccountabilityJournal 118, I 19. 
217 Scott, above n 214, 219. 
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3.2 Meso level: Organizational Field Level Drivers of 
Change 
Business and society scholars have endeavoured to explicate voluntary corporate change 
that responds to environmental and/or social issues. This literature postulates that 
companies can and should engage with CSR in order to be socially or environmentally 
responsible beyond their legal or economic obligations. A related body of scholarship is 
evinced in the business strategy literature, which focuses on business case reasons - such as 
profit enhancement and risk mitigation - for 'doing good'. The business strategy literature 
investigates whether adopting social or environmental initiatives is 'win-win', 'win-lose' or 
variable for the corporate bottom line. Accordingly, this section begins by reviewing the 
business and society literature, with particular attention to ethical versus pragmatic 
conceptions of CSR, before reviewing the business strategy literature on the business case 
as a driver of corporate greening. 
3.2.1 CSR: short history and lack of conceptual clarity 
The literature reveals CSR as a moving targct 21 8 that defies universal definition. 219 It 
embodies a spectrum of meaning and activity, with ethically-based philanthropic 'do-
gooding' at one end and 'sound business management' at the other. At the heart of the 
concept lies reference to voluntary and unenforceable action beyond that which is required 
by law. Yet definitional debate remains as to whether such action must be the product of 
ethical motivation or whether ' enlightened self-interest' is sufficient, 220 such as protecting 
reputation, relieving social pressures, or simply cutting costs. 221 
218 N Churchill , 'Toward a Theory of Social Accounting' (1974) 15(3) Sloan Management Review 
I 
219 See, eg, A Dahlsrud, 'How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: An Analysis of 37 
Definitions' (2008) 15 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management I. 
220 GD Keim, 'Corporate Social Responsibility: An Assessment of the Enlightened Self-Interest 
Model' (1978) 3( l) Academy o,f Management Review 32. 
221 AB Carroll, 'Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct' (1999) 
38(3) Business and Society 268; G Auld, S Bernstein and B Cashore, 'The New Corporate Social 
Responsibility' (2008) 33 Annual Review a/Environment and Resources 20.1. 
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The notion of CSR dates back to the l 950s,222 with Bowen's exploration of the obl igation 
of business to make decisions and take actions that are "desirable in terms of the objectives 
and values of our society". 223 By the 1970s, and against a background of protests against 
capitalism, 224 publications coalesced around the notion that business had "some form of 
social responsibility over and above its responsibility to perform economically" 225 and 
beyond "narrow ... technical and legal requirements of the firm". 226 van Oosterhout and 
Heugens contend that an implicit 'justificatory stance" of CSR research began at this time, 
whereby authors sought to prove "that CSR is desirable, either in its own right . .. or because 
it is in the long-term economic interest of corporations"227 and that this normative bias has 
shaped ensuing CSR scholarship and debate. 228 
Since the 1970s, there has been a proliferation of theories, terminology and approaches in 
the field of CSR scholarship. While a number of authors have made recent attempts to 'map 
the territory' and classify CSR theories into coherent groupings, 229 there has been little 
222 J van Oosterhout and P Heugens, 'Much Ado About Nothing: A Conceptual Critique of 
Corporate Social Responsibility ' in A Crane, A Mc Williams, D Matten, J Moon, and DS Siegel 
(eds) The Oxford Handhook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
UK, 2008), 200. 
223 HR Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (Harper and Row, New York, I 953), 6. 
224 D Mele, 'Corporate Social Responsibility Theories' in A Crane, A Mc Williams, D Matten, J 
Moon and DS Siegel (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford UK, 2008), 50. 
225 
van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 200. Those publications include: WC Frederick, 'The 
growing concern over business responsibility' ( 1960) 2( 4) California Management Review 54; K 
Davis and RL Blomstrom, Business and its Environment (McGraw Hill , New York, 1966); C 
Walton, Corporate Social Responsibilities (Wadsworth, Belmont CA, 1967). 
226 K Davis, 'The Case for and against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities' (1973) 
16(2) Academy of Management Journal 312, 312. 
227 
van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 200 (emphasis added) . 
228 Ibid. 
229 See: D Windsor, 'Corporate Social Responsibility: Three Key Approaches' (2006) 43(1) Journal 
of Management Studies 93, who categorises three key approaches being "ethical responsibility 
theory", "economic responsibility theo.ry" and "corporate citizenship theory"; M ele, above n 224, 
who discusses four theories of CSR being "corporate social performance", "shareholder value 
theory", "stakeholder theory", and "corporate citizenship theory"; and E Garriga and D Mele, 
'Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory' (2004) 53(1-2) Journal of 
Business Ethics 51, who similarly group CSR theories into four categories of economics, politics, 
social integration, and ethics. These authors develop similar substantive categories but employ 
different terminology to describe them, for example, the "ethical responsibility theory" category in 
Windsor loosely translates to "Stakeholder theory" in Mele, and " ethical theories" in Garriga and 
Mele. See also RJ Klonoski , ' Foundational Considerations in the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Debate' (1991) 34( 4) Business Horizons 9, who distinguishes three different kinds of theories 
namely "fundamentalism" or shareholder wealth maximization, moral agency of the firm, and 
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progress in constructing of a systematic conceptual framework. 230 As such, "[ n ]o consensus 
yet exists ... about an appropriate taxonomy for CSR, let alone its main forms and ends."231 
This lack of conceptual clarity around CSR is largely due to a lack of definitional 
consensus on its composition. In their article Much Ado About Nothing, van Oosterhout and 
Heugens assert that "no satisfactory intensional definition of CSR - one that specifies with 
precision and clarity which conjunction of attributes makes up the concept - is available" 
nor, they argue, can one be expected. 232 But this is not for want of trying. An often-cited 
starting point is Carroll's definition of CSR as comprising "the economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at any point in time". 233 Yet the 
conceptual difficulties do not lie with the economic and legal duties of companies. As noted 
by van Oosterhout and Heugens, even "a one-eyed neoclassical economist like Milton 
Friedman"234 can acknowledge a company's responsibility to increase its profits "within 
the rules of the game". 235 The real debate is about the discretionary and ethical 
responsibilities of business. 236 This brings us to the normative dimension of CSR, detailed 
below. 
For those who situate CSR within a normative framework, CSR is intimately connected to 
issues of social justice and environmental ethics. From this perspective, "business . .. is an 
political and ethical theories that emphasize the social dimensions of business. Basu and Palazzo 
attempt to explain CSR activities through a lens of organizational scnsemaking: K Basu and G 
Palazzo, 'Corporate Social Responsibility: A Process Model of Sensemaking' (2008) 33( I) 
Academy of Management Review 122. 
230 0 h . d van osterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 200. See also: Carroll, above n 221, w o rev1ewe 
over 25 different ways that CSR is defined in academia; and Dahlsrud, above n 2 J 9, who analysed 
over 37 definitions. 
231 B Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21'' Century (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 
2010),34. 
232 
van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 216. Dahlsrud similarly opines that, as a social 
construct, CSR is incapable of a universal definition and will always be to subject to bias: Dahlsrud, 
above n 219, 2. 
233 AB Carroll, 'A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Perfonnance' (1979) 4(4) 
Academy of Management Review 497, 500. See also AB Carroll and KM Shabana, 'The Business 
Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice' (2010) 
12( I) international Journal of Management Reviews 85, 95. 
234 
van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 202. 
235 M Friedman and RD Friedman Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1962), 133. 
236 
van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 202. 
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activity embedded in the larger society with an obligation to the common good of 
society". 237 This is a distinctly prescriptive, philosophical approach 238 that entreats 
corporations to voluntarily exhibit greater responsibility and accountability to society at 
large. 239 On this view, CSR can be defined as " the notion that corporations have an 
obligation to constituent groups in society other than [share]holders and beyond that 
prescribed by law or union contract"240 and that "business and society are interwoven rather 
than distinct entities". 24 1 
Some authors observe that this definition of CSR emphasises obligation242 and implies a 
social contract between business and society. 243 Others have described the basis of ethical 
theories in CSR as 'the right thing to do' 244 with some empirical studies finding that 
companies have acted on this basis. For example, Kesidou and Demiral found that UK 
companies that had adopted environmental management systems were "driven by 
ethical/strategic (ie. CSR)" motivations as well as regulatory ones. 245 Similarly, Bansal and 
237 CR Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business (Oxford University 
Press, New York, l 992), cited in JM Shepard, M Betz and L O'Connell, 'The Proactive 
Corporation: Its Nature and Causes' (1997) 16 Journal of Business Ethics I 001, I 006 (emphasis 
added). 
238 LE Preston, 'Corporation and Society: the Search for a Paradigm' ( 1975) 13 Journal of 
Economic Literature 434. 
239 Carroll, above n 221; Davis, above n 226; TM Jones, 'Corporate Social Responsibility revisited, 
redefined' (1980) 22(2) California Management Review 59; AG Steiner, Business and Society 
(Random House, New York, 1975). 
240 Jones, ibid, 59-60 
241 DJ Wood, 'Corporate Social Performance Revisited' ( 1991) 164 Academy of Management 
Journal 691, 695. 
242 B O'Dwyer, 'Conceptions of Corporate Social Responsibility: The Nature of Managerial 
Capture' (2003) 16( 4) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 523, 526-27; B Mitnick, 
'Systematics and CSR: The Theory and Processes of Normative Referencing' (1995) 34(1) Business 
and Society 5. 
243 RH Gray, DL Owen, and CA Adams, ' Corporate Social Reporting: Accounting and 
Accountability ' (Prentice-Hall, London, 1988); SL Wartick and PL Cochran, 'The Evolution of the 
corporate social performance model ' (1985) 10(4) Academy of Management Review 758. 
244 Garriga and Mcie, above n 229, 60. See also: JC Borek and C Cogliancsc, Beyond Compliance: 
Explaining Business Participation in Voluntary Environmental Programs (University of 
Pennsylvania Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-04, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 12-06, 7 June 2011 ); I Jackson and J Nelson, Profits 
with Principles (Currency/Doubleday, New York, 2004). 
245 E Kesidou and P Demirel, Motivations for Organisational Eco-Innovations: Adoption of 
Environmental Management Systems by UK Companies (Nottingham University Business School 
Research Paper No. 20 J 2-0 I, I 0 January 2012), I. See J Gonzalez-Benito and 0 Gonzalez-Benito, 
' An Analysis of the Relationship Between Environmental Motivations and IS014001 Certification' 
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Roth found that a small number of firms in their sample were motivated to 'go green' on 
the basis of "ecological responsibility", a term which emphasised the ethical/obligation 
aspects of CSR ratherthan self-interest. 246 
Jn this vein, ' corporate citizenship' has emerged as a prominent term in CSR-management 
literature to describe the '"rightful ' place [of business] in society, next to other 'citizens', 
with whom the corporation forms a community." 247 Whilst this literature lacks definitional 
clarity, 248 the pervasive image of the firm as a 'good corporate citizen ' is of "the 'good 
guy' next door who cares for you" as opposed to an impersonal or inhumane power-
player. 249 Indeed, some management scholars have presented an 'extended view' of 
corporate citizenship whereby corporations "enter the arena of citizenship at the point of 
government failure to protect citizenship" 250 and thereby fulfil a quasi-governmental role in 
solving social problems. 251 
Yet broad, normative notions of CSR have been accused of ambiguity and vagueness,252 
which confound efforts to operationalise CSR by business. Concepts of ethical CSR and 
idealised citizenship emphasize altruism and voluntary self-restraint; they assert 
"undesirably broad" corporate duties and stakeholder rights. 253 The WBCSD found that a 
(2005) 16(2) British Journal of Management 133, who found that Spanish companies that adopted 
J SO 1400 l were driven by both ethical and competitive motivations. 
246 Bansal and Roth, above n 2 I 6, 728. 
247 A Crane, D Matten and J Moon, 'The Emergence of Corporate Citizenship: Historical 
Development and Alternative Perspectives' in AG Scherer and G Palazzo (eds) Handbook of 
Research on Global Corporate Citizenship (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008), 28. See also: 
Solomon, above n 237, 184; and S Waddell, 'New Institutions for the Practice of Corporate 
Citizenship: Historical, Intcrsectorial, and Developmental Perspectives' (2000) I 05( 1) Business and 
Society Review I 07. 
248 Crane et al, ibid, 28. See also: Mele, above n 224, 70, 74; and Garriga and Mele, above n 229, 
57. 
249 Crane et al , ibid, 26-27. 
250 Mele, above n 224, 70. 
251 Matten D and Chapple W, 'Behind the Mask: Revealing the True Face of Corporate Citizenship' 
(2003) 45( I) Journal of Business E1hics I 09; Matten D and Crane A, 'Corporate Citizenship: 
Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization' (2005) 30( I) Academy of Management Review 
166; Crane et al, above n 247, 30-3 I, 36-38. 
252 See, cg, MBE Clarkson, 'A Stakeholder Framework for Analysing and Evaluating Corporate 
Social Performance' (1995) 20(1) Academy of Management Review 92; MT Jones, 'Missing the 
Forest for the Trees: A Critique of the Social Responsibility Concept and Discourse ' ( 1996) 35(1) 
Business and Society 7. 
25' 0 Windsor, above n 229, 96. 
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common business reaction to CSR in practice is: "Corporate social responsibility is a very 
broad agenda. Please give us something we can do differently on Monday morning to make 
things happen" . 254 
More specifically, Henry Bosch AO, former Australian National Companies and Securities 
Commission chainnan, has opined that "that the only common denominator [in CSR 
discourse] is a wann cuddly glow". 255 Holliday, Schmidheiny and Watts similarly call for a 
more pragmatic and less ' fuzzy ' approach, arguing that implementation of CSR must be 
business-directed. 
Leading companies are making up their own versions of CSR as they go along, and 
this is as it should be, for companies must guarantee a good fit with their own 
market realities. 256 
Arguably, a pragmatic, self-interested approach to CSR transmutes its ethical nature. For 
example, Gustavson argues that the network of entities supporting CSR in Australia was 
framed within the context of ethics until the mid-l 990s since which time there has been a 
notable "shift away from CSR as ethics to CSR as risk management and as a tool for 
driving profit."257 But why might this be? Windsor asserts that a corporate preference for 
an 'economic approach ' to CSR belies a political philosophy of efficiency-oriented 
utilitarianism 258 and a belief that companies contribute to society just by being 
profitable. 259 For some other authors the conceptual shift (or "revision" 260 ) in CSR 
discourse away from ethics and toward pragmatism and self-interest, is seen as a 'maturing' 
of CSR. For example, Frederick 261 traces the transition from 'CSR 1' being "the 
254 World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) Corporate Social 
Re.sponsibility: Making Good Business Sense (WBCSD, Geneva, 2000), 5. 
255 H Bosch, 'Corporate Social Responsibility: Submission in Response to the Invitation of the 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee from Henry Bosch AO' (24 February 2006), 4: 
<http://www.camac.gov .au/camac/camac.nsti'byHeadline/PDFSubmissions _ 2/$file/HBosch _ CSR.p 
df.> viewed 22 January 2012. 
256 CO Holliday, S Schmidheiny and P Watts, Walking the Talk: The Business Case for Sustainable 
Development (Greenleaf, Sheffield, 2002), 11 3. 
257 R Gustavson, ' Australia: Practices and Experiences' in SO Jdowu and WL Filho (eds) Global 
Practices of Corporate Social Responsibility (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2009) 4 77, 4 72. 
258 Windsor, above n 229, 96. 
259 See also The Economist, ' Survey: The good company' 374(8410) The Economist (22 January 
2005), which argues that capitalism contributes to societal wellbeing. 
260 
van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 216. 
261 WC Frederick, 'From CSR I to CSR2: The Maturing of Business-and-Society Thought' ( 1994) 
33 Business & Society 150 (an article based on a 1978 working paper). 
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philosophical-ethical concept of corporate social responsibility" as corporations' obligation 
to work for social betterment to "the action-oriented managerial concept of corporate social 
responsiveness" or the capacity of a corporation to respond to social pressure being 
'CSR2' .262 He contends that the latter is more proactive and pragmatic than the fomier. 263 
Similarly, Carroll has argued that the lack of ethical or moral threads running through 
'social responsiveness' makes it less problematic than a broad (ethics based) conception of 
CSR. 264 Indeed, Sethi has recommended that a broad conception of CSR be supplanted by 
this narrow notion of managerial ' corporate social responsiveness' due to its operational 
focus. 265 
However, protagonists of the ethical dimension contend that such a narrow view of CSR is 
"insufficient and myopic"; 266 and that the fundamental nature of CSR is Jost when an 
ethical dimension is replaced with the unexceptional notion of 'business as usual' (BAU). 
For example, O'Dwyer notes that the "core concern" of ' corporate social responsiveness ' is 
"society's impact on business rather than business's impact on society" with the result that 
" it is business which decides on the level of its social response and economic issues take 
clear precedence over social [or environmental] issues." 267 As such ' responsiveness' is not 
viewed as a complementary concept to 'responsibility' with the former displacing the latter 
in "an effort to treat as a management issue one which had been predominantly treated as a 
social and/or ethical issue."268 
262 Ibid, 150. 
263 Frederick went on to third and fourth iterations of CSR, namely CSR3 'corporate social 
rectitude' and CSR4 'cosmos, science, religion'. These iterations have not gained widespread 
acceptance. See: WC Frederick, 'Toward CSR3: Why Ethical Analysis is Indispensable and 
Unavoidable in Corporate Affairs' (1986) 28(2) California Management Review 126; and WC 
Frederick, 'Moving to CSR4: what to pack for the trip ' (1998) 3 7(1) Business and Society 40. 
264 Carroll , above n 233, 500-502. 
265 
cg SP Sethi, 'Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility ' (1975) I 7(3) California 
Management Review 58. Note, however, Carroll suggests that "responsiveness is but one ... aspect 
to be addressed if corporate social performance is to be acceptable": ibid, 503. 
266 Windsor, above n 229, 96. 
267 O'Dwyer, above n 242, 527. See also: Frederick 1986, above n 263; and SP Sethi, 'A Conceptual 
Framework For Environmental Analysis of Social Issues and Evaluation of Business Response 
Patterns' (1979) 4(1) Academy of Management Review 63. 
268 O'Dwyer, ibid, 527, citing RW Ackerman and RA Bauer, Corporate Social Responsiveness 
(Reston Publishing, Reston, VA, 1976), vii. O'Dwyer demonstrated this phenomenon with an 
empirical study of how 29 senior executives in Ireland perceive the concept of corporate social 
responsibility. He found that (a) the dominant managerial view of CSR was one of economic self-
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A number of scholars, particularly in the social environmental accounting field, have 
termed such displacement as 'middle-way' framing 269 and ' managerial or corporate 
capture' 270 of the debate over the meaning of CSR. In short, this comprises "a perceived 
necessity or desire to capture and control conceptions of CSR within conventional business 
norms", 
271 that is, within the parameters of BAU. In so doing, corporations may "subtly 
dismiss" 272 the tensions between growth and ' nature' 273 and/or the societal and ethical 
obligations implicit in a broad conception of CSR. 274 For example, in cross-industry 
interviews at 25 UK companies, Spence found that: 
All socio-economic [or non-commercial] concerns had to be harnessed to a business 
case in some fashion to the extent that it seemed as though the starting point for 
CSR is not any notion of social responsibility as such, but that anything that 
organisations do in the CSR field must bolster their own interests in some way. 275 
Specifically, some scholars in the corporate environmental management literature argue 
that business discourse can perpetuate the 'appropriation ' of social and environmental 
issues by "translating them into [corporate] economic and risk based language". 276 For 
example, Kearins, Collins and Tregidga 277 argue that the concept of 'nature' has been 
transformed and supplanted in business discourse by 'environment', a term which is not 
only more manageable for business but also more vulnerable to exploitation by it in the 
interest, although (b) there were pockets of resistance to this 'managerial capture' of CSR when 
managers' "personal perspectives clashed with an imposed corporate perspective": 532. 
269 MJ Milne, H Tregidga and S Walton, 'Words not actions! The Ideological Role Of Sustainable 
Development Reporting' (2009) 22(8) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 1211. 
270 Egs: O'Dwyer, above n 242; R Gray, R Kouhy and S Lavers, ' Corporate Social and 
Environmental Reporting: A Review of the Literature and a Longitudinal Study of UK Disclosure' 
(1995) 8(2) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 47; T Tinker, C Lehman, and M 
Neimark, 'Falling Down the Hole in the Middle of the Road: Political Quietism in Corporate Social 
Reporting' (199 J) 4(2) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 28; C Spence, 'Social and 
Environmental Reporting and Hegemonic Discourse' (2007) 20(6) Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal 855. 
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272 Ibid, 524 
273 K Kearins, E Collins and H Tregidga, 'Beyond Corporate Environmental Management to a 
Consideration of Nature in Visionary Small Enterprise' (20 I 0) 49(3) Business and Society 512. 
274 O'Dwyer, above n 242, 524. 
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- Spence, above n 270, 869. 
276 M Power, 'Auditing and Environmental Expertise: Between Protest and Professionalization' 
(199 1) 4(3) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 30, 39. See also M Mi lne, K Kearins 
and S Walton, 'Creating Adventures in Wonderland: The Journey Metaphor and Environmental 
Sustainability ' (2006) 13(6) Organization 801. 
277 Kearins et al, above n 273. 
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pursuit of BAU. Their case research of three visionary small enterprises (or ' ecopreneurs') 
in New Zealand revealed "fundamental differences between a conception of nature-centred 
business and a more business-pragmatic one where nature is seen as somehow separate 
from business", 278 with adverse consequences for the natural environment. 
Overall, at the heart of the CSR conceptual debate is the issue of what distinguishes CSR 
initiatives from everyday business or BAU. 279 Clearly, this debate about the discretionary 
and ethical responsibilities of corporations over and above their legal and economic 
obligations shows that the features of CSR are still ambiguous. Clearly, CSR is a contested 
concept instead of an established one despite its existence in academic and industry 
discourse for over 60 years. 280 
Some scholars have postulated recently that the main reason for conceptual dissonance is 
because "the CSR concept evolved from predominantly normative origins"281 which has 
created a normative bias in CSR theorizing. 282 Conception of the word ' responsibility' in 
the phrase 'CSR ' is " located in normative space"283 and both discourse and research have 
tended to focus on the 'ought' and not the ' is'. Indeed, van Oosterhout and Heugens write 
that: 
Rather than resulting from an attempt to explain actual business behavior, it was the 
normative debate about whether corporations had social resgonsibilities over and 
above their economic self-interest that sparked CSR research. 84 
In other words, the CSR concept arose not from the question of why companies actually go 
green but from normative discussion about why they ought to go green. 
278 Ibid, 5 13. 
279 As noted in van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 202. 
280 Ibid, 202, 216. 
281 Ibid, 201 (emphasis in original). 
282 Ibid. See also: Mele, above n 224, 76; and Matten and Chapple, above n 25 1. 
283 
van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 204. 
284 Ibid, 20 I. Cf Davis, above n 226. 
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3.2.2 The Business Case for 'Doing Good' 
Literature that endeavours to explain and theorise actual 'real-life ' corporate change 
revolves predominantly around ' the business case' . Referred to by some authors as ' the 
business case for (corporate) sustainability' 285 it is described as "a company ... voluntarily 
doing something that improves not only its economic performance in absolute terms, but 
also its environmental and social performance." 286 Steger focuses on a 'value' increase, 
namely increase to shareholder value through dividends and share prices. 287 Salzmann 
focuses on 'profit' increase by defining the business case for sustainability as a "strategic 
and profit-driven corporate response to environmental and social issues caused through the 
organization's primary and secondary activities". 288 Regardless, the dominant thread of 
business case research is that CSR is something business should do in order to get ahead. 
That is, business will 'do well by doing good '. 289 
The 'win-win '/ 'win-lose' literature 
Salzmann et al. note that the business case has been approached by business, NGOs and 
academics "in many different ways to prove or disprove the sound economic rationale for 
corporate sustainability management". 290 ln particular, debate has focused on whether 
adopting and incorporating environmental and social initiatives into business activities has 
a positive or negative impact on the corporate bottom line. In other words, whether 
"decreasing the environmental impact and improving the social impact creates economic 
value, or an economic advantage over social and environmental laggards." 291 This 
encapsulates the notion of CSR - and its more environmental-specific equivalent ' corporate 
285 0 Salzmann, A Ionescu-Somers and U Steger, 'The Business Case for Corporate Sustainability: 
Literature Review and Research Options' (2005) 23( 1) European Management Journal 27, 27; U 
Steger (ed), The Business of Sustainability: Building Industry Cases for Corporate Sustainability 
(Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2004), 39. 
286 St .b .d · eger, 1 1 . 
287 Ibid, 38. 
288 Salzmann, above n 285, 27. 
289 C Laszio, How the World 's Companies Are Doing Well by Doing Good (Greenleaf, Sheffield, 
2008) 
290 Salzmann, above n 285 , 27. 
29 1 Ibid. 
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environmental responsibility' (CER) 292 - as 'win-win ' or 'win-lose' for company 
profitability. 
The literature on this topic is described by Adams and Whelan as having a pragmatic 
undergirding based on the recognition that corporations in capitalist nations are required to 
maximise profits and thus engage only with socio-environmental activities that increase 
profits. 293 This situation reflects Milton Friedman's famous assertion that: 
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society 
as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make 
as much money for their stockholders as possible. 294 
Jn the years following Friedman's assertion it became de rigueur for commentators to 
condemn it. Yet now, as David Vogel points out: 
many contemporary advocates of CSR have implicitly accepted Friedman 's 
position ... But they have added a twist: in order for companies to [create wealth for 
their shareholders], they must now act virtuously. 295 
Whilst notions of 'enlightened self-interest' had been circulating since 1954,296 the 'win-
win/win-lose' debate began in earnest in the 1990s. Eco-efficiency was one of the early 
292 CER, like CSR, is a variously defined concept. For example, an expansive definition of CER is 
that a company "fully embraces sustainability and has a net positive impact on the environment and 
society" and operates "within the finite ecological limits of the environment": per A Jamison, M 
Raynolds, P Holroyd, E Veldman and K Tremblett, Defining Corporate Environmental 
Responsibility: Canadian ENGO Perspectives (The Pembina Institute and Pollution Probe, Toronto, 
2005), iv. Gunningham provides a more narrow, ' effects-oriented' definition, namely "practices that 
benefit the environment (or mitigate the adverse impact of business on the environment) that go 
beyond those that companies are legally obliged to carry out": N Gunningham, 'Shaping Corporate 
Environn1ental Performance: A Review' (2009) 19 Environmental Policy and Governance 215, 
2 15. Gunningham's definition ofCER is adopted in this dissertation. 
293 Adams and Whelan, above n 216, 134. 
294 Friedman, above n 235, 133. Note that eight years later, Friedman stated that companies have a 
responsibility to shareholders to "make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom" : M 
Friedman, 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits ' New York Times Magazine 
(13 September 1970) 32, 32 (emphasis added). Arguably, inclusion of the words ' ethical custom' is 
a softening of his 1962 stance. However, in the final paragraph of that article, Friedman reiterates 
and confirms his 1962 position whereby operating within "the rules of the game" means that a 
company "engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud", which is a very 
limited notion of 'ethics': at 33. 
295 D Vogel , The Market.for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2005), 26. 
296 Eg P Drucker The Practice of Management (Harper, New York, 1954) who claimed that 
responsibility and profitability were compatible; see also Keim, above n 220. 
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frameworks for propounding the relevance of environmental considerations to business 
operations. 297 Eco-efficient companies were defined in 1991 by Schmidheiny and the (then) 
newly-formed Business Council for Sustainable Development 298 as " those which create 
ever more useful products and services - in other words, which add more value - while 
continuously reducing their consumption of resources and their pollution". 299 
Schmidheiny and Zorraquin 300 provided case-study evidence that beyond-compliance 
actions such as minimising emissions and energy use, recycling, and substituting hazardous 
materials, can have bottom-line benefits by cutting operating budgets and improving profit 
margins. 301 In relation to environmental regulation, Porter and van der Linde contended that 
such regulation, which had been traditionally regarded by economists as an inhibitor of 
innovation and profitability, could incentivise novel corporate approaches to pollution 
reduction and also provide savings on raw material , energy costs, and future compliance 
costs. 302 
Conversely, industry consultants Walley and Whitehead303 clarified that while the win-win 
case is laudable it is also illusory. They argued that win-win outcomes are exceptional and 
"insignificant in the face of the en01mous environmental expenditures that will never 
generate a positive financial return" and, as such, should not be the driver of a company's 
environmental strategy. 304 Akin to Friedman, they exhorted companies to "minimize the 
297 S Waage, ' Reconsidering Business from a Systems Perspective: The Shift to Sustainability-
Oriented Enterprises and Financial Systems' in S Waage (ed) Ants, Galileo and Ghandi: Designing 
the Future of Business Through Nature, Genius and Compassion (Greenleaf, Sheffield, 2003) 45. 
298 It was renamed the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) in 2000. 
299 S Schmidheiny and The Business Council for Sustainable Development, Changing Course: A 
Global Business Perspective on Development and the Environment (MlT Press, Cambridge MA, 
1991 ). 
300 Schmidheiny and Zorraquin, above n 6 I. 
3ot See also: Waage, above n 297, 46; and Holliday et al, above n 256, 83-95, 96-102. 
302 M Porter and C van der Linde, 'Green and Competitive: Ending the Stalemate' ( 1995) 
(September/October) Harvard Business Review 120; M Porter and C van der Linde, 'Toward a New 
Conception Of The Environment-Competitiveness Relationship' (1995) 9 Journal ofEconomic 
Penpectives 97. See also K Green, P Groenewegen and PS Hofman (eds) Ahead of the Curve: 
Cases of Innovation in Environmental Management (Kluwer Academic Publishers, New York, 
2001). 
303 N Walley and B Whitehead, ' It Isn 't Easy Being Green ' (1994) (May/June) Harvard Business 
Review 46. At the time of writing that article, Walley and Whitehead were both consultants in the 
New York and Cleveland offices ofMcKinsey & Company. 
304 Ibid, 46. 
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destruction of shareholder value"305 likely to be caused by such expenditure. They further 
argued that win-win advocates offered little practical guidance to managers about how to 
implement win-win strategies. 
Enter 'natural capitalism' 306 and 'ecological modernization ', 307 both of which have built on 
eco-efficiency literature by attempting to specify strategies that will "reduce environmental 
harm, create economic growth and increase meaningful employment."308 The central tenets 
of ecological modernization are that environmental and economic imperatives can be 
reconciled and that reducing costs can increase profits. Natural capitalism specifically 
posits that humans need to harness life-supporting eco-services and enhance 'resource 
productivity', which roughly equates to eco-efficiency. In relation to climate change, 
Hawken et al. use natural capital and eco-efficiency arguments to contend that the earth's 
climate can be protected not at a cost but at a profit. They argue that the climate threat 
"disappears if customers use energy as efficiently as is cost-effective", 309 which creates 
win-win results. Thus, whether a business 'believes' in climate change or not is irrelevant; 
companies should take these steps "simply because they make money."310 
Theories of natural capital and eco-efficiency are still popular today, with some authors 
recently proposing energy efficiency as the first step to climate change mitigation because 
it can radically reduce GHG emissions without radically altering existing business 
structures or financial output. 3 11 These theories have been complimented by the term 'triple 
305 Ibid, 47, 52. 
306 P Hawken, AB Lovins, and L Hunter Lovins, Natural capitalism: the Next Industrial Revolution 
(Earthscan, London, I 999). They argue that a properly functioning economy requires four types of 
capital , namely natural capital, human capital (labor, culture, intelligence, organization), financi al 
capital (cash, investments, financial instruments), and manufactured capital (factories, 
infrastructure, machines). They claim that our current economy, based on 'conventional capitalism', 
utilises the latter three forms of capital only. 
307 For good sununaries of this theory, see: A Gouldson and J Murphy, Regulatory Realities: The 
Implementation and Impact of Industrial Regulation (Earlhscan, London, 1998), 2-3 ; and J Dryzek, 
The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 1997). 
308 Hawken et al, above n 306, 11. 
309 Ibid, 243 
310 Ibid. 
311 RU Ayres and E Ayres, Crossing the Energy Divide: Movingfrom Fossil Fuel Dependence to a 
Clean-Energy Future (Prentice Hall, New York, 2010) who argue that existing energy systems can 
be radically reformed to maximise current use of fossil fuel without scientific breakthroughs. In this 
way, they argue that improvements in energy efficiency can bridge the global economy until clean 
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bottom line', 312 which denotes single (financial) bottom line accounting as insufficient for 
sustainability and requiring the inclusion of environmental and social costs and returns. 313 
Yet some ecological socialists and political economists have argued that such theories are 
fundamentall y flawed because they sit within a conventional economic paradigm314 such 
that attempts to internalise 'green ' costs can only be win-lose. 315 
Given the polarity of the win-win/win-lose debate and the reality of capita list imperatives, a 
body of theoretical and empirical literature has focused on linking corporate social and 
environmental performance (CSP) 316 to corporate financial perfonnance (CFP) with the 
aim of proving categorically whether environmental uptake creates a win-win or win-lose 
result. 
The theoretical literature has tended to revolve around stakeholder theory as espoused in 
Freeman's seminal work. 3 17 Stakeholder theory promotes consultation and dialogue 
rencwablcs can fully replace fossi l fuels. See also TR Casten, Pro-Profit, Pro-Planet: How Adam 
Smith Can Help Us Solve the Climate Crisis (Recycled Energy Development, Westmont IL, 2010) 
who argues that a market-based approach to climate change can increase energy efficiency and help 
transform the US energy system "from a gas-guzzling Hununer into a sleek, efficient hybrid": 8. 
312 J Elkington, Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21" Century Business (Capstone 
Publishing, Oxford UK, 1997). 
m Waage, above n 297, 48. 
314 Eg Joel Kovel has responded from an 'ecological socialist' perspective arguing that natural 
capitalism attempts to internalize costs and merely harnesses conventional capitalism's predilection 
for greed and growth. What we need is revolution not reform, he argues. See J Kovel, 'The 
Justifiers: A Critique of Julian Simon, Stephan Schmidheiny, and Paul Hawken on Capitalism and 
Nature' (1999) 10(3) Capitalism Nature Socialism 3, 23-32. That article became a chapter in J 
Kovel , The Enemy of Nature (Fernwood Publishing, Halifax, NS, 2002) in which Kovel argues that 
the capitalist system is necessarily eco-destructive and propounds instead a form of 'ecological 
socialism'. Sec also: DH Meadows, D Meadows and J Randers, The Limits to Growth (Universe, 
New York, 1972); and FE Trainer, 'The Limits To Growth Case Now' (1999) 19(4) The 
Environmentalist 325. 
315 Some political economists argue that a market economy is driven to externali se costs due to the 
nature of relationships between producers, consumers and the environment and the notion of 
'rational choice', which tends to be collectively irrational. They argue that externalisation is all-
pervasive in a market economy yet reliable procedures to account for externals are lacking, so any 
theory that attempts to internalise 'green' costs is erroneous and can only be win-lose. See: G 
Liodakis, 'The People- ature Relation and the Historical Significance of the Labour Theory of 
Value' (2001) 73 Capital and Class 113; and L Brown, Eco-Economy: Building an Economy for the 
Earth (WW orton, New York, 2001). 
316 A prominent definition of CSP is " the configuration in the business organization of principles of 
social responsibility, processes of response to social requirements, and policies, programs and 
tangible results that reflect the company's relations with society": Wood, above n 241, 693. 
317 RE Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman, Boston, MA, 1984). 
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between a company and its stakeholder groups3 18 in order to shape socially responsible 
corporate behaviour. This theory suggests that business strategies intended to add social 
and/or environmental value to external stakeholders wi ll also provide value to shareholders. 
"Ergo, there is no necessary tension between economic and ethical considerations." 3 19 
However, stakeholder theory makes a number of assumptions, including that (a) all 
stakeholder interests have intrinsic value, 320 (b) interests of various stakeholders are 
commensurate and equally-valued by the company, and (c) any disparate interests can be 
compromised or balanced against each other. 321 None of these assumptions are practical 
given that a wide definition of stakeholders includes "any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the corporation". 322 Moreover, in capitalist markets, it must be 
acknowledged that a company responds to the most powerful and influential (financial) 
318 Stakeholders may include government, unions, employees, consumers and clients, NGOs, and 
even competitors. 
319 JC Ludeschcr, /\Mc Williams and OS Siegel, 'The Economic View of Corporate Citizenship' in 
AG Scherer and G Palazzo (eds) Handbook ofResearch on Global Corporate Citizenship (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008), 320. 
320 T Donaldson and LE Preston, 'The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, 
and implications' (1995) 20( 1) Academy of Management Review 65, 81. 
321 ln Evan and Freeman's words, management "must look after the health of the corporation, and 
this involves balancing the multiple claims of conflicting stakeholders": WM Evan and RE 
Freeman, 'A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism' in T Beauchamp 
and N Bowie (eds) Ethical Theory and Business (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1988), 151 . 
For detail on (b) and (c) see: AM Marcoux,' A Fiduciary Argument against Stakeholder Theory ' 
(2003) 13( 1) Business Ethics Quarterly l, who argues that stakeholder theory is morally Jacking as 
it does not prioritise the fiduciary duty owed by corporation to shareholder; also DA Gioia, 
'Response: Practicability, Paradigms, and Problems in Stakeholder Theorizing' ( 1999) 24(2) 
Academy ofManagement Review 228 . 
322 Mele, above n 224, 64. 
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stakeholders. 323 Indeed, Adams and Whelan opine that stakeholder theory simply offers a 
different way of actioning shareholder wealth maximisation. 324 
Some CSR scholars have started to focus on stakeholder theory and 'va lue creation'. In so 
doing, they di fferentiate between ' profit ' and 'value', which are terms that tend to be 
conflated in the business strategy literature. 325 Conflation is unsurprising given the 
conventional financial wisdom that a rational investor desires only an increase in 
shareholder return. In contrast, authors such as Kurucz326 and Argandona 327 argue that the 
concept of 'value ' is broader than exclusively economic returns; managers need to focus on 
the relationship between a company and its stakeholders to ensure "total long-run value of 
the firm". 328 That even stockholders may value non-financial rewards is supported by a 
2005 CPA Australia survey, which found that only 34% of shareholders agreed that 
financial performance is more important then social and environmental concerns. 329 
Arguably, the very existence of 'green' investment funds and SRI ev idence that some 
323 Freeman was asked about these assumptions at a public conference. He responded that in 1984 
he had advocated for the prioritizing or 'balancing' of stakeholder interests, but he now admits that 
not all stakeholders are equal. Instead, he is now advocating for the "harmonizing" of interests and 
relationships such that "when you play different notes they sound good together." Reflecting on the 
past 25 years, Freeman emphasized the importance of a company having a clear ' purpose' "based 
on its values, that drives what it does, and with which it acts consistently": Ed Freeman 
(Stakeholder Theory Workshop, Victoria University, City Flinders campus, Melbourne, Australia, 
12 October 2010). So it appears that the 'new' Stakeholder Theory overlaps with Change 
Management theory as enunciated by authors such as Doppelt and Dunphy. See eg: Doppelt B, 
Leading Change Toward Sustainability (Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield UK, 20 I 0); and Dunphy D, 
Griffiths A and Benn S, Organizational Change For Corporate Sustainability: A Guide For 
Leaders and Change Agents of the Future (Routledge, London, 2003). 
324 Adams and Whelan, above n 2 l 6, 134. 
325 As illustrated by a recent Ernst & Young report that implies that 'stock value' is synonymous 
with 'revenue': Ernst & Young, Six Growing Trends in Corporate Sustainability (Ernst & Young 
and GreenBiz Group, New York, 2012), 6, 27. 
326 E Kurucz, B Colbert and D Wheel er, 'The Business Case For Corporate Social Responsibility' in 
A Crane, A Mc Williams, D Matten, J Moon and DS Siegel (eds), The 04ord Handbook of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 2008) on "synergistic value 
creation": 91. 
327 A Argandona, 'Stakeholder Theory and Value Creation' (IESE Business School Working Paper 
No. 922, 2011). 
328 MC Jensen, 'Non-Rational Behavior, Value Conflicts, Stakeholder Theory, and Fi1m Behavior' 
(2008) 18(2) Business Ethics Quarterly 167, 167. See also C Wheeler, B Colbert and RE Freeman, 
'Focusing on Value: Reconciling Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainability and A Stakeholder 
Approach in a Network World ' (2003) 28(3) Journal of General Management l on "sustainable 
value": 20. 
329 CPA Australia, Confidence in Corporate Reporting 2005: Detailed Findings (CPA Australia, 
Melbourne, Australia, 2005). 
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individual investors are willing to take lower financial returns if they receive personal 
'value' from investing ethically. But the fact that lower returns can be derived from socially 
responsible investments, even if investors are comfortable with that result, only undermines 
a CSP-CFP positive coITelation. 
In terms of empirical literature, Margolis and Walsh330 identified 127 studies from 1972 to 
2002 that focused on linkages between corporate environmental uptake and financial 
outcomes. 331 They noted that while the studies revealed reasonable evidence of a positive 
correlation between CSP and CFP, there were numerous methodological problems 
particularly in establishing causality. 332 A number of other authors similarly conclude that 
the CSP and CFP causal sequence remains unresolved 333 given that studies have not 
identified (a) a simple positive or negative association between CSP and CFP, or (b) if 
causality does exist, in which direction it actually fl ows. 334 Some authors reason that 
ambiguity surrounding the definition of CSR ensures that CSP-CFP studies will remain 
inconclusive. 335 
Yet these limitations in CSP-CFP research reveal insights about the appropriateness of a 
'one size fits all ' approach to business case theorizing. Salzmann opines that instrumental 
studies show that the CSP and CFP relationship is "complex and contingent on situational, 
company- and plant-specific factors". 336 Similarly, in exploring both the potential and 
limits of CSR, Vogel uses the ambiguity of the CSP-CFP correlation as evidence that there 
330 Margolis JD and Walsh JP, 'Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by 
Business' (2003) 48 Administrative Science Quarterly 268. 
33 1 See also De Bakker, P Groenewegen, F Den Hond, 'A Bibliometrical Analysis of 30 Years of 
Research and Theory on Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Social Performance' (2005) 
44(3) Business & Society 283 who identified 155 CSP papers for the same period. 
m Margolis and Walsh, above n 330, 277-78. Salzmann ct al state that methodological 
shortcomings include: not empirically testing definitions and concepts; inadequate sampling 
techniques; limited data availability; and the variety of CFP measures used (for example, 
accounting or market-derived measures which "focus on different aspects of performance and are 
subject to particular biases"): Salzmann ct al, above n 285, 30. See also van Oosterhout and 
Heugcns, above n 222, 205-210. 
333 Egs: Salzmann ct al, ibid; van Oosterhout and Hcugens, ibid; J Griffin and J Mahon, 'The 
Corporate Social Performance and Corporate Financial Performance Debate: Twenty-Five Years of 
Incomparable Research' (1997) 36( I) Business & Society 5. 
334 Salzmann et al, ibid, 28 30. 
335 See, eg van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 204 who also opine that CSP 'measurement' 
research avoids the more difficult task of intensionally defining CSR. 
336 Salzmann et al, above n 285, 30. 
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is no clear-cut business case for virtuous corporate behavior. 337 He claims that uncertainty 
1s unsurpnsmg. 
[T]he risks associated with CSR are no different than those associated with any 
other business strategy [such as advertising or marketing expenditures]; sometimes 
investments in CSR make business sense and sometimes they do not. Why should 
we expect investments in CSR to consistently create shareholder value when 
virtually no other business investments or strategies do so?338 
As such, it is unrealistic to argue that behaving more responsibly is in the self-interest of all 
firms or that engaging in CSR will always make business sense. 339 Specifically, Vogel 
contends that the market or consumer demand for virtue is not sufficiently important to 
incentivise all companies to voluntarily behave more responsibly. 340 
The 'it depends' literature 
The theses of scholars such as Salzmann and Vogel - that the business case for going 
beyond compliance will only yield benefits to specific businesses in certain circumstances -
is central to a second body of CSR/CER literature that moves beyond the win-win/win-lose 
polemic. This body of literature focuses on more nuanced notions of what drives corporate 
uptake of environmental and social strategies. 34 1 ln this dissertation, this body of 
scholarship is termed as the ' it depends' literature to acknowledge the contention that 
whether or not a business will benefit by adopting an environmental strategy depends on a 
variety of internal and contextual factors. 
The 'it depends ' literature emerged at the beginning of the millennium when a number of 
authors attempted to explain the circumstances in which CSR/CER might be best used to 
337 Vogel, above n 295, 17, 29-34. 
338 Ibid, 33. 
339 !bid, 34. 
340 Ibid, 17, 46. See also D Vogel, ' Is There A Market For Virtue? The Business Case for Corporate 
Social Responsibility' (2005) 47 California Management Review 19-45, 20. 
341 Gunningham labels this body of CER literature as "second generation": Gunningham, above n 
292, 219-22 1. Yet it can be queried whether a generational evolution has truly occurred given that 
win-win language is still in use. For example, in 2008 a report by The Economist stated that: 
"businesses should concentrate on the sweet spot where initiatives are good for both profits and 
social welfare. This is the sort of 'win-win ' situation that executives love to talk about: the smart 
thing to do as well as the right thing to do": The Economist, 'Just Good Business: A Special Report 
on Corporate Social Responsibility' The Economist ( 19 January 2008), 9 (emphasis added). 
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gain competitive advantage. Forest Reinhardt342 sought to specify the circumstances in 
which CER uptake would provide strategic advantage and concluded that whether or not 
beyond compliance environmental actions could deliver corporate bottom-line benefits 
depended on "the structure of the industry in which the business operates, its position 
within that structure and its organizational capabilities". 343 Tn order to turn environmental 
strategy into competitive advantage, Reinhardt entreated companies to identify the 
fundamental business logic, in terms of risk management and value enhancement, peculiar 
to their company and context. 344 
Writing specifically on the drivers of voluntary corporate climate-related measures, 
Andrew Hoffman345 asserts that the question 'does it pay to be green?' is the wrong one. 
He writes that the correct question is "whether there exists an economic opportunity for 
your company to be green vis-<'1-vis your competitors and then ... how and when that 
opportunity can best be achieved."346 Tn pai1icular, Hoffman notes that despite the absence 
of mandatory GHG emission reductions in the USA, business is engaging in voluntary 
climate change-related initiatives and that "many of these companies are agnostic about the 
science of climate change or the social responsibility of protecting the global climate." 347 
His conclusion is that companies go beyond compliance for "decidedly strategic" 
reasons 
348 that vary with company-specific cost/benefit analysis and business logic. 349 
Hoffman contends that corporate change will not occur without a business case to drive it. 
342 F Reinhardt, 'Environmental Product Differentiation: Implications For Corporate Strategy' 
( 1998) 40 Cal(f'ornia Management Review 43 who explored the circumstances in which a company 
might differentiate products on environmental bases. See also: F Reinhardt, 'Market Failure and the 
Environmental Policies of Firms: Economic Rationales For "Beyond Compliance" Behavior' 
( 1999) 13 .Journal of Industrial Ecology 9; and F Reinhardt, Down to Earth: Applying Business 
Principles to Environmental Management (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2000). 
343 Reinhardt 1999, ibid, 18. 
344 Reinhardt 2000, above n 342. 
345 Hoffman, above n 6. 
346 !hid, 38. 
347 Ibid, 22. Ernst & Young similarly note that, despite the lack of a carbon price in the USA, 68% 
of the Global 500 in 2011 had integrated climate change action into their overall business strategy 
(compared to 48% in 2010): Ernst & Young, above n 325, 19. 
348 Hoffman, ibid, 22. ln particular, companies wish to be prepared in the long term should GHG 
emission reductions or a carbon price become mandatory while simultaneously reaping short term 
economic and strategic benefits if such regulation is delayed or non-existent. 
349 See also A Kolk and J Pinkse, 'Market Strategies for Climate Change' (2004) 22(2) European 
Management Journal 304, which uses CDP responses in 2002 to develop a typology of climate 
strategies that focuses on threats and opportunities. 
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In short, companies "must have a bottom line rationale or such efforts will be financially 
unsustainable."350 
It is apparent from the 'it depends' literature that a company must be clear about its core 
business strategy in order to benefit from adopting green practices. A joint cross-industry 
study edited by Steger in 2004 351 investigated the business case for corporate sustainability 
by focusing on 'value drivers', being factors that significantly contribute to shareholder 
value. Value drivers included licence to operate, reputation and brand value, attraction and 
retention of talented employees, risk management and cost reductions. 352 Similar to 
Reinhardt's work, this study concluded that there is not a universal blueprint for every 
company in every sector around the world. It concluded that "all business cases require the 
support of a core business strategy", 353 which will be peculiar to a specific company. 
Similarly, Porter and .Kramer354 and Esty and Winston355 also focus on the link between 
core business and competitive advantage created by CSR/CER. For example, Porter and 
Kramer state that companies need to: 
analyse their prospects for social responsibility using the same frameworks that 
guide their core business choices... [so as to harness CSR as] a source of 
opportunity, innovation and competitive advantage. 356 
The importance of ensuring CSR is part of a company's core agenda or philosophy is also 
made clear in the change management literature. Defining seven common pitfalls on the 
road to corporate change, Doppelt writes how "deep-rooted cultural transformation is 
350 Hoffman, above n 6, 23. 
351 Steger, above n 285. The industries researched were automotive, aviation, chemical, oil and gas, 
electricity, food and beverage, pharmaceutical, technology and finance. Sec also U Steger, A 
Ionescu-Somers and 0 Salzmann, 'The Economic Foundations of Corporate Sustainability' (2007) 
7(2) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 162, which is a more 
recent publication out of this research but with the same findings. 
352 Steger, ibid, 40-45. 
353 Ibid, 62. 
354 ME Porter and MR Kramer, ' Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage 
and Corporate Social Responsibility ' (2006) (December) Harvard Business Review 78. 
355 D Esty and A Winston, Green to Gold: How Smart Companies Use Environmental Strategy to 
Innovate, Create Value and Build Competitive Advantage (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 
2006). 
356 Porter and Kramer, above n 354, 78. Esty and Winston contend that strategies to cut costs and 
risks, increase profits and create strong brands can create 'eco-advantage' for companies that ride 
the ' green wave'. However, like Reinhardt, they emphasize that exact strategy depends upon each 
company's context. 
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necessary to overcome the resistance inherent to the profound changes necessary to achieve 
true sustainability."357 To this end: 
the ultimate success of a change initiative occurs when sustainability-based 
thinking, perspectives, and behaviours are embedded in everyday operating 
procedures, policies, and culture. 358 
Hans-Joerg Hess's study of why financial actors adopt green strategies similarly found that 
"real changes should take place in the core business" if the business case as driver is to 
generate a positive sustainability impact. 359 He notes that the existence of a sustainability 
unit is no guarantee for effective changes at the core. 360 In other words, sustainability must 
become 'built in' to corporate life and not just ' bolted on' to it. 
Yet interviewees in Hess's study stressed that altering the values and culture of their 
company was difficult and that changes have limited effects if firm values are incompatible 
with short-tenn business goals. 361 Doppelt argues that a company's vision must regard 
sustainability as equally or more important to the goals of profitability or shareholder 
value. 362 This is a challenging proposition for companies in capitalist economies. It is 
hardly surprising that Doppelt found that none of the companies he studied were truly 
sustainable because each was "plagued by inconsistencies between their vision and current 
practices. " 363 
357 B Doppelt, 'Overcoming the Seven Sustainability Blunders' (2003) 14(5) The Systems Thinker 2, 
3. See also D Smith, 'Engaging In Change Management: Transformation Through Sustainability 
Strategy at Norm Thompson Outfitters' in S Waage (ed) Ants, Galileo & Ghandi: Designing the 
Future of Business through Nature, Genius, and Compassion (Greenleaf, Sheffield, 2003 ), which 
highlights that 'cultural change' must occur in an organisation for sustainability initiatives to be 
successful. Welford states that: "Culture change within the organization will require everybody 
within that organization to reconsider their roles, perceptions and values": RJ Welford, 
Environmental Strategy and Sustainable Development: the Corporate Challenge for the 2 l " 
Century (Routledge, London, 1995), 114. 
358 Doppelt, ibid. See also Doppelt, above n 323. 
359 HJ Hess, CSMIWWF Research Project: The Business Case for Sustainability/ Financial Services 
Sector Report (IMD Working Paper Series, lMD 2003-8, 2003), 16. 
360 Ibid, 18. See also: Lins et al, above n 51, 2; and Doppelt, above n 323, 50. 
361 Hess, ibid, 16. 
362 Doppelt, above n 357, 6. 
363 Ibid, 6. Similarly, Waage states that "[t]hc ability or inability to fully 'retrofit ' large, modem 
corporations to reflect principles of sustainability has yet to be proven" : S Waage, 'Conclusion: A 
Shift Towards Sustainability Within Companies and the Financial Services Sector' in S Waage (ed) 
Ants, Galileo and Ghandi: Designing the Future of Business Through Nature, Genius and 
Compassion (Greenleaf, Sheffield, 2003), 243. 
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So we can see from the business strategy literature reviewed so far that competitive 
advantage is the key motivator for beyond compliance corporate action. However, there are 
some studies that suggest more complex motivations for corporate environmental behavior, 
such as the studies authored by Bansal and Roth, 364 and Gunn ingham, Kagan and 
Thornton. 365 
Bansal and Roth's cross-industry, cross-national study of the motivations and contextual 
factors that drive corporate ecological responsiveness also features 'competitiveness.366 
(being a meta-label for business case motivations) as one of three basic dri vers of corporate 
change. Yet, this study concluded that firms were primarily motivated by concerns for 
legitimacy, not competitiveness. 367 'Legitimacy' is a company's desire "to improve the 
appropriateness of its actions within an established set of regulations, norms, values, or 
beliefs". 368 Legitimation is a common thread throughout macro theories and will be 
elaborated upon in the next section. At the meso-level, Bansal and Roth ' s class ification of 
' legitimation' translates into managing downside risk, particularly risk to a company's 
reputation or social licence, whereas ' competitiveness' focuses on fiscal benefits to the 
company. 
Indeed, while previous theorists such as Reinhardt emphasize risk mitigation as a motivator 
of corporate greening, there are several studies that, consistent with Bansal and Roth 's 
conclusions, prioritise risk mitigation as the central dri ver. Husted writes that CSR as a real 
option is oriented toward downside prevention of risk, that is, the containment of possible 
364 Bansal and Roth, above n 2 16. 
365 Gunningham et al, above n 21. 
366 
'Competitiveness' is defined to include profitability, competitive advantage, cost-benefit 
analysis, consumer-responsiveness, and innovation: Bansal and Roth, above n 216, 724-726. 
367 Ibid, 733. Lastly, a small number of companies were motivated by 'ecological responsibility' or 
a company' s concern for social good. Bansal and Roth further describe three In contextual factors 
that drive change: issue salience (how meaningful an environmental issue is for the constituents of a 
company), field cohesion (whether competitors in a field are connected closely e ither formally or 
informally) and individual concern (whether individuals in a company value environmental issues 
and whether they are in a position to champion ecological responses). 
368 !bid, 726. 
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losses, rather than capturing opportunities.369 He argues that a company's decision whether 
to invest in CSR/CER projects should be based on the ability of that project to generate 
indirect benefits or resources for the firm, being goodwill and/or trust, as opposed to direct 
pecuniary benefits. He advocates that such decisions be based on managerial perceptions of 
future risk (as opposed to historical records) in terms of potential reputation loss and 
financial cost to the firm. In this way, as stated by Beck, risk assessments "promise the 
impossible: events that have not yet occurred become the object of current action". 370 
These findings on risk mitigation are echoed in some previous studies of financial actors' 
adoption of green strategies. For example, in 2003 Hess conducted an empirical study of 
the exploitation of the business case for sustainability in the finance sector. 371 He found that 
financial companies mostly view sustainability issues as risks with the most important 
value driver for a business case being risk management, particularly risk to reputation (as 
leveraged by NGOs). He also found that new products and business opportunities were not 
seen as key value drivers but rather niche markets of the future. 372 Similarly, empirical 
studies of why banks adopt the Equator Principles (for example, by Watchman in 2005 373 
and Conley and Williams in 2011 374) have concluded that a key reason for uptake relates to 
reputation risk management. 375 Moreover, in 2008 Lins et al. found that the main 
motivation for climate change action by Brazilian banks was mitigating "risks against 
reputation" due to inertia on the issue.376 Conversely, however, a 2009 empirical study by 
Neuhoff et al. found that large risks were a deterrent to investors engaging in climate 
369 BW Husted, 'Risk Management, Real Options, and Corporate Social Responsibility' (2005) 60 
.Journal of Business Ethics 175, 179-181. 
370 U Beck, ' From Industrial Society to the Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure 
and Ecological Enl ightenment' ( 1992) 9 Theory, Culture and Society 97, I 00. 
371 Hess, above n 359. Hess's report focuses on the credit business within corporate and investment 
banks and activities of insurance companies. Interviews were conducted in sustainability and 
environmental units only. This report was later included, with slight modifications, in the 2004 
study edited by Steger: Steger, above n 285. 
372 Hess, ibid, 13. 
373 Watchman, above n 114. This study specifically mentioned 'reputation' and 'stakeholder and 
NGO activism' and included some other reasons such as ' level playing field' and ' business as 
usual' : 50. 
374 Conley and Williams, above n 117. 
375 Moreover, some banks have made their own public statements about what drives their social-
cnvironmental initiatives, and risk appears to top the list. See eg Citi, 'Opinion - Francesco Vanni 
d'Archirafi, Citi', (2010) 24(2) Dialogue, 9-10, available at 
<https://www.swiftcommunity.net/communities/216/files> accessed 21 Apri l 20 12. 
376 Lins ct al, above n 51, 30. 
93 
finance, particularly regulatory risk and financial risks associated with unproven clients and 
uncertain technology. 377 Accordingly, previous studies have yielded mixed results on the 
role of risk as a driver or deterrent for actors to adopt green strategies, particularly in the 
finance sector. 
Importantly, these studies tend to highlight corporate reputation as a leverage point for 
change; it is regarded as a kind of sweet or 'soft' spot of corporations. A number of 
previous studies have found that there are key drivers, referred to as 'soft issues' or 
'intangibles', which include licence to operate, leadership, brand value, and reputation.378 
Specifically, Steger's empirical study showed that brand value and reputation are key 
concerns for industries that have "specialized products and brands that are in direct contact 
with the consumer'', which include financial services industries. 379 A 2012 Ernst & Young 
report found that, in particular, " [r]eputation issues arise when independent organizations 
rate or rank companies on climate emissions and goals". 380 
Yet most authors agree that 'soft' issues cannot be quantified easily if at all. 38 1 Hess states 
that "risk and reputation management. .. only contribute indirectly to a company's business 
success" and there is generally no direct feedback mechanism associated with them. 382 
Similarly, Spence found that the business case for producing social environmental reports 
lay more in 'soft' issues "such as managing relationships and responding to social 
pressures", which "were presumed to yield an advantage in the long-term" but not 
necessarily amenable to cost/benefit analysis. 383 
377 K Neuhoff, S Fankhauser, E Guerin, JC Hourcade, H Jackson, R Rajan and J Ward, Structuring 
International Financial Support to Support Domestic Climate Change Mitigation in Developing 
Countries (Climate Strategies, Cambridge UK, 2009), I 0. 
378 Steger, above n 285, 39; Salzmann et al , above n 285, 33; Porter and Kramer, above n 354. 
379 Steger, ibid, 43. 
380 Ernst & Young, above n 325, 18. It also found that "reputation management" was a main driver 
for company interest in internal GHG emissions and those of their supply chains. 
381 Steger, above n 285, 39; Salzmann et al , above n 285, 33; Porter and Kramer, above n 354. 
382 Hess, above n 359, 21. 
383 Spence, above n 270, 866. 
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Accordingly, despite Smith's assertion that a company's reputation and the value of its 
brand are "among its most valuable assets", 384 it is still not exactly clear how 'soft' issues 
fi t into the business case. Several business strategy scholars, including Steger and 
Salzmann et al ., have noted that the salience of 'soft' dri vers to a business case is under-
researched in the literature. 385 Jn particu lar, a company's reputation is intuitively important 
but difficult to quantify, with Steger noting that: "the value of[ reputation] is probably only 
known once it is lost".386 As such, the precise nature of 'reputation ' is not clear from the 
business strategy literature. Mostly, it is assumed that a company's 'reputation' is its social 
reputation, which fits with the legitimacy literature. However, important questions remain 
about the role and nature of' corporate reputation ' as a green driver. 
In keeping with a more complex approach that goes beyond 'competitive advantage' as the 
central driver of corporate greening, Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton's empirical cross-
national study of the pulp and paper industry evidenced that economic motivations are not 
necessarily separate from or privileged over social or regulatory ones. These authors 
proposed a conceptual model of corporate environmental behaviour that accounts for 
variation 387 by addressing the complex interaction between a firm's social licence, 
tightening regulations, economic constraints and also internal managerial decision-making 
processes. This model was termed a socially constrncted three-pronged ' license to operate' 
comprised of economic, social and regulatory licenses, which reflect the expectations of 
company stakeholders 388 that monitor, enforce and leverage the licences. 389 The term 
' licences' acknowledged that external pressures from communities, markets and regulators 
384 T Smith, ' Institutional and Social Investors Find Common Ground' (2005) 14Journal of 
Investing 57, 60. 
385 Salzmann et al, above n 285, who write that more descriptive research needs to be done to 
determine what comprises a business case for managers: 33. Specifically, the 2004 study edited by 
Steger found that "the impact of reputation loss on the cost of capital appeared to present a thus far 
neglected but emerging potential for formulating a business case" in all industries: Steger, above n 
285, 41 , 62. 
386 s "b "d 62 teger, 1 z , . 
387 A number of authors have observed the variability in corporate uptake of environmental strategy. 
Sec eg: Gunningham, above n 292, 218, 222; M Jacobs The Green Economy (Pluto, London, 1991 ); 
N Gunningham, 'Beyond Compliance: Management of Environmental Risk' in B Boer, R Fowler 
and N Gunningham (eds) Environmental Outlook: La.wand Policy (Federation, Sydney, I 994); 
Salzmann et al, above n 285, 30, 33. 
388 Such as shareholders, investors, customers (economic licence), legislators, regulators, enforcers 
(regulatory licence), and environmental activists, local communities, voters (social licence): 
Gunningham et al, above n 2 1, 35-36. 
389 Ibid, 37. 
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are interrelated and omni-directional. 39° Further, the authors found that the different ways 
that managers interpret, operationalise and negotiate external licence pressures creates 
variable environmental performance by companies in the same industry and subject to 
similar external pressures. 391 
So it appears from the business strategy literature that the business case as driver is 
important to green uptake but that it may not be the only or even the detennining driver, 
with notions of legitimacy and social licence also taking centre stage. There is also some 
unce1iainty around the importance of risk mitigation in driving corporate greening. In 
particular, the need to mitigate risk to a company's ' reputation' needs elucidation. From the 
literature, it appears that reputational risk is synonymous with risk to a company's social 
licence. Yet concepts such as 'reputation' and ' branding' need further deconstruction if we 
are to understand their strength and limitations as drivers. Specifically, the role of soft 
factors in making a business case - such as ' reputation', ' leadership' and ' branding' -
remains unclear in extant literature. 
3.3 Macro Level: Socio-Cultural Drivers or 'External' 
Factors 
From the literature review on banks and climate change in Chapter 2, we can infer that the 
most relevant external influences on bank behavior that may prompt climate-related uptake 
would be peer pressure, activist/NGO pressure, and legal regulation. We also know from 
the business strategy literature outlined earlier in this chapter that CSR is a socially 
constructed and contested concept. Institutional theory investigates how external macro 
pressures shape organisational behaviour by defining what is 'appropriate' and 
'responsible'. As such, it has a role in helping to explicate why companies, including 
banks, might 'go green'. 
390 Ibid, 17, 35 
391 i bid, 17, 132-33. Yet the authors caveat that environmental management style is significant but 
"not overwhelmingly powerful" in shaping environmental perfom1ance: 133. 
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Scholarship in organization theory, political science, and social science posits that there are 
external 'beyond the business case' reasons for corporate environmental behaviour. 
Specifically, institutional theory provides that what constitutes responsible or irresponsible 
corporate behaviour, and what are deemed ' legitimate' activities or goals around which to 
build a business case, depends very much on the wider socio-cultural setting. The idea is 
that macro socio-cultural and political factors influence organizational action and change 
by defining and regulating 'appropriate' corporate action. For this reason, several authors 
have asserted that academic focus on the content of CSR activities has led to the neglect of 
institutional factors that shape the construction of such activities in the first place. 392 
Moreover, corporations may not always or only make decisions based on "atomistic, 
financial self-interest" pursuant to a business case imperative. 393 Indeed, Dillard et al. write 
that institutional theory is increasingly appearing in organization theory literature due to its 
wide range of applicability. 394 This is largely due to the work of Scott, which showed that 
all organizations are ' institutionalized ' to varying degrees: that is, all organizations are 
socially constituted and subject to regulative processes which define "how they may 
operate legitimately". 395 
Institutional theory focuses on the process of nonn formation by which certain actions 
become acceptable or normal. ' Institutions' are macro influences on organizational 
behaviour that shape "how important issues are perceived and how appropriate actions are 
developed. " 396 ' Institutionalisation ' is the process by which practices, as responses to these 
influences or pressures, are developed and adopted within a social setting. 397 Impo11antly, 
organisations are situated (or institutionally embedded) within their 'organizational field ' or 
inter-organizational context. This means that individual organisations must conform to the 
392 MT Jones, 'The Institutional Detcnninants of Social Responsibility ' ( 1999) 20 Journal of 
Business Ethics 163; JL Campbell, ' Institutional analysis and the paradox of corporate social 
responsibility' (2006) 49 American Behavioral Scientist 925; Margolis and Walsh, above n 330. 
393 C Parker and J Braithwaite, 'Regulation' in P Cane and M Tush.net (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
~lLegal Studies (O_xford University Press, Oxford U~, 2003), I 31. . . . 
· JF Dillard, JT Rigsby and C Goodman, 'The Making and Remaking of Orgarnzat1on Context: 
Duality and the Institutionalization Process' (2004) 17(4) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal 506, 508. 
395 WR Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Foundations/or Organizational Science (Sage, 
Thousand Oaks CA, 1995), 136. See also Dillard et a l, above n 394, 508. 
396 AJ Hoffman, 'Institutional Evolution and Change: Environmentalism and the US Chemical 
Industry ' ( 1999) 42(4) Academy of Management Journal 351, 353. 
397 Dillard et al, above n 394, 508-9. 
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rules and requirements of their field in order to receive support and legitimacy. 398 Meyer 
and Rowan state that when an organisation adopts institutionalized clements then it protects 
itself from having its conduct questioned because it can give "prudent, rational and 
legitimate accounts" of its activities. 399 
So what form do ' institutions' take? And how might we recognise their influence on a 
company' s willingness to 'go green'? W. Richard Scott describes how a social framework 
comprises three institutional elements, being regulative, normative and cognitive 
' pillars'.400 Andrew Hoffman gives a good overview of each pillar, stating that they form a 
continuum moving "from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the 
taken for granted". 401 Each is briefly described and illustrated below. 
Regulative aspects of institutions are often regulations that "guide organizational action and 
perspectives by coercion or threat of legal sanctions ."402 Hoffman gives the example of 
corporations adopting new pollution control technologies in order to conform to 
environmental regulations. 403 Tnstitutionalists are less interested in law as a fact, and more 
concerned with law as a social construct and how it shapes corporate behavior and 
managerial decision-making. The idea is that prevailing socio-economic nonns and values 
are sometimes codified in Jaws and regulations. 404 For institutionalists (as opposed to 
lawyers), the focus is not on fines or inspections as a detenent threat per se but on how 
fines and inspections bring management attention to macro expectations that may affect the 
legitimacy and operation of their company. 405 As such, regulative institutions can shape 
CSR activities and corporate attitudes. For example, the UK legislature recently amended 
the UK Companies Act 2006 to provide that directors and corporations must have regard to 
398 WR Scott and JW Meyer, 'The Organization of Societal Sectors' in JW Meyer and WR Scott 
(eds) Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Sage, Beverly Hills, 1983), 149. 
399 Meyer J and Rowan B, ' Institutionalized Organizations: Fonnal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony' in WW Powell and PJ DiMaggio (eds) The New fnstitutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991 ), 50. 
400 Scott, above 214, 52-59. 
401 AJ Hoffman, From Heresy to Dogma: An institutional hist01y of corporate environmentalism 
(Stanford University Press, California, 2001), 36. 
402 Hoffman, above n 396, 353. 
403 !bid. 
404 Dillard et al, above n 394, 527. 
405 Parker and Braithwaite, above n 393, 131. 
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corporate impact on the environment and the community. 406 In contrast, the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 does not explicitly encourage directors to consider environmental or 
social corporate impacts; they must simply discharge their duties in "the best interests of 
the corporation". 407 Thi s phrasing is interpreted to mean the best economic interests of a 
company, with some commentators arguing that the Act may deter 'good ' corporate action 
that does not maximize profit.408 A detailed analysis of the impacts of corporate law and 
banking rules on bank corporate governance is provided in Chapter 6. It is sufficient to say 
here that corporate regulation shapes directors' attitudes toward going beyond compliance: 
directors of Australian companies may be more sceptical of going beyond the business case 
in order to go green, whereas their UK counterpa11s may do so more readily. 
Normative aspects of institutions guide organizational action and belief via social 
obligation or professionalization. Scott states that norms "specify how things should be 
done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends."409 Normative or value systems 
define goals and objectives (for example, making a profit) but also designate appropriate 
ways to pursue them (for example, via ethical business practice). 410 Pattberg and Stripple 
posit that new "norm-setting devices" have deepened the institutionalization of beyond-the-
state approaches to climate change. 411 They cite civil society driven campaigns, the rise of 
non-state market- and infonnation- based mechanisms such as the Carbon Disclosure 
Project and the Investor Network on Climate Risk, and the rising proliferation of voluntary 
codes such as the Equator Principles and Carbon Principles, as evidence of the 
406 Specifically, directors must act in "good faith ... to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole" by having regard to, amongst other matters, the likely 
consequences of any decision in the long term, operational impact on the community and the 
environment, and maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct: s. 172(1 )(a)-(f), 
Companies Act 2006 (c.46) (United Kingdom). 
407 
"A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their 
duties: (a) in good faith in the best interests of the corporation; and (b) for a proper purpose": 
s.18 l (I), Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
408 Egs: P Henley, 'Were Corporate Tsunami Donations Made Legally?' (2005) 30(4) Alternative 
law Journal 154, 155; and T Wilson, 'The Pursuit of Profits at All Costs: Corporate Law as a 
Barrier to Corporate Social Responsibility' (2005) 30(6) Alternative Law Journal 278, 279. 
However Gustavson argues that, in practice, Australian directors have wide scope for exercising 
CSR given that "any decision will benefit at least one of the company's stakeholder groups" 
therefore benefi tting ' the company' within the meaning of the Act: Gustavson, above n 257, 5.4.1. 
409 Scott, above n 214, 54-55. 
4 10 ibid, 55. 
411 P Pattberg and J Stripple, Remapping Global Climate Governance: Fragmentation Beyond the 
Public/Private Divide (Global Governance Working Paper No 32, November 2007), 17, 30. 
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institutionalization of "new norms at the transnational level".412 These norms affect how 
corporations respond to climate change and legitimacy threats by, for example, reducing 
and/or reporting their emissions, and signing onto voluntary 'green' codes. 
Finally, the cognitive pillar embodies behaviour that is 'taken-for-granted'4 13 and attention 
to this third pillar is a key distinguishing feature of neo-institutionalism. 414 Cognitive 
beliefs are the most entrenched as they are essentially unconscious ' ways of doing 
things' 415 such that it is "almost unthinkable to do anything else". 416 For example, in 
market economies, it is regarded as natural that corporations care about profits and pursue 
economic goals. 4 17 ' Institutional isomorphism' arises out of this cognitive element and is 
defined as "a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other 
units" that face the same set of external conditions. 418 Institutional scholars use 
isomorphism to explain the phenomenon of organizational homogeneity amongst 
. fi 419 
compctmg 1rms. 
So how does institutional theory help to explain organizational change given its apparent 
preoccupation with reproduction and inertia? DiMaggio and Powell 420 actually use the 
concept of isomorphism to explain organizational, and even organizational fi eld-level, 
change. They g ive three reasons or mechanisms for why and how organisations copy and 
adopt institutional practices. First, 'coercive isomorphism' results when (political) pressure 
is exerted on an organisation by other organisations upon which it is dependent and by 
expectations of communities within which it operates. For example, organisational change 
may be a direct response to government mandate; indeed DiMaggio and Powell note that "a 
common legal environment" creates increasingly homogenised organizations within 
412 /hid, 12. 
413 Scott, above n 214, 58. 
414 Ibid, 57. 
415 Hoffman, above n 396, 365; Zucker L, 'Organizations as Institutions' in S Bacharach (ed) 
Research in the Sociology of Organizations (JAI Press, Greenwich CT, 1983). 
41 6 Parker and Braithwaite, above n 393, 132. 
417 Hoffman, above n 396, 353. 
418 PJ DiMaggio and WW Powell, 'The Jron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rational ity in Organization Fields' in WW Powell and PJ DiMaggio (eds) The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991 ), 66. 
419 s "b'd ee eg 1 1 • 
420 Ibid, 67-74. 
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specific jurisdictions. 42 1 Second, ' normative isomorphism ' takes place through 
professionalization, whereby members of an occupation collectively struggle to define the 
modes and conditions of work. 422 Finally, 'mimetic isomorphism' occurs when an 
organisation imitates a more successful organisation in their field, which often occurs when 
there is a lack of certainty and guidance in its own environment. DiMaggio and Powell 
describe uncertainty as "a powerful force" that encourages imitation or 'modeling' of 
competitors that are perceived as more legitimate or successful. 423 
This third mechanism of 'mimetic' isomorphism highlights Aldrich's assertion that "the 
major factors that organizations must take into account are other organizations. "424 In other 
words, business organisations often act on the basis of peer pressure in order to be seen as 
' normal' and 'appropriate' so as to survive. 425 As part of this mimetic process, businesses 
adopt the practices, rhetoric and symbols of 'being part of the club' .426 ln the institutional 
theory and diffusion literatures, authors such as Rogers label early-moving organisations as 
' innovators', being the organisations that develop new organisational practices within the 
boundaries of organizational field practices, and label the mimicking organisations as ' late 
adopters'. 427 Dillard et al. explain the process of corporate change and resulting 
' normalizing' using institutional isomorphism: as late adopters uptake and implement the 
new practices of innovators, their effect (of establishing what is legitimate and rational) is 
421 Ibid, 67. They also note that coercion may be found from parent to subsidiary companies, or 
imposed by monopolistic service infrastructures - such as telecommunications or transportation -
on those organisations that use them. 
422 Dillard et al, above n 394, 509. 
423 DiMaggio and Powell, above n 41 8, 69-70. 
424 HE Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ , 1979), 265. 
In other words, "[ o ]rganizations ... rcspond to an environment that consists of other organizations 
responding to their environment, which consists of organizations responding to an environment of 
organizations' responses": DiMaggio and Powell, ibid, 65. 
425 For the theoretical link between organizational legitimacy and organizational survival see: Meyer 
and Rowan, above n 399; L Zucker, ' Institutional Theories o f Organization' ( 1987) 13 Annual 
Review of Sociology 443; MC Suchman and LB Edelman, ' Legal Rational Myths: the New 
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition' (1996) 21 Law and Social Inquiry 903. 
426 Friedland Rand Alford RR, ' Bringing Society Back ln: Symbols, Practices and Institutional 
Contradictions' in WW Powell and PJ DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991 ), describing institutions as both 
"supraorganizational patterns of activity ... and symbolic systems": 232. See also Meyer and Rowan, 
above n 399, describing isomorphic "organizational language" as evidence of an organisation 's 
rationality and legitimacy: 50. 
427 EM Rogers, Difji1sion of Innovations (Free Press, New York, 1995). 
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further reinforced at the field organisational level, which m turn encourages more late 
adopters. 428 
As such, corporations can be influenced by the 'green ' actions of other, perhaps more 
successful, firms. In this way, corporations model or copy each other in order to enhance 
their social reputation and their economic and political legitimacy. 429 In particular, 
Hoffman's longitudinal study of environmental change in the chemical industry showed 
how cognitive beliefs changed over a 30 year period "as particular rules or norms became 
less contested through enduring persistence". 430 New practices can thus become "accepted 
as the legitimate form of organizational action and ingrained in the cognitive institutional 
realm". 431 In other words, over time, new practices can become the industry norm. Other 
authors have similarly found that if successful competitors adopt widely publicized greener 
technologies or environmental management plans then pressure is created for all foms in 
the same industry to follow suit. 432 Lundgren and Catasus further note that embedding the 
'green value' at the corporate level through mimetic isomorphism may, in tum, create 
positive changes for the natural environment. They state that "[ o )ver time, this kind of 
influence should not be underestimated."433 
However, it is not clear from the literature whether there is some magic number or critical 
mass of early-moving films required to create such a domino effect. Arguably the tipping 
point may vary within different organizational fields or depend upon the 'stickiness' of 
current norms. It is also not certain whether early-moving firms acting alone or in small 
numbers that move too far ahead of the curve are at risk of being yanked back down to the 
lowest common denominator rather than being lauded for their leadership. 434 Finally, even 
428 Dillard et al, above n 394, 515. 
429 Suchman and Edelman, above n 425. 
430 Hoffman, above n 396, 365. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Eg: RS Marshall, M Cordana and M Silverman, 'Exploring Individual and Institutional Drivers 
of Proactive Environmentalism in the US Wine Industry' (2005) 14 Business Strategy and the 
Environment 92; B Cashore and I Ycrtinsky, 'Policy Networks and Firm Behaviours: Governance 
Systems and Finn Responses to External Demands for Sustainable Forest Management' (2000) 33 
Policy Sciences ] . 
433 Lundgren M and Catasus, above n 8, 189. 
434 Eg, if an industry association sets a low benchmark against which the industry standard is 
measured as acceptable and appropriate: Gunningham et al , above n 21, 33. 
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when organizations adopt institutionally acceptable practices in order to be perceived as 
legitimate, it is not certain that they will integrate those practices into their "essential 
machinery" so as to create substantial change within the firm, the field or the natural 
environment.435 
In summary, the concepts of isomorphism and mimetic behaviour help to explain the 
process of corporate change as a response to external socio-cultural and field-level 
pressures. However, there are limitations to institutionalism as an explanatory theory. 
Scholars have critiqued institutional research as tending to under-emphasize the political 
nature of organizations, which includes notions of power and the role of special interest 
groups, and to over-emphasize maintenance of the status quo due to the constraining nature 
of institutional practices and beliefs. 436 ln the context of the research questions in this 
dissertation, it must be acknowledged that institutiona.l theory, on its own, has limited 
explanatory power regarding internal drivers of change, variation or heterogeneity within 
and between firms, and interaction between internal and external drivers. 
3.4 Micro Level: Intra-Organisational Drivers or 
'Internal' Factors 
Much of the meso- and macro-level literature encompasses external drivers of corporate 
environmental change. However, internal drivers may also be important and are a particular 
focus of the micro-level literature. Literature at this level has identified multiple variables 
for corporate greening that are internal to a firm. These include coalition-building within an 
organization, 437 the availability of intra-organizational resources (human and financial) to 
4
'
5 On 'symbolism vs. substance' and 'decoupling' generally sec: BE Ashforth and BW Gibbs, 'The 
Double-Edge of Organizational Legitimation ' ( 1990) 1(2) Organizational Science 177; O'Sullivan 
and O'Dwyer, above n 116; Dillard et al, above n 394; Meyer and Rowan, above n 399. In relation 
to banks and climate change, this issue is elaborated upon in Chapters 5 and 6 below. 
436 Egs: Scott, above n 395; Dillard et al, ibid; Hoffman, above n 396; P Hirsch and M Lounsbury, 
'Ending the Family Quarrel: Toward a Reconciliation of 'Old' and 'New' Institutionalisms' (1997) 
40 American Behavioral Scientist 406. 
437 Eg Prakash evidenced the relevance of how successfully proponents or skeptics of an 
environmental measure build coalitions within an organization, and the extent to which a measure 
would impose incremental or revolutionary change on existing power relationships and 
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invest in green strategies, 438 an organization's capacity to learn, and also how it acquires, 
interprets and internally distributes knowledge.439 Yet the one consistent theme in the micro 
literature is that a central internal driver of corporate environmental change is managerial 
decision-making. Adams and Whelan write that "human action is of obvious importance to 
understanding organisational action [as] .. . it is always individuals, or a given number of 
individuals, that decide to act in a certain way."440 The literature on managerial decision-
making as an internal driver of corporate greening provides the focus for this section. 
Previous studies on corporate greening have demonstrated that the attitude and actions of 
senior management are crucial. Hoffman recently found that "senior-level support and 
engagement are the most critical components of any successful climate strategy" and that, 
more specifically, "CEO leadership was identified as a key driver at all stages of [climate] 
program development and implemcntation." 441 Similarly, Thomas Gladwin argued that 
"charismatic green leadership" is required for proactive corporate env ironmental 
greening; 442 and in their study of Swedish banks, Lundgren and Catasus found that it was 
important for the CEO of a bank to "use the word environment. .. in a way that signals it is a 
sincere belief rather than a mere intellectual exercise." 443 Jn other words, senior 
management sets the tone for firm policy from which flows actual practices, employee 
mind-sets and also public perceptions. 
Some corporate environmental management literature asserts that a crucial variable in 
uptake or avoidance of environmental strategies is whether senior managers perceive 
organizational routines: A Prakash, Greening the Firm: The Politics of Corporate 
Environmentalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 2000). 
438 Studies show there is a strong correlation between resources and corporate size, cg R Hartman, 
M Hug and D Wheeler, Why Paper Mills Clean Up: Determinants of Pollution Abatement in Four 
Asian Countries (World Bank Policy Research Paper 1710, 1997). 
439 A Schaefer and B Harvey, 'Stage Models of Corporate 'Greening': a Critical Evaluation' (I 998) 
7 Business Strategies and the Environment 109-123. 
440 Adams and Whelan, above n 216, 120 (emphasis in original). 
441 AJ Hoffman, Getting Ahead qf the Curve: Corporate Strategies that Address Climate Change 
(Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington VA, 2006), 37. 
442 TN Gladwin, 'The Meaning of Greening: A Plea for Organizational Theory' in K Fischer and J 
Schot (eds) Environmental Strategies for industry: International Perspectives on Research Needs 
and Policy Implications (Island Press, Washington DC, 1993), 52-54. 
443 Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8, 192. 
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environmental protection issues as an opportunity or a threat. 444 This literature interacts 
with the business strategy literature. For example, Carroll's conception of ' social 
responsiveness' embodies a continuum of managerial business strategies or philosophies 
"from no response (do nothing) to a proactive response (do much)" in the face of social 
445 M . dl b pressures. oreover, perception of risk or opportunity varies marke y etween 
individual managers. For example, Prakash found that risks and opportumt1es were 
interpreted differently by different managers even within the same firm.446 Gunningham et 
al. also evidenced that different managers can interpret similar external demands differently 
and that "skilful corporate officials" can reshape some demands by, for example, 
negotiating with regulators and activists or engaging in outreach with local communities.447 
Yet this literature does not explain why a manager would act in one or more of these ways, 
or whether and how a manager might change their own response over time or in the face of 
new influences. 
To this end, scholars such as Howard-Grenville, Nash and Coglianese,448 and Thauer 449 
elaborate on the work of Prakash and Gunningham ct al. by identifying specific 
organizational factors, such as identity and culture, and organizational structure, which help 
explain how managers perceive external pressures and develop their motivations for action. 
However, Borek and Coglianese note that although the empirical literature testing these 
frameworks is growing it remains incomplete.450 
444 For perception of environmental protection measures as a threat to business: Walley and 
Whitehead, above n 303. For such measures as an opportunity: Poiter and van der Linde, above n 
302. 
445 Carroll, above n 233, 501. See also McAdam who gives four social responsibility philosophies 
that describe the managerial approach that would characterize the range of responsiveness on this 
continuum, namely: (1) Fight all the way; (2) Do only what is required; (3) Be progressive; and (4) 
Lead the industry: TW McAdam, 'How To Put Corporate Responsibility Into Practice' (J 973) 6 
Business and Society Review/Innovation 8. 
446 Prakash, above n 437. 
447 Gunningham et al, above n 21 , 38 
448 J Howard-Grenville, J Nash and C Coglianese, 'Constructing the License to Operate: Internal 
Factors and Their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions' (2008) 30 Law & Policy 73. 
See also J Howard-Grenvi lle, Corporate Culture and Environmental Practice: Making Change at a 
High-Tech Manufacturer (Edward Elgar, Northampton, 2007). 
449 CR Thauer, Goodness Comes From Within: Intra-organizational Dynamics of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (paper delivered at the Academy of Global Governance Workshop Multi-Mode 
Governance, Shaping and Being Shaped by Globalization, Florence, 16-17 December 2011 ). 
450 Borek and Coglianese, above n 244, 6. 
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As part of this burgeoning scholarship, researchers have attempted to explain how 
managers make decisions. Traditionally, managerial decision-making has been 
conceptualised as a rational and linear process. 451 However, more recent theories espouse 
that a manager's past experience, risk expertise, personal values, and even gender452 bear 
upon their decision-making so that decisions follow an 'inner logic' rather than an objective 
one. Klein's Recognition-Primed Decision Model indicates that experienced decision-
makers are often influenced by what they judge as familiar rather than rationally weighing 
options. 453 On the specific topic of low-carbon investment, Neuhoff states that "investment 
decisions are influenced to a larger extent by traditional approaches and intuition rather 
than by fundamental analysis." 454 As such, there is a concern that senior finance managers 
might have a natural tendency to pursue conventional technologies on the basis of 
familiarity and competitive advantage. 
Moreover, some scholars contend that managers' personal morals or ethics may influence 
their decision-making, particularly as it pertains to CSR/CER-related deliberations and 
corporate uptake. Beach's Image Theory contends that personal values or principles are 
"the foundation of one's decisions" such that "potential goals and actions must not 
contradict them or those goals and actions will be deemed unacceptable". 45 5 Wood goes 
one step further in proffering the ' Principle of Managerial Discretion ', 456 which posits that: 
451 Jani s and Mann describe a four-stage sequential process that starts with appraising the challenge, 
moves to surveying alternatives, weighing alternatives, deliberating about commitment, and results 
in adhering to commitments even despite negative feedback: IL Jani.s and L Mann, Decision 
Making: A psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (Free Press, New York, 
1977), 172. 
452 Eg Williams evidences that female board members are more likely to support philanthropy and 
community cultural activities than their male counterparts: RJ Williams, 'Women on Boards and 
Firm Philanthropy' (2003) 42 Journal of Business Ethics 1. 
453 G Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1998), 
30. See also P Slovic, ' Perception of Risk' (1987) 236(4799) Science 280, who evidences that a 
person's level of expertise and experience will affect how they perceive risk when deciding an 
issue. 
454 Neuhoff, above n 99, 13. He further explains that: "their longer experience with these 
technologies offers them a competitive advantage, individually relative to younger staff and as an 
organisation relative to new companies entering the market": 13. 
455 LR Beach (ed), Image Theory: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations (Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Mahwah NJ, 1998) at 9. 
456 Wood, above n 241. 
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managers are moral actors, [so] they are obliged to exercise [managerial] discretion, 
within the very domain of CSR, as is available to them, towards socially responsible 
outcomes. 457 
In other words, according to Wood, managers cannot avoid exercising their individual 
discretion to 'do the right thing' even when faced with contrary corporate rules, procedures 
I. . 458 or po 1cies. 
In this context, the concept of cognitive dissonance is relevant to human and organisational 
change. Festinger explains that humans experience a "cognitive dissonance" and 
psychological discomfort when ideas/values (internals) do not match with an actual state of 
affairs (externals) and we experience 'wrongness'.459 Festinger contends that when a person 
experiences dissonance they will act to remove the discomfort in order to return to a level 
of hannoniousness.460 Adams and Whelan contend that cognitive dissonance motivates (or 
shocks into action) corporate change by 'unfreezing' corporate stasis. They argue that 
managers can then resolve dissonance by finding new role-models and adopting a new 
cognitive framework with 'refreezing' occurring only once the new set of cognitions are 
b . d . d b h . 461 emg expresse m every ay e av1our. 
Empirically, prev10us studies have revealed evidence of cognitive dissonance between 
interviewees and their organisations on the topic of CSR. For example, in 1996 Bebbington 
and Thomson found that managerial conceptions were more radical than organisational 
conceptions of 'sustainable development', 462 and O'Dwyer's 2003 examination of 
managerial conceptions of CSR in Irish corporations evidenced 'pockets of resistance' by 
457 Mel6, above n 224, 53. 
458 Wood, above n 241, 699. 
459 Adams and Whelan, above n 216, 124; L Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford 
University Press, Stanford CT, 1957), 3. Adams and Whelan further explain that our 'cognition' or 
"any knowledge, opinion, belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one's behaviour" is 
"out of sync" with what is actually presented: 124. 
46
° Festinger, ibid, 6; Adams and Whelan, ibid, 125. This may include changing one's action to 
bring it into hannony with reality, changing one's thoughts to rationalize the dissonance, or 
changing one's values. 
461 Adams and Whelan, ibid, 125-126, drawing on Lewin's 3-step model of change: K Lewin, 
'Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method, and Reality in Social Science' (1947) 1 Human 
Relations 5. 
462 J Bebbington and I Thomson, Business Conceptions of Sustainability and the Implications for 
Accountancy (ACCA Research Report No. 48, ACCA, London, 1996). 
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individual managers to a narrow corporate conception of CSR that privileged shareholder 
wealth maximisation. 463 Yet it is not clear from these studies whether managerial 
dissonance then led to radical organisational change; so the potential for agency to bring 
about transformative corporate change is not demonstrated satisfactorily. Moreover, Spence 
writes that cognitive dissonance was not evidenced in hi s more recent cross-industry study 
of UK companies in 2007. He reasons that in the past decade companies have become more 
proficient at expounding a business case for sustainability that eradicates conflict. 464 
In summary, theories about managerial decision-making acknowledge the 'human ' element 
in corporate activity and help to explain variation in corporate green uptake. However, this 
literature often raises more questions than it answers and, as such, does not provide a 
comprehensive theory of corporate environmental behavior. Specifically, it does not assist 
with predicting organisational change because the ethical dimensions of managerial 
decision-making are intrinsic to each individual and therefore defy consistency. Moreover, 
it is still not clear how individual perceptions of CSR are shaped or, most impo1tantly, 
whether leadership alone is sufficient to induce far-reaching corporate change. 
Furthermore, while previous studies highlight the combined influence of external pressures 
and internal variables on a company's commitment to beyond-compl iance measures,465 it is 
not obvious how they interact and influence each other. The complex and sometimes 
confounding interplay between internal and external drivers was acknowledged by 
Gunningham et al. who stated that individual managers do not operate in a vacuum: their 
decisions and personal values are reflective of bigger picture influences. They assert that 
attempting to "disentangle environmental management style from the external pressures 
that a firm faces" is overly simplistic.466 Nonetheless, it appears from the literature that the 
relationship between internal and external drivers can be difficult to define or predict 
systematically. 
463 O'Dwyer, above n 242, 548. 
464 Spence, above n 270, 875. 
465 Gunningham et al, above n 21; also N Roome, 'Developing Environmental Management 
Strategies' ( 1992) 1 Business Strategy and the Environment 11 -24; and A Ghobadian, H Viney, J 
Lui and P James, 'Extending Linear Approaches to Mapping Corporate Environmental Behavior' 
(1998) 7 Business Strategy and the Environment 13. 
466 Gunningham et al, above n 21 , 133. 
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3.5 Summation: Knowledge Gaps and Empirical Next 
Steps 
This chapter has provided three different theoretical perspectives from meso, macro and 
micro levels on why companies voluntarily adopt environmental and social initiatives. Yet 
there are several gaps in the extant literature, particularly at the meso level, in relation to 
the research questions posed in this dissertation. 
In summary, at the meso level, it appears from the business strategy literature that the 
business case as driver is important to green uptake. However, it may not be the only or 
even the determining driver, with notions of legitimacy and social licence also taking centre 
stage. There is also some uncertainty around the importance of risk mitigation in driving 
corporate greening, with 'reputational' risk requiring specific elucidation. From the 
literature, it appears that reputational risk is synonymous with risk to a company's social 
licence. Yet concepts such as ' reputation' and 'branding' need further deconstruction if we 
are to understand their strength and limitations as drivers. Specifically, the role of soft 
factors in making a business case - including 'reputation ', ' leadership' and 'branding' -
remains unclear in extant literature. 
At the macro level, it appears that the concepts of isomorphism and mimetic behaviour help 
to explain the process of corporate change as a response to external socio-cultural and field-
level pressures. Yet institutional theory, on its own, has limited ability to explain any 
heterogeneity within and between firms. While that gap can be remedied in part by theories 
about managerial decision-making, such micro level theory does not systemically explain 
how managerial perceptions of CSR are shaped or whether leadership alone is sufficient to 
induce far-reaching corporate change. Finally, neither institutional theory at the macro level 
nor decision-making theories at the micro level adequately account for how external 
pressures and internal variables meet and interact to shape a company's commitment to 
beyond-compliance measures. 
importantly, for the purposes of this dissertation, our understanding of what motivates 
banks to adopt climate-related strategies remains poor despite the plethora of theory about 
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why companies do and should ' go green '. As evidenced in Chapters 1 and 2, the banking 
industry has an essential role in assisting climate change mitigation and the shift to a low-
carbon global economy. As such, we need to better understand what drives climate-related 
behaviour of banks given their importance to one of the biggest economic transitions for 
modem human society. However, reviewing the extant literature reveals two concerns: first, 
we cannot assume that what applies to other industries generally applies to the banking 
industry specifically; secondly, there is a dearth of literature about what motivates banks to 
adopt 'green' practices and innovations. 
Specifically, many of the studies that investigate why comparnes go green have either 
grouped finance sector actors together with other sectors, such as the food and beverage 
industry and primary producers,467 or not included finance sector actors in their data sample 
at all. 468 As such, it has not been clear whether the finance sector is dri ven to 'go green' by 
the same forces as other corporate sectors. Although some studies have attempted to 
remedy this gap, they have generall y omitted to differentiate banks from other finance 
sector actors (usually insurers and institutional investors),469 so we are still not clear what 
motivates banks particularly. 
Moreover, studies that have focused on banks tend to take two noticeable approaches: first, 
they imply or assume that the banking industry is a homogenous entity; 470 and secondly, 
they elucidate what banks are doing 471 and/or advocate why banks ought to become 
greener 472 rather than investigating why they are actually doing so. Both of these 
approaches are limited for the reasons below. 
In reality, the banking industry comprises several different types of banks: private, retail, 
commercial, investment. Are they all motivated by the same factors? lf not then what are 
the differences and what are the implications for leveraging bank voluntarism? Also, what 
contests occur within a bank on the issue of CSR or green uptake? Many qualitative studies 
467 See eg: O' Dwyer, above n 242; Hoffman, above n 6. 
468 See eg: Bansal and Roth, above n 216; Gunningham et al, above n 21. 
469 See eg: Hess, above n 359; Watchman, above n 114. 
470 See eg: Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8; Conley and Williams, above n 117. 
471 See eg: SAM Report, above n 8 1; Ceres Report, above n 81; WWF/Allianz, above n 49. 
472 See eg: Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8; SAM Report, above n 81, 41 -44; Thomas, above n 17. 
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on corporate sustainability interview only those employees in corporate responsibility or 
public relations departments. 473 As such, the views of employees 'on the ground' or in 
transactional units of a firm are often unexplored in the literature. And yet their perspective 
is important for a more complete understanding of the drivers and barriers of corporate 
greening in practice. Specifically, the role of managerial decision-making and ethical 
conceptions of CSR need elucidation in this respect. 
Furthermore, there is very little empirical data on why banks are actually adopting climate-
related strategies. Previous studies have left us with uncertainty around risk mitigation as 
the main driver of change, the role and meaning of ' reputation' as a soft factor in the 
business case, and whether and which macro influences shape bank behaviour. There is a 
gap in our knowledge about what ' is' from which we can then draw implications about 
what 'could be'. This dissertation posits that without an empirically grounded 
understanding of the actual 'why' for banks, "it is impossible to disentangle wishful 
thinking and ideological exhortation from the kind of realistic expectations on which 
governmental and social policy can sensibly be based."474 
Accordingly, this dissertation seeks to address these deficiencies in existing approaches 
through an empirical investigation of why early-moving banks in market economies are 
adopting climate-related business strategies. This dissertation posits that we can 'follow the 
leader' by investigating early-moving banks that are leading on the issue of climate change. 
What are these banks doing about climate change and, more importantly, why are they 
doing anything about it at all when not compelled to do so? Identification of the levers and 
limits of voluntary climate-related practices by leading banks in practice will provide 
insights for effective climate policy-making that can mobilise the industry as a whole. The 
empirical discussion and analysis takes place in Chapters 5 and 6 following a detailed 
description of the methodology in the next chapter. 
473 See eg: Hess, above n 359; Bebbington and Thomson, above n 462. 
474 Gunningham et al, above n 21, 135. 
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Chapter 4 Research Design and Method 
4.0 Overview 
The design of this study and the research methods employed are specific to the purpose, 
scope and objective of this research, which were outlined in Chapter 1. To reiterate, the 
central research question to this dissertation is: 
(1) Why are early-moving banks making voluntary climate-related changes, 
particularly given an absence of regulatory certainty on climate change at 
international and national levels? 
Two additional research questions give contextualisation and gravity to this central research 
question, namely: 
(2) How can banks assist climate change mitigation'! Specifically: (a) what climate-
related business practices are being adopted by early-moving banks, and (b) what is 
the facilitative potential of the industry as a whole'! 
(3) What implications can be drawn from the .findings for: (a) the mainstreaming of 
'enlightened ' climate-related practices in the banking industry as a whole, and (b) 
effective climatefi.nance policy-making? 
This chapter details the methods used to address these research questions across three 
discrete sections. The first section outlines why a qualitative research method was chosen, 
and describes the theoretical framework and case study design. Section two details the data 
sources and how data was collected. Finally, section three describes the data analysis 
process and its implications for theory generation. 
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4.1 Qualitative Research Method 
The research questions and the contributions to knowledge that thi s dissertation seeks to 
make place this research squarely within the domain of qualitative social research. In a 
nutshell: what makes early-moving banks 'tick' in relation to climate change? How can 
they help, what are they doing about it and, most importantly, why are they doing anything 
when they are not compelled to do so? While the ' how' and 'what' questions have been 
largely addressed in Chapter 2 by consulting industry-based and theoretical bodies of 
literature, the 'why' question requires human interaction. Qualitative research provides an 
appropriate set of tools with which to study processes and relationships, and to understand 
actors as conscious social beings who shape their world and are shaped by it. 475 
Importantly, qualitative research embraces context (rather than eradicating it) by placing 
respondents' perspectives and behaviour in the context of wider social settings. 476 It is this 
very aspect of qualitative research that enables meanings to be generated, 477 which makes it 
highly appropriate for this dissertation. 
4.1.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: an Adaptive Theory 
approach 
Bansal and Roth state that an inductive methodology is apt for developing theory that is 
empirically grounded. 478 However, Layder opines that all social research and theorising 
involves both inductive and deductive elements such that extant theory is tested and new 
theory is generated. 479 Rather than choosing a purely inductive methodology, such as 
grounded theor/80 or analytic induction, 481 I chose a method that draws upon Layder's 
adaptive theory. 482 
475 F Devine, ' Qualitative Analysis' in D Marsh and G Stoker (eds) The01y and Methods in Political 
Science (St. Martin's Press, New York, J 995), 137. 
476 Ibid, 138 
477 A Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 2004), 62. 
478 Bansal and Roth, above n 2 16, 719. 
479 D Layder, Sociological Practice: Linking Theory and Social Research (Sage, London, 1998), 51, 
15. 
480 BG Glaser and AL Strauss, The Discove1y of Grounded Theo1y (Aldine, Chicago, 1967). 
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Adaptive theory explicitly accommodates existing theories while allowing for new theory 
generation from emergent data. 483 ln this sense, adapti ve theory is similar to critical theory 
whereby it occupies a middle ground between strict empiricism (where theory-testing is the 
principle aim) and grounded theory (where theory-generation from data is the principal 
aim). 484 In a practical sense, the adaptive method is structured around a research topic and 
problem, which at two broad levels shapes the emergent data. First, existing theoretical 
concepts and models may feed into the understanding of emergent data by suggesting 
patterns and ordering this data. Second, it offers the possibi li ty of new concepts and 
theoretical ideas coming to the surface from the data analysis itself, which feed into 
theoretical contemplations. 485 
As such, an adapti ve theory approach enabled me to carry theoretical ideas into the field 
with the express intention of developing a dialogue or interaction between primary research 
data and extant theory. In this way, I could move dynamically between extant theory and 
the empirical data to both test existing theories and generate new theory through an iterative 
process. 
4.1.2 The Case Study Design 
This study employs a multiple case study design corresponding to Stake's486 idea of "an 
instrumental study extended to several cases to provide insight into an issue". 487 This 
design was considered the most effective method for critically analysing the explanatory 
power of extant theory in light of the research questions and also for developing new 
theoretical concepts. As others have argued, a case study approach has the advantages of 
481 PK Manning, ' Analytic Induction' in PK Manning and RB Smith (eds) A Handbook of Social 
Science Methods (Ballinger, Cambridge MA, 1982). Bansal and Roth use this methodological 
approach: Bansal and Roth, above n 216. 
482 Layder, above n 469. 
483 Ibid, 19 
484 lbid, 133, 142. 
485 !hid, ch 6. 
486 RE Stake, ' Qualitative Case Studies' in NK Denzin and YS Lincoln (eds) The SAGE Handbook 
of Qualitative Research (Sage, Thousand Oaks CA, 2005). 
487 Kearins et al, above n 273, 525. 
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allowing, first, contingent generalisations to be made in order to model complex relations, 
and second, new hypotheses to be identified through a combination of induction and 
deduction.488 As such, a case study design fits well with an adaptive theory approach. 
Using a multiple case study design, I selected similar cases so that the findings of one case 
could be tested against a second, third or fourth case in an attempt to replicate the findings. 
Yin and Eisenhardt point out that, in this way, the explanatory power of extant and 
emerging theory can be tested across multiple cases enabling more robust findings and 
increasing the generalisability of the findings. 489 
Seven cases were chosen for this dissertation, being seven 'leading banks' . My sampling 
procedures are described in depth below. 
4.2 Data Sources and Collection 
4.2.1 Sampling Procedures 
In a qualitative case study design the sampling logic is purposive not random. Cases are not 
selected randomly to be representative of a population, but rather with a specific purpose in 
mind, such as replication. 490 Indeed, Devine notes that because the aim of qualitative 
research is to focus on human accounts, it is not feasible to interview a large enough 
number of people for a statistically representative sample. 491 
As discussed in Chapter 2, this dissertation seeks to 'follow the leader' by investigating 
why early-moving banks are adopting climate-related practices, and then drawing 
implications from those findings for mainstreaming within the banking industry. 
488 KM Eisenhardt, ' Building Theories from Case Study Research' (1989) 14 Academy of 
Management Review 532, 535-536. 
489 R Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage, Thousand Oaks CA, 2003 ), 3 1-33; 
Eisenhardt, ibid, 536-537. See also D Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for 
Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction (Sage, London, 200 I), 250-252. For a full discussion of the 
generalisability of my findings see Chapter 7 below. 
490 y · "b'd m,1 1. 
491 Devine, above n 476, 142. 
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Accordingly, the first step in my research design was to assemble a sample of ' leading 
banks'. 
'Leading banks' 
Two reports documented what early-moving banks were doing in relation to climate change 
and ranked them accordingly: the Ceres Report492 and the SAM Report. 493 I contacted the 
authors of both reports in order to clarify the top ten rankings and leadership criteria 
utilised by the researchers. The ' leading' banks in those reports fulfilled certain key criteria 
that included climate corporate governance mechanisms (such as an environment charter, 
board oversight, and specific focus on 'climate change' as opposed to the more general 
'environment'), risk management and project financing/lending practices that account for 
carbon intensity of clients and projects, climate-oriented corporate investment products 
(such as clean tech equities), high activity in carbon markets and funds, and high activity in 
advising/knowledge-sharing on climate change with clients, community, and 
governments. 494 
I then cross-referenced the top ten ranked banks in both reports to reveal banks common to 
both lists. There were five banks that were common to both reports, being a mix of 
European and UK banks only. I added two Australian banks that had been ranked within 
the top quintile in the SAM Report, given that the Ceres Report had not investigated any 
Australian banks. I also added two US banks, which had come within the top 11 ranked 
banks in the Ceres Report. 
As such, the initial sample derived from these reports consisted of nine banks. However a 
key limitation of both rep01ts was that they based their findings on pre-GFC data dating 
from 2006-2007. When I began investigating contact points within the banks in February 
2010, it became clear that the GFC has taken its toll on the ' top 9' . One bank had been 
bought out subsequent to both ranking reports and its buyer was undergoing massive 
492 Ceres Report, above n 81 . 
493 SAM Report, above n 8 1. 
494 For full methodologies of the reports see: Ceres Report, above n 81, 5-9; SAM Report, ibid, 22, 
36. 
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financial upheaval because it had taken on the near-bankruptcy of the first bank in the 
takeover. The buyer bank had not been ranked in either report as a leader; and I was not 
able to find any relevant contacts for either bank on the topic of climate, despite checking 
their websites, annual and CSR reports, or external reports from entities such as UNEPFI. 
Searches for relevant contacts in two other banks from the initial sample were similarly 
fruitless. Requesting infonnation on the appropriate person to contact at those banks via 
emails through the generic 'sustainability@bank.com' address proved unsuccessful. 495 I 
ended up removing those three banks from my sample. I also added one other bank that had 
been repeatedly recommended as a leader in the space by several bank respondents, and 
which had also been ranked within the top 10 leaders in the Ceres Report (but not the SAM 
Report). 
In total, the final number of leading banks in my sample was seven. These banks were 
further confirmed as leaders in the space by multiple other sources, namely bank 
interviewees, NGOs, consultants, and mass media articles. 496 These leading banks are 
global with offices throughout the world, but their head offices are located in four 
jurisdictions: the USA, Australia, Europe and the UK. 
As noted under the ' interview ethics' section below, interviewees were informed that they 
would not be individually named in any public documents arising from this doctoral 
research. When writing up my results, I decided to take the extra precautionary step of not 
listing the seven leading banks in order to further protect the confidentiality of respondents. 
My logic in doing so was that it would be relatively easy to deduce which respondents 
belong to which bank and thereby deduce the identity of respondents given that: the size of 
the sample is contained; a detailed explanation of how that sample was assembled has been 
provided; and the role and/or jurisdiction of a respondent is often incorporated in 
subsequent empirical chapters to contextualise the data. 
495 One week later I received a response from the Associate Director of Sustainability at Barclays 
stating that: "Unfortunately we are unable to help with your research at this time. We get lots of 
requests to support research on the low-carbon economy and unfortunately we cannot respond to 
them all". 1 received no response from UBS. 
496 Eg The Economist, ' Finance and Economics: The Greening of Wall Street; Banks and Climate 
Change' 386(157 1) The Economist (15 March 2008), 105. 
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Accordingly, in the empirical chapters, the seven leading banks are referred to as 'case A' , 
'case B', 'case C', and so on through to 'case G'. The respondents are referenced as 
numbers onl y. Thus, for example, a reference to 'case B l ' means that the quote was given 
by the first respondent that J interviewed at Bank B, 'case G3 ' is the third respondent that I 
interviewed at Bank G and so on. 
One-on-one interviews were the mam method of primary data collection for this 
dissertation. As well as the purposeful sample of leading banks, the interviewees met 
Dunn's criteria as they were purposefu11y chosen on the basis of the issues and themes that 
emerged from the development of the research questions and the literature reviews. 497 
Using an approach similar to that in Shades of Green, 498 interviews were conducted with 
two groupings ofrespondent. The first group comprised ' internal respondents', which were 
elite bank personnel with intimate knowledge of the climate-related initiatives and 
endeavours in each leading bank. The second group comprised ' external respondents', 
which included third party experts who consult to these banks on climate matters, and 
NGOs that have knowledge of the leading banks ' climate practices. In total I conducted 32 
interviews. 
Bank Respondents 
Two to four people from different units within each leading bank were interviewed so as to 
ensure a variety of perspectives and responses for each case. ln total I interviewed 19 bank 
respondents. The majority of interviewees were managers (titled ' managing director' , 
' executive director', 'director', ' vice president' or 'senior manager') who head up the 
teams/units responsible for carbon and climate-related bank practices. Specifically, these 
units are: renewable and clean technologies, equity and investment research, carbon 
trading, project and structured finance, energy and power. I targeted thi s group of managers 
for their hands-on knowledge and implementation of climate-related practices, as we11 as 
their link to senior management and central environmental policy within the bank. Three 
497 Dunn K, 'Interviewing' in I Hay (ed) Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography 
(Oxford University Press, Melbourne Australia, 2005). 
498 Gunningham et al, above n 21 , 7-8. 
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other interviewees were managers that head up CSR/corporate sustainability units, and one 
interviewee headed up an environmental-social risk management team. 
Accordingly, r had access mostly to upper management transactional bankers and analysts, 
not CSR or public relations officers. I decided that this was important given that qualitative 
studies on corporate sustainability often focus on employees within these latter 
departments, 499 leaving the perspectives of employees 'on the ground' relatively 
unexplored in the literature. 
Following this logic, I did not seek interviews with Senior Management such as 
Chairpersons or CEOs. I wanted to interview the bankers on the ground, who were directly 
involved in climate-related transactions and depa1tmental decision-making. 1 acknowledge 
that a study of chairpersons/CEOs would also be valuable in terms of assessing the role and 
import of leadership in this emerging research area of banks and climate change. However, 
interviewing CEOs would have altered the aim and research questions in this particular 
dissertation. 
I identified respondents by researching climate-related bank material, including: bank 
reports which listed employees' contact details as authors/contributors; media articles 
written by bank employees or in which ce1tain bank employees had been quoted; industry-
based reports (such as those by UNEPFI) for which certain bank employees had been 
consultants; membership lists of industry bodies that had commissioned or compiled 
relevant reports which noted specific bank employees; and bank websites which posted 
material, events and relevant contact details. This research comprised intensive Internet 
searching over several weeks. 
Furthermore, during interviews, 1 used snowballing and opportunistic sampling soo 
techniques to identify a second layer of potential respondents, which included interviewees ' 
colleagues within the same bank as well as personnel in competitor leading banks. These 
499 See, eg: Bebbington and Thomson, above n 462; Hess, above n 359. 
500 MQ Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (Sage, Newbury Park CA, 1990). 
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techniques were invaluable ways of using networks or 'webs of influence' 501 to access 
people who may have been otherwise invisible by virtue of not having public contact 
details. 
I targeted individual bank personnel by email with a follow up telephone call if they did not 
respond. I did not make enquiries through a generic bank contact department or other 
gatekeeper. I achieved a very high response rate from bank personnel and no respondents 
cancelled at the last minute. Only one interviewee was unprepared when I arrived at his 
offices in New York City, which necessitated cancellation of the interv iew by me. 
Assumptions as to why I achieved such a high response rate include: 
- Contact was personalised and targeted, and included brief reasons as to why I had 
chosen that specific employee for an interview. I think this approach, though highly 
time-consuming to research, was invaluable. 
- Leaders are genuinely proud of their changes: they want to tell their story and share their 
glory. Indeed, almost a11 interviews began with respondents telling their story of how the 
unit/team had begun and their role in the creation or development of the initiative. 
- Non-threatening topic: ' leaders' 
- Non-threatening study: PhD dissertation 
- Respondents were media savvy and experienced interviewees. 
- Industry competitiveness and respondents wanting to be seen as forthcoming. Indeed, 
once I had conducted interviews in one bank I often used that fact as leverage with the 
next bank(s). 
501 J Braithwaite and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge UK, 2000). 
120 
Table 4.1 Bank Respondents 
Units/Departments USA Australia Europe/UK Total 
Respondents 
Equity/renewables/investment 1 0 4 5 
bankinq 
Project finance/ enerqy 2 4 0 6 
Corporate responsibility/ 3 1 0 4 
sustainability/ risk 
Trading/ carbon markets/ 0 1 3 4 
quantitative research 
Total 6 6 7 19 
Respondents 
External Respondents 
For additional perspectives on the role of banks in climate change mitigation and the 
practices of the leading banks specifically, J also interviewed external respondents. In total 
I interviewed 13 external respondents from Europe, the UK and the USA. These 
respondents included: independent consultants on climate change to the finance sector 
and/or UNEPFI; researchers who had authored reports on the topic; several staff and the 
CEO of an unconventional but commercial climate change bank in London; the editor of a 
leading industry journal; and relevant members of environmental activist and NGO groups. 
In pai1icular, some of the NGOs had their own sophisticated 'climate finance' units as well 
as ongoing relations with leading banks and/or experience with campaigning against 
financiers of ' dirty' projects. Again, I received a high response rate despite the busy and 
under-resourced nature of some of these sources. Many external respondents were 
genuinely interested in this research and welcomed the opportunity to contribute their 
perspective. NGO respondents, in particular, often wanted to relate their perspectives of 
'unsustainable' bank practices in relation to coal and to tell their stories of affecting 
positive changes in bank behaviour. 
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Table 4.2 External Respondents 
USA Job title & no. of Europe/ Job title & no. of Total 
resoondents UK resoondents 
NGOs NGO-A Head. Campaigns 1 
& Communications 
NGO-B - Advisor, Climate 2 
Policy. 
- Director, Energy and 
Finance Proqrams. 
NGO-C Manager. Corporate 1 
Proqrams. 
NGO-D Director, Green 1 
Investments Proqram. 
Consultants/ Con-A Special Advisor 1 
Experts 
Con-B Senior Policy 1 
Fellow and Project 
Director 
Con-C Associate Fell ow 1 
Media M-A Editor 1 
Niche CCC -Vice Chairman. 4 
Climate -Associate. Equity. 
Change -Vice President. 
Bank Advisory. 
- Associate. Legal. 
13 
4.2.2 Qualitative Data Collection: semi-structured interviews 
Interview Ethics 
Primary data collection for this research was undertaken in accordance with the Australian 
National University (ANU) Human Ethics Committee' s guidelines and associated consent 
form . The ANU Human Ethics Committee provides advice and clearance of all research 
work involving humans, using the guidelines set down by the National Health and Medical 
Research Council. 
When potential interviewees were contacted by email, they were infonned of the purpose of 
the research and of why they had been chosen to participate. At the beginning of each 
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interview, I reiterated the purpose and scope of the study, and informed interviewees that I 
would be taking extensive notes and that they could refuse to answer any question or end 
the interview at any point. I used handwritten notes rather than a tape recorder to capture 
the content of interviews after it became clear in the early interviews that respondents were 
much less candid if the interview was taped. During all interviews I took down 
stenographic notes in order to record, as faithfolly as possible, the interviewees' own 
words. During primary data collection, no interviewees expressed concern about being 
interviewed under these conditions. I informed interviewees, either in person (at interview) 
or by email (post-interview), that individual respondents would not be named in public 
documents arising from this doctoral research. 
There were two reasons for confidentiality. First, it ensured that interviewees could speak 
freely increasing the likelihood that the data would be richer and I would not get only ' the 
party line'. Second, the implications that flow from the findings needed to focus on the 
banking industry as a whole: where it is at and where it is likely to go regarding climate 
change mitigation strategies. The literature, particularly NGO and media sources, tends to 
single out and judge individual banks; and bank interviews revealed the highly competitive 
nature of the banking industry. It became clear during data analysi s that naming individuals 
or even individual banks would likely obfuscate and distract focus from my findings and 
their import for effective policy-making. Where possible throughout the text I have 
included some additional descriptive infonnation about interviewees in order to 
contextualise responses; however the identity ofrespondents remains confidential (eg. 'one 
analyst stated that', 'a sustainability manager suggested that ', 'Bank A is a good example 
of'). Finally, all data was stored on a password-protected computer to safeguard the 
confidentiality of respondents. 
Interview Protocol 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted during May-June 2010 in Europe, the UK and 
the USA, and during November-December 2011 in Australia. All interviews were 
conducted in English and ranged from 35 to 150 minutes, with the average taking 
approximately 75 minutes to complete. 
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Most interviews with bank personnel were conducted in person and on site at their offices 
in London, New York City, Paris, and Melbourne (Australia). Three other interviews took 
place in a public cafe, one other in a bank employee luncheon room. Only one bank 
interview was conducted by telephone. Conversely, the majority of interviews with external 
respondents were conducted by telephone or Skype. 502 The reasons for this were simple: 
there were time constraints in how much ground (literally) T could cover to conduct 
interviews around the world and I was keenly aware of not burning more GHGs than 
necessary while writing a thesis on how to mitigate GHG emissions. Accordingly, I focused 
my efforts on face-to-face interviews with 'elite' bank personnel , the organisations of 
which are at the heart of this thesis. 
My interview protocol was designed to elicit information about each bank 's climate change 
practices and innovations that involved corporate clients, such as investing, financing, 
research and trading. The questions were designed to prompt from respondents: stories of 
the implementation and development of such practices; insights into their longevity for that 
particular bank; examples of limitations or barriers to adoption of climate-related 
initiatives; and reflections on the transferability of climate-related initiatives to other non-
leading banks. Following the suggestions of Taylor and Bogdan, 503 I started most 
interviews with descriptive questions by asking what the interviewee's position entailed 
and then twinning structural and descriptive questions to ask what climate-related changes 
had occurred (if any) in the interviewee's bank and unit in the last five years. Respondents 
shared their success stories for the first 15 minutes or so of the interview, describing the 
change or initiative, how and why it began, and their role in it. l then probed more deeply 
about drivers of and motivations behind the change or initiative. Throughout the interview I 
also asked respondents about external and internal stakeholder relationships, soc10-
economic and political contextual factors, and aspects of their finn structure. 504 
The line of questioning that was germane to my research questions revolved around, first, 
why the bank had adopted or initiated climate-related products, services and/or practices 
502 King and Horrocks suggest using Skype for remote interviews: N King and C Horrocks, 
Interviews in Qualitative Research (Sage, London, 2010), 84-85. 
503 SJ Taylor and R Bogdan, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: The Search For 
Meanings (John Wiley, New York, 1984), 25. 
504 A similar approach was used by Gunningham et al, above n 21 . 
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(Research Question 2), and second, the exact nature of those climate-related initiatives, 
including what innovations if any had occurred (Research Question I ). I had already gained 
information from documentary sources on this latter aspect (see Chapter 2) but l wanted 
climate-related activities clarified and elaborated upon in the interviewees ' own words. 
Data and findings from this line of questioning are discussed in detail in the next Chapter. 
Prior to data collection, some of my colleagues had expressed scepticism as to whether 
leading banks were actually doing what they clai med to be doing or whether it was simply 
'greenwash' and public relations machination. During the interviews I probed any 
inconsistencies to build internal validity505 and it became clear that banks are doing what 
they proclaim to be doing. Climate-related departments and employees exist; and their 
work is focused on the areas stated in bank disclosures, namely renewable and clean tech 
project finance and investments, equity research, and carbon trading. 
However, a theme started emerging from the data around the 'core' nature of these 'green' 
activities. In the spirit of the adaptive method, experience from early interviews helped to 
refine and guide subsequent data collection. 506 Of methodological relevance here is 
Eisenhardt's question: " Is it legitimate to alter and even add data collection methods during 
a study?"507 Her own response is ' yes' when the aim of the research is to build theory. She 
writes: "if a new line of thinking emerges during the research, it makes sense to take 
advantage by altering data collection, if such an alteration is likely to better ground the 
theory or to provide new theoretical insight". 508 She terms this "controlled opportunism" 
whereby researchers can take advantage of "the emergence of new themes to improve 
resultant theory". 509 
Accordingly, in addition to the initial questioning around ' what are leading banks doing 
and why?', a second layer of questioning emerged: 'to what extent are the climate-related 
practices of leading banks a core or significant business activity of the bank?' This 
505 Eisenhardt, above n 488, 532-550. See also: Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 501; King and 
Horrocks, above n 502. 
506 Layder, above n 479, 48-49. 
507 Eisenhardt, above n 488, 539. 
508 Ibid. 
509 Ibid. 
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additional line of questioning sought to elicit information on areas such as: compensatory 
mechanisms for interviewees; the level of board/senior management involvement in 
climate-related practices; the extent to which the work of climate-related units was 
integrated into or communicated to other units within the bank; whether interviewees had to 
switch projects during leaner times (eg. the GFC) and/or divide their efforts between 
'green ' and non-green projects. The findings and implications from this line of questioning 
are discussed in Chapter 6. 
All bank personnel were frank and forthcoming. I found them to be very generous with 
their time and insights. Their responses were relevant and direct, with little obfuscation or 
peregrination off-topic. In part I assume this is due to a banker's training in addressing 
specific questions and working within tight time frames. I think that targeting 
predominantly transactional bankers 'at the coal face' of doing deals as well as analysts that 
crunch the numbers - as opposed to just CSR or PR personnel - ensured that the 
information elicited about bank practices and drivers of change appeared to be mostly 
genuine and accurate. 
Importantly, I was surprised when interviewees, notably transactional bankers and analysts, 
gave me responses that did not appear to be overly 'green'. Many of these interviewees 
were very frank about the importance of making money for the bank and shareholders, and 
the secondary nature (at best) and even irrelevance (in some cases) of 'doing the right 
thing' to their work. This suggested that I was not getting the bank 'party line' and that 
interviewees were not tell ing me what they thought I wanted to hear. Nonetheless, J probed 
interviewees to test whether there were contradictions, hybrid positions or more nuanced 
responses. I wanted to check (as much as possible) whether interviewees were giving me 
the 'expected' answers for their role. For example, I asked transactional bankers about the 
relevance of their bank's social standing (not just profit making) to their own job 
satisfaction in order to grasp whether it was all about the money. I asked questions such as: 
"Would it worry you if your bank 's social reputation fell even though profits increased?" 
and "What does 'sustainability' mean to you personally"? I did receive some more nuanced 
answers as a result of thi s further probing, which added complexity and depth to the data. 
These data and findings are elucidated in detail in Chapter 5. 
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All but three of the bank respondents were male, and all appeared to be aged between 30-50 
years old. Contrary to Harvey's concern about the 'power relationship' when interviewing 
elites, 5 10 I did not sense any overt power imbalance between the respondents and me. I 
made it known to respondents prior to or during interviews that I have a background in law 
as both practitioner and academic. Given that there are significant professional similarities 
between bankers and lawyers T did this to present some parity between us; I also wanted to 
make the respondents more comfortable by reducing my status as outsider or 'enemy'. I 
always dressed impeccably, mirroring respondents ' professional and elite status. One ' hot 
tip' from a very experienced female qualitative researcher had stuck in my mind: "Dress 
like an elite or dress like an academic but never, ever dress like the secretary." 
I suspect that my efforts with professionalism and transparency before, during and after the 
interviews helped to build rapport and trust with respondents. For example, in addition to 
communicating the ethics process and assuring confidentiality at the beginning of each 
interview, I also sent subsequent emails thanking interviewees for their time and insights, 
and updating them of my thesis timeline. I also informed respondents that I would give 
them prior access to quotes that I intended to release into the public domain . All 
respondents indicated that they welcomed ongoing contact post-interviews if I had further 
questions. Most respondents expressed interest in reading publications and results arising 
from this dissertation. J suspect that this is due to not only their genuine interest in the topic 
but also their intrinsic competitive desire to know how other banks are tracking. 
4.2.3 Documentary Sources 
Documentary sources were an additional source of data and reflection in the primary data 
collection and analysis stages of the research. These sources included bank powerpoint 
presentations, bank adve1tisements, bank equity investment strategy documents, bank 
policy documents, newspaper articles published in the cities at the time of interviews, NGO 
reports and unpublished material such as posters. These sources were included during 
informal processes of reflection as well as the more formal process of data analysis. 
510 WS Harvey, 'Methodological Approaches for Interviewing Elites' (2010) 4(3) Geography 
Compass 193. 
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4.3 Data Analysis 
4.3.1 Annotation 
In the spirit of adaptive theory, data analysis frequently overlapped with data collection. 511 
I typed up handwritten interview notes within 48 hours of interviews while they were still 
fresh in my mind. Doing this provided me with the opportunity to annotate the data512 by 
including reflections and observations in bold/italics. Following Eisenhardt's suggestion, I 
wrote down whatever impressions I had, that is, I ' reacted' to the data rather than 'sifting 
out' what might seem important. 513 This approach ensured that as much information as 
possible was included in the interview notes given the difficulty in predicting precisely 
what information would be useful in the future. 514 
I also pushed thinking in my notes by asking questions such as "How does this interview 
differ from the last?" and making suggestions about how emerging categories and themes 
were revealed, exemplified, connected or contradicted by the incoming data. This 
annotation process helped to stimulate preliminary analysis of the data by engaging with 
and thinking about the interviews. Similar to Layder's 'theoretical memos', my annotations 
generated self- dialogue between theoretical reflection and data analysis by "exploring and 
teasing out whether or in what sense particular codes, concepts and categories really are 
illustrated (indicated) by the data". 515 
511 Eisenhardt opines that this overlapping is a "striking feature of research to build theory from case 
studies": Eisenhardt, above n 488, 538. 
512 I Dey, Qualitative Data Analysis: A User Friendly Guide.for Social Scientists (Routledge, New 
York, 1993), 88. 
513 Eisenhardt, above n 488, 538. 
514 Ibid, 539 
51 < 
- Laydcr, above n 479, 59. 
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4.3.2 Coding, Categories and Themes 
Initially, data were coded by case and employee type. Further reflections on the data, 
guided by the research questions, then led to more extensive coding and re-coding as new 
concepts were developed. 5 16 Dey points out that the tenn 'coding' has a mechanistic 
overtone at odds with the conceptual task of categorising qualitative data. 517 He notes that 
coding qualitative data is an iterative, reflexive process rather than a processual , objective 
one. Accordingly, the coding process I used was highly iterative because codes were treated 
as a provisional tool to engage with, understand and create meaning from the data. 
I did not use software programs such as NVivo. Instead I began by manually selecting 
passages of text in each interview that appeared indicative of a particular perspective or a 
critical passage of information. That passage of text was then assigned to a suitable 
category. When I began this process I sorted the data into key categories that were based on 
orienting concepts from the literature reviews and interview questions. 518 This was to 
ensure that the data was being analysed in a way that was relevant and appropriate to the 
research questions. Initially I sifted the interviews into key comparative categories in order 
to locate ' drivers' of change and to answer the 'why' and 'what' questions (Research 
Questions I and 2). These key categ01ies were descriptive and included risk averse vs. 
opportunity-driven, business as usual vs. entrepreneuri al, economic vs. moral/ethical, 
regulatory vs. social pressures, and stakeholder vs. shareholder approach. I adopted an 
approach similar to that used by Kearins et al. by first reducing the data by selecting out all 
mentions of these terms, as well as inferences related to each. 519 Included in the reduced 
data were statements of contextual relevance particularly relating to achievements, 
constraints and barriers, conceptualizations of 'sustainability' and 'CSR', and divergence or 
adherence to industry standards or norms. £mportantly, this process of categorisation and 
reduction faci litated cross-case analysis by looking for within-case similarities coupled with 
inter-case differences. 520 
516 Silverman, above n 489, 227-228; H Marshall , 'What Do We Do When We Code Data?' (2002) 
2 Qualitative Research Journal 56. 
517 Dey, above n 512, 58. 
518 b Layder, a oven 479, 101; O ' Dwyer, above n 242, 530. 
519 . Keanns et al, above n 273, 526. 
520 Eisenhardt, above n 488, 540. 
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When reflecting on the interview data and my time in the field, I began to appreciate that 
important and new issues were emerging from the data that were not so easily categorised 
into these initial codes. For example, on the topic of CSR, it became apparent that the 
language interviewees had used was sometimes quite different from terminology employed 
in the literature, even though both sources were speaking to the same issue. Accordingly, I 
added more coding categories, which became more refined as the coding process continued 
and I moved from ' descriptive' coding to 'interpretative' coding, as recommended by King 
and Horrocks. 521 An example of codes can be seen in Table 4.3 below. 
To assist this textual coding process, I also employed more lateral methods such as drawing 
flow diagrams by hand on large sheets of paper, connecting them with arrows and stapling 
them into an enormous collage. Multiple bright colors were used to highlight exemplary 
quotes and to visually represent coding categories and emerging themes in order to 
understand relationships between them. 
521 King and Horrocks, who advocate three stages of thematic analysis being descriptive coding 
(stage I), interpretative coding (stage 2) and defining overarching themes (stage 3): King and 
Horrocks, above n 502, 152-159. 
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Table 4.3 Coding Examples 
Coding category Description Exemplary Quote Motivations 
Management Senior Management "[Its] under very senior profit 
driven initiate or support a management 
climate initiative leadership .. . The first opportunity 
thing they will do is 
assess climate change reputation 
markets and 
opportunities in each [risk aversion?] 
business unit and decide 
how to change or move 
business to capture that 
oooortunity" 
Client driven Clients approach bank "My work started end- profit 
for climate-related 2006 with the request of 
solutions a very large pension reputation 
fund that came to my 
team saying that 'we've leadership/ 
been working with you differentiation 
for a long time and [the 
bank] is climate friendly, 
can you help us with a 
problem?"' 
Mora I/responsibility Climate initiative "The Chairman is very the right thing to 
driven created for ethical green and sustainability- do 
reasons minded, so it came from 
him" 
Furthermore, in order to ensure construct and internal validity,522 I cut the data from the 
interviews four ways. First, the data were evaluated for consistency within each case. I 
undertook within-case analysis523 by comparing interviews between different respondents 
within the same bank. To do this, I prepared detailed matrices to summarise the codes/ 
categories identified by each interviewee, 524 which then displayed the core coding 
categories that emerged from the coding process. From these matrices I was able to draw a 
list of top fi ve 'drivers' of climate-related uptake for each respondent and to compare 
interviews for consistency and differences within and between the narratives. Second, I 
522 Yin, above n 489, 34. 
523 Eisenhardt, above n 488, 540; King and Horrocks, above n 502, 150. 
524 MB Mi !es and AM Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis (Sage, Beverly Hills, 1994). 
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used the matrices to engage m cross-case searches for patterns, 525 which involved 
comparing cases to each other to look for subtle similarities and differences between them. 
I did this by initially comparing cases within the same jurisdiction, and then comparing all 
cases with each other as an aggregate. During subsequent readings of the data I placed 
emphasis on locating interviews and cases that would tend to conflict with the primary 
coding categories that had developed from earlier stages of analysis. 526 This helped to 
provide some protection against "the presentation of 'unreliable' or ' invalid' evidence". 527 
Third, I made jurisdictional comparisons by comparing groups of cases from the 
UK/Europe, the USA and Australia against each other and situated interview data within 
the socio-political context at the time of data collection, which is appropriate for an 
adaptive theory approach. As a fourth dimension of data analysis, I cross-compared data 
from two groupings of employees, namely ' transactional ' bankers/analysts as compared 
and contrasted against ' policy/sustainability' managers. 
During thi s highly iterative process of 'sifting and cutting', a set of overarching themes528 
emerged from the data that informed the 'why' and 'how' research questions (Research 
Questions 1 and 2) and also appeared to bear upon implications and conclusions arising 
from the findings (Research Question 3). These themes were: the nature of change 
(core/peripheral/barriers); the meaning of CSR; the role of banks in society; bank influence; 
and regulatory context. In addition to informing the findings of 'why banks go green' in 
Chapter 5, these themes helped to frame the implications for mainstreaming of climate-
related changes in the industry as a whole (Chapter 6) and my recommendations for 
policymakers (Chapter 7). 
525 Eisenhardt, above n 488, 540, stating that cross-case compari sons are important to redress human 
infonnation-processing biases. 
-26 ) O'Dwyer, above n 242, 530. 
527 MB Miles, ' Qualitative Data as Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis' ( 1979) 24 
(December) Administrative Science Quarterly 590, 590. See also: Patton, above n 500; and 
Silverman, above n 489. 
528 King and Horrocks, above n 502, 153, 156-157. 
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4.3.3 Theory-Testing and Theory-Generation 
Following an adaptive theory approach, my intent when analysing the data was twofold: 
test extant theory and generate new theory. Chapter 3 described the 'trichotomous ' 
theoretical lens employed in this dissertation, being micro, meso and macro levels of 
theorizing. Given the scope and objectives of this dissertation, Chapter 3 made clear that 
salient multi-level theoretical interactions that are revealed in the data will be discussed, but 
that particular attention is given to meso-level theorising. Most importantly, my aim is "to 
clarify current conceptual tools and to construct new ones". 529 
Wodak clarifies this approach by stating that the question for qualitative researchers is not 
always "Do we need grand theory?" but rather "What conceptual tools arc relevant for this 
or that problem and for this and that context?" 530 Llewellyn extends this approach by 
proposing a broader understanding of 'theory' that includes not only 'grand theory' but also 
'metaphor', 'differentiation ', 'conceptualization' and 'context setting'. 531 She suggests that 
the latter four ways of theorising about (or "conceptually framing") organizational issues 
are important for reflecting and explicating "the contestation of meaning and significance in 
social and organizational life". 532 
Accordingly, this dissertation adopts an approach to theorising that draws on Llewelyn's 
"conceptual framing" and also Mouzelis' "conceptual pragmatism". 533 Mouzelis exhorts 
theorists who are interested in the theory-empirics relationship to construct theories that 
follow "criteria of utility rather than truth". 534 This is important for qualitative social 
researchers because 'truth' is a relative concept: it often depends on the perspective of an 
interviewee, the sense-making tactics of a researcher, and the socio-cultural context of 
529 Mouzelis, Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong? (Routledge, London and New York, 
1995), 9. 
530 R Wodak, 'The discourse-historical approach' in R Wodak and M Meyer (eds) Methods of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (Sage, London, 200 I ) 63, 64. 
531 S Llewelyn, ' What Counts As ' Theory' in Qualitative Management and Accounting Research? 
Introducing Five Levels of Theorizing' (2003) 16( 4) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal 662. 
532 Ibid, 664. 
533 Mouzelis, above n 529, 8. 
534 Ibid. 
133 
both.535 Accordingly, when interacting between extant theory, empirical data and emerging 
theory, I adopted a conceptually ' pragmatic ' approach by using flexible and open-ended 
conceptual tools when moving from micro through meso to macro levels of analysis. 536 As 
will be seen in Chapters 5-7, this approach helped me not only to test extant theory against 
the data but also to generate empirically-grounded theory. 
In this way, my theoretical approach fits within Merton 's ' middle-range theory', 537 which 
sits between "the working hypotheses" that evolve during empirical research and "the all-
inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual scheme". 538 Indeed, Boudon asserts 
that the aim of middle-range theory is to elucidate and consolidate segregated hypotheses 
without attempting to explain the entire social world. 539 Specifically, he argues that it is 
"quixotic to try to determine the overarching independent variable that would operate in all 
social processes, or to determine the essential feature of social structure, or to find out the 
[concepts] sufficient to analyze all social phenomena. " 540 
As such, theory-generation in this dissertation might be termed ' modest' as opposed to 
'grand'; it makes no great claims to understanding the world at a level of influence or 
abstraction that philosophers such as Weber or Foucault have done. But it does aim to 
explain the organisational logic behind climate-related bank changes and the implications 
of that logic for the industry, policymakers, and our transition to a low-carbon economy. As 
such, the theoretical contribution of this dissertation is considered to be relevant, realistic 
and very timely. 
535 A Sayer, Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (Routledge, London and New York, 
1992), 51. 
-36 
' Llewellyn, above n 531 , 666. 
537 RK Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Free Press, Glencoe IL, 1957). 
538 RK Merton, ' Introduction to Social Theory and Social Structure" in SP Hier (ed) Contemporary 
Sociological Thought: Themes and Theories (Canadian Scholars ' Press, Toronto, 2005) 24. 
539 R Boudon, 'What Middle-Range Theories Are' (1991) 20(4) Contemporary Sociology 519. 
540 Ibid, 519 (emphasis in original). 
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Chapter 5 Drivers: Empirical Evidence 
5.0 Overview 
This chapter addresses the question of what drives early moving banks to adopt clirnate-
related practices by presenting analysis of interview data and findings. The next chapter 
also relies upon findings from the empirical data in order to draw implications for the 
mainstreaming of climate-related strategies in the banking industry. 
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the word 'driver' is an imperfect descriptor for 
what shapes (and is shaped by) bank behaviour because it implies that a motivator is both 
unidirectional and independent. Empirical data from this study reveal that there is a 
complex interplay between actors in the field (banks, competitors, NGOs, regulators) and 
reasons for behavioural change. Nonetheless, viewing the data in terms of ' drivers' 
provides a useful lens through which to identify and disaggregate influences on leading 
banks as well as salient themes in the data. Consistent with an adaptive theory approach, 
this enables linkages between the " lifeworld" (or subjective view of the respondent) and 
"system elements" (or ' the bigger picture')541 to be made, which can prompt new insights 
(as detailed in Chapters 6 and 7). 
Climate-related changes to bank business are driven primarily from three directions: 
bottom-up via clients seeking solutions; top-down via senior management initiatives or 
support; and middle-out via mimicking of competitors' behaviour due to peer pressure. As 
such, all three levels of theoretical lens - meso, micro and macro - are evidenced and 
engaged by the data. When taken together however, reported drivers of bank action yield a 
single strong message: the overarching driver of climate-related initiatives by early moving 
banks is business case logic. The business case comprises two facets. First, profits are 
enhanced: directly via fee generation and indirectly via competitive edge. Second, risks 
(credit, investment, litigation, reputation, regulatory) are minimized: what is known as 
54 1 Layder, above n 479, 48. 
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' downside prevention'. Behind each direction of change lies a common, ulterior motivation 
for banks: make money and do not lose money. 
Arguably, these findings are unsurpnsmg. It can be seen from Chapters 2 and 3 that 
business case reasons for 'going green' are prevalent in a number of studies of different 
corporate sectors. In a capitalist paradigm where shareholder return is paramount, how can 
it be otherwise? Yet my findings also inform and challenge pmts of the business strategy 
and CSR literatures by revealing a deeper and more complex understanding of corporate 
'reputation' as a powerful motivator of bank behaviour. Moreover, the role of external 
drivers such as environmental activist groups and the importance of regulatory contexts that 
shape bank decision-making are elucidated. This investigation yields jurisdictionally-
specific findings, which have important policy implications. Finally, the role and meaning 
of CSR as an actual driver of climate uptake is deconstructed, which reveals important 
insights about managerial conceptions of CSR and the limited ability of CSR to mobilise 
corporate change in 'real life'. 
5.1 Drivers: Bottom-up, Top-down and Middle-out 
Client interest in business-aspects of climate change is one of the prime motivators for a 
bank to create new products and enter new markets. In nearly all of the cases studied, large 
corporate and/or wealthy individual clients had approached a bank to seek solutions: not 
only for mitigating regulatory risk associated with extant or threatened carbon pricing, but 
even more so to capitalise on opportunities created by new markets. As stated by one bank 
respondent: 
Tt's incredibly client driven. We wouldn't do it unless clients wanted it. Clients see 
an economic opportunity for them to do it and their clients and customers want to 
do it. So it 's end-user driven. (case B 1 ). 
An example of how client demand drives climate innovation is provided by Bank A. This 
bank built up a specialist climate-related service for clients, which includes new investment 
indices, a research centre dedicated to climate knowledge and policy, and development of 
"investable ideas" in the renewables/clean tech spaces. This service was developed due to 
the growth in the number of large clients interested in the climate change area. Specifically, 
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the initiation of new investment indices illustrates clearly how client interest in climate 
change "motivated [the bank] to build successful products." (case A l). These new indices 
re-classify industrial sectors into four climate-related themes: low carbon energy 
production, energy efficiency, climate finance, and water/waste/pollution control. In so 
doing, the indices evaluate and funnel investment into "companies that are focused on 
addressing, combating or developing solutions to offset and overcome the effects of climate 
h " 542 A I I . h . . c ange. n ana yst exp ams t eir creat10n: 
My work started end-2006 with the request of a very large pension fund that came 
to my team saying that 'we've been working with you for a long time and [the bank] 
is climate friendly, can you help us with a problem? ' The Trustees had set a 
mandate to identify parts of the [fund] portfolio affected by climate change and the 
client didn ' t know where to start. Neither did we! But we ended up creating the 
Indices which map the world for different investors to identify different [climate-
related] investment opportunities. (case A2). 
At the same time, new initiatives require senior management support. Adopting or 
developing new products and getting into new markets takes additional human and 
financial resources. All interviewees indicated that their unit budget is fixed and if they 
wish to go beyond it for new initiatives then they need to make a business case to senior 
management. As stated by one banker: " [The Board has] a clearly defined strategy: if it 
makes good business sense then we will do it." (case G 1) And senior management teams 
are becoming more informed about when and how climate-related initiatives make good 
business sense. One interviewee explained his Board's rationale behind getting into the 
renewables space: 
What's different now compared to the ' 90s is that the [senior] management team is 
more focussed on the economics of it all. Distribution strategies, differentiation 
strategies from our competitors, levelized cost of energy or 'LCE'; that is, creating a 
business model that makes sense. In the ' 90s we were dealing with ideas of what 
might happen in the [renewables] space in the future, it wasn' t concrete yet. Now it 
is concrete and investors like that. 543 (case C3). 
Similarly, an analyst described how his bank became active in carbon trading: 
542 Bank A, Climate Change Index Strategies (March 2010), 6. 
543 This sentiment is reiterated by other finance sector players: "People once backed hope. Now they 
back revenues", per Stephen Mahon, chief investment officer at Low Carbon Investors, London, 
quoted in Bloomberg News, 'Renewed Appetite for lPOs Set to Boost Solar, Wind (Update I)' 
Bloomberg News (15 April 20 l 0). 
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I wrote a report in 2005 when no-one else was in carbon emissions trading and I 
spelt out the (positive) impacts of it on profitability .. .I've written a lot of reports 
but this one had the most impact internally within the bank management and also 
externally with investors and clients. (case E2) 
So we begin to see an interplay between Board decisions, 'good business sense' and client 
service. For example, one interviewee explained that climate change is a strategic pillar of 
the bank's business: 
[The climate change pillar] was recently placed under very senior management 
leadership . . . The first thing they will do is assess climate change markets and 
opportunities in each business unit and decide how to change or move business to 
capture that opportunity ... [The bank] is saying this is not an issue that will go away 
anytime soon. (case A 1 ). 
Another interviewee stated simply: "Climate change is a big theme for our clients so it 
makes sense for [the bank] to focus on it." (case B 1 ). 
For banks, providing responsive and innovative client service creates two important 
benefits. The first consequence is direct: it generates fees. These fees are significant, 
coming from large corporate and/or affluent individual clients and they create profit for the 
bank and increase value for shareholders. In other words, fee-generation is a hard or 
measurable item that comprises an unambiguous business case. The second consequence is 
indirect and harder to quantify, yet it ties into the first. Excellent and innovative client 
service creates a reputation for the bank as the 'go to' bank in the space. This is crucial 
because the banking industry is highly competitive. In the words of an interviewee: " It is a 
very competitive industry because we are all competing for a fixed universe of clients. 
There is a fixed size of the purse." (case A2). The effect is that "You do or die on customer 
perceptions of you." (case F2). So reputation as the 'go to' bank creates competitive 
advantage. The corollary is that each bank is working very hard to win clients from other 
banks whi lst satisfying their own. 
Clearly then, retaining and gammg clients is good for profits/value increase; thus 
' reputation ' inevitably, albeit indirectly, generates fees. In terms of the business case, it is a 
virtuous hard-soft-hard circle. Leadership and reputation are regarded in the business 
strategy literature as 'soft issues', which are intangible, often unmeasurable, and therefore 
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under-researched as factors relevant to a business case. 544 Yet it is clear from my study that 
(soft) 'reputation' is as crucial as (hard) fee generation in driving bank behaviour and 
innovation. 
In summary, my data reveal that 'reputation' is an important albeit unquantifiable part of 
the business case for green uptake because it relates to: first, making money via being - or 
being seen to be - 'green ' and/or delivering excellent client service that puts a bank above 
its competitors (that is, reputation enhancement); and second, not losing money via 
negative social or corporate perceptions (that is, prevention of reputation loss). This 
proposition needs further and detailed explanation. To do this, a central concept in the data 
and literature must be unpacked: the meaning of ' reputation '. 
5.1.1 Meaning and Role of 'Reputation' as Driver 
Literature that addresses legitimacy often focuses on 'social licence' as the key to a 
company's right to exist. Social licence is borne of compliance with regulatory standards, 
institutional norms and/or societal expectations and, as such, confers legitimacy upon a 
corporation. 545 The idea is that: 
society gives licence to business to operate and, consequently, business must serve 
society not only by creating wealth, but also by contributing to social needs and 
satisfying social expectations towards business. 546 
Complying with these elements shows that a company' s values match those of the social 
system within which it is embedded; when there is a mismatch then an organisation 's 
legitimacy, and hence survival, is threatened. 547 Social licence also comes from ' the power-
responsibility equation' 548 whereby business has power which brings with it responsibility 
544 Porter and Kramer, above n 354; Salzmann et al , above n 285; Steger, above n 285. 
545 MC Suchman, 'Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches' (1995) 20 
Academy of Management Review 571 , 574; Meyer and Rowan, above n 399; Zucker, above n 425; 
SL Hart, ' Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World' (1997) 75(1) Harvard Business 
Review 66; K Davis, 'Five Propositions for Social Responsibility' ( 1975) 18(3) Business Horizons 
19. 
546 Mele, above n 224, 49. 
547 Sethi, above n 267; J Dowling and J Pfeffer, ' Organisational Legitimacy: Social Values and 
Organisational Behaviour' (1975) 18(1) Pacific Sociological Review 122. 
548 K Davis, 'Understanding the Social Responsibility Puzzle' (1967) 10 Business Horizons 45-5 1. 
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beyond economic and legal considerations. 549 This acceptance of "further socio-human 
responsibilities" by business550 dovetails with Davis's 'Tron Law of Responsibility' , which 
states that "those who do not take responsibility for their power, ultimately shall lose it". 55 1 
In other words, business needs social acceptance to survive. 552 
As such, a necessary part of social licence is 'social reputation'. The notion of social 
reputation emphasises both the risk to which a company is exposed if its actions are 
contrary to societal or community expectations553 and the benefit for a company if it is 
accepted by the community within which it operates. 554 Social reputation also dovetails 
with the concept of ' reputation capital', which: 
represents a communications bridge that predisposes NGOs, communities, and other 
groups to enter into open discussion rather than hostile opposition. Reputation 
capital carries with it credibility. 555 
As such, the up-front risk and costs associated with gaining social acceptability are reduced 
and access to profits is enhanced. 556 In this way, building reputation capital can be 
perceived by firms as a good economic investment. 557 
As desc1ibed in Chapter 3, some CSR scholars have found that a company's social licence 
or social reputation can be leveraged by NGOs and civil society to pressure individual firms 
into becoming more socially and environmentally responsible. For example, in their cross-
national study of pulp and paper mills, Gunningham et al. fo und that "the social license was 
the primary source of [corporate] beyond-compliance measures of the good citizenship 
549 K Davis, 'Can Business Afford to Ignore Social Responsibilities?' ( 1960) 2(3) California 
Management Review 70-76; Davis, above n 226; CC Walton, Corporate Social Responsibilities 
(Wadsworth, Belmont CA, 1967). 
550 Davis 1960, ibid, 76. 
551 Davis and Blomstrom, above n 225, 174; Davis, above n 548, 50. 
552 Mele, above n 224, 52. 
553 Davis, above n 545. 
554 S Lewis, 'Reputation and Corporate Responsibility' (2003) 7(4) Journal <if Communication 
Management 356. 
555 SA Joyce and l Thomson, 'Earning a Social License to Operate: Social Acceptability and 
Resource Development in Latin America' ( 1999) Mining Journal, 441. 
556 Through, for example, local community tolerance, having the trust and ear of regulators, and not 
being targeted by NGOs: Gunningham et al, above n 21, 53. 
557 !bid. 
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variety" due to pressure from societal stakeholders. 558 
Similarly, as described in Chapter 2, a number of previous bank studies highlight that bank 
reputations are at risk from public 'naming and shaming' campaigns by NGOs that target 
financiers of environmentally 'dirty' borrowers. 559 Such campaigns have potential to 
undermine the trust and reputation deemed so crucial to banks' operations. 560 Arguably, the 
fear of that outcome motivates attention to CSR in downside prevention, as postulated by 
Husted. 561 As such, protection of social reputation would seem to be a logical driver of 
socially and environmentally responsible bank behaviour. 
Yet, in reality, social reputation 1s not the only type of reputation to motivate bank 
behaviour, and 'tmst' has a number of facets. In the literature, the tenns 'social reputation' 
and 'corporate reputation' are often used interchangeably, 562 which indicates that a 
company's 'reputation ' has been conflated with its social standing. However, my 
interviews reveal that the concept of 'reputation' from the perspective of banks and bankers 
is multi-dimensional. As such, the role of ' reputation' as an actual driver for bank 
behaviour is more complex and nuanced than envisaged in the literature. 
'Reputation ' has more than one meaning for banks: it encapsulates ' social ' reputation in a 
way that accords with the literature; but it also encapsulates reputation for good business 
sense, what is termed in this dissertation as ' client service reputation '. Both types of 
reputation can co-exist in the same firm; they are not mutually exclusive. Yet their context 
and effect differs. This nuanced conception of corporate ' reputation ' as a disaggregated 
phenomenon is captured in Figure 5.1 below. In summary, ' client service reputation' is a 
powerful motivator of bank behaviour, as acknowledged by all interviewees regardless of 
558 Ibid, 51 . 
·59 ) Watchman, above n 114; Oekom Research, above n 11 4; Cooper, above n 114; Lundgren and 
Catasus, above n 8. 
560 Johnson, above n 113. 
561 Husted, above n 369. 
562 Sec eg: Mele, above n 224, 49; C Wright and A Rwabizambuga, ' Institutional Pressures, 
Corporate Reputation, and Voluntary Codes of Conduct: An Examination of the Equator Principles' 
(2006) 111 Business and Society Review 89; Lewis, above n 554; JF Mahon, 'Corporate Reputation: 
Research Agenda Using Strategy and Stakeholder Literature' (2002) 41 (4) Business and Society 
415; D Windsor, 'Corporate Citizenship: Evolution and Interpretation' in J Andriof and M 
Mcintosh (eds) Perspectives on Corporate Citizenship (Greenleaf, Sheffield, 200 1). 
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their type of bank or jurisdiction. Conversely, regard for 'social reputation' - and the 
concomitant role of NGO pressure - as a driver of bank behaviour is variable. It is 
important to banks, but its salience as a driver depends on a number of factors. Both types 
of reputation are di scussed in detail below. 
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Figure 5.l A new conception of 'corporate reputation': social reputation and client service reputation 
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Client Service Reputation 
As evidenced earlier in this chapter, client service excellence is top priority for banks. The 
corporate clients of banks are also motivated by the business case, so it is at this level that 
banks pitch their services to them. Often, the approach is one of 'strategic partnership' or 
that a bank can be a 'trusted advisor' to the corporation. The notion of trust here pertains to 
the bank being an excellent service provider that will help the client's business to flourish. 
The inner logic is that «we need our clients to do well in order for us to do well. Helping 
them helps us." (case G3). So 'client service reputation' has two key components, namely 
' trnst' in the context of' good business sense'. 
Most early-moving banks have moved to a 'relationship model' which goes beyond just 
'doing deals' to understanding client needs and designing solutions for them. One bank 
respondent described it thus: "We arc a strategic partner as well as a financial partner with 
our clients. All clients need to reduce their carbon footprint so we help to solve clients' 
hurdles" (case D2). Notions of ' trust' and 'relationship ' augment client satisfaction. And 
satisfied clients keep coming back. As evidenced earlier, this 'client service reputation' is 
crucial for bank business because it builds business. One bank respondent described it in 
these terms: "Leadership and trustworthiness are very important to [the bank]. Clients come 
to me because of our reputation. Reputation creates business and can sustain business". 
(case A2). 
Client service reputation is crncial in a highly competitive market. It helps a bank to 
differentiate itself from its competitors; it creates hard profits from soft factors. 
Australia is an emerging market regarding carbon so we are carving out our 
leadership now ... Our perceived expertise, understanding the energy market, 
guiding clients in the right products etc is critical. So reputation from a customer 
service perspective is vital. (case F2). 
And, in the words of one bank respondent, the clear upshot to having a reputation for good 
business sense is "the bottomline" because such a reputation "creates client business: sector 
expertise puts us above our competitors, which means that clients keep coming back and 
they bring others with them." (case G2). 
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This is very important for an industry in which banks are motivated by profit imperatives 
and jostling each other for a bigger slice of the same pie. 
As such, strategies for appropriate 'client service reputation' branding and image 
management are vital to differentiation; and the hook for marketing to corporate clients is 
'good business sense' . A number of bankers and analysts explained how they can blend 
climate-related strategy with good business sense to enhance client service reputation and 
competitive edge for their bank. One example is Bank A' s climate investment indices 
discussed above. A project financier at another bank described how he worked closely with 
the commodities group to use hedges in order to facilitate lucrative returns for the bank and 
clients; this had made his bank a leader in energy/renewables projects in the USA. 
A further example is Bank E, which coordinates its environmental activities through a 
senior management committee. It was explained to me that this " improves [the bank' s] 
ability to sell itself to clients as an integrated climate change aware entity." (case E2). 
Doing this comes back to good business sense and appropriate branding. Bankers in 
different departments are coordinated in their dealings with the same client: 
so that they can give integrated advice and client service - it is important that [the 
bank] is seen as integrated ... It is also part of our branding. We make clients aware 
[of climate-related opportunities) because it's good for business and also we can be 
seen as a socially responsible corporate entity. (case E2). 
This notion of 'being seen to be green' came up often in interviews but most clearly when 
discussing branding and differentiation strategies of other banks. At these times, 
interviewees tended to be quite frank about their competitors' non-green motivations for 
'going green' . A number of interviewees had worked at other leading banks and, armed 
with inside information and now having changed alliances, were quite willing to discuss 
competitors' strategies. Apparently banks in various jurisdictions were engaging with 
climate-related matters only for the 'image' . For example: 
[One bank] is at the start of the cycle so it's very busy raising its profile regarding 
climate change initiatives. We pulled back from sponsoring climate-related 
leadership conferences; [the other bank] is doing it now. Why are they doing it? 
Because it makes money ... Their message will be 'we are doing this to be a good 
corporate citizen ' . But I argue that at the heart of it there is a strong economic 
rationale. (case B 1 ). 
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This underlying economic rationale is also relevant to managing 'social reputation ', which 
is discussed next. 
Sometimes it is not in a bank's interest to be seen as a global warming advocate, yet it can 
still push climate-related products and services. For example, one interviewee recalls: 
we were having a meeting with a large US pension fund and one of their executives 
said 'we don't believe in the science ' and got very angry about it. .. [My bank's] 
response is that we don' t make any assumptions regarding the science of climate 
change. It is purely quantitative research. For example, in 2004 there were 154 
companies delivering goods and services in low-carbon. In March 2010 there were 
385 such companies. So obviously companies are moving on the climate change 
issue. (case A2). 
The implication is that banks and their clients also need to get on board in order to keep up. 
The above examples demonstrate that for a climate-related initiative to make economic 
sense and/or enhance the brand, banks can be agnostic about climate change. As postulated 
by Hoffman 563 and also by Hawken et al., 564 climate-related corporate changes can be 
viewed as a strategic issue rather than an environmental or ethical response to a scientific 
fact. There were some individuals within the banks who did profess to care about climate 
change on a moral level, as elucidated in Section 5.2 below. However, the overarching 
characterisation of climate change by interviewees was in terms of 'risks/benefits', which 
embodies business case logic. A bank can get ahead or be left behind depending on their 
approach to climate-related strategy. As such, 'going green' is therefore viewed as 
appropriate and even necessary for bank and client businesses. Put simply: "whether or not 
you want to be [interested in the climate issue], you've got to be. This is the way the world 
is moving." (case E2). 
563 Hoffman, above n 6. 
564 Hawken et al , above n 306. 
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Social Reputation 
The literature reveals that social licence - and hence social reputation - is particularly 
salient for companies that produce environmentally damaging products or are highly visible 
polluters, which makes them an object of pressure by environmental activists locally and 
abroad. 565 As noted in Chapter 2, banks are not big polluters nor are they high-emitting 
entities; indeed, they have been peripheral actors until relatively recently. However, bank 
relationships with GHG-intense clients and projects have come under increasing scrutiny 
from NGOs that have started to look behind polluters to their financiers. Banks, and 
particularly employees in sustainability/policy units, are quite aware of this change: "The 
public and also advocacy groups are more sophisticated about following the 
money ... Banks arc no longer invisible." (case C2). 
Thus, two factors combine to provide the 'social reputation' of banks. First, banks are in a 
highly competitive service industry and reliant on customers' goodwill for survival. 
Second, they are now visible and their financing activities can be scrutinised publicly. Yet 
there is subtlety and variation associated with social reputation beyond that described in the 
literature. My data reveal that the salience of social reputation and the concomitant power 
of NGOs as a driver of bank behaviour vary with three factors: the type of bank, the type of 
employee, and the regulatory context. Appreciating this variation means that social 
reputation for banks can be understood more accurately and, therefore, leveraged more 
effectively. 
Tyre of Bank 
In relation to the type of bank, social reputation has greater salience for private banks and 
retail banks than for investment banks without consumer branches. This is because private 
banks deal with wealthy individuals and are therefore very careful to check a potential 
client's background for risks that may cause credit or reputational damage to the bank. For 
banks with retail branches, their relationship is with the general public because people 
565 Eg Gunningham et al, above n 21 , 31-32, 52. 
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invest their savings with them. As such, both private and retail banks have a relationship 
with civil society. 
Trust is crucial to a bank's relationship with 'mum and dad' account-holders. Yet, unlike 
client service reputation, this type of trust relates less to the bank's business acumen and 
more to the bank being 'nice', 'safe' and a 'good corporate citizen'. One sustainability 
manager summarised it well: 
We want to be a force for good but there is probably a pragmatic component to this. 
We have a large retail base in Australia. We have lots of customers and 
shareholders who are a bit like voters - we can make an analogy to government here 
- and we want to be well-perceived by them because they hold accounts with us and 
own our shares ... We don' t want our retail base to think we are a complete pack of 
bastards, well, anymore than they already might (due to rate hikes etc). We want 
them to know we are not entirely evil all the time. (case G4) 
Bank respondents emphasised their concern that if the retail base of a bank distrusts the 
bank or dislikes its behaviour, then they will switch across to another bank taking their 
accounts with them. As such, capturing the 'hearts and minds' of the general public is a 
crucial component of consumer relationships and, hence, social reputation for retail banks. 
Accordingly, branding and image management are also very important to the 'social' 
dimension of reputation. Yet, unlike client service reputation which requires ' good business 
sense' branding, social reputation requires 'good conscience ' image management. 
With our bank logo we want an emotional response. Its about trust - put your 
money with our logo, or borrow from us for ' the biggest purchase you'll ever make' 
as the marketers say. (case G 1 ). 
Notions of 'sustainability' or 'good corporate citizenship' or 'CSR' become important as a 
branding tool here. One banker elaborated on this using the marketing strategy of a 
competitor bank where he had previously been employed. He stated that the competitor 
bank is the biggest home lender with the biggest branch network in the jurisdiction and 
therefore it had a commercial rationale underlying their eco-friendly marketing. That 
rationale was to keep retail customers happy (so they keep their mortgages and accounts 
with the bank) and NGOs happy (so they do not campaign against the bank and tum 
customers away). I asked an interviewee at said competitor bank about this assessment and 
he agreed, adding: 
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Our ad campaign aimed at consumers regarding climate change was highly 
successful. We are in the market as a good corporate citizen and we are doing our 
bit for a sustainable future. Jt resonated well with the mums and dads ... many 
people came to us because of it. (case F l) 
So it is at the retail/consumer level - where banks have a relationship with civil society as 
opposed to the corporate sector - that 'social reputation' manifests for banks. 
Concomitantly, it is at this level that NGOs have the most influence as a driver of bank 
behavioural change. How NGOs can do this is well-illustrated by the experiences of Bank 
D and Bank G. An interviewee at Bank D related how a large environmental NGO (ENGO) 
had launched a "nasty campaign" against his bank based on its funding and support for 
fossil fuel and extractive industries. The campaign involved customer boycotts, during 
wh ich activists went onto college campuses and advocated for university students to cut up 
their credit cards. Similarly, interviewees at Bank G related how another large ENGO had 
been campaigning recently against the bank for its financing of coal. As part of that 
campaign activists protested outside local branches and the ENGO ran media publicity that 
distorted the bank' s marketing slogan. Both campaigns hit at the heart of the banks' social 
reputations. 
These campaigns had clearly rattled staff and senior management. Interviewees at Bank G 
commented that: "our retail arm is important enough - especially when ENGOs are 
hassling branch staff - for us to want to mitigate protests" (case G l ); "We have customers 
and we want to keep them" (case G2); and "we don ' t want customers to go through that -
it's not sustainable for a business" (case G3). So Bank G - and indeed all major retail banks 
in that jurisdiction - initiated discussions with that ENGO about their approach to coal 
financing. Moreover, senior management started ensuring that new renewable energy deals 
were announced publicly in order to reinvigorate the bank's image. The aim of this 'green' 
marketing approach was to keep customers with the bank, and hostile ENGOs away from it. 
In contrast, banks without retail arms, such as investment banks, are not so easily moved by 
public protests. One project financier at an investment bank gave me his perspective of the 
2007 TXU campaign. As explained in Chapter 2, RAN targeted financiers of TXU, which 
had proposed to build 11 'cleaner' coal-fired plants in Texas. The outcome was described 
as a success by activists due to TXU being bought out by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) 
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and Texas Pacific Group with an agreement to build only three of the coal-fired power 
plants and to invest in "green" energy technology. This bank interviewee gave a different 
perspective: 
TXU was sold via consortium to KKR. KKR then lobbied govenunent and said 
'we'll only build three plants' and got everyone happy and comfortable with it. But 
TXU was never going to build 11 plants, it was just negotiating for three. So [the 
bank] did the deal and was a winner anyway. (case Cl). 
Indeed, the TXU deal at US$45 billion has been described as the largest-ever acquisition by 
private equity firms. 566 Tn short, NGO influence on a bank without consumer branches is 
negligible. "There were protestors outside [the bank's] office over TXU. But that won't 
stop us from financing as long as we are doing the work necessary to be done." (case C 1 ). 
So, NGOs can drive 'greener' corporate consciousness and behaviour via campaigns 
directed at private banks and banks with retail aims. They do not have such leverage with 
investment banks. Moreover, the data also show that, after a certain point, even retail banks 
demonstrated resistance to hostile campaigns. For example, Bank G interviewees 
acknowledged the importance of discussions with NGOs but emphasized that: they would 
"not be held to ransom" by them; that NGOs would "not dictate" bank policy; and that 
capitulating entirely to NGO demands would be analogous to "negotiating with terrorists". 
Similarly, an interviewee at Bank D exhibited resistance in these terms: 
[The NGO] wanted the bank to get out of the forestry sector. We said ' no, that 
doesn't make sense'. We did a forestry policy instead. Then they said ' get out of all 
coal-fired deals'. Our response was 'no, but we will ask better questions and 
understand the risk.' European NGOs have recently said 'get out of all nuclear. ' It 
won't happen. (case DI ). 
It becomes clear that if NGO demands contradict a bank's conception of good business 
sense, then the bank will not comply. For example: 
[The NGO] wanted us to put in writing that we would not fund new coal, and I 
refused. It is ludicrous to say that 1 will not do coal today when there might be less 
polluting technology tomorrow ... There is so much coal in this country that it is not 
very smart to ignore it. (case Fl). 
566 Mudde and Abadie, above n 52, 14. 
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Similarly, "Will we fund new coal? Maybe not. But we decide each case on its merits in 
accordance with regulation and good business sense." (case G 1).567 
Banks made clear their preference for partnerships and dialogic engagement with well-
known NGOs. Partnerships can reduce hostility, protect social reputation and, interestingly, 
enhance client service reputation. On this latter point, a number of policy interviewees 
noted that partnering with a 'bonafide' NGO (as opposed to one simply seeking exposure) 
facilitates research collaboration and can help the bank to manage projects and clients 
better, which in turn gives the bank a competitive advantage boost. This is a 'sweet spot' 
of banks - both retail and investment - that has not had much attention to date. Mostly, 
discussion of NGO leverage has focussed on exploiting social reputation. Yet NGOs can 
also leverage banks' obsession with client service reputation in order to facilitate social 
goals. For example: 
Large NGOs want to come in the door and have conversations with financial 
institutions. We can partner with them which can work to our [corporate] clients' 
advantage too. (case G4). 
Overall , NGOs help banks to "focus on the cost/benefits" (case C2) of bank activities and 
can thereby exploit business case logic, and not just social reputation, for socio-
environmental gains. 
Type of Employee 
Regard for social licence and NGOs depends on the type of bank employee. In particular, 
interviews revealed a marked difference between the attitudes of transactional 
bankers/analysts as opposed to CSR/corporate sustainability managers. 
'Sustainability' departments 568 are a bank' s contact point with NGOs and there can be 
frequent interaction between these bank employees and activists. Sustainability managers 
567 Moreover, good business sense may dictate that, even if new coal financing slows down 
domestically, it could continue and even escalate overseas where there is not NGO pressure or 
media interest. For example, respondents at one of the Australian banks noted that it has a large 
presence in Asia where there is a growing market for coal-generated energy and minimal NGO 
resistance. 
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tend to view constructive relationships with NGOs as preferable to fighting public 
campaigns. Indeed, "coalition building" with externals, including NGOs, was a key 
performance indicator (KPI) for some of these interviewees. The approach of sustainability 
managers follows a stakeholder theory model. These managers balance the interests of 
NGOs and civil society with those of clients and shareholders; they engage in consultation 
and dialogue, which helps to shape corporate behaviour; they develop corporate strategies, 
such as 'green' policies and enhanced due diligence, that meet the approval of a broader 
conception of key stakeholder groups. As stated by one policy employee: 
There is a process of original demand by NGOs, then discussion with the bank, 
engagement and disagreement, but we see if a robust policy can come out of it 
which satisfies the NGOs. (case D 1 ). · 
These employees understand the importance of engagement. They realise that shareholder 
and customer satisfaction is partly informed by their bank's social reputation, and that 
social reputation needs to be managed. As such, these managers appreciate the value of 
' reputation capital'. For example: "We came out of the NGO's [coal] campaign and report 
much better than [other banks] partly because we fund less coal, partly because we engage 
actively with them." (case Fl). Similarly: 
We try to proactively engage with NGOs - we want long term relationships with 
them - you can build up credit with them in order to move forward in the lean 
times ... it reduces conflict and increases productive dialogue. (case F2). 
This dialogic approach is central to the job of the sustainability manager. They are 'front of 
house' to NGOs for their bank. As one policy interviewee put it: 
[The bank] has a long history of engagement with NGOs and clients to create better 
understanding of where they are coming from. We will talk when someone knocks 
on the door. (case Dl). 
In contradistinction, bankers and analysts are not motivated by social reputation or NGO 
pressure. They view it as a 'policy thing' and outside their remit. They do not interact 
directly with NGOs. They are motivated by profit imperatives, client/external 
568 This dissertation uses 'sustainability departments' as an all-encompassing term for the units 
responsible for making policy and engaging with external stakeholders on issues of corporate 
responsibility, CSR, and sustainability. In actuality, such units have a variety of titles, including: 
"sustainable development", "emissions and environment", "environment, social finance and 
community reinvestment", "environmental and social risk management", "environmental affairs", 
"corporate sustainability'', "corporate responsibility". 
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acknowledgment and by "finding and winning every good renewable deal" (case C2). One 
interviewee described his motivation in no uncertain terms: 
You eat what you kill in the banking business. In order to keep your job and get 
paid bonuses you need to keep bringing home the bacon. You need to make 
revenue, transaction-oriented revenue, which is then reflected in your compensation 
and the fact that you still have a job at the end of the day. (case E 1 ). 
When l asked some transactional bankers in different jurisdictions about who they consider 
to be their stakeholders, they did not include NGOs or even civil society in that sphere. 
They were concerned only with balancing the needs and interests of shareholders, 
regulators, clients and employees. For bankers, legitimacy comes not from social 
acceptance by 'giving back' to society but from market acceptance by creating wealth. This 
is done via fee generation and excellent client service. Contrary to the literature, they 'do 
well' by doing their job properly, not by ' doing good' for society. 
The remit from our shareholders is to make money ... [The bank] does some socially 
responsible activities, for example microfinance, but for renewable energy the core 
remit is ' what is it that's good for the bank?' (case Bl ). 
So bankers can acknowledge social licence, but it does not drive them. Indeed, some view it 
as inappropriate that it should: "Are banks there to support society? No they are not. They 
are economic, commercial experts." (case B 1 ). In contrast to their sustainability/policy 
counterparts, these bankers - wittingly or not - subscribe to Levitt's 1958 exhortation on the 
dangers of CSR that" ... if something does not make economic sense, sentiment or idealism 
ought not to Jet it in the door" . 569 
1 probed interviewees to test whether there were hybrid positions within each group of 
employees. For example, I asked sustainability employees about the relevance of making a 
business case for extra funding; and I asked transactional bankers about the relevance of 
their bank's social standing to their own job satisfaction. I wanted to check (as much as 
possible) whether interviewees were giving me the 'expected' answers for their role. For 
sustainability employees, business case logic is still present when addressing CSR issues, 
which is deconstructed in detail in Section 5.2 below. 
569 T Levitt, 'The Dangers of Social Responsibility' (I 958) 36(5) Harvard Business Review 41 , 42. 
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In relation to transactional bankers, there were also some more nuanced responses. Upon 
further probing, three transactional interviewees commented that the wealth of a client was 
irrelevant if that client would cause serious reputational damage to the firm; in such a case 
the bank would not approve that client. However, that decision was made by a risk 
reputation committee, not the bankers personally. Two other transactional bankers 
explained the nature of reputational risk in the ESG risk assessment process. It was clear 
that if a client company has good governance structures in place, even if it engages in 
socially unacceptable activities, the bank can work with them. One interviewee stated 
simply that: "Risk is everything, its just a matter of managing and pricing it." (case G 1) 
Another interviewee made clear that environmental risk is not automatically synonymous 
with social reputational risk: 
A company can be involved in quite controversial activities but if those risks are 
well-managed then they do not pose a reputational risk for the bank; the risks might 
be environmental or social, but not necessarily reputational. (case FI) 
Finally, one interviewee responded that the sustainability ethos at his bank meant that he 
preferred to work there as opposed to a competitor bank, adding that: 
From a business perspective it gives me the opportunity to feel good regarding deals 
and the environment, so when I talk to friends and relatives about what I do tangibly 
it is very satisfying. (case F2) 
In summary, it would appear that the social reputation of their bank does matter to 
transactional bankers, but the extent to which it matters varies with each individual. 
Importantly, further probing confinns that social reputation is not the overarching driver of 
green activity for transactional bankers, although it may be a background factor and a 
reason to 'feel good' about their work. 
The disparate approaches and motivators between transactional bankers/analysts and 
sustainability/policy managers have created occasional friction within the same bank, 
showing that CSR is still a contested concept within firms. One interviewee related how his 
department had "head-butted with the mining bankers for months" before they could agree 
on and implement an enhanced due diligence policy around MTR coal mining. The reason 
for struggle was simple: the bankers feared a negative reaction by their client base and a 
slow down on deals. To the bankers, it did not matter that financing such deals 
compromised the bank's social reputation due to NGO campaigns let alone that such 
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practices irrevocably damaged local environments and communities. CSR did not factor for 
the bankers or, if it did, they conceptualised it very differently to their sustainability 
counterparts. This notion of contest or debate was reiterated by another policy interviewee 
who stated that it can be difficult to "convince" colleagues, especially bankers, of the 
importance of sustainability. Similarly, another sustainability interviewee in a different 
jurisdiction noted that he could have "better conversations with other people like me at 
other banks than with bankers at [my bank]." The contested meaning and legitimacy of 
CSR is explored further in Section 5.2 below. 
Regulatory context 
The data also show that NGOs can successfully leverage the social licence of banks when 
there is a lack of government regulation or industry standards and/or the regulator is weak. 
As stated by one interviewee: "We need to make our own decisions when [regulation] 
doesn 't exist - then civil actors and common standards become quite important." (case DI ). 
A good example of this dynamic is the changing attitude of US leading banks toward the 
practice of MTR coal mining. An interviewee at Bank D explained how NGO pressure had 
motivated enhanced bank due diligence processes for clients and projects involved in this 
form of coal mining: 
We realized that these were scary practices to try and get coal. But the issue is that 
MTR is legal in the US, companies can get permits under certain conditions. And 
under the Bush Administration the regulations were watered down. Then NGOs 
started focussing on financiers, and we started getting [adverse] attention. (case D 1 ). 
This threat to social licence motivated the involvement of Bank D's Chairman and changes 
to bank practice. 
In the past we would simply get representations from a client that they were 
complying with their licences etc. Now we want to see every permit, every asset, 
sometimes even an independent review. (case Dl ). 
Several leading banks that operate in the US have voluntarily instigated internal MTR 
policy ranging from enhanced due diligence to outright veto. 
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Interviewees at NGOs and banks alike told similar stories about the creation of voluntary 
industry standards. For example, interviewees related how the Equator Principles had been 
drafted by four banks that were the target of NGO campaigns. Similarly, the Carbon 
Principles were described as "a direct outcome of the RAN-TXU campaign" (NGO-B2). A 
banker described how that campaign " received major attention" in the Wall Street Journal 
and New York Times, and stated that: 
The US had no carbon mitigation standards and banks were in a tough situation 
because NGOs and civil society were asking 'what are you using to judge 
investments in the coal sector?' We got together with [other leading banks in the 
financing syndicate] and developed the Carbon Principles for coal fired plants in the 
US, which is an enhanced due diligence process. (case D l ). 
Indeed, previous studies have suggested that the Equator Principles were pa1t of a strategy 
by "exposed" banks to "deflect NGO criticisms" and create a level playing field with 
competitors who were less vulnerable to campaigns. 570 So out of NGO pressure on certain 
banks' social licences arises evidence of the role and effect of peer pressure on bank 
behavior. My empirical data on the creation of voluntary Principles reveal that "NGO 
pressure shamed them into it", 571 which is consistent with previous studies by Conley and 
Williams572 and also O' Sullivan and O' Dwyer. 573 However, my data further indicate that, 
in large pa1t, peer pressure drives the adoption of Principles by banks other than the 
original signatories. 574 Therefore, it can be a two-stage process, as described by one 
interviewee: 
With the Carbon Principles we were driven by what our competitors do. I went to a 
whole bunch of those meetings and we were all looking at each other and 
wondering why we were there. It's peer pressure, we don't wanna be singled out. 
(case B2). 
Peer pressure is relevant to bank life due to the competitive nature of the banking industry 
and the fact that there is no regulatory certainty across jurisdictions on climate change let 
alone climate finance. As stated by one interviewee: " finance is fungible so banks cannot 
57
° F Amalric, The Equator Principles: A Step Towards Sustainability? (Centre for Corporate 
Responsibility and Sustainability Working Paper Series No 1/5, University of Zurich, Zurich, 
2005), 6; O' Sullivan and O'Dwyer, above n 116, 565. 
571 Conley and Williams, above n 117, 558. 
572 Ibid. 
573 O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, above n 116. 
574 Cf Conley and Will iams, above n 117, 558. 
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be an island. For example, if one bank won't finance coal then the client will go to other 
banks. Money is money." (case C2). So regard for client service reputation, and not just 
social reputation, helps to forge voluntary Principles. These soft codes reduce competition 
by setting a common industry standard so that "all banks are asking for the same thing 
when pitching a deal" .575 (case DI). 
Moreover, yielding to peer pressure (not just NGO pressure) can help to protect and 
enhance a bank's social reputation. For example, signing onto voluntary standards can be a 
strategic part of image management and risk mitigation; it can be "a nice PR thing" (case 
B2). Thus, using language from O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, creating voluntary standards can 
"repair perceived reputational damage caused to [banks] by NGO campaigns" and adopting 
them can help competitor banks "gain legitimacy for their financing activities". 576 
In this way, the creation and then adoption of voluntary industry standards exemplify the 
combined power of social reputation and client service reputation in shaping bank 
behaviour. 
According to the institutional theory and legitimacy literatures, 577 banks' responses to these 
external pressures may be either symbolic (resulting in little actual corporate or field-level 
change)578 or substantive (whereby the institutional practice is integrated into management 
and organisation processes). 579 In relation to banks adopting voluntary Principles, the issue 
of 'symbolism versus substance' has certainly garnered attention within the academe and 
civil society. This aspect is explored more fully in the next chapter. 
575 Note however that not all 'leading' banks have signed on to all three Principles. Two banks had 
not signed onto the Equator Principles, four banks had not signed onto the Carbon Principles, and 
only one bank had signed onto the Climate Principles. As explained by one of the non-signatory 
banks, senior management had debated whether or not to sign on to the Equator Principles but 
concluded that internal policies achieved the same result. 
576 O' Sull ivan and O'Dwyer, above n 11 6, 565. See also: R Lawrence and W Thomas, 'The Equator 
Principles and Project Finance: Sustainability in Practice?' (2004) 19 Natural Resources and 
Environment 21, who asse1t that a driver to adopt the Equator Principles is a (reputational) level 
playing field: 22. See also Wright and Rwabizambuga, above n 562. 
577 Such as: K Eisbach and R Sutton, 'Acquiring Organizational Legitimacy Through Illegitimate 
Actions: A Marriage of Institutional and Impression Management Theories' ( 1992) 35 Academy of 
Management Journal 699; O'Sullivan and O'Dv.ryer, above n 116; Dillard et al, above n 394. 
578 Also known as 'decoupling' in institutional theory: Meyer and Rowan, above n 399. 
579 Dillard et al , above n 394, 518-5 19. 
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5.1.2 Risk Mitigation as Driver 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the business case as driver comprises not only 
upside enhancement but also downside prevention. Indeed, some studies outlined 
previously conclude that finance actors view sustainability issues as threats and therefore 
mitigation of risk, particularly to social reputation, is their main motivation for green 
uptake. 580 In contrast, however, the data in this dissertation reveal that risk mitigation is not 
the main driver for all leading banks. Indeed, for many of the cases, capturing climate-
related opportunities is the key motivation. As we now know, banks are not a homogenous 
group. 
My data show that there is a spectrum of 'risk-opportunity as driver' that the banks are 
placed along, with risk mitigation as the main driver of climate-related behaviour at one 
end, and opportunity (for profit, reputation enhancement, and competitive edge) at the 
other. While individual banks may be at slightly different points on this spectrum, data 
analysis reveals that overwhelmingly the placement of banks on the spectrum correlates to 
jurisdiction. In summary: for Australian leading banks, risk mitigation is the key driver of 
climate-related behaviour with opportunities just beginning to emerge; for US leading 
banks, risk mitigation is one driver of climate-related behavior but they are more focused 
on the opportunities created by uptake; and for leading banks in Europe, risk mitigation is 
no longer a driver of climate-related behaviour but instead they are focused on capturing 
opportunities created by adopting and innovating 'green' strategies. 
On deeper inspection, this variability of risk mitigation as driver and the differing 
placement of where leading banks sit on the risk-opportunity spectrum can be related to the 
regulatory environment in each jurisdiction. Specifically, regulation that (a) sets a carbon 
price, (b) incentivises investment in renewables and clean tech, and/or (c) directly coerces 
bank behaviour in a socially-focussed way, appears to inform bank mindsets toward 'risk' 
and 'opportunity' . Moreover, as described in Chapter 2, there are different types of risk, 
namely regulatory risk, credit/financial risk, and reputational risk - which we now know 
can be risk to either social licence or client service reputation. The weighting that a bank 
580 Hess, above n 359; Watchman , above n 114. 
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places on ' risk' or 'opportunity' is strongly informed by the government regulatory context 
as well as the type of risk. To support this contention, an overview of relevant government 
regulation is described below followed by an analysis of leading bank approaches in each 
jurisdiction. 
Regulation 
In relation to a carbon price, interview data suggest that an actual or even threatened carbon 
price - whether in the form of a tax or ETS - disincentivises unconditional bank support for 
carbon-intense corporate activities. This stems from banks' traditional concern to foresee, 
mitigate and manage risk. The main risk for banks from a carbon price is associated with 
their clients, especially credit and investment risks (from corporate clients that are exposed 
to regulatory pressure and changes in market demand in an increasingly carbon-constrained 
economy) and reputation risk (to both social licence and client service reputation). Banks 
are also concerned here with regulatory risk or uncertainty - especially in jurisdictions 
where a price is only threatened or newly implemented - which they concede is the hardest 
to mitigate. As evidenced below, the data reveal that regulation that puts a price on carbon 
has the effect of, at least in part, discouraging bank activity away from carbon-intense 
industries. Europe and Australia (now) have priced carbon; the USA has not. 
In relation to financial incentives, interviewees in all jurisdictions emphasised the 
importance of indirect government regulation that motivates private funding and business 
activity in alternative energy sectors. Akin to pricing carbon, this type of regulation is 
indirect: it does not apply to banks specifically nor is it coercive. Instead, this type of 
regulation encourages bank activity in specific sectors by providing financial incentives. In 
particular, incentives are crucial in the renewables and clean tech spaces: stait-up costs of 
projects can be prohibitive; and new technologies can be unpredictable in their early phases 
such that returns are uncertain . Stable financial incentive regulation covers market risk, 
which encourages funding. At the time of interviews, both the USA (at the federal level) 
and Europe had this type of incentivising regulation in place; Australia (at the federal level) 
still does not. 
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In relation to socially-focused direct regulation, the USA has unique federal legislation 
titled the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA),581 which applies to defined 'banks' 
including commercial and savings banks and financial holding companies, but not 
traditional investment banks. 582 It imposes an obligation on these banks to serve the credit 
needs of low- and moderate-income communities within which they operate. 583 The CRA 
was introduced by President Carter to serve a social objective through financial means. It 
was enacted to help revitalize inner cities by redressing inadequate and discriminatory 
lending584 to low socio-economic neighborhoods "at a time when investment was moving 
to .. . more affluent and outlying communities". 585 Banks that are subject to this regulation 
are examined every three years by federal financial agencies 586 to determine levels of 
compliance. Examination culminates in a rating and a written report that becomes part of 
the supervisory record for that bank. 587 Sanctions, resulting from an unsatisfactory CRA 
rating due to inadequate or non-compliance, consist of government denial or delay of bank 
mergers, acquisitions and new branch openings. 588 
US banks that are subject to this legislation are now extending their activities to include 
climate-related initiatives, which are described below. Europe and Australia do not have 
this legislation. 
581 Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (Pub L 95-128, title YIU of the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1147, 12 U.S.C. ch 30), implemented by Regulations 12 CFR 
parts 25, 228 and 203, 345, and 563e. 
582 Specifically, all banking institutions that receive Federal Deposit insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
insurance must comply with the CRA: ibid, s 803. 
583 Ibid, s 802. Banks meet this obligation by providing affordable mortgage programs, small 
business loan products, community development financing, funding for non-profit housing and 
economic development programs: <http://www.ncrc.org/> viewed J 2 May 2012. 
584 Depository institutions reputedly "drew a red line around certain neighborhoods on the basis of 
the racial composition, age of housing stock, or other factors regardless of the creditworthiness of 
individual loan applicants, and declined to make loans in those neighborhoods": K Ardalan, 
'Community Reinvestment Act: Review of Empirical Evidence' (2006) Academy of Banking 
Studies Journal l , I. 
585 Ibid. 
586 These agencies are the FDIC, the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 
587 CRA, above n 581 , s 803. 
588 Ibid, s 804. 
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Leading bank approaches by jurisdiction 
Europe/UK 
Data gathered from interviewees at leading European banks show that risk mitigation is not 
a driver of climate-related behaviour. Rather, leading banks in that region are focussed 
squarely on capturing business opportunities created by climate-related uptake. 
Europe is a mature jurisdiction with regard to climate change regulation. As noted in 
Chapter 1, Europe's carbon pricing mechanism is well-established: the EU ETS moves into 
Phase III in 2013 with a more stringent GHG reduction target and the UK ETS now 
dovetails with it. Concomitantly, several European countries have financial incentives in 
place for renewables, mostly in the form of feed-in-tariffs (FITs). A FIT is a guaranteed 
price for a specified duration to generators of renewable electricity at a premium higher 
than energy produced from fossil fuel generators. ln other words, a government buys 
renewable energy at a set price for a long period of time (often 20 years) based on the cost 
of generation, which means that returns are guaranteed. 589 Gennany and Spain have 
adopted strong tariffs. Specifically, Germany's Renewable Energy Sources Act 2008 
applies FlTs to a wide variety of energy sources, including not only wind and solar 
(photovoltaic and thermal) but also hydropower, landfill gas, sewage treatment, biomass, 
and geothermal. 590 
From the interview data, the most relevant risk for leading European banks seemed to be 
social reputation risk. This is perhaps unsurprising given that all leading banks were either 
private or had retail anns. All banks had risk reputation committees sitting above 
operational units to vet clients and projects prior to engagement. As described by one 
interviewee: "the focus is protecting reputation, not enhancing it." (case Bl) This due 
diligence is an entrenched process; guided by internal processes or by the Equator 
Principles, it identifies and assesses a range of risks including ESG risks. If risks can be 
managed or mitigated then the client/project is approved. Yet risk management was 
589 Eg, in 2010 the Italian government guaranteed a 15% return over 20 years for producers of solar 
energy. 
590 Renewable Energy Sources Act 2008, above n 39, s 3(3). 
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mentioned by only a few interviewees and then only very briefly. Interviewees instead 
placed emphasis on oppo1tunities and benefits arising from the adoption of climate-related 
strategies. Their approach, as described in detail at the beginning of this chapter, is driven 
by capturing direct and indirect financial opportunities. For example, direct financial 
opportunities include activity in the European carbon market ("carbon trading is an 
immature market so there arc attractive returns for an early mover": case E2), and indirect 
profit enhancement comes from client service reputation due to expertise in carbon and 
renewables spaces and offering innovative investment products. 
All interviewees emphasised the importance of stable financial incentives to motivate the 
development of innovative products and renewable energy uptake. For example: 
l 'm an arch capitalist; let the markets decide. But we still need government 
intervention ... It is very difficult to drive it solely by purchasing-power. We need 
government to kick-start the process, for example FITs for solar and wind. Then it 
can become viable on its own merits. (case Bl) 
Indeed, Bank A' s climate investment indices disaggregate the world into different 
investment sectors and themes according to the regulation in place. As an investment 
analyst explained: 
There is coffelation between sector performance and government subsidies. We 
watch very carefully for regional and national statements so as to ascertain 
investment targets. (case A2). 
The attractiveness of regulatory incentives is brought into sharp relief when they are taken 
away. At the time of data collection in Europe, Spain had threatened to retroactively 
remove FITs for renewable projects. This was lamented by a number of analysts and 
bankers. 
At a time when long tenn finance capital is in short supply due to the GFC these 
[renewable] projects are struggling ... The bullet proof solution is good tariffs to 
ensure high returns but now there is pressure on tariffs which is leading to decreased 
returns. And if the return is not strong then you need strong regulation. If there's not 
strong regulation then things slow down. (case A I) 
Interviewees emphasised the lure of stable, long term incentives, such as those provided by 
Germany, in order to obviate market risks and capitalise on opportunities associated with 
renewables. 
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ln summary, the well-established regulatory environment in Europe, which combines a 
regional carbon price with an ambitious reduction target and financial incentives for 
renewables, provides a fecund environment in which leading banks can focus on 
opportunities as the key driver of climate-related strategics. Specifically, banks are 
motivated by opportunities to make profits, to enhance client service reputation and to 
strengthen social licence. Although banks conduct enhanced due diligence to ascertain 
potential risks, it is a process that they undertake for all new clients and projects. It does not 
drive their climate-related uptake specifically. 
United States of America 
Data gathered from interviewees at leading banks in the USA show that risk mitigation is 
relevant to climate-related bank behaviour but not a prime motivator of it. Interviewees 
spoke more frequently of the opportunities and benefits derived from adopting climate-
related strategies, particularly in relation to enhanced client service reputation and profits. 
Although a carbon pnce has been touted by the Obama Administration, 59 1 there is no 
federal ETS or carbon tax as yet. Despite the lack of an actual price, it appears that the 
threat of one is sufficient to mobilise risk mitigation strategies in leading US banks. At the 
time of interviews, all interviewees were anticipating a carbon price in the intermediate 
future, and credit rating agencies had begun to factor in that likelihood. 592 Contracts for 
coal-fired plants are long term (usually 20 years) so any new coal deal sits within that 
regulatory timeframe. Several interviewees in the USA commented that bank business in 
traditional fossil fuel projects had diminished since 2008/2009, which coincides with the 
passing through the Lower House of the American Clean Energy and Security Act593 to 
price carbon (amongst other things). Interviewees explained that part of the reason for the 
591 President Obama had origina lly pledged to implement an ETS by 2016, however it has taken a 
back seal in light of the US economic downturn and a looming federal election: J Massola, 'Obama 
Praises PM on Carbon Price Move, But Declines to Follow Suit' The Australian (16 November 
2011 ). 
592 
"When we go to the capital markets we need a credit rating and the credit rating agencies are 
factoring it [carbon pricing regulation] in and we need a credit rating so we factor it in." (case Cl) 
593 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (HR 2454), also known as the Waxman-
Markey Bill, is the most recent attempt to establish an ETS in the USA. In 2009 the Bill passed 
through the House of Representatives but was defeated in the Senate the following year. 
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downturn in coal deals is the threat of a future carbon price: equity investors and financiers 
run the risk of locking in revenue streams at today's prices even though expenses might 
jump due to a carbon tax tomorrow. Hedge providers, banks and third parties are not 
willing to take on that risk. 594 In addition to this downturn, leading US banks are 
undertaking enhanced due diligence processes, which have included climate risk since 
commencement of the Carbon Principles. As one interviewee stated: "Now we' re asking 
questions like ' What's your company's carbon/GHG mitigation strategies?' - no bank was 
asking that question previously." (case 01). Nonetheless, all bankers pointed out that lhey 
will continue to finance coal-fired power plants that have (to use their language) "clean 
coal" characteristics. So risk mitigation drives cautious but not radical 'green ' bank 
behaviour. 
The climate-related focus of leading banks in the USA is renewable energy projects. For all 
banks, entering the renewables space was motivated by client demand for opportunities. For 
example: "It was a fresh area for return; the entire area was built on government subsidies 
so [the driver was] more about seeing opportunities than avoiding regulatory risk" (case 
Bl); and " [investment clients] were attracted to the growth element ... The clean tech sector 
resembles the Internet in this way." (case C3). Those opportunities arise predominantly 
from government financial incentives. In the US this takes the form of tax credits, being an 
energy investment tax credit (ITC) and renewable energy production tax credit (PTC). 
These tax credits reduce the federal income taxes of owners of renewable energy projects, 
either via capital investment in renewable energy projects (in the case of ITCs) or the 
electrical output of renewable energy facilities (being PTCs). ITCs gencraJly provide a 30% 
tax credit for investments in renewable energy projects, 595 which "help offset upfront 
investments in renewable energy projects" such as solar photovoltaics and fuel cells. 596 
PTCs provide a credit of up to 2.1 cents per kilowatt-hour for electricity produced from 
renewable sources, 597 which is an " incentive to develop and deploy technologies that 
594 Reasons for oil/gas project diminishment may also include high oil prices and that "oil 
companies are flush with cash so they don ' t need financing" (case B2). 
595 American Recove1y and Reinvestment Act (2009), above n 40, s 1102. 
596 
.T Goodward and M Gonzalez, Bottom Line on Renewable Energy Tax Credits (World Resources 
Institute, Washington DC, 2010) available at <http://www.wri.org/publication/bottom-line-series-
rcnewable-energy-tax-credits> viewed 12 May 2012. 
597 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009), above n 40, s 1102. 
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harness renewable resources" such as wind, biomass and geothermal. 598 At the time of 
interviews, the US also had a federal ' renewable energy grant' scheme in lieu of tax credits 
for investment in renewable energy facilities. 599 An interviewee described it thus: 
You can build a wind farm and the government will write a cheque for 30% [of that 
expenditure]. There's no tax credits but you get 30% off plus accelerated 
depreciation. That government regulatory incentive is very attractive. (case Cl) 
Inte rviewees explained how this financial incentive regulation encourages bank activity in 
renewable and clean tech spaces: "Renewable sources are actually in [our] portfolio 
because tax credits make it very attractive" (case C2); and "We look at deals with 
renewables because incentives are there so banks and business are shifting attention to it." 
(case DI). Another interviewee described the government grant scheme as a "30% off sale" 
on renewable power which meant that "everyone is rushing to do it". (case C l). 
Capitalising on these opportunities satisfies bank motivations for enhanced profits and 
client service reputation. It feeds the overarching business case imperative that drives 
banks: "We can only do something if it makes sense economically. If we get government 
incentives then we are happy to put 95% of our financing towards renewables." (case Cl). 
And, by implication, the reverse is also true - if there are no incentives then there is little 
bank interest in renewables due to their inherently risky nature. This dynamic has important 
ramifications for the sector itself: "Regulation helps the sector to grow; it provides a kiss to 
the financing." (case C l).600 
Finally, banks in the USA are highly conscious of compliance with the CRA given that 
ratings impact positively or negatively on business and reputation, both in terms of social 
licence and client service. How this drives climate uptake is that proactive banks have 
598 Goodward and Gonzalez, above n 596. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) 
also increases the amount of funds available to issue new clean renewable energy bonds from $800 
million to $2.4 billion for electricity generated from renewable sources (eg wind and solar): 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009), above n 40, s 1111. 
599 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) , ibid, ss 1104, 1603. The grant scheme expired 
31 December 20 11 : Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010 (HR 4853), s 707. 
600 Indirect regulation is also important for: encouraging institutional investment because pension 
funds require price signals to know where to invest in the long term; and carbon trading, which 
needs governments to decree a carbon price and set up the ETS system. The carbon market was 
described by one interviewee as unique because it is "extremely political: it depends on politicians 
making very big deci sions and technocrats implementing them" (case E2). As such, it is the 
climate-related market sector most closely linked to government regulators. 
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extended their CRA social-financial activities to include environmental facets, such as 
microfinancing low-carbon initiatives and putting tax equity credits into the renewables 
space. They believe that doing so satisfies regulatory obligations while creating strategic 
advantage in a highly competitive industry. For example: 
Our attitude is that we could just give money away and regard the CRA as a tax, or 
we could regard it as an opportunity to do well-structured and ri sk-managed deals 
(case C2). 
This behaviour fits with the theses of Porter and van der Linde601 and also Reinhardt602 that 
there are economic rationales for beyond compliance behaviour and that regulation can 
incentivise novel corporate approaches to mitigate environmental issues. However, the data 
provides an interesting twist to the theory: a driver of climate action for US banks is going 
beyond compliance with socio-financial legislation aimed directly at the banking industry, 
not environmental legislation aimed at the corporate milieu generally. 
In summary, the regulatory culmination of a threatened carbon price, fi nancial incenti ves 
for renewables, and direct social legislation appears to shape US bank perceptions of risk 
and opportunity as drivers of climate-related behaviour. This combination of regulation 
pushes profit-making and client service reputation opportunities into the foreground while 
simultaneously moving socia l reputation and credit risks to the background. 
Australia 
Data gathered from Australian interviewees reveal that risk mitigation is the main driver of 
climate-related bank behaviour. Whilst one bank seemed to be more proactive about 
opportunities in the renewables sector, both banks were motivated by downside prevention 
regarding regulatory risk, credit ri sk, social reputation risk (from associating with coal 
clients) and potential loss of client service reputation (from ostracising fossil fuel clients). 
However, the data also show that these banks are starting to turn attention toward 
opportunities created by climate-related strategies, such as enhanced profits from carbon 
60 1 Porter and van der Linde, above n 302. 
602 Reinhardt, above n 342. 
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market activity and garnering social and client service reputations from increased 
association with renewable energy clients. 
The Australian regulatory context is the least certain and least incentivizing of all three 
jurisdictions. Debate and dischord had surrounded a carbon price since its proposal by the 
Rudd government in 2007. Three versions of carbon legislation were drafted and debated 
within four years; Labor leadership changes saw government support for a price wax, wane, 
and then wax again. Finally, in November 2011 the Australian Senate passed the Clean 
Energy Legislative Package comprising a number of initiatives including a carbon tax. That 
price commenced on 1July20 12 and will be fixed for the first three years before moving to 
a market-based ETS in 2015. 603 At the time of data collection, the legislation had just been 
passed but was yet to commence; there was still uncertainty around the exact price, 
transitional arrangements from a tax to an ETS, and whether or not the legislation would be 
revoked by an Opposition Government. 
The threat and eventual implementation of a carbon price has created broader risk exposure 
for Australian banks through their infrastructure and energy portfolios. All interviewees 
described the abundance of coal in Victoria/Australia and hence the number of lucrative 
coal clients in leading bank portfolios. As such, banks are now keenly aware of rebalancing 
their portfolios to reduce their own risk. As one interviewee explained: 
Ten of my clients are responsible for half of the taxable emissions in Australia. This 
has driven our climate change strategy since June 2011 in response to the 
Government' s carbon legislative package. We are in the frontline and we need our 
risk management processes to be up to speed with the language of carbon and 
climate change. (case G l ). 
As was the case in the USA, interviewees in Australia highlighted a decline in finance for 
new coal, citing the reason as a mix of tougher Environment Protection Authority (EPA) 
approvals, increased NGO pressure, and the advent of the new carbon pricing framework. 
Yet, as with US and European banks, interviewees at Australian banks remarked that they 
will continue to work with coal clients and would consider financing new coal if 
technologies become available that make it ' cleaner'. Banks remain cautious and 
603 Sec Australia's Clean Energy Legislative Package, above n 46. 
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committed to client service: "if we can mitigate risks then we will work with the client 
rather than turning them away." (case G3) 
However, interviews also evidence a slow movement from a risk model to one of 
profiteering. "Mostly we are focussed on risk but we will need to focus on the 
oppo1tunities, that is, increasing expertise [in carbon markets and also renewables] and 
getting new business" (case G4). 
While one bank claims to be ahead of the other in accessing carbon trading opportunities, 
both banks are now awakening to opportunities in renewable energy. 
We need to look mid to long term on renewable energy. There will be $20 billion 
investment in renewable energy in Australia to meet the RET [renewable energy 
target]. This amount of money is easily manageable. 70% of it will be funded by 
banks, so it is a $ 17 billion oppo1tunity for banks. That also includes foreign 
exchange opportunities and hedging opportunities (of interest rate risk and 
electricity risk). So renewable energy is a big opportunity for banks. (case F 1 ). 
To this extent, Australian banks are working more with renewable energy clients in order to 
rebalance their portfolios and to gamer client service reputation in that sector: "we were the 
first to finance wind and solar here because we want to be well thought of as easy to work 
with by renewable energy clients for the future." (case G 1) 
This interest in renewables is nascent, however, due to the lucrative nature of coal clients 
and a lack of financial incentives to switch support to renewables. In Australia there are no 
FITs or tax credits, only solar grants and the RET which has undergone several changes but 
now stipulates that 20% of Australia's electricity supply is to come from renewable sources 
by 2020. 604 Australian interviewees lamented this situation. One interviewee explained: 
604 Tn 200 I the Howard Government introduced a Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) of 
approximately 4% of new electricity generation. In 2009 this target was expanded by the Rudd 
Government to 20% by 2020. As of 1 January 20 I 1, the RET is now in two parts: the Small-scale 
Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) which applies to households, small business and community 
groups, and the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) which will deli ver the majority of 
the 2020 target by covering large-scale renewable energy projects like wind farms, commercial 
solar and geothermal: Australian Government, 'Fact sheet: Enhanced Renewable Energy Target' at 
<http://www.climatcchangc.gov.au/en/government/initiatives/renewable-target/fs-enhanced-
ret.aspx> viewed 9 February 20 12. 
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The venture capital set up in Australia is bad. In the US it is booming because 
venture capital providers get tax breaks. There aren' t any in Australia. We need 
government support to get it happening. There are examples of innovative 
Australian clean tech companies doing business in Israel, California and Spain 
instead of here. There's no support for them here ... That absence of government 
incentives is very frustrating for banks and bankers here. (case F 1 ). 
Another interviewee noted that some Australian super funds are investing in large-scale 
renewable projects overseas: 
There aren't the right opportunities and returns in Australia ... It comes back to 
unce1tainty. We must know what the returns will be. We are focussed on short term 
returns but power assets are long term investments of20 to 30 years. (case G2) 
One attempt by federal government to incentivise solar photovoltaic (PY) investment was 
the 'Solar Flagship Program'. It was described by several interviewees as a "disaster" 
because too many solar renewable energy certificates were issued under the scheme with 
the result that "even though solar has a lot of potential in this country we're still not there 
yet." (case Fl) But the focus on solar - even though unsuccessful - meant that little 
attention was paid to wind or other forms of renewable energy generation during that 
pe1iod. The upshot is that neither solar nor any other forn1 of renewable energy has taken 
off in Australia to date. As summarised by one banker: "Government support and certainty 
mean that banks get on board. We have not seen it in Australia." (case Gl). 
In summary, the uncertain regulatory environment surrounding a carbon price and lack of 
stable financial incentives for renewables in Australia has largely shaped bank preferences 
for downside prevention as a driver of behaviour. This regulatory environment pushes the 
full gamut of risks - credit, regulatory, social and (coal) client service reputation - into the 
foreground. The consequence is that corporate behaviour is reactive and banks are cautious: 
"there's no need to make radical changes in a time of uncertainty." (case Fl). However, 
with the advent of a carbon price, leading banks acknowledge that background 
opportunities for profit-making (from experti se and trade in carbon) and enhanced client 
service reputation (from increasing interaction with renewable energy clients) are moving 
slowly to the fore. 
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5.2 Non-Driver: The 'Care' Factor 
The analysis of ' drivers ' above reveals that bank behaviour regarding climate change is 
motivated by the business case, specifically: (a) the profit motive - both directly via fee 
generation and indirectly via reputation enhancement and competitive edge; and (b) 
downside prevention or ri sk mitigation. Through this analysis a deeper and more complex 
understanding of ' reputation' has been realised, one that separates 'corporate reputation' 
from 'social reputation', and introduces the notion of 'client service reputation' as one of 
the most powerful motivators of bank behaviour. Moreover, the role of environmental 
activist groups and the importance of regulatory contexts that shape and color bank 
decision-making have been elucidated, which yields jurisdictionally-specific findings. In so 
doing, this analysis has endeavoured to inform extant business strategy literature by 
bringing it up to date and filling in the gaps regarding what motivates early-moving banks 
to adopt climate-related initiatives. 
Yet, it is equally important to reflect on what factors are not powerful motivators to 'go 
green'. What is revealed by silences in the interviews? Which topics were dealt with 
ambiguously or ambivalently by interviewees? When questioned directly about the 
relevance or meaning of CSR (and related concepts), how did interviewees respond? 
Attention to these questions has enabled a second layer of findings about what does not 
drive banks to adopt climate-related initiatives. To this extent, data show that CSR 
considerations are subordinate (at best) and in some cases negligible, which is contrary to 
literature that states CSR considerations can and do drive corporate changes. In summary, 
the data reveal that while attention to CSR was present in most banks, in no cases did CSR 
appear as a stand-alone driver, and in all cases it was subordinate to business case 
imperatives. 
The following sections elaborate upon and evidence this contention by showing how and 
when CSR manifested in early-moving banks, how CSR and related terms were 
conceptualised and defined by interviewees, and how and when CSR was subordinated to 
bottom line thinking and action. 
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5.2.1 Manifestation of CSR 
Respondents at four out of seven banks described their bank using CSR terminology. These 
interviewees used a mix of descriptors, most notably 'good corporate citizen ', 'CSR', 
'socially responsible', and 'sustainable'. 605 No interviewee used the term ' CER'. These 
interviewees described their banks as: "having an interest in CSR and being a responsible 
citizen" (case A 1 ); being "a good corporate citizen and leading by example" (case E 1 ); 
engaging in "socially responsible activities" such as microfinance and philanthropy (case 
Bl ); contributing to "a sustainable future" (case F 1 ); and "pushing a strong sustainability 
agenda" (case F2). Nearly one half of all bank interviewees did not mention CSR (or any 
variation of it) when describing their bank, their Board, themselves, their work, or the 
drivers of adopting climate-related business practices. 
The clearest manifestation of CSR was in individual action. For two of the leading banks, a 
passionate senior officer had set the tone for the bank and instigated or supported climate-
related initiatives. For example, interviewees at Bank A described their then-Chairperson 
thus: "The Chairman is very green and sustainability-minded, so it came from him. He was 
a very important driver to setting up [this new climate unit]" (case A3); "Climate change is 
one of his biggest issues of interest and promotion." (case A2). This evidence of 
'charismatic green leadership' also supports Hoffman's contention that senior-level 
engagement is a key driver of corporate climate-related uptake. However, the data further 
show that leadership alone is insufficient for far-reaching corporate change, as detailed in 
the next chapter. 
Also at Bank A, one interviewee had initiated change because he was pro-environment and 
had located a 'green' gap in the market. 
I had a personal interest in the environment and environmental issues, l see mysel f 
as a responsible citizen. I pitched the clean tech policy to management because of 
this personal interest and because no other bank was doing it at that stage so it 
605 
'Sustainability' was the preferred term for Australian and US interviewees. 'CSR', 'socially 
responsible' and 'good corporate citizen ' were tem1s used almost solely by European managers. 
Indeed 'CSR' was not used by any US or Australian interviewees; and 'good corporate citizen ' was 
used by only one Australian interviewee and not at all by US interviewees. Other tem1s used 
sporadically by interviewees included 'responsible citizen', ' triple bottom line', and 'responsible 
finance' . 
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added value to our clients. Management was amenable and then the 'clean tech 
area' in [the bank] was created. (case A 1 ). 
Even though this is a lone example in my sample, when it is added to the evidence of 
'green' leadership above, we can see some suppo1t for the micro literature which contends 
that a manager's personal morals may influence their decision-making. 
5.2.2 Conceptualisation of CSR 
This section discusses how interviewees conceived of and defined the most often-used 
CSR-related terms, namely 'good corporate citizen', 'CSR', 'socially responsible', and 
'sustainability'. Analysing conceptions of these terms assists our understanding of their 
relevance to bank business strategy and their role in driving (or not) green uptake. 
One half of interviewees who used the term 'good corporate citizen' used it to describe 
their organisation. ln applying the term, interviewees referred to a variety of examples, 
from non-green philanthropy work on the one hand to reducing carbon emissions or 
proposing climate initiatives on the other. The other half of interviewees conceptualised 
' good corporate citizenship' at the individual level, usually to describe themselves or their 
Chair. Overall, there was a lack of clarity and consistency about the actual meaning of the 
phrase 'good corporate citizen'. When asked, one interviewee responded simply: " It 's an 
esoteric concept. It's in the hands of each individual." (case A2). 
This lack of clarity in practice on the meaning of ' good corporate citizen' parallels the lack 
of definitional clarity in the literature noted in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, in the literature, 
there seems to be consensus on the point that 'corporate citizenship' applies to 
corporations, not individuals. This is evinced by scholars such as Logsdon and Wood who 
state that notions of business and corporate citizenship are separate from and secondary to 
individual citizenship, 606 and Solomon's definition which confirms that "the corporation 
itself is a citizen, a member of the larger community and inconceivable without it". 607 Some 
606 JM Logsdon and DJ Wood, 'Global corporate Citizenship: From Domestic to Global Level of 
Analysis' (2002) 12(2) Business Ethics Quarterly 155, 167. 
607 Solomon, above n 237, 184 (emphasis added). 
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scholars go so far as to argue that ' corporate citizenship' involves corporations 
administering citizenship rights for individuals. 608 Therefore, the data evidence a 
misalignment between practice and theory. Practitioner conceptions of 'good corporate 
citizenship' as an individual preference do not accord with the literature that regards it as an 
organisational obligation. 
Similarly, the phrases 'CSR ' and 'socially responsible' appeared to have various meanings 
for different interviewees. For example, one interviewee described 'CSR' as a "drumbeat" 
to which his bank was moving (case Al), whereas another discarded the term as "simply 
PR", "dead and buried" and " too heavily oriented toward philanthropy" (case F2). 
Fascinatingly, six interviewees across all jurisdictions stated that voluntarily taking radical 
steps toward a low-carbon economy, such as redlining fossil fuel clients and funding only 
clean tech, would be socially irresponsible. For example: 
CSR is a big issue in the bank. We need to look at the social responsibility of 
pulling out of coal immediately, what negative consequences that will have for the 
community. Power security is a main part of that. Its not as simple as dropping coal 
and going straight to renewable energy. (case G3). 
Similarly: 
We recognise that the world needs energy; we want to deliver products in a socially 
responsible way. If the bank turned off the tap altogether then it would bring a huge 
amount of trouble on the global economy. It would cause more damage to the green 
movement than benefit. (case E 1) 
In other words, being socially responsible means ' keeping the lights on '. Sometimes these 
comments refuted NGO demands by appealing to common sense: 
What constitutes 'fossil fuel ' [that we should stop associating with]? Clients that 
own fossil fuel s? Clients reliant on them? Even NGOs rely on fossil fuels - they're 
not sitting in the dark or using solar 100% of the time. (case B2). 
These interviewees asserted that their continued association with fossil fuel clients is 
consistent with what society wants and needs. As such, they perceive thei r banks as socially 
responsible and socially responsive. For example: 
608 Matten and Crane, above n 25 1, 173. 
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Its not that [the bank] is hanging on to coal; the community and society is. This is 
because, first, there are huge amounts of coal reserves here in Australia for 
hundreds of years to come and, second, it's very cheap. So we have a safe, reliable, 
secure energy source, which means that coal is very good. (case Fl). 
Similarly: 
In Europe - nuclear is acceptable but not coal. In Australia it's the opposite. In 
Australia coal is not the dirty dirty thing it has become in Europe - it is an essential 
part of our economy and its not going away tomorrow. (case G4). 
It is relevant to note that five out of the six proponents of this perspective were 
transactional bankers in project finance/utilities departments. As such they were in the 
frontline ' doing deals' with lucrative fossil fuel clients and motivated by client service 
reputation. 
In contrast to conceptions of 'CSR' and ' good corporate citizen', interviewees were clearer 
in their conceptions of 'sustainability' . There were three groupings of definition. First, and 
overwhelmingly, this term was defined to mean ' bank longevity and viability' . Certainly, 
some researchers in the corporate environmental management literature also use the term 
' corporate sustainability' to imply an interest in perpetuating business longevity. 609 
However, their approach is in stark contrast to other scholars in that literature, such as 
Kearins et al ., who interpret ' sustainability' as a systems concept focused on "the longevity 
of biophysical systems that support human I ife". 610 
In practice, for some interviewees, the conflation of 'sustainability' with ' economic 
viability' flows from succession planning and good business sense. For example: 
Sustainability means longevity... something that can survive a long time, that is 
bank sustainability, that we' ll still be here in 50 years beyond the lives of the current 
management board. (case G3). 
For other interviewees it was a reaction to the reputational carnage of the GFC, for 
example: "its important [now] to show a bank as long tenn sustainable, that it won't 
609 Eg: Dunphy et al, above n 323; T Dyllick and K Hockerts, 'Beyond the Business Case For 
Corporate Sustainability' (2002) I 1 Business Strategy and the Environment I 30. See also NA 
Dentchev, 'To What Extent is Business and Society Literature Idealistic?' (2009) 48(1 ) Business 
and Society 10. 
61
° Kearins et al, above n 273, 51 9. 
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disappear overnight." (case BI). Interviewees explained that bank longevity is assured by 
proactive risk management, high returns, regulatory compliance, and appropriate branding 
and image management, as described earlier in this chapter. 
The second grouping of definition of 'sustainability' was given by two US interviewees 
who conceived of it in socio-financial terms. They defined it in the context of going beyond 
compliance with the CRA "to prove that it is sustainable - socially and financially - for the 
finance sector to do business with, as opposed to just granting money to, poor 
communities." (case C2). 
Thirdly, interviewees at only one bank in Australia included longevity of the environment 
in their definitions of ' sustainability' . Clearly then, the majority of cases evidence that 
respondents' conceptions of 'sustainability' in practice do not accord with the UNEP 
Finance Statement on Sustainability, which explicitly acknowledges that economic 
imperatives must be balanced with human welfare and a healthy environment. 611 This 
disconnect exists despite the fact that all leading banks except one are signatories to the 
UNEP Finance Statement on Sustainability. 
In all conceptions of CSR-related terms, mention of an ethical or moral dimension was 
negligible. Only two interviewees at the same bank implied that adopting climate-related 
initiatives was an ethical obligation or the 'right thing to do'. Two other interviewees at 
another bank claimed a moral obligation to assist poor communities. However, in the first 
case, it became clear that ' doing the right thing' had to make money or it would not be 
done. And in the second case, the bank was obliged by legislation to help poor 
communities, so ascribing a moral motivation to that activity seemed superfluous at best. In 
short, all interviewees conceptualised CSR (and related phrases) in terms of (enlightened) 
self-interest and business case logic. Some interviewees even downplayed moral aspects of 
CSR in order to elevate the business case. One interviewee summarised this well when 
describing his bank's message to clients: 
Don't read too much into having 'a higher agenda'. The focus should be on 'good 
business sense'. Don't just feel good by reducing your emissions; you can make a 
s**tload of money if you do it right. (case El) 
611 UNEP Finance Statement on Sustainability, above n 63, preamble. 
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Indeed, a number of interviewees at different banks stated explicitly that a corporate-ethical 
agenda did not drive their bank' s involvement in climate- or even social-related spaces. For 
example: "One of the core drivers in renewable energy is energy security. lt is not about 
saving polar bears"; " We are not trading carbon to save the planet, we are doing it because 
of fee generation" ; and " ... we can engage in pseudo pro bono work, not because we are 
gold hearted but because its good for [the bank] and builds its reputation." (case Bl). 
Another interviewee explained the rationale for his bank's financial engagement with 
disadvantaged communities: 
Its self-serving: we get access to more customers [and we can] make strong 
communities in places where we operate which creates a strong healthy economy 
which creates strong places to do business. (case 02) 
A different interviewee noted the neutrality of good risk management: 
We don't bar sectors on the basis of legitimacy. It's a risk management process ... In 
practice, [new coal-fired stations] don 't exist because of the risk price attached to 
financing coal, not because of some moral judgment. (case F2). 
Similarly, two other interviewees noted that their bank was in the renewables space not for 
moral reasons but only because tax credits were available. As stated by a banker from 
another department: " if there were tax credits for doing couches, the bank would be doing 
couches." 
It is at the individual level that ethical dimensions of CSR were most apparent, whether 
through a CEO or employee's actions. lt is at this micro level that climate-related practices 
and products were initiated because " it is the right thing to do." (case A3). As such, actions 
by individuals provided the strongest examples of a genuine ' care factor' in business. 
Nonetheless, as discussed below, ethical discretion by individual managers is constrained 
by business case parameters. 
5.2.3 Subordination of CSR 
Regarding CSR, two findings are clear from the data: first, in all cases CSR was 
conceptuali sed in a business case context with little apparent regard for ethical dimensions; 
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and second, in all cases CSR was subordinate to the bottom line. As evidenced throughout 
this chapter, the driving imperative for leading banks is to make money and not lose it. The 
data show that being 'socially responsible', a 'good corporate citizen' or 'sustainable' are 
also on bank agendas only if they flow from or contribute to this profit imperative. 
This subordination is illustrated in express statements by interviewees. For example: 
"[Banks] need to be more socially responsible but they can't increase costs in doing so." 
(case Bl). Similarly: 
It is important that financial actors do look at these areas [such as climate change] ... 
As a good corporate citizen l need to help that happen but if I can't convince the 
board and clients of the economic viability of new strategies then it ' s no use. (case 
Al). 
In some cases senior management was willing to back new and risky initiatives, but those 
initiatives needed to become financially viable on their own in order to persist. 
Some interviewees intimated that a bank needed to be financially successful in order to 
engage with CSR. That is, client service reputation and fee generation are first-tier 
priorities, attention to which then enables second-tier activities such as pro bono work and 
green uptake. In contrast, other interviewees noted that attention to CSR had become more 
prominent for banks that were not doing well due to the GFC. That is, attention to CSR was 
important to help "rebuild credibility and trust at a time when the industry is viewed as not 
credible and not trustworthy." (case D2). As stated by one interviewee though: "Part of this 
is genuine, part of it is image management and a marketing tool." (case Bl).612 
Regardless of these sentiments, the advent of the GFC provides further illustration of the 
secondary nature of CSR. Several interviewees explained how their banks had contracted 
climate-related initiatives and staff as a result of fiscal tightening. In particular, the GFC 
"pulled the rug from underneath the equity market" (case EI), which means less ready 
612 One interviewee even labelled public 'green ' announcements by his bank as 'greenwashing' for 
the reason that it was ' spin' aimed at external image management. However - and to be fair to his 
bank- the bank was engaging genuinely with renewables projects. It was just that the bank actively 
publicised those green activities in order to appease NGO campaigns and to rebalance the bank's 
image (due to its concurrent engagement with coal). 
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capital for renewable energy and clean tech projects. Three interviewees described the 
practical effects of the GFC on their bank's green activities: 
[The bank] was one of the first to start in clean tech and renewables in 2000. But 
then the GFC came and the bank focussed its approach and kept only the fee earners 
and let go the people without a real role who were running around doing nice things 
(case B 1). 
Similarly: 
Three years ago we had an idea for a clean energy fund which focussed on 
investment in clean energy products and projects ... But then the GFC happened and 
we did not proceed because it did not stack up from a financial perspective. (case 
Fl) 
And, simply: "Now I spend more time on IT in Europe and less time in the renewables 
space." (case El). 
In stark contrast to the change management literature, empirical data evidence that CSR is 
subordinate even when it is purported to be core to a bank's business philosophy. For 
example, one interviewee stated that "sustainability is always at the forefront of how we 
want to be seen in the market. We want to be seen as a good corporate citizen and that is 
part of our core values." Yet when asked how sustainability and the bottom line are 
balanced in practice, he responded that: 
The bottom line is very important. I will not support a transaction that 
underperfonns on return on equity. If it is below the 'retwn on equity' threshold, 
even if it's good for climate change, we won't do it. So we will not sacrifice return 
on equity just to support climate change mitigation innovations. [The CEO] would 
support and agree with that. (case F 1 ). 
Furthermore, in contrast to the literature on cognitive dissonance as a modality of 
organisational change, 613 the data in this dissertation did not reveal pockets of micro-level 
resistance to or deviation from "an imposed corporate perspective" if it clashed with 
personal perspectives. 6 14 Only four interviewees expressed regret at the limitations of 
single bottom line thinking or at the hypocrisy of contributing to global climate change by 
613 See eg Adams and Whelan, above n 216. 
614 O'Dwyer, above n 242, 32, who demonstrated this phenomenon in his empirical study of how 29 
senior executives in Ireland perceived the concept of CSR. See also Bebbington and Thomson, 
above n 462. Cf Spence's more recent cross-industry study of 25 companies in the UK in which 
cognitive dissonance was not evidenced by interviewees: Spence, above n 270. 
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exporting pollution (in the form of raw coal or tradeable emissions) whilst redlining it 
domestically. A fifth interviewee, who frequently reiterated the supremacy of business case 
logic and of "making economic decisions, not emotional ones", mentioned fleetingly at the 
end of the interview that inflexible obeisance to 'following the money' could sometimes 
perpetuate societal harm as it had in the case of slave-trading. He mused that, at that time, 
slave trading was the 'done' thing and there were strong economic arguments to keep the 
status quo, but it was also morally wrong and it proved to not be necessary for economic 
prosperity. This is an apt analogy to current thinking on the economic imperatives for 
continued fossil fuel use. However, it received only passing mention and by only one 
interviewee. 
So there was no evidence of personal resistance to the status quo. Indeed, of the 
interviewees who brought up CSR or related concepts, most expressed satisfaction with 
their bank's level of engagement with climate, environmental or social considerations. 
Specifically, a number of these interviewees expressed professional and personal 
satisfaction that their pursuit of commercial success could have the corollary effect of 
"saving the planet" (case C2). For example: "You can use core commercial skills and be a 
banker, but you arc also on the cutting edge of a low carbon economy." (case C2); and 
"When I sit and have drinks with my friends in the energy sector I say to them 'I may be an 
evi l banker but at least 1 am facilitating some kind of global economic shift '." (case B 1 ). 
All interviewees appeared to accept that doing good is secondary to doing well because it is 
a bank's job to make money for clients and shareholders: that is the life of a bank and its 
employees. As such, the status quo is deemed reasonable and appropriate for those within 
and also external to the bank. Any request or expectation that a bank voluntarily do much 
more than that, especially if it might cause financial loss, is irrational and inappropriate. 
So conceptions of CSR appear to be informed by a bank's perceptions of its role or purpose 
in society. My expectation prior to data collection was that interviewees would appreciate 
the 'network change potential' of their bank as described in Chapter 2, whereby banks have 
innate capacity to facilitate exponential emissions reductions through enl ightened practices 
that influence corporate networks in an ever-widening web. However, only one interviewee 
expressed the role of a bank in this way. This interviewee stated adamantly that banks can 
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be "a greater force for good in the long term" by creating "uniquely value-added ways to 
find solutions for problems" and that the bank's sustainability group had been created for 
this express purpose. 
(The] group asks 'what are the opportunities of the future? Water, housing, 
conservation: areas that are not quite commercial yet but could be. for example, we 
need to save the rainforests, we all know that. But so far only activists and 
philanthropists are doing it - but that's not enough and government is not fast-
moving enough. There has to be a significant role for private capital to bring in 
funding to monetise the preservation of forests, to make it more economical than 
deforestation ... What today seems just interesting 'castles in the sky' stuff can 
become the clean tech banking group 10 years from now if we work on it. (case 
C2). 
However, most other interviewees, being bankers and sustainability managers alike across 
all jurisdictions, viewed the role of a bank in narrow fiscal terms. Indicative of this mind-
set are statements such as: "A bank's traditional role is to oil the cogs of industry" (case 
BI); "banks are the centre of commerce: they've got to do what's best for shareholders" 
(case C3); and "We are massive creators of shareholder wealth and massive contributors to 
the economy ... That is a key role for banks: stewardship of the economy" (case Gl). 
Overall , there was a lack of imagination in conceiving how banks fit into and/or benefit 
society beyond their legal and economic obligations. 615 
5.2.4 Implications and Next Steps 
Some may argue it is unsurprising that CSR does not drive voluntary environmental uptake, 
that it is subordinate to business case considerations, and that this is acceptable to bank 
employees. What else should be expected in a capitalist society? 616 Yet these findings are 
important for understanding and harnessing motivations of the banking industry in a way 
that is realistic, accurate and frnitful , as detailed in Chapters 6 and 7. Moreover, multiple 
6 15 Perhaps CEOs or board members would have more imagination or different conceptions. 
Regardless, the interviews arc indicative of conceptions at the middle level of a bank and one can 
assume that the 'corporate message' has been developed at the top and then distributed down. So it 
is hard to imagine that these managers were straying too far from the tone or message set at board 
level. 
616 Sec eg Adams and Whelan, above n 216. 
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implications flow from these findings that are relevant to deepening extant business 
strategy literature, as detailed below. 
First, there are clear structural restraints on when CSR is activated and how far it can go in 
driving corporate change. Several interviewees in Europe and the USA described how CSR 
is more important for bank images now due to the GFC. Yet the very advent of the GFC 
means that there is less liquidity and therefore less capital available for CSR-type 
endeavours, including financial support for clean tech and renewable energy projects. 
Similarly, when lean times come, some leading banks will shrink their sustainability 
departments and/or curb climate-related initiatives. As such, there is evidence of a 
"perceived impact of structural restrictions on management when addressing CSR" 61 7 
creating "a perception [by managers] of limited power at the corporate level". 618 This is in 
stark contrast to Wood's theoretical Principle of Managerial Discretion which posits that, 
on moral grounds, managers cannot avoid exercising their individual discretion to ' do the 
right thing' even in the face of contrary corporate rules or policies. 619 Jn actuality, the 
perception by managers of constrained decision-making power curtails not only individual 
discretion but also broad, ethics-based conceptions of CSR. Structural restraints - actual 
and perceived - ensure that CSR is conceived (if at all) in a narrow fashion consistent with 
corporate goals of shareholder wealth maximisation. 
Secondly, 'doing well by doing good' is not a pervasive philosophy within the banking 
industry. The driving philosophy is 'we can do good if we are doing well' . And a bank does 
well by doing what it does best: making money and not losing it. The data does show that 
attention to 'green' or 'sustainability' issues can buttress this goal by delivering business 
value, enhancing reputation, and creating business opportunities, which is why banks have 
adopted climate-related strategies. Yet this focus on win-win by banks arguably 
demonstrates two points. First, consistent with literature on corporate capture, any tension 
between corporate and social-centred goals are downplayed, which allows corporate actors 
to construct their own narrow meaning of CSR and obviate broader ethical obligations. 
Implications of this for transformational corporate change are discussed in the next chapter. 
617 O'Dwyer, above 242, 538-539. 
618 Ibid, 538. 
6 19 Wood, above n 241. 
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Second, notwithstanding exhortations in the change management and sustainability 
literature, green considerations are added on and/or not balanced evenly with fiscal 
considerations. The bottom line is still very much a singular and financial one. Evidence of 
a triple bottom line in action - where social, environmental and financial imperatives are 
balanced equally in reality and beyond rhetoric - is not apparent from the data despite a 
sustainability ethos at some banks and my impression that interviewees genuinely believed 
that ethos. Yet the supremacy of a single bottom line in practice is clearly inconsistent with 
both the UN formulation of 'sustainable development' and triple bottom line theory. The 
situation only makes sense when one realises that 'sustainability' has been conceived by 
firms in such a way as to mean business longevity, economic viability and/or economic 
stewardship. fn such a case there is no conflict between a bank's social responsibility and 
its pursuit of profit. 
Clearly then, corporate and managerial definitions of concepts such as sustainability, CSR, 
and good corporate citizenship are vital to their relevance (or lack of) in business strategy. 
Tt can be argued that definitions are conceived within the context of how a firm and its 
employees perceive their role in society. In the case of banks, this role is predominantly 
utilitarian; ethical or moral preferences are included - if at all - at a personal-individual 
level. And, as Spence found, exercising ethical preferences at the individual level 1s 
" limited by macro power structures that place business case parameters around CSR."620 
In short, and consistent with the contention of van Oosterhout and Heugens, the data show 
that the notion of CSR appears to be a limited explanatory tool for what drives actual 
corporate environmental-social uptake. 621 In particular, data in this dissertation does not 
support the findings from previous studies by scholars such as Bansal and Roth that ethical 
motivations drive social or environmental corporate changes. In part this is due to the very 
nature of the banking industry, which is the embodiment of capitalism in its rawest form. 
However, it can be argued, particularly with reference to studies by scholars such as 
Spence, that the banking industry is not a unique creature in a market economy paradigm. 
620 Spence, above n 270, 874. 
621 
van Oosterhout and Heugens, above n 222, further argue that the notion of CSR ought to be 
dispensed with altogether in favou r of economizing and legitimizing theories that can better explain 
business behaviour. 
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Indeed, the banking industry may simply be considered the brightest light in the capita list 
constellation; it is certainly not the only industry that privileges business case logic. As 
such, my findings on CSR as a non-driver of corporate greening have resonance for wider 
business strategy scholarship, which is detailed further in Chapter 7. 
Business strategy scholars appear to agree on only one point regarding CSR: it has 
multiple, contested meanings. My data confirm this and go one step further to evidence that 
CSR has contested legitimacy and that such contest occurs even within the one firm. The 
analysis in this chapter of what drives green uptake by banks demonstrates that there are 
"competing priorities and different cultures" between departments (case F2) and that 
knowledge and understanding around concepts such as sustainable development and 
corporate responsibility varies within a bank. The meaning and importance of CSR (and 
related terms) is conceived heterogeneously - when it is thought of at all - within the one 
firm. 
Importantly, this study finds no support for the literature that maintains that CSR must be 
core to a corporation's values and culture. Such literature assumes that firms in capitalist 
economies have a core agenda beyond making money by legal means. In the case of banks 
at least, that assumption is largely inaccurate. More specifically, the notion of one core 
agenda - to which CSR ought be central - assumes that within one firm all departments 
share the same goals and are driven by the same incentives. My data demonstrate that this 
is not the case. In summary, how CSR manifests for one firm and the extent to which it 
drives voluntary change is varied. By implication, how CSR might - on its own - drive a 
whole industry is simply unfathomable. 
As noted in Chapter 3, proponents of CSR in business and society literature have tended to 
focus on the 'ought' and not the ' is' of corporate greening. Data in this dissertation show 
that the question of why firms actually go green can be separated from a normative 
discussion about why they ought to go green. Appreciating these aspects of ' real life' is 
crucial to theorising about how mainstreaming might occur optimally. The profit imperative 
and competitive nature of the banking industry coupled with a multi-dimensional 
understanding of ' reputation' provides a theme throughout the data and an anchor for my 
recommendations on harnessing banks to better society in Chapter 7. Prior to that, 
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implications of 'the business case as driver' for whole-of-industry change are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Mainstreaming in the Banking 
Industry 
6.0 Overview 
The previous chapter evidences that business case logic is the overarching driver of 
voluntary climate-related changes by early moving banks. Specifically, the business case 
comprises two facets: first, increasing profits directly via fee generation and indirectly via 
competitive edge and reputation enhancement; and secondly, minimizing financial, 
regulatory, and reputational risks. Moreover, a new finding is revealed through the data: 
corporate ' reputation ' comprises not only 'social reputation ' but also ' client service 
reputation' , which has important and subtle implications for how and why banks are 
motivated to change their behavior. 
This chapter considers the implications of those findings for mainstreaming of climate-
related practices in the banking industry. Is it likely that mainstreaming will occur given 
certain limitations to business case logic? If so, how might mainstreaming occur 
organically? And can mainstreaming occur fast enough and help take us far enough toward 
a low-carbon economy? 
As described in Chapter 2, the ' network change potential' of banks is a key reason why the 
industry is an important and unique player in climate change mitigation efforts. In short, 
' enlightened ' climate-related banking practices that are mainstreamed in the industry as a 
whole - and not just the praxis of early movers - have potential to facilitate exponential 
GHG emissions reductions through corporate networks in an ever-widening web. 
Therefore , we need to consider how best to mobilise the industry as a whole. 
Using the empirical data, this chapter investigates three mam areas m relation to 
mainstreaming. First, it analyses the limitations of the business case as a driver of en masse 
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green uptake, which includes materiality of the 'green' business case and the existence of a 
competing ' non-green' business case. Secondly, it theorises how mainstreaming might 
occur organically via isomorphism and mimetic behaviour. Thirdly, it revisits the urgency 
of global warming and theorises whether mainstreaming in the context of pure voluntarism 
can be sufficiently far-reaching and fast-acting to facilitate required global change. 
Contemplating implications of 'the business case as driver' for mainstreaming and whole-
of-industry change in this chapter will pave the way for recommendations in the next 
chapter about how to leverage the business case for optimal mainstreaming. 
6.1 Limitations of the Business Case as Driver 
There are two key limitations to the business case as a driver for mainstreaming climate-
related practices by banks. The first is that, by definition, if an initiative is not profitable or 
the costs outweigh the benefits - that is, if there is not a business case to do it - then banks 
will not make the change. The second important limitation is that, at present, there exists a 
competing business case to support OHO-intensive clients and projects. Each of these 
limitations is discussed in tum below. 
6.1.1 The Requirement of a Business Case for Green Uptake 
The first limitation - the prerequisite of a business case for green uptake - is exemplified by 
Bank A. This bank appeared to be the most climate change conscious and proactive leading 
bank in my sample. It had a passionate Chair who provided leadership on green issues and 
supported climate-related business initiatives; some of its managers and advisers had green 
credentials and were brought onboard to progress the bank's low-carbon agenda; other 
managers held strong personal beliefs about environmental stewardship and were proactive 
in initiating green services. This bank demonstrated innovation around climate services and 
products: it established a new unit dedicated to climate change research and knowledge 
diffusion, and created a new set of investment indices that had potential to revolutionize 
how fund managers allocate investments. Moreover, climate change had been elevated to 
the corporate governance level under senior management oversight; and the bank had 
adopted all three voluntary Principles making it the only bank in my sample to sign onto 
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the Climate Principles. Despite all of this, it was clear from interviewees that if a 'green' 
initiative did not make good business sense then it would not get traction. 
For example, interviewees at Bank A stated that there had to be "revenue streams 
associated with climate change" and that green initiatives needed "a sound business case 
and to create value for shareholders." (case Al). They stated that a climate-related unit 
needed to be commercially viable in order to get started: "If it wasn't then we simply 
couldn't do it, we wouldn ' t get the management funding and support." (case A2). And 
whilst the Board had shown willingness to back new and risky climate-related initiatives, 
those initiatives needed to become self-sustaining in order to persist. For example: "The 
success of this [climate research unit] is gauged by external and internal feedback and how 
much money it makes. We have passed the honeymoon period so it must be financially 
sustainable now or it wouldn' t exist." (case A3). 
Again we see how business case logic overrules green considerations and that this, at least 
in part, is a product of the prevailing bank view of its role in society. An interviewee from a 
different bank summarised it thus: "We are massive creators of shareholder wealth and 
massive contributors to the economy" (case GI) and therefore, as stated by yet another 
interviewee, "No-one is expecting banks to be charities ... [or] to finance a bunch of 
unprofitable projects." (case E l ). Put simply: "we recognise we are a bank and we need to 
make money." (case El). 
The problem with building a business case for climate-related initiatives is that profit 
increases may take time to show up on the balance books, and value increases can be 
difficult to measure. For example, profit momentum from gaining new large clients may 
take time to materialise; and some initiatives will have only indirect consequences on the 
bottom line, such as enhancing a company's social reputation or its capacity to attract and 
retain talented staff. 622 Thus, the 'materiality' of the business case can be an impediment to 
corporate environmental uptake. 
622 Lins et al, above n 51 , 32. 
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This limitation is acknowledged in corporate sustainability literature, which highlights how 
the business case can be difficult to detect and/or marginal in practice given that "the 
economic value of more sustainable business strategies ... only materializes in the long 
term."623 The problem is that, as noted by Dermine, we live in "a world in which financial 
markets reward short-term reported profits."624 As such, the focus on short-term profit can 
trump long-term value and be a significant barrier to corporate environmental change. 625 
Generally, if public companies and especially financial firms, "cannot demonstrate tangible 
economic success in the here and now [then] there may be no long term to look forward 
to. ,,626 
Specifically, the shareholder primacy of bank governance structures and corporate law is 
highly relevant to short-termism and business case imperatives. Indeed, understanding the 
fiduciary duties of bank directors and the framework of bank corporate governance helps to 
illuminate constraints, both perceived and actual, on climate-friendly bank action. 
The banking industry is highly regulated in each of the UK, the US and Australian legal 
jurisdictions: it must comply with general corporate law as well as specific banking rules, 
and its activities and compliance are monitored by government regulators. The net effect of 
this regulation and supervision is that banks cannot do whatever they like - for better or 
worse. The next two sub-sections set out: first, a summary of bank regulation and 
supervision in the UK, Australia and USA; and second, an analysis of how corporate law 
and cultural norms impact upon bank greening in these jurisdictions. 
623 Salzmann et al, above n 285, 33. Effects on intangible assets such as 'brand' and employee 
attraction/retention are a lso difficult to quantify. 
624 J Dermine, Bank Corporate Governance, Beyond the Global Banking Crisis (INSEAD Working 
Paper No. 20 11/33/FJN, 14 March 20 11), 9. 
625 Especially given the expensive start-up costs of many environmental initiatives: Gunningham, 
above n 387; A Rappaport and M Flaherty, Multinational Corporations and the Environment 
(Centre for Environmental Management, Tufts University, Boston MA, 1991). Sec also Hess, above 
n 359, who found that environmental and social risks were viewed by the finance sector as separate 
to financial risks in the sho11 term, which curtailed exploitation of the business case for 
sustainability: 14. 
626 Gunningham, above n 292, 2 18. 
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Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Central to bank regulation and supervision is the concept of prudence: that bank activities 
will be undertaken with reasonable care. 627 Banks must be highly regulated because their 
way of doing business makes them susceptible to failure; that is, they function on a small 
asset reserve, hold a large proportion of illiquid assets, and work within an inter-bank 
market that comprises a network of large, unsecured debtor and creditor relationships such 
that failure of one bank can lead to the collapse of others. 628 Accordingly, banking rules 
and supervision exist to regulate and monitor day-to-day banking activities such as bank-
customer relationships, credit lending, mortgage and other securities transactions, and 
financial crime. 
The UK adopted a consolidated system of regulation to govern deregulated markets in the 
1980s. 629 Subsequently, the Bank of England A ct 1998 (UK) and the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (UK) shifted responsibility for banking supervision to a single 
unified regulator, being the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 630 The FSA monitors 
banks and other financial institutions, and makes rules regarding authorised and prohibited 
activities, enforcement and appeals. 631 The objectives of FSA regulation include 
maintaining market (depositor and investor) confidence, protecting consumers, and 
reducing financial crime. 632 Accordingly, banks must comply with FSA rules in their daily 
627 D Singh, Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markels (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
Burlington VT, 2007). 
628 Ibid, 8. See also: CAE Goodhart and G llling (eds), Financial Crises, Contagion, and the Lender 
of Last Resort: A Reader (Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 2002). 
629 Banking Act J 987 (UK), which formalised prudential supervision; and the Financial Services Act 
1986 (UK), which introduced self-regulation into a statutory framework intended to oversee 
investment activities. Singh provides a thorough history of these Acts: ibid, I 0-14. 
630 The FSA works together with the Bank of England and Treasury as follows: the FSA monitors 
financial institutions; the Bank of England monitors systemic risk including matters of interest rate 
policy; and Treasury has overall responsibility for the FSA and financial markets. See: Bank of 
England, HM Treasury and FSA, Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, The Bank 
of England and the FSA available at 
<http://www.bankofengland.eo.uk/financial stability/Documents/mou.pdf> viewed l l February 
2013. 
63 1 Preamble, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) (hereafter Financial Services and 
Markets Act). 
632 Financial Services and Markets Act, s. 2(2). 
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operations; for example, by having appropriate record keeping, customer identification and 
internal reporting procedures to prevent money laundering. 633 
In contrast to the UK system of a single centralised regulatory body, the US bank 
regulation/supervision regime comprises multiple and independent agencies to regulate 
banks as well as insurance and securities entities. US bank regulat ion and supervision is 
primaril y codified in the United States Code (USC) Title I 1 Banks and Banking; however, 
individual regulatory agencies (discussed below) have a significant portion of !heir 
responsi bilities and powers set out separately in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
Title 12 Banh and Banking and their individual agency manuals. nJ-1 The first hallmark of 
the US system is its dual nature. There are two formal systems of chartering (authorising to 
operate) commercial banks: state banks are chartered by individual state charters, and 
national banks arc chartered and prudentially supervised by the Office of Comptroller of 
Currency (OCC) 635 pursuant to the National Bank Act 1864 (USA). 636 In addition, three 
other agencies have significant prudential supervisory responsibilities over US banks, being 
the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), 637 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)638 
and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 639 T he Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council attempts to facilitate uniformity and consistency between the 
supervisory and enforcement practices of these regulatory agencies. 640 Nonethe less, there is 
633 Money laundering Regulations 1993 (UK), rr. 5-14. 
634 See Singh, above n 627, 33-36. 
635 12 USC ~ l; 12 USC, ss. 27(a)-(h); CFR s.4.2. 
636 Note, however, that a national bank can conve1i its charter to a state charter and vice versa: 12 
USC, Chapter 2, ~ 21 4(a). Also. national banks are required to be members of the FRB and the 
FDlC (pursuant to 12 USC § 282 ), the latter giving them access to the public deposit insurance fund 
(12 USC~ 18 14(b)). 
637 12 USC, Chapter 3. The FRB is the US central bank; it manages monetary stability by gauging 
the prudential stability of the US hanking system: Federal Reserve Act 1913 (USA). Specifically, it 
supervises bank and financial holding companies, foreign bank operations, and state charter banks. 
See, eg, 12 USC § 184 l (bank ho lding companies) and 12 USC § 184 l (foreign hanks). 
638 12 USC, Chapter 16. The FDIC administers the deposit insurance fund (12 USC § 181 l (a)) and 
is the primary regulator of state chartered banks (12 USC § 18 15). 
639 12 USC, Chapter 12. 
640 Federal Register I Vol. 62, No. 34 I Thursday, February 20, 1997 I Notices, Revised Policy 
Statement on "Interagency Coordination ofFormal Corrective Action by the Federal Bank 
Regulatory Agencies, 7782-7783, available at 
<http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/rpsi.pdf> viewed 11 February 2013. 
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concern by banks and some commentators regarding the level of inconsistency and 
regulatory burden inherent in a dual system with multiple financial regulatory bodies. 641 
Australia has similarly developed an extensive bank regulatory system over time which, 
unlike the UK and the USA, has experienced very few bank failures in recent decades. 642 
The operations of Australian financial institutions are regulated by three bodies, namely the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), 643 the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) 644 and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). 645 
These bodies, together with Treasury, form the Council of Financial Regulators, which 
aims to promote cooperation between the regulatory bodies and efficiency within the 
financial system. 646 APRA is the key agency concerned with banks: it is responsible for the 
prudential regulation of authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADis), pension funds, and 
insurance companies. 647 The Banking A ct 1959 (Cth) is the key piece of banking legislation 
in Australia: it charters bank business and provides APRA with various powers, including 
the power to investigate non-compliant banks, 648 revoke ADI status, 649 and remove bank 
directors. 650 APRA provides prudential statements and guidance notes, which form the 
basis of prudential regulation in Australia with which banks must comply. 65 1 
641 For a full discussion see Singh, above 11 627, 35-44. 
642 Kidwell et al, above 11 85, 408. 
643 The RBA is responsible for overall systemic stability and the conduct of monetary policy: 
Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth). 
644 ASIC is primarily responsible for the performance of the financial system and financial actors, 
and promoting investor and consumer confidence in the financial system: Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). Most notably it administers the Co1porations Act 2001 
(Cth). See <www.asic.gov.au> viewed 10 February 2013. 
645 APRA has powers pursuant to the Banking Act 1959 (Cth), the Financial Sector (Collection of 
Data) Act 2001 (Cth), and the Legislation Amendment (Financial Claims Scheme and Other 
Measures) Act 2008 (Cth). 
646 Kidwell et al, above n 85, 418. 
647 APRA's supervisory framework requires financial entities to prudently manage their activities 
and risks; it "emphasises risk management and prevention through active supervision rather than a 
more mechanistic rules-based approach": ibid, 420. See also <www.apra.gov.au> viewed 10 
February 2013 . 
648 Banking Act 1959 (Cth) (hereafter Banking Act), s. 13A. 
649 Banking Act, ss. 9, 9A. 
650 Banking Act, s. 23. 
65 1 Unlike its UK and USA equivalents, APRA does not guarantee depositors' funds. Instead it 
assesses and maximises the probability of ADI financial viability and their ability to meet 
obligations to depositors. For details of probability calculations see Kidwell et al , above n 85, 420-
444. 
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Corporate Law and Directors' Duties 
In addition to the banking mies and supervision that govern banking business, there are 
corporate laws that regulate Board conduct and decision-making. A multi-jurisdictional 
analysis of directors ' fiduciary duties in the context of corporate law, corporate governance 
and climate-friendly bank practices is provided below. 
United Kingdom 
Pursuant to the UK Companies Act 2006, directors have a duty to "promote the success of 
the company". 652 In discharging this duty, directors are legally required to consider a 
broader suite of considerations beyond the bottom line. Section 172 of the Act provides that 
directors must act in good faith to promote the success of the company "for the benefit of 
its members as a whole" by having regard to, amongst other matters, maintaining a 
reputation for high standards of business conduct, operational impacts on the community 
and the environment, and likely long term consequences of a decision. 653 
These enumerated directives appear to legally mandate corporate greening and socially 
responsible behaviour. This may be true for certain heavy-polluting industries. For banks 
however, these directives will have little motivating effect on Board decisions to facilitate 
climate change mitigation. As evidenced in Chapter 5, most bank Boards will consider that 
they are ' maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct' by creating 
wealth; ethical considerations are secondary at best. Jn other words this directive can be 
satisfied even when bank Boards do not adopt climate-related strategies. Moreover, being 
required to consider community and environmental operational impacts is largely irrelevant 
for banks given their minimal direct impacts. The most likely lever in this legislation for 
greening banks is the directive that Boards consider probable long term consequences of 
652 Companies Acl 2006 (c.46) (UK) (hereafter Companies Act), s. 172. 
653 Sec Companies Act, ss. 172(1 )(a)-(t). Duties are owed by directors to the company, not to 
shareholders. As such, only the company can sue a director for loss sustained by the company as a 
result of a director' s breach. Shareholders can sue only if the company fails to pursue a claim; in 
which case shareholders can apply to the court for permission to recover the company's loss on its 
behalf. Note, however, that s. 172(1) is subject to any legal requirements for directors to consider or 
act in the interests of company creditors: Companies Act, s. 172(3). 
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their decisions. Arguably, this clause captures the indirect environmental and social 
consequences of bank activities, such as funding ' dirty' clients and projects. Of course, if 
ostracising lucrative fossil fuel clients is likely to result in long term pecuniary and client 
service reputational damage to a bank vis-a-vis its competitors, then Boards will need to 
consider that consequence too. As such, bank Boards may still choose to adopt non-green 
strategies in certain circumstances; even this directive does not guarantee greener 
behaviour. 
Overall , the legal directives in s. 172 of the Companies Act provide a potent example of 
how progressive legislation is sometimes pitted against ingrained cultural-cognitive norms 
and economic realities. Arguably the directives are best described as an important first-step 
to changing behaviour; they are unlikely to have any immediate impact on remedying 
directors ' perceived and actual constraints to climate-friendly bank action. 
Australia 
Under s. 181 of Australian Corporations Act 2001, Australian directors must discharge their 
duties in good faith and for proper purpose in "the best interests of the corporation" . 654 In 
contrast to the UK legislation, there are no enumerated directives to this end. 
The parameters of s. 181 are illuminated in s. 180(2) of the Corporations Act, which sets 
out what is commonly known as the 'business judgment rule ' . This rule is a director's 
defence to an alleged breach of duty provided that they have acted impartially and honestly 
on credible information and with a rational belief that the judgment was in the best interests 
of the corporation. Australian Courts are generally reluctant to interfere in matters that 
involve business judgment, especially where a range of decisions could have been made by 
a director in a particular situation. 655 
654 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Australia) (hereafter Corporations Act), s. 18 l(l ). 
655 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporate 
Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value (Conunonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2006), 
45 
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1mportantly, and akin to the UK legislation, ss. 181 and 180(2) of the Corporations Act 
require directors to act in the best interests of the corporation, not the shareholders. This has 
important ramifications for short-termism and climate-related bank efforts. The Australian 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services has pointed out that 
the long-term interests of the corporation may not always accord with short-tenn 
shareholder interests: 
(I]f directors make a decision ... benefiting long term and future shareholders, but 
which results in a short term loss (and a short term decline in share value for current 
shareholders), then this decision will be in the interests of the company, but will be 
unwelcome news for shareholders who have taken a short term, perhaps speculative 
position. 656 
Accordingly, the Committee concluded that the Corporations Act permits directors to 
"consider and act upon the legitimate interests of stakeholders [other than shareholders] to 
the extent that these interests arc relevant to the corporation" even where they do not 
generate immediate profit. 657 
In theory this conclusion is good news for proliferating climate-friendly bank action. Jn 
actuality however, it provides little comfort to banks concerned about shareholder or stock 
market backlash where greener efforts result in diminished short-term performance. Indeed, 
on the issue of short-termism, the Committee simply stated that Boards will need to decide 
if corporate responsibility should trump immediate profit generation "depend[ing] on ... the 
competitive pressures, strategic position and community expectations of each individual 
company." 658 Clearly this statement is redolent of the 'it depends' literature and does not 
mandate greener corporate behaviour in all circumstances. 
United States of America 
US corporate law differs from UK and Australian law in two mam respects. First, 
corporations in the USA are creatures of state not federal law, so the fiduciary duties of US 
656 Ibid, 44. 
657 !bid, 52. For these and other reasons, the Committee opposed amending the Corporations Act to 
include directive provisions similar to the UK amendments: Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, above n 655, Recommendation 1 at xxi. 
658 !hid, 49. 
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directors are defined by a company's state of incorporation. 659 Second, the primary 
fiduciary duties of 'care' and 'loyalty' are obligations at common law and remain 
uncodified in US legislation. 660 
The fiduciary duty of care requires directors to make decisions prudently based on full and 
credible infom1ation. 661 Black opines that pursuant to this duty, directors are not obligated 
to make sensible decisions: "They only have to show up, pay attention, and make a decision 
that is not completely in-ational". 662 The duty of loyalty obligates directors to act in good 
faith and in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 663 
Unlike the UK and Australian jurisdictions, US fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation 
and its shareholders. 664 Importantly, the legal requirement to make decisions in the best 
interests of shareholders provides the foundation of the ' shareholder primacy' norm in US 
corporate culture. 665 Shareholder primacy means that the corporation 's main purpose is to 
maximise shareholder profit and that "the powers of the directors are to be employed for 
659 See SM Bainbridge, 'A Critique of the NYSE Director Independence Listing Standards' (2002) 
30 SEC REG. L.J. 370. See also: Burh v. Lasker, 441U.S. 471 (1979). 
660 Most US companies are incorporated in the state of Delaware and The Delaware Court of 
Chancery has a long history of jurisprudence and precedent regarding directors' fiduciary duties. 
See BS Black, BR Cheffins, M Gelter, H-J Kim, R Nolan, MM Siems, Legal Liability of Directors 
and Company Officials Part l: Substantive Grounds for Liability (Report to the Russian Securities 
Agency) (2007) COLUM. BUS. l. REV. 614, 643. 
661 Black gives a comprehensive statement of this duty: BS Black, The Principal Fiduciary Duties 
of Boards of Directors (Presentation at Third Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance, 
Singapore, 4 April 2001 ), 6. 
662 Ibid. See also RS Sprague and AJ Lyttle, 'Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule: 
Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy' (2010-2011) 16 Stan. JL Bus & F in l-42, 8. 
663 Which includes eschewal of improper personal benefits gained from their position: Black, ibid, 
4-6. 
664 Historically, US courts viewed company directors as trustees and each stockholder as a 
beneficiary of that trust (see eg, Gray v President 3 Mass (3 Tyng) 364, 379 (1807)) and that 
metaphor was even extended to shareholder value in Dodge v Woolsey 59 US 331 (1855). Note that 
US di rectors' duties of care and loyalty are not owed to creditors: North American Catholic 
Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007). 
665 Sprague and Lyttle, above n 662, 5. See also: D Gordon Smith, 'The Shareholder Primacy Norm' 
(2008) 23 J Corp L 277, 278; SM Bainbridge, ' In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green' (1993) 50 Wash & Lee l Rev 1423, 1423-25; KB Davis Jr, 
'Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain: A Survey 
of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law' (1988) 13 Can-US Law J 7, 8. 
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that end". 666 Shareholder primacy is described by Sprague and Lyttle as a "dominant force" 
in American corporate governance. 667 
Nonetheless, and similar to Australian Boards, US company directors have the benefit of a 
' business judgment rule'. It is a presumption in US corporate law (rather than a defence) 
that in making a business decision the directors "acted on an informed basis, in good faith 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company". 668 
The burden lies with the party bringing an action to establish facts rebutting that 
presumption. Absent an abuse of discretion, a director's business judgment will be 
respected and not second-guessed by the courts with the benefit of hindsight. 669 As such, 
and similar to the Australian jurisdiction, American courts do not penalize directors who 
make honest mistakes. 
Arguably then, despite the shareholder primacy norm, the business judgement rule allows 
American banks to adopt climate-friendly practices even if those decisions result in reduced 
shareholder returns. Boards need only act in good faith and with the requisite degree of care 
and loyalty when making that decision. Indeed, this proposition is supported by recent 
American jurisprudence in the context of stock downturn in the wake of the GFC. In 2007-
2009, Citigroup shareholders sued bank directors for financial losses suffered as a result of 
decisions to invest in sub-prime mortgage-related securities. 670 The Delaware Court of 
Chancery dismissed the claim on the basis that plaintiff shareholders had not rebutted the 
business judgement rule presumption. Specifically, the court stated the rationale of the 
business judgement rule as allowing directors discretion "to maximise shareholder value in 
the long term by taking risks without the debilitating fear that they will be held personally 
liable if the company experiences losses."671 
666 Per Michigan Supreme Court in Dodge v Ford Motor Co 170 NW 668, 684 (Mich 1919). This 
case may provide the earliest j udicial statement of the norm: Sprague and Lyttle, ibid, 5. 
667 Ibid. 
668 Per Delaware Court of Chancery in re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (hereafter re Citigroup) at 124, quoting from Aronson v Lewis 473 A2d 805, 8 12 
(Del 1984). 
669 
re Citigroup, ibid, I 24; Gant/er v Stephens 965 A2d 695, 705-06 (Del 2009). 
670 c· . .b.d re 1ttgroup. 1 1 . 
671 Ibid, 139. 
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In light of similar precedents, 672 bank directors clearly have latitude within American 
corporate law to increase their climate-friendly endeavours. 673 However, it is improbable 
that they will prioritise green behaviour above profit imperatives. Despite a congenial legal 
environment for corporate responsibility, US bank Boards must make decisions in light of 
economic constraints and the entrenched corporate governance norm of shareholder 
primacy. In reality, very few Boards are willing to risk adverse market impacts on 
economic viability and client service reputation due to green 'mistakes' . 
Data in this dissertation show that, consistent with corporate governance constraints 
(perceived and real) outlined above and the 'it depends' literature outlined in Chapter 3, 
bank approaches to short-termism depend on the materiality of the business case. This was 
illustrated most clearly when interviewees' discussed their client needs and Board support. 
In relation to client needs, there were areas where short-termism was actually antithetical to 
client interests. For example, pension funds are concerned by climate change impacts on 
investments due to their fiduciary obligation to deliver returns to members in the long term. 
As such, climate change creates 'sticky' (or long-term) investments for these funds. 674 
Therefore the focus of banks is likewise longer-term when servicing pension fund clients. A 
good example is Bank A's innovative climate-related investment indices, which were 
developed in response to such client needs. Conversely, retail and mutual funds deal in a 
form of ' hot' or fast-moving money: their focus is short term and depends on whatever is 
fiscally en vogue at the time ("today it's climate change, tomorrow it's tech" (case A2)). 
672 Eg: re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 UMP) at 4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11 , 2010), 
in which the plaintiff litigants were unsuccessful in suing Lehman for flawed decision-making 
(which included substantial investments in sub-prime mortgage related securities) that ultimately 
bankrupted the firm and decimated share value: at 2. 
673 See also Rhee, who contends that American corporate Jaw authorises company boards to assume 
broad principles of corporate social responsibility, and ought to be extended to pursuing the public 
good in times of public crisis: RJ Rhee, 'Cri sis, Rescue, and Corporate Social Responsibil ity Under 
American Corporate Law' in W Sun, J Stewart and D Pollard (eds), Reframing Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Lessons Ji-om the Global Financial Crisis (Critical Studies in Corporate 
Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability, v.1, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley 
UK, 2010), 127-144. 
674 Harmes disputes this by stating that while pension funds may have a long-term focus, the fund 
managers do not; he concludes that, from a purely theoretical perspective, there is no inunediate 
business case for climate change mitigation by investors due to the short-term focus of specific fund 
types and of individual fund managers: Harmes, above n 74. Cf Ernst & Young, above n 325, 
which uses empirical data to show that corporations perceive a growing scrutiny of their 
sustainability credentials by equity analysts: 12, 27. 
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Overall, however, an initiative will not get Board support unless managers can show a clear 
and immediate business case. Arguably this is so for all new initiatives, yet for 'green' 
initiatives in particular there is potential for: (a) disjunction between seeing how 
environmental-social risks and opportunities translate into fi scal ones, especially given that 
sustainability-related gains or losses can be difficult to quantify, and/or (b) a lag between 
green implementation and financial results. Either of these limitations in business case logic 
has potential to impede en masse bank activity in climate-related spaces outside of pension 
fund investment. 
6.1.2 The Countervailing Business Case for Non-green Initiatives 
The second key limitation of the business case as the driver for mainstreaming climate-
friendly bank practices is that, at present, there still exists a countervailing business case to 
support GHG-polluting clients and projects. 675 Banks will continue to work with these 
clients, which often have relationships with a number of different departments within the 
same bank and are therefore a lucrative overall source of fee generation. Retaining such 
large clients is inextricably entwined with the highly competitive nature of the banking 
industry. Ostracising a client is equivalent to handing that client on a silver platter to a 
competitor and missing out on a part of ' the purse'. It also ties back to client service 
reputation via client satisfaction: 
For any bank a huge percentage of business is mining companies. We can't afford 
to tum business away and we wouldn ' t be looking after our clients if we did."( case 
El) 
Australian banks provide a good illustration of this point. Interviewees described how, in 
recent years, they have become very focused on ' relationships' with clients and how being 
trusted as a good business adviser is central to that dynamic. In addition, Australia is a coal-
rich jurisdiction, it has only four big banks, and coal clients comprise a major part of those 
banks' energy/power portfolios. Making any radical voluntary changes against their coal 
clients is tantamount to compromising client service reputation and therefore compromising 
675 Richardson also acknowledges this limitation in relation to institutional investors and socially 
responsible investment: Richardson 2008, above n 74, 507. 
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financial returns. Banks need to balance competing client interests with their own financial 
and rcputational interests. Coal is a short- to mid-tenn reality; low carbon energy sources 
are a mid- to long-term proposition. Australian banks are willing to hedge their bets by 
taking on renewable energy clients, but they are not willing to drop lucrative coal clients of 
their own volition. For example: 
We did two [renewable] transactions that created positive feedback from the market 
which led to more renewable energy business that in tum lifted our reputation in 
that space. That's important for the future. But reputation with the coal-fired sector 
is also important to us, especially regarding refinancing, which is happening now. 
(case F2). 
It is here that we get an even deeper understanding of the interplay between ' client service 
reputation' and the business case. As one interviewee stated: 
We are a well-regarded energy bank, so energy clients - whether coal, gas or 
renewable - come to us for business . . . We are not going to pick sides in an emotive 
turf war. We need to be a trusted adviser. (case G4 ). 
It becomes clear that client service reputation is a double-edged sword in tenns of voluntary 
corporate action. On the one hand it mobili ses banks to innovate new products and to 
become active in green spaces due to the desire for competitive advantage and enhanced fee 
generation. Yet, concomitantly and ironically, client service reputation impedes far-
reaching entrepreneurialism. Even leading banks are not willing to voluntarily make radical 
business changes lest they compromise their competitive edge and financial returns. They 
will not irrationally sacrifice lucrative clients on the 'green' altar. So, while client service 
reputation is a strong motivator for banks to voluntarily drive action in a 'greener' 
direction, it is a simultaneous brake on driving too far down that path. It becomes clear that 
business case logic is tantalising but also unsatisfying as an assured modality of corporate 
change. 
Nonetheless, data in Chapter 5 evidenced that leading banks are motivated by risk 
mitigation imperatives and peer pressure. These factors, in tum, are motivating incremental 
changes by banks that influence clients "to change their ways" (case El). We see this in 
two categories of climate-related bank initiatives. First, nearly all leading banks have 
commenced enhanced due diligence processes, either as part of the Carbon or Equator 
Principles, or through heightened internal risk management procedures. Several 
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interviewees described enhanced due diligence as an indirect dete1Tence for clients to 
continue in heavy polluting activities due to the extra hoops involved in seeking finance. 
Second, some banks have become "strategic advisers to migrate fossil fuel clients across" 
to a lower-carbon ex istence (case C2) which includes modernising or decommissioning old 
coal plants on the one hand and financing environmental technology for plants and 
renewables on the other. In other words, instead of dropping clients entirely, banks are 
prepared to "push at both ends" (case C2). 
6.2 'Organic' Mainstreaming via Isomorphism 
Indeed, evidence of peer pressure and the isomorphic nature of the banking industry 
supports the proposition that mainstreaming of 'leading' bank practices will likely occur in 
the future via mimetic processes as espoused in institutional theory. As described in 
Chapter 3, institutional scholars posit that there are three mechanisms of isomorphic 
change, namely coercive, normative, and mimetic. 676 The interview data revealed some 
elements of coercive isomorphism (when responding to community expectation and NGO 
pressure) and normative isomorphism (through professionalisation in the banking industry). 
However, it was banks' propensity for mimetic isomorphism (whereby organisations 
"model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more 
legitimate or successful") 677 that was evidenced most consistently throughout the data. 
Specifically, the data revealed that the likelihood of 'following the leader' in the banking 
industry is due to three main motivators: the competitive nature of the banking industry; the 
high visibility of leading banks; and the uncertainty that comes with climate change. This 
connection between theory and data is explained in detail below. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, banks are subject to peer pressure when adopting voluntary 
industry standards, especially when there is a lack of government regulation. Indeed, 
climate change creates unce1tainty for organisations in a variety of ways not the least of 
which is regulatory uncertainty. In practice, leading banks are dealing with this uncertainty 
676 DiMaggio and Powell, above n 418, 67-74. 
677 Ibid, 70. 
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by exploiting it: they are capitalising on business opportunities created by immature 
markets while simultaneously honing risk mitigation strategies. 
Mimetic isomorphism most often occurs when organisations are responding to 
uncertainty, 678 which has been described as a "powerful force" that motivates imitation. 679 
In uncertain environments, organisations will adopt the practices, rhetoric and symbols of 
more successful firms in order to be seen as 'normal' and ' appropriate' in order to 
survive. 680 The risk/benefit approach of leading banks toward climate change can be 
viewed by the rest of industry as legitimate and compelling because it fits with business 
case imperatives and is consistent with the prevailing view of how banks see their role in 
society. In other words, 'risk/benefit ' language is redolent of the "organizational 
language" 68 1 used by banks to demonstrate their rationality and legitimacy in the cultural 
context of capitalism. Indeed, it is arguable that risk/benefit discourse and economic 
efficiency are particular forms of rationality privileged by market economies. 682 So, as 
postulated by Meyer and Rowan, other banks will "gamer more legitimacy if they can 
emulate or symbolically reproduce that rationality" 683 by adopting leading banks' climate-
related risk/benefit strategies. 
Moreover, climate-related practices and products that have been created by leading banks 
provide good mimetic fodder for the rest of the industry. It is apparent from the data that 
leading banks tend to set standards together because none of them want to be ' the odd one 
out'. If those standards/practices are perceived to be an industry standard or to provide 
competitive advantage 684 then, suggest Jennings and Zanderbergen, adoption of 
678 DiMaggio and Powell write that uncertainty may be caused by poorly understood technologies, 
ambiguous goals, or the environment itself: ibid, 69. 
679 ibid. 
680 Meyer and Rowan, above n 399; Zucker, above n 415; Suchman and Edelman, above n 425 . 
681 Meyer and Rowan, ibid, 50. They assert that the evolution of organisational language is "a most 
important aspect of isomorphism": 50. 
682 ibid. Weber argues that in western cultures the objective of economic efficiency has become the 
dominant criteria for evaluating outcomes, which only acts to reinforce the dominant modem socio-
economic order: M Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Scribner, New York, 
1958). See also Dillard et al , above n 394, 508, 518. 
683 Meyer and Rowan, ibid. 
684 Dillard et al, above n 394, 515, 518, stating further that: "an institutional practice is a practice 
that provides at least a perceived competitive advantage" as judged by the prevailing capitalist 
'value ' or norm ofeconomjc efficiency: 515. 
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environmentally responsible practices is likely. 685 In other words, as noted by Bebbington, 
Higgins and Frame, "simply coming up with moral-based arguments for adopting [green] 
practices is unlikely to be convincing" 686 or to lead to mainstreaming in the industry. 
Of course, leading banks may not intend to set standards for the rest of the industry or even 
want to be mimicked, especially if doing so diminishes first mover advantage. However, 
DiMaggio and Powell write that subjective intention is irrelevant to mimetic processes. 687 
Wittingly or not, leading banks lend themselves to mimicry for two main reasons. First, 
they are 'loud and proud' about their innovations through public disclosures on their 
websites and in industry publications, so their practices are readily accessible. My data 
show that finns monitor each others' market ratings and inform themselves about 
competitor activities. Second, the banking industry is close-knit even though (or perhaps 
because) it is so competitive, which means that field cohesion is high and cross-pollination 
likely. Bansal and Roth' s study confirmed that organisations operating in highly cohesive 
fields adopt ecologically responsive practices that are established as legitimate in order to 
' fit in ' . 688 DiMaggio and Powell note specifically that models can be diffused and copied 
through employee transfer and industry trade organisations. 689 It is evident from interviews 
that employees move frequently between banks; and high interaction in the field is 
indicated by, for example, industry conferences and Bankers' Associations. 
In short, industry-wide change will likely occur due to early-moving banks providing 
models of success that other banks can follow and copy. Their climate-related actions, 
together with soft law codes such as the Equator Principles, inculcate industry standards 
and taken-for-granted behaviors. Using neo-institutional theory, it is probable that 
mainstreaming of leading practices in relation to climate change - despite inherent 
limitations to business case logic - will occur over time in the banking industry. 
685 D Jennings and P Zanderbergen, 'Ecologically Sustainable Organizations: An Institutional 
Ar, proach ' ( 1995) 20(4) Academy of Management Review I01 5. 
68
' J Bebbington, C Higgins and B Frame, ' Initiating Sustainable Development Reporting: Evidence 
From New Zealand ' (2008) 22( 4) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 588, 595. 
687 DiMaggio and Powell, above n 41 8, 69. 
688 Bansal and Roth, above n 2 16, 732. 
689 DiMaggio and Powell, above n 41 8, 69. 
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6.3 Incremental vs. Transformational Change 
If mainstreaming occurs organically via institutional processes, then the critical question 
becomes this: is it prudent to put our faith in purely voluntary standard-setting by banks as 
the mode by which they assist timely transition to a low-carbon economy? There are two 
main concerns with doing so. First, how far can mainstreamed bank-created standards take 
us down a low-carbon path? Second, how.fast can real change occur this way? 
6.3.1 Going the Distance: Standard-Setting and Real Change 
To address the first concern of whether purely voluntary action can take us far enough, we 
must ask ' what exactly is being embedded as the industry norm?' The conundrum is that if 
a low industry benchmark is set then it may not be sufficient to create core or meaningful 
change to corporate practices. Specifically, some scholars suggest that voluntary changes 
driven by business case imperatives result in low standard-setting; this is because such 
changes target only easi ly achieved cost efficiencies or ' low hanging fruit '. 69° Certainly, 
authors such as Steger and also Hoffman, who advocate the business case as driver for 
corporate greening, highlight how 'easy wins' can be achieved through increased 
operational- or energy-efficiency measures rather than introducing environmental 
programmes. 691 Indeed, Salzmann et al. have suggested that an increase in energy- or eco-
efficiency is the basis for the environmental dimension of the business case. 692 
Whilst 'efficiency' arguments can be viewed as an attractive and pragmatic selling point for 
corporate environmental uptake, they also seem to advocate "the 'no-brainers' of good 
(rather than corporate sustainability) management." 693 As noted by Bebbington, efficiency 
690 Particularly through risk management and cost reductions: Steger, above n 285, 41. See also 
Bebbington et al, above n 686. 
691 Eg Steger, above n 285, who states that 'easy wins' can be achieved in this way, particularly by 
the laggards in industries: 42. Hoffman similarly highlights easily identifiable solutions that 
businesses can take to lower their GHG emissions such as "simple energy efficiency initiatives, 
behavioral changes, or process improvements": Hoffman, above n 441 , 16. 
692 Salzmann et al , above n 285, 33. 
693 Ibid. As such, some social-environmental accounting scholars have accused academe of helping 
industry to set low standards. It is an unwitting unvirtuous circle: business strategy scholars 
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on its own is a necessary but insufficient condition for sustainability. 694 Spence further 
explains that "efficiency gains can potentially be undone by business growth" with the 
outcome that a business may create a larger overall environmental footprint despite making 
per unit eco-efficiency improvements. 695 
The concern is that 'no brainers' can result in minimalist change becoming embedded as 
the corporate norm, with the result that doing more than the minimum is anathema. As 
such, a low industry standard is set that equates to BAU with only peripheral changes. 
Literature on this issue, particularly in critical management studies and social-
environmental accounting, contends that when businesses perpetuate BAU with peripheral 
change only, the magnitude of environmental issues and the level of corporate change 
actually required to address them is masked or deflected. 
As noted in Chapter 3, some scholars have termed this phenomenon as corporate or 
managerial 'capture' of the CSR agenda. It means that corporations may selectively choose 
elements of CSR/CER that suit their business interests whilst appearing to be listening to 
criticism and enacting change. A swathe of scholars in the social-environmental accounting 
literature suggest that doing so equates to legitimation of the status quo and, thus, resistance 
to desired change by "veering little from business as usual". 696 
Other scholars label this phenomenon as the 'middle' or 'third' way, which sits between 
"free-market fundamentalism and the green left" as a pragmatic and economic imperative 
highlight 'easy wins' because they want to encourage corporate uptake of green initiatives, yet in so 
doing, the uptake they arc encouraging may fall far short of what is required to actually achieve 
environmental-social solutions. For details of this argument, see eg O'Dwyer, above n 242, 526-
527. Note, however, the counter argument that disengagement from the business community due to 
fear of 'capture' is similar to "fiddling while Rome burns": Parker, above n 216, 844-845, 850; and 
GH Gray, 'The Social Accounting Project and Accounting, Organizations and Society: Privileging 
Engagement, Imaginings, New Accountings and Pragmatism Over Critique?' (2002) 27(7) 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 687, 70 I. 
694 J Bebbington, ' Sustainable Development: A Review of the International Development, Business 
and Accounting Literature' (2001) 25(2) Accounting Forum 128. 
695 Spence, above n 270, 870. 
696 O'Dwyer, above 242, 527. See also: Milne et al, above n 269; Spence, above n 270; Tinker et al, 
above n 270. 
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for business. 697 These scholars view the demands of 'the environment' and 'development' 
as conflicting; they argue that business discourse that attempts to simplify this conflict 
actually obfuscates the complexities and tensions inherent in far-reaching environmental-
corporate change. 698 This concern highlights the contested nature of win-win claims in the 
business strategy literature, as outlined in Chapter 3. Indeed, Prasad and Elmes contend that 
win-win discourse merely reinforces a continuing propensity by industry to damage the 
Earth while deflecting from doing so. 699 
Similarly, Milne, Tregidga and Walton found that some businesses are not ' doing ' 
sustainability so much as BAU when they used a discourse analysis approach to interpret 
business reports and assess the effects of middle way business discourse on sustainable 
development. 700 Moreover, Milne, Kearins and Walton found that corporate environmental 
discourse often dismisses the adverse impacts on nature of business initiatives that have 
been invoked in the very name of 'sustainability'. 701 
How these outcomes might occur is well evidenced in this dissertation by the prevailing 
bank conceptions of 'sustainability' to mean self-sustaining instead of the longevity of the 
natural environment. Perversely, however, other companies are likely to adopt these 
prevailing conceptions in order to not be "presented as somehow missing out, not up with 
the play, and perhaps ultimately illegitimate".702 
Yet there are two outcomes from creating or perpetuating the impression that meaningful 
change is occurring when actually it is not. First, 'corporate capture' or 'middle way' 
framing of CSR discourse results in a missed opportunity to facilitate real solutions to 
697 Milne et al, ibid, 1236. See also: P Prasad and M Elmes, ' In the Name of the Practical: 
Unearthing the Hegemony of Pragmatics in the Discourse of Environmental Management' (2005) 
42(4) Journal of Management Studies 845, 856; and Tinker ct al, ibid, who propose that the middle 
ground is a contested terrain that shifts over time with social conflict and, as such, it is unwise to 
assume "that today's middle ground will simply coast into tomorrow": 28. 
698 Milne et al , ibid, 1230. See also: Spence, above n 270; and RH Gray and J Bebbington, 
'Environmental Accounting, Managerial ism and Sustainability: is the Planet Safe in the Hands of 
Business?' (2000) I Advances in Environmental Accounting and Management I . 
699 Prasad and Elmes, above n 697, 285. 
700 Specifically, reports of the New Zealand Business Association and eight of its founding 
members: Milne et al, above n 269. 
7oi Milne et al, above n 276. 
702 Milne et al , above n 269, 1236. 
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pressing problems. In other words, it "crowds out and closes down alternative . . . principles 
and practices that might actually be better for conserving the Earth". 703 Second, it can result 
in subtle but decided corporate resistance to needed change 704 by keeping BAU but adding 
'a lemon twist'. 
In this sense, it is arguable that mainstreaming of voluntary corporate green uptake 
motivated by business case logic is not so much a bridge to salvation as a tweak to the 
status quo. In the context of climate change, Vogel provides useful illustration of this 
conundrum. 705 Vogel uses BP to exemplify how some climate-related gains are peripheral 
when compared to core business activities and that responsible behaviour is limited when 
the business case for green uptake relies on market demand and consumer patronage. 706 
Vogel states that BP had invested over $200 million in solar power between 1995-2001 , yet 
in 200 I alone it had spent $8.5 billion to explore and produce fossil fuels. 707 Putting that in 
perspective, for the year 2002 BP's investment in solar equalled less than half a percent of 
its expenditure on petroleum development and only 0.02 percent of its entire net worth. 708 
Moreover, even though BP had reduced its own GHG emissions and created a new market 
for its natural gas waste, 709 Vogel notes that the significance of BP's contribution to the 
production of GHG emissions is not through its own pollution. Rather it is "primarily from 
the consumption of the fossil fuels it markets and whose sales continue to form the basis of 
its business." 710 In other words, at its core, the business of BP is to explore and produce oil 
and to disseminate that oil to the world. Tweaking the edges of that core business, whilst 
laudable, does not create significant or meaningful change to the status quo. 
703 Milne et al , ibid, 1239. See also: Prasad and Elmes, above n 697; S Deetz, Democracy in an Age 
of Corporate Colonization: Developments in Communication and the Politics of Everyday Life 
(State University o f New York, Albany NY, 1992); MA Hajer, The Politics of Environmental 
Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process (Clarendon Press, Oxford UK, 1997). 
704 See eg O ' Dwyer, above n 242, 525, 527. 
705 Vogel, above n 295. 
706 ibid, 127. 
707 ibid, 126; C Murphy, ' Is BP Beyond Petroleum? Hardly' Fortune (20 September 2002), 44. 
708 Vogel, ibid; P Driessen, Eco-Imperialism (Free Enterprise Press, Bellevue, 2003), 11 6. 
709 By 2002 BP had reduced its own GHG emissions by over ten percent on 1990 levels: Vogel, 
ibid, 125, 127. 
710 !bid, 127. 
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This 'core' conundrum is echoed, somewhat more cynically, in a survey published by The 
Economist in 2005. That article claimed that the greatest failing of CSR is its focus "on 
relati vely trivial action by companies at the margins of their businesses rather than 
substantial action at the cores". 711 The contention is that 'virtuous' corporate behavior is 
cosmetic and not central for most conventional public companies: it is a kind of "gloss" or 
"human face that CSR applies to capitalism". 7 12 
These concerns have clear resonance in the context of climate-related business changes by 
banks. Lundgren and Catasus note that: 
It appears that banks have taken a number of steps, which, taken together, 
emphasize a responsibility towards the natural environment. The level of ambition 
can, however be questioned. What would the critical stakeholder with ... knowledge 
of scientific facts ... think about the steps that have been taken?713 
To this end, NGOs and some academics have questioned the ingenuity of leading banks' 
commitment to a 'core' green agenda. Criticism has been aimed at three main areas. First, 
that 'new' practices such as carbon trading and climate risk due diligence fall within the 
scope of current practice and are therefore simply logical as opposed to truly 'green '. 71 4 
Second, that the voluntary Principles are sub-optimal for achieving environmental and 
sustainability objectives. 7 15 Third, that funding continues for fossil fuel projects and at 
levels di sproportionate to renewables and clean tech. 716 These three areas of criticism are 
considered in detail throughout this section. 
711 T he Economist, above n 259. 
712 Ibid. The article contends that this is a good thing such that CSR should not attempt to 
reconstruct capitalism because the very fact of running a profitable company is likely to be 
advancing the public good. However, the atticle acknowledges that more attention ought be paid to 
' business ethics'. As such, we again sec a conceptual delineation between 'CSR' and 'ethics', to the 
point that the two are viewed as mutually exclusive. 
713 Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8, 186. 
714 See eg BankTrack 20 10, above n 144. This criticism was also voiced by NGO respondents to 
this dissertation: NG0-0 I; NGO-A I. 
715 See eg: BankTrack 2009, above n 144; Rainforest Action Network, above n 144; Macve and 
Chen, above n 143. Specific concerns have coalesced around legitimacy and lack of transparency, 
including defici ent review and accountability mechanisms: O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, above n 116. 
716 From 2005-20 11 lenders have apparently provided the coal industry with more than €232 billion 
thereby nearly doubling their support for the coal industry since the Kyoto Protocol came into force: 
H Schiicking, L Kroll , Y Louvel and R Richter, Bankrolling Climate Change (urgewald, 
groundWork, Earth life Africa Johannesburg and Bank Track, 2011 ), 58. See a lso: Rainforest Action 
Network (RAN), Banks, Climate Change & the New Coal Rush (RAN, San Francisco, undated); 
Profundo, Australian Bank5 Financing Coal and Renewable Energy: A Research Paper Prepared . 
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My empirical data reveal that there are grounds for concern regarding the 'core' and 
substantive nature of voluntary climate-related changes by leading banks. On the one hand, 
there are some genuine innovations initiated by these banks, which have been described in 
previous chapters. For example, one bank has declared an outright veto on lending to 
companies that practice MTR coal mining. 717 Another bank, Bank A, has created new 
indices that can revolutionise how fund managers classify and allocate institutional 
investments using a climate change lens. An analyst at Bank A explained the process: 
The classification determines the asset allocation process. Fund managers have no 
translator between the way they see the world and the way the world is changing. 
We offer them a different view. (case A2) 
Voluntary bank changes of this calibre have potential to facilitate corporate GHG 
reductions through client networks in a ripple-out effect as postulated in Chapter 2. 
Yet the evidence also shows that banks are largely capitalising on what they already do 
well. As stated by one interviewee in the energy sector: "What we do hasn ' t changed but 
techniques we use and markets we access change all the time." (case B2). For some banks 
this is also true of signing onto voluntary Principles: 
In my own view I don't really think [the Carbon Principles] impact upon the way 
we do business because we are already practicing a lot of what is presented in them 
regarding risk assessment and diligence levels. It wasn't a lot of effort to sign up 
and agree to all those things. (case B2). 
Similarly, interviewees involved in trading carbon noted that it was another asset class to be 
exploited by banks. For example: 
[The bank] is active in carbon trading in the same way it is active in other trading 
areas such as oil, gas, electricity and coal trading desks. Therefore the carbon 
market is a natural addition to these desks. It makes no sense to trade in other 
commodities and not carbon. (case E2). 
For Greenpeace Australia (Profundo, Amsterdam, 2010); and Greenpeace, Pillars of Pollution: 
How Australia 's Big Four Banks Are Propping Up Pollution (Greenpeace, Sydney, 20 I 0). 
717 As confirmed by Rainforest Action Network (RAN), Policy and Practice: 2011 Report Card on 
Banks and Mountain Top Removal (RAN, San Francisco, 2011), 12. 
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In this way, changes that relate to trading, risk mitigation and even financing in some cases, 
comprise 'good business sense' and a logical extension of BAU. NGOs therefore claim that 
banks "do not get green bragging rights" (NG0-01) for these activities. 718 
Jn particular, the act of corporations signing onto voluntary industry codes has drawn 
criticism for providing symbolic appearance of action without delivering substantive 
environmental and social outcomes. 719 In relation to banks adopting the voluntary 
Principles, most attention has been directed at the Equator Principles, which have been in 
force the longest. 72° Criticisms of this voluntary code have focused mainly on two 
perceived shortcomings: limited coverage and a Jack of accountability mechanisms. In 
relation to limited coverage, the Equator Principles apply only to project finance activities 
above $ I 0 million (as of 2006) and NGOs argue that this covers only "a small percentage 
of the environmental and social impacts of the financial sector as a whole". 72 1 For example, 
two NGO respondents pointed out in interview that corporate finance activities comprise a 
h I f . fi 722 A h muc arger part o bank balance sheets than project mance. s sue , some 
commentators posit that regulating project finance represents "convenient ' low-hanging 
fruit'" for financial institutions 723 and deflects attention from "other fundamental areas of 
concern" in banking practice. 724 In relation to accountability, NGOs and legitimacy 
scholars have also criticized the absence of clear accountability mechanisms in the Equator 
Principles at organizational or project levels, arguing that there is little opportunity to 
evaluate environmental results 'on the ground' or assess whether "the essential 
machinery"725 of a bank has changed or improved. 726 
718 See also BankTrack 2010, above n 144. 
719 O'Sullivan and O 'Dwyer, above n 116, 557, 576. Ashforth and Gibbs argue that adopting highly 
visible but peripheral practices to appease social stakeholders is tantamount to 'ceremonial 
conformity' and is merely symbolic: Ashforth and Gibbs, above n 435. Other authors contend that 
certain actions, such as adopting industry codes or forming a corporate ethics committee, can lack 
substance while providing the appearance of action: see M Lenox and J Nash, 'Industry Self-
Regulation and Adverse Selection: A Comparison Across Four Trade Association Programs' (2003) 
12(6) Business Strategy and the Environment 343; and P Bansal and T Hunter, ' Strategic 
Explanations for the Early Adoption of ISO 1400 l' (2003) 46 Journal of Business Ethics 289. 
720 ln 2005, Richardson suggested that the first iteration of the Equator Principles represented BAU 
only: Richardson, above n 143. 
72 1 O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, above n 116, 566. 
722 NGO-Al ; NGO-DI. 
723 Ibid, quoting an NGO interviewee from Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale. 
724 Ibid. 555. 
725 Ashforth and Gibbs, above n 435, 181. 
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However, several authors in recent years have argued that assessing 'effectiveness' may 
encompass more than just measuring outcomes; that adoption of voluntary codes may 
facilitate processual benefits such as organisational learning and dissemination of best 
practices among adopting and non-adopting firms alike. 727 Specifically, some scholars have 
suggested that the very act of adopting the Equator Principles "may be both evidence of and 
a catalyst for cultural change" within not only adopting banks but also lending 
syndicates. 728 
It was not the aim of this dissertation to investigate the effectiveness of the Equator 
Principles, Carbon Principles or Climate Principles in delivering improved environmental 
outcomes, nor whether banks are strictly complying with them. My questions about these 
Principles were intended to grasp only the extent to which codes have become a pa11 of core 
bank business and/or altered BAU. Accordingly, I asked interviewees in project finance and 
risk management departments whether adoption of the Principles had made any difference 
to their everyday practices. 
In relation to the Equator Principles, all interviewees at adopting banks affirmed that 
Equator Principles' standards are integral to ESG risk assessments for project finance, and 
usually coordinated through a Risk Committee. This finding accords with Meyerstein's 
research that most adopting institutions standardize and benchmark their project finance 
procedures to World Bank standards and designate risk management personnel. 729 
726 O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, above n l 16, 576. 
727 Sec cg: TP Lyon and JW Maxwell, 'Environmental Public Voluntary Programs Reconsidered' 
(2007) 35(4) Policy Studies Journal 723-50; and N Darnall and S Sides, 'Assessing the 
Performance of Voluntary Environmental Programs: Docs Certification Matter?' (2008) 36(1 ) 
Policy Studies Journal 95-117. 
728 Conley and Williams, above n 117, 546. See also: DE Rupp, CA Williams and RV Aguilera, 
' Increasing Corporate Social Responsibility through Stakeholder Value Internalization (and the 
Catalyzing Effect of New Governance): An Application of Organizational Justice, Self-
Determination and Social Influence Theories' in M Schminke (ed) Managerial Ethics: Managing 
the Psychology of Morality (Routledge, New York, 20 IO); and H Spitzeck, 'Organizational Moral 
Leaming: What, Tf Anything, Do Corporations Learn from NGO Critique?' (2009) 88 Journal of 
Business Ethics 157. 
729 In a study of the implementation of the Equator Principles, Meyerstein collected web-based 
survey data from 24 of the Equator Principles' signatories in order to assess the extent to which 
those institutions have changed their organizational structures, policies and procedures post-
adoption. Meyerstein concluded that "a significant percentage of the adopting institutions" have 
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However, my data do not accord with Conley and Williams' suggestion that application of 
the Equator Principles is expanding to departments outside of project finance, such as 
commercial lending or underwriting. 730 Indeed, consistent with NGO concerns, my data 
evidence that internal (not Equator Principles') procedures and standards are used to assess 
corporate finance and other bank activities. Moreover, as evidenced in the previous chapter, 
I did not find empirical support for the contention in the literature that the reflective 
processes required by the Equator Principles are deeply engaging " the moral and ethical 
sensibilities of employees and managers". 731 
I received mixed results in relation to the impact of the Carbon Principles on everyday bank 
practices, which apply only to coal clients/activities in the USA. Two interviewees at 
different banks stated that adopting the Carbon Principles had not changed BAU, with one 
interviewee remarking that: 
We've always looked at the environmental consequences of new projects. All power 
plants will have a negative impact on the environment, even wind plants with birds 
and solar technology with turtles. That is already factored in and won 't necessarily 
stop the deal. (case C 1 ). 
However, a risk manager at a third adopting bank gave a different response: 
No bank was doing as in-depth a due diligence review prior to what is now required 
by the Carbon Principles. Some questions being asked - like ' What's your 
company's carbon mitigation strategies? ' - no bank was asking that question 
previously. (case Dl) 
Only one leading bank has signed onto the Climate Principles. There was no mention by 
interviewees at this bank of the effect of that code on their practice. An analyst directed me 
to the Manager of Group Sustainability for details about policy implementation and risk 
assessment, however that manager declined an interview when requested. So the level of 
penetration of the Climate Principles into daily bank practice is not revealed in the data; 
although it may be imputed that attention to them is confined to one department only. 
taken their Equator Principles commitments "very seriously" and that these Principles are not 
merely greenwash: A Meyerstein, On the Effectiveness of Global Private Regulation: The 
Implementation of the Equator Principles by Multinational Banks (PRI Academic Conference, 
Sigtuna Sweden, 26-28 September 2011 ), I. 
73
° Conley and Williams, above n 117, 552. They do not provide evidence for this suggestion. 
731 Ibid, 553. See also: Rupp et al, above n 728; Spitzeck, above n 728. 
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Overall, there are mixed results in my study about the penetration of these three sets of 
voluntary Principles into the everyday practices of adopting banks. A number of 
interviewees responded that they were already doing what is required in the Carbon and 
Equator Principles, and not all leading banks had signed onto them for this very reason. 
Accordingly, two preliminary deductions can be made from the data: climate risk 
assessments are now core to leading banks' business practices; but adopting any or all of 
the Principles has not significantly altered BAU in this regard. 
Arguably, the main aim of the Equator Principles and the Carbon Principles is mitigation of 
(social) reputational, financial and regulatory risks. 732 There is no doubt that risk mitigation 
is an important first step in corporate change and a strong driver for some banks to go 
green( er). Nonetheless, it is a first step only. As evidenced in the previous chapter, banks 
are placed along the risk-opportunity spectrum according to jurisdiction. It is apparent that 
when motivated by opportunity enhancement, banks become proactive and innovative in 
order to get a bigger slice of the pie. Opportunities can present a break with usual practice 
or can motivate the bank to leap two steps ahead of the curve, instead of just one logical 
step fmther down the BAU path. Conversely, banks that are primarily driven by risk 
mitigation are reactive; their aim is to keep BAU running as smoothly as possible. As 
Bansal and Roth found, when a firm 's goal is to minimise risks and costs then it will aim 
only to meet standards not to exceed them, and the dominant approach will be to imitate 
their peers. 733 
This notion of 'satisfice' was clearly evidenced in the Australian data. Most Australian 
interviewees revealed that there had been little change to BAU in the past five years, with 
the exception of enhanced due diligence processes for climate risks. They further noted that 
corporate clients were similarly reactive, stating that "you'd be hard pressed to find a top 
I 00 ASX company that has its head around the carbon issue" (case G 1) and that clients 
were "in no mood to make $100 million investment decisions in a climate of uncertainty." 
(case G2). It is only now, with the advent of a carbon price, that Australian banks ·- and 
732 As noted by Conley and Williams in relation to the Equator Principles: "[i]nvestors and bankers 
share 'the language of risk as a lingua jiwica' for talking and thinking about the EPs": Conley and 
Williams, ibid, 565. 
733 Bansal and Roth, above n 216, 728. 
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their clients - are gomg beyond the adoption of voluntary codes to begin seeking 
opportunities and to think more creatively. 734 Ln contrast, European banks (where climate 
regulation is well-established) and even US leading banks (where federal incentives and a 
threatened carbon price existed at the time of interviews) 735 are motivated by opportunities 
more so than risk mitigation. In these jurisdictions, leading banks have developed 
innovative financial solutions around climate change mitigation. 
Another concern regarding the 'core' significance of climate-related changes by leading 
banks is the nature of their financing activities. NGOs around the world have highlighted a 
dispari ty between coal- and green- funding by banks. Coal-fired plants account for nearly 
one half of man-made C02 emissions. 736 As such, NG Os argue that funding renewable and 
clean tech projects while continuing to fund fossil fuel projects is counterproductive to the 
aim of a low-carbon economy. For example, some leading banks in the USA have been 
described by RAN as: 
the ATMs for a dirty industry that is bad for health and bad for business. Coal is the 
ultimate subprime investment for the climate. We cannot solve climate change if 
banks continue to prop up this risky and outdated industry. 737 
For these reasons, a European NGO respondent explained how his organisation 1s 
commencing a project which endeavours to assess the carbon implications of a bank's 
lending and investment activities using the 2°C guardrail as an absolute benchmark. 
Traditionally, banks have been benchmarked against each other. However this NGO 
respondent contended that a comparative yardstick was not appropriate or sufficient. 
734 Of course, risk mitigation may produce innovation in circumstances where the actual survival of 
the business is threatened by a crisis situation. Eg, Dillard et al note that fundamental shifts in 
market composition and competitive characteristics forced the US coal, textile and railroad 
industries to reconceptualise organisational and technical processes: Dillard et al , above n 394, 521-
2. However this level of crisis and response were not evidenced in the data for this dissertation. 
735 And before the Republicans controlled both Houses. 
736 40% to be precise: per US Environmental Protection Agency, available at 
<http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html> viewed 17 April 
2012. 
737 Per Amanda Starbuck, Director of Rainforest Action Network's Energy and Finance Program, 
quoted in Enews Park Forest, 'US Banks Risk Public Health and Climate by Financing Coal' 
enew!>pfcom (I May 2012). For these reasons, some leading US banks received ' fai l' grades in a 
20 12 NGO report that ranked US financiers on investments, transactions and ownership of coal 
mining and coal burning utility companies: Rainforest Action Network (RAN), BankTrack and 
Sierra Club, Dirty Money: US Banks at the Bottom of the Class: Coal Report Card 2012 (RAN, San 
Francisco, 20 12). 
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Right now there is nowhere near a consistent approach by banks [to climate change 
mitigation]. It's like saying you 're 15% pregnant; either you're doing climate 
change mitigation or you're not. They need to be saying '2°C is a challenge for us 
and we will tackle it' . (NGO-Al) 
Furthermore, NGOs argue that amounts of funding for fossil fuel projects far outweigh 
those for low-carbon initiatives, making the 'green' efforts of banks tantamount to 
'greenwash '. For example, in an NGO report reminiscent of Vogel's BP dilemma, RAN 
alleged that Citi's commitment in 2007 of US$50 billion over 10 years to address global 
warming amounted " to less than 0.2 percent of the company' s $2.2 trillion in assets."738 
The rep01t continues: "What is Ci ti doing with the other 99.8 percent? .. .In 2006 Ci ti 
financed 200 times more money for dirty energy than it did for alternative energy." 739 
Similar claims have been leveled at ' the big four' Australian banks, 740 with Greenpeace 
asserting recently that "[m]ajor banks such as ANZ and Westpac have happily accepted 
sustainability awards while continuing to invest hundreds of millions of dollars into 
polluting coal stations". 741 
As noted in the previous chapter, since 2007 there has been little funding of new coal-fired 
power stations in the USA or Australia. This is due, in part, to increased credit and 
reputational risk from threatened carbon pricing in those jurisdictions. Nonetheless, my 
data show that leading banks in jurisdictions that (a) are rich in fossil fuels and/or (b) do not 
have well-established climate-related federal regulation in place - such as the USA and 
Australia - are cautious in sending signals that could be interpreted as 'choosing' renewable 
energy client interests over more lucrative fossil fuel ones. In these jurisdictions, coal and 
oil entities comprise a key component of banks' client bases. For reasons of 
competitiveness and client service reputation, banks will not readily drop these clients. As 
stated by one US interviewee: "we don't walk away from long-standing clients easily if an 
activity is not illegal." (case DJ). An Australian interviewee gave a more textured response: 
Because our clients are mixed [between fossil fuel and low-carbon], it's always 
dangerous to go too strong one way or the other. We are inherently conflicted due to 
738 RAN, above n 716, 5. 
739 Ibid. 
740 Greenpeace asserted that Australia's big banks have invested over AU$5 billion into coal 
(mining, burning, transporting) and only AU$0.78 billion into renewable energy: Greenpeace, 
above n 716, 5. See also Profundo, above n 716. 
741 G 'b'd 3 reenpeacc, / 1 · , . 
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our client mix. Banks usually don ' t like to advocate on any issue for that precise 
reason: they don't want to piss off clients. (case F2) 
Indeed, this assertion was bolstered by two interviewees at an Australian bank who 
lamented the lack of government incentives for renewables but admitted that the bank had 
not lobbied for such regulation for fear it would "irritate" its coal clients. Another 
interviewee at that bank told how a big coal client at a competitor bank had contacted him 
to discuss switching across because the competitor bank had proactively engaged with the 
government about pricing carbon. An interviewee at said competitor bank acknowledged 
the ' inherent conflict' due to client service reputation, responding that: "You don 't want to 
completely disadvantage yourself. But we thought we had more to gain in the long run so 
we did it." (case F2). onetheless, that competitor bank had not made a choice to red line 
coal clients, and interviewees stated expressly that they had no intention of doing so. 
For similar reasons, interviewees showed distaste for initiating preferential loans that have 
the effect of rewarding low-carbon clients and penalising GHG-intensive ones. NGOs and 
some academics have advocated for banks to charge differentiated interest rates depending 
on the green performance of the borrower. 742 Jeucken writes that an inherent activity of 
banks is pricing risk; therefore interest rate differentiation based on 'sustainability' (or 
lower environmental risks) is justified from a risk perspective. 743 An important by-product 
is that banks "support the good-doers and offset the wrongdoers." 744 In this way, banks can 
"contribute to sustainable entrepreneurship" through their financing policies. 745 
However, my data show that preferential lending is unlikely to occur of banks' own 
volition. No interviewee supported it. Two interviewees at the same bank commented that 
their bank was acting sufficiently by virtue of having a renewables team and a sustainability 
department. Another interviewee at a different bank responded that lending conditions are 
decided on a case-by-case basis using risk metrics and good business sense, not by 
imposing ethical 'values' . He stated that: 
742 NGO-DJ ; Jeucken, above n 77, 222-223; Lins et al, above n 51, 2. 
743 Jeucken, ibid, 222; Jeucken, above n 57, 2. 
744 Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8, 190. 
745 Jeucken, above n 57, 2 . 
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Sustainability is a strategic game. You achieve it through p01tfolio limits and 
pricing risk ... If a coal station is giving us lots of business in Asia then we'll do the 
deal; and we might decline a renewable project because the client owns a leaking 
nuclear plant overseas. (case G 1 ). 
Two other interviewees made clear that preferential lending to incentivise clean energy 
activity is "not part of what we do on a daily basis" (case C3) and is too far outside BAU to 
be considered seriously. For example: 
The general philosophy of the bank is that we facilitate and give equal service to all 
clients. Giving preferential rates to renewable energy creates a difficult situation 
regarding why the bank is making certain choices. We need an economic rationale 
for doing this. It's not a bank's role to fudge the system. Get entrepreneurs or 
governments to incentivise. (case B 1) 
Consistent with 'BAU with a lemon twist', I found that leading banks are willing to engage 
in enhanced due diligence processes instead of preferential lending because it is a logical 
step for banks to extend their cmTent due diligence practices to include 'climate risk'. 
Indeed, doing so is consistent with their established processes for evaluating financial and 
ESG risks associated with any new client or project. Importantly, enhanced due diligence 
does not involve any perceived moral or value judgement: 
We don't bar sectors on the basis of legitimacy. It's a risk management process ... 
We price risks associated with different industries ... not because of some moral 
judgement. (case F2). 
Nonetheless, several interviewees opined that enhanced due diligence is an indirect 
deterrent for high-polluting activities and a mechanism through which banks can subtly 
" influence changes in economic activity." (case B2). 
So, at first glance, my data on preferential lending are similar to those of Lundgren and 
Catasus who found that the standard answer from credit managers in Swedish banks was "it 
is not our role to promote certain [environmental] values in the lending process". 746 For 
leading banks, taking an "economic not emotional" (case B 1) approach to climate-related 
strategies indicates that a bank has good business sense, which is crucial to its client service 
reputation. 
746 Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8, 190. 
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Yet my additional findings on enhanced due diligence show that some leading banks do 
want to influence normative corporate change; however, they will pick the mode of 
influence on the basis of what is most palatable and appropriate to them. Due diligence 
mechanisms do not belie a bank's intention to 'choose' clients on a moral basis, which 
would compromise the bank 's client service reputation and fee generation. Conversely, 
appearing to choose clients and projects on an economic basis is simply good business 
sense, which is appropriate and rational. So again we see the double-edged nature of client 
service reputation: it has the effect of motivating banks a little way down the 'right' path, 
but also inhibits them going too far. 
Further evidence that climate-related endeavours may not yet be 'core' is that none of the 
interviewees had their salary incentives or KPls tied to environmental outcomes or 
mitigation of climate change. In the change management literature, Doppelt argues that 
sustainability-based thinking and behaviours must be embedded in 'everyday' activities in 
order to generate real organisational change. 747 He states specifically that an organization 
needs to link "bonuses, promotions, new hiring, and succession planning to performance on 
sustainability" in order to motivate cultural change toward genuine triple bottom line 
sustainability. 748 
Yet my data show that remuneration and KPJs are not so linked in leading banks. 
Transactional bankers revealed that their compensation depends on fee generation and how 
the individual, department, and bank perform financially each year. In some cases there was 
commission on deals. Yet, the 'greenness' of a deal was not relevant to remuneration. As 
stated by one interviewee: "whether I IPO 749 climate friendly companies or dirty companies 
I still get paid." (case EI) One interviewee asserted that her remuneration was linked to 
'carbon'. Yet, after further probing, it became clear that this was due to her involvement in 
trading carbon as a commodity; it did not equate to a KPI for positive environmental 
performance or climate change mitigation. Indeed, in that same bank, a fixed portion of the 
747 Doppelt, above n 323 . 
748 Doppelt, above n 357, 3. 
749 An Initial Public Offering or 'IPO' is the first sale of a company's stock to the public. IPOs are 
used in the renewables/clean tech space as a way lo raise necessary capital for a company. 
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remuneration for all staff - even if they worked in the "back room" in IT - was assessed 
using financial metrics based on customer service satisfaction. 
Similarly, researchers and analysts ' compensation at the leading banks was "linked to 
financial not environmental outcomes" (case E2). These employees were judged on their 
level of external recognition via client and industry voting, which depended on how much 
their work had added value to client investment and decision-making processes. Finally, the 
KPis of sustainability managers were described as "very subjective" (case D2), being 
linked to "coalition building with externals" (case 02) and "external recognition" via CRA 
government ratings, NGO rankings, and "getting good sustainability ratings and the 
resulting reputational impact for the firm." (case C2). As such, there is no evidence that 
banks have heeded Hart's exhortation for companies to "close the loop on their own 
rhetoric" by rewarding employees that move " the company and the world toward 
sustainability". 750 
Furthermore, different divisions within the one bank have different priorities and cultures. 
For example, data in Chapter 5 showed how sustainability managers and transactional 
bankers have disparate attitudes to social reputation, and that conceptions of CSR (and 
related te1ms) vary between departments and individuals within the same bank. Similarly, 
attention to climate change, let alone mitigation of it, did not appear consistent throughout 
the banks. In two leading banks only, it was evident that climate change had been elevated 
to the corporate governance level with senior management oversight and regular meetings 
of inter-departmental managers to discuss and coordinate climate strategies. As stated by an 
NGO respondent: "If climate change is not something the CEO reports on then it hasn't 
arrived at where it needs to be sitting." (NGO-Al). 
Moreover, in most of the cases, managers could not explain clearly whether attention to 
climate change was spread throughout their bank, whether any such attention was 
consistent between departments, or whether there were future plans for diffusion of 
climate-related knowledge, practices or mitigation efforts throughout the firm. Most 
750 S Hart, Capitalism at the Crossroads: Aligning Business, Earth and Humanity (Wharton School 
Publishing, Upper Saddle River, 2007), 231-32 (emphasis added). 
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managers could only tell me how their department or division addressed climate change (or 
even just 'carbon issues') and/or diffused that knowledge. 
This situation m practice 1s m stark contrast to the change management literature on 
sustainability, which emphasizes that a 'siloed ' approach to socio-environmental issues 
indicates that real changes have not taken place in the core business. Specifically, in their 
study of sustainability and Brazilian banks, Lins et al. found that "sustainability lies in 
introducing corporate responsibility in core business activities rather than in departments or 
institutions disconnected from the main activities of the companies". 75 1 Studies by 
Doppelt752 and Hess 753 similarly evidence the importance of embedding sustainability into 
everyday practices throughout the whole of an organisation. 
From piecing together the interview data, it became apparent in this study that climate-
related consciousness was not consistently nor widely-spread throughout the one bank in 
most cases. ln some cases it seemed confined to specific departments only. For example, 
activities within institutional or investment banking divisions usually involved attention to 
climate change by focusing on carbon as a risk factor or trade commodity and clean tech as 
an investment opportunity. Yet this did not seem to be the case for activities in other 
divisions, such as wealth management or retail banking, within the same bank. 
One interviewee was able to explain how this worked in practice: 
It's still early days. But to be honest, in Retail Banking, when a person walks into a 
branch and wants a home loan, we're not interested in the sea level elevation of the 
property or carbon emissions. ln Corporate Lending, we'll check a company's 
credentials and if we like their business plan then we'll lend the money. In 
Institutional Banking, that's when we take into account the environmental practices, 
reputation management, and long-term sustainability [economic viability] of the 
business. Could we do more? Absolutely. But that's where we are. 754 (case GI) 
751 Lins et al, above n 51, 2. 
752 Doppell, above n 323, 50. 
753 Hess, above n 359, 16. 
754 The last sentence in this quote is reminiscent of the reply received by Lundgren and Catasus to 
their question of whether nature per se (as opposed to nature being viewed as a risk) is a factor for 
consideration in the lending process of Swedish banks. One of their interviewees responded 'We are 
not there yet': Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8, 190. In other words, banks are using a cost/benefit 
basis not an ethical or 'green' one for thei r decision-making. Clearly also, g iven that Lundgren and 
Catasus conducted their study over 12 years ago, banks are not fast-moving creatures. The import of 
this is discussed in the next section. 
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Taking stock of the evidence so far, it is apparent that even leading banks could be doing 
more to ensure that their climate-related practices arc core to everyday business and 
facilitate real corporate progress toward a low-carbon economy as opposed to tweaking 
BAU. For example, in addition to enhanced due diligence processes and activity in carbon 
and clean tech markets, banks could be linking employee KPis to climate mitigation efforts; 
providing preferential lending rates; redlining the most GHG-intense clients and projects; 
ensuring that attention to climate change and mitigation efforts is present in all departments 
and under the umbrella of board oversight; and even assessing bank activities by how far 
they move us toward the 2°C guardrail on global warming. In the words of an NGO 
representative: "banks shouldn't think this is their contribution to saving the world ... What 
we are looking for is a little bit of ambition and heroism" (NGO-DI ). 
Yet the honest response from leading banks, as evidenced in my data, is that they see their 
core business as servicing clients and making money, not saving the world. Pursuit of 
commercial success can have flow-on effects that benefit the planet, but these are happy 
corollaries. In short: business case logic is a motivator and a barrier to corporate green 
uptake; and client service reputation as a driver is a double-edged sword. As stated by one 
banker: "being a good corporate citizen - as an individual - is encouraged [by the bank] ... 
But at the end of the day we are not paid to be nice people, we are paid to be successful." 
(case BI ) 
And, as evidenced in the data, 'success' is measured by business case standards. Whether 
by hard or soft means, an initiative must translate into making money and not losing money 
for the bank, and employee remuneration is tied to this imperative. 
Furthermore, and given the importance of business case logic to bank behaviour, it is 
relevant at this point to acknowledge current limitations to the size ofrenewable energy and 
clean tech markets. Having regard to the risk-opportunity spectrum in the previous chapter, 
we know that banks and their clients are actively looking (or beginning to look) for 
opportunities associated with climate change as much as they are trying to mitigate risks. 
As such, the 'opportunity' component to the business case is an increasingly important 
motivator for corporate green uptake. 
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Renewable energy and clean tech spaces present such opportunities for banks. These 
industries are lucrative - over $1 trillion of private investment went into renewable energy 
and clean tech for the period 2007- 20 I 0 755 - and they have long-term potential for 
significant investment opportunities. For these reasons, most interviewees stated that being 
in the renewables space is core to their bank's business, with one interviewee describing it 
as "pretty mainstream now in the [bank] industry generally" (case Bl). 
However, renewable energy and clean tech markets are currently regarded as nascent and 
may not reach maturation for decades; they are considerably smaller in size than traditional 
energy markets. This has obvious repercussions for bank activity in both low-carbon and 
fossil fuel spaces. As stated by one interviewee: 
We're currently doing doubles and singles not multiples and home runs [in the 
renewables space] because although the market is currently $100 billion in size that 
is still not a huge market for a big investment bank. (case C3) 
The comparatively small size of alternative energy markets ensures that banks will not 
make radical changes that have a chilling effect on fossil fuel clients. There is no logical 
reason for doing so if there is not a guaranteed or large enough return to warrant or entice 
such a switch. In other words, it would not make 'good business sense'. Neuhoff et al. 
found in 2009 that climate finance was stifled for this very reason: 
With the current regulatory framework unable to sufficiently incentivize low-carbon 
project developers and thereby stimulate a strong low-carbon project pipeline, 
investors do not have enough projects, or sufficiently large projects, to which they 
can easily provide finance. Consequently, they are unable to realize the necessary 
economies of scale. 756 
For an industry driven by profit and client service, the current size of the renewables market 
is not conducive to banks' ostracizing, let alone excising, fossil fuel clients and funding 
only alternative energy initiatives. So a Vogel-type dilemma exists whereby the renewables 
market is not yet significant enough to drive radical changes to bank practices. Yet, 
ironically, private finance is required to bring low-carbon energy solutions to scale. The 
answer is that these markets need to be expanded in order to attract more capital ; and this 
755 Ethical Markets, above n 167. 
756 Neuhoff et al, above n 3 77, 7. 
221 
needs to happen now, not decades in the future. The question is 'how?' My suggestions are 
detailed in the next chapter. 
Overall, there are grounds for genume concern about how far purely voluntary bank 
changes can take us toward a low-carbon existence. Genuine innovations do exist but they 
are few. The more prevalent actions, such as carbon trading and enhanced risk assessments, 
fit readily under the umbrella of 'BAU with a lemon twist'. As such, there is a question 
mark over the 'core' nature or significance of these latter practices. Specifically, client 
service reputation is a double-edged sword. Tt drives banks to adopt green practices that can 
enhance and protect client service in order to enhance and protect profits. Yet, 
simultaneously, this means that banks will only make rational and conservative changes 
that do not compromise their client base or potential for profit maximisation. 
6.3.2 Timeliness: The Imperatives of Expeditious and Radical Change 
The previous section showed that there are grounds for concern about how far purely 
voluntary bank changes can take us toward a low-carbon existence. Even if we assume the 
best, whereby bank industry standards are set high and resulting change is substantial not 
peripheral, we stil l need to contemplate the second concern about whether such action can 
create real change fast enough. To do this we need to examine types of corporate change 
and re-visit the urgency of global warming. 
Within the fields of organisational change and organisational development, scholars 
consider corporate change as either 'incremental', being small alterations to existing 
practice, or 'fundamental ', which encapsulates "risky and transformational shifts". 757 ln the 
context of sustainable development, Dunphy et al. define incremental corporate change by 
757 S Waage and J Torok, 'Organizational Change for Sustainability' in S Waage (ed) Ants, Galileo 
and Ghandi: Designing the Future of Business Through Nature, Genius and Compassion 
(Greenleaf, Sheffield, 2003), 215. They advocate for a change continuum with ' incremental' at one 
end and ' fundamental' at the other and "developmental change" and "transitional change" placed 
along it: 215. See also: D Anderson and L Anderson, Beyond Change Management: Advanced 
Strategies for Today's Transformational Leaders (Jessey-Bass, San Francisco, 2001); G Barczak, C 
Smith and D Wilemon, 'Managing Large-Scale Organization Change' ( 1987) Organizational 
Dynamics 23. 
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what it is not. It does not include "radical changes in strategy, structure, capability or 
organizational realignment." 758 Indeed incremental change "for the most part impacts on 
the organization's day-to-day operational processes", 759 whi.ch includes "the drive to 
efficiency". 760 As such, business strategy literature that advocates increased operational-
and eco-efficiency is actually advocating incremental change only. 
In contrast, transformational corporate change is fundamental, radical and 'deep'. 761 Quinn 
writes that " [d]eep change differs from incremental change in that it requires new ways of 
thinking and behaving. It is change that is major in scope, discontinuous with the past and 
generally irreversible." 762 Levy and Merry describe this kind of change as involving a 
paradigmatic shift. 763 In other words, fundamental or transfonnational change is well 
beyond ' BAU with a lemon twist'. 
There are circumstances m which incremental corporate change is appropriate and 
successful, 764 and some might argue that incremental change is better than no change at all 
or that grabbing even low hanging fruit is a starting point in a change management process 
to move in the right direction. However, the magnitude and urgency of global warming 
requires fundamental and transformational change to address it. Returning to some statistics 
from Chapter 1, the imperative of GHG emissions reduction is to cap global warming at 
2°C within the next few years in order to stop catastrophic change. Yet GHG emissions are 
now occurring three times faster than predicted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change in 2007 765 and we are already moving beyond "the patterns of natural variability 
within which contemporary society and economy have developed and thrived". 766 In this 
context, there can be no meaningful discussion of incremental mitigation of climate change. 
Notions of '3-4°C warming is close enough to 2°C and better than 5°C' or 'getting it right 
in 30 years is better than not doing it at all' arc nonsensical. Climate change mitigation 
758 Dunphy et al, above n 323, 230. 
759 Ibid. 
760 Ibid, 228. 
761 !bid, 263-264. 
762 R Quinn, Deep Change: Discovering the Leader Within (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1996), 3. 
763 A Levy and U Merry, Organizational Transformation (Praeger, New York, 1986). 
764 For example, for creating "new strategic opportunities, more minor culture shifts, capability 
development or changes in the workforce skills mix": Dunphy et al, above n 323, 229. 
765 Gamaut et al , above n 26; Hepburn and Stern, above n I. 
766 Copenhagen Synthesis Report, above n 27, 6. 
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requires radical action. 
Yet the banking industry has never been known for its radicalism. Although Ceres has 
con finned that "[b ]anks have the reach, influence and access to capital required to lead the 
changes needed to expeditiously address global warming", 767 actions by leaders are 
relatively recent and the industry as a whole is yet to follow suit. lndeed, the data evidence 
that even leading banks believe changes in corporate practice and the switch to a low-
carbon global economy will need to happen gradually. As stated by one interviewee: "The 
planet does need coal fired energy ... We can't pull the plug due to our shareholders but we 
can work strategically to change over time." (case C2) Phrases used by interviewees such 
as "we can't pull the plug" (case C2), "we can' t turn off the tap altogether" (case E l) and 
"we can ' t just switch off coal" (case G3) indicate that sudden and radical voluntary change 
is unthinkable to even leading banks right now. 
Illustrative of this point, several interviewees in all jurisdictions made clear their intent to 
keep servicing coal clients on the grounds that there might soon be new technology that 
makes coal 'clean'. This would indeed be 'win-win' for all concerned: coal clients, banks, 
the environment, and communities that rely on secure and cheap coal-fired energy. This 
'wait and see' approach makes good business sense to banks: 
Technology will keep developing. I believe that over time technologies like CCS 
[carbon capture and storage] will become cheaper, in 20-40 years time, we can have 
a kind of 'clean ' coal. There is so much coal in this country that it is not very smart 
to ignore it. (case Fl). 
Moreover, banks link this approach to the needs and expectations of society, which gives it 
legitimacy and rationality. For example, six interviewees stated that it is a bank's social 
responsibility to help ' keep the lights on ' . Similarly, four interviewees stated that they must 
support fossi l fuel clients in order to facilitate low-carbon solutions. For example: 
Fossil fuel companies are the most able to push change right now because they have 
the resources and wherewithal to do so. We are seeing companies in fossil fuels that 
are investing in emerging tech. To not help or enable those companies would set 
back the whole clean tech market. (case B2). 
767 Per Mindy S Lubber, Ceres President, quoted in the Ceres Report, above n 81 , i. 
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Yet critics describe a 'wait and see' approach as a rouse to protract BAU. It is now known 
that large-scale deployment of CCS cannot be realised, if at all, until long after 2020, 768 
which will be too late to assist with the 2°C target given that global emissions must peak by 
no later than 2015. 769 Recent publications such as Freakonomics 770 and Little Green U es771 
assert that humans have the capability to develop innovative technologies to redress a range 
of human-induced crises, including global warming. 772 To these claims, Shu and Bazerman 
respond that: 
little concrete evidence exists that a new technology will solve the problem in time. 
In fact, such claims make the task of the climatologist all the harder... [and] serve as 
an ongoing excuse for the failure to act today. 773 
The fact is that we already have the technology to reduce GHG emissions. Required now 
are investment strategies, in all jurisdictions, to grow existing renewables and clean tech 
76
R International Energy Agency, Technology Roadmaps: Carbon Capture and Storage 
(OECD/IEA, Paris, 2009), which envisioned "an ambitious CCS growth path" with " I 00 projects 
globally by 2020 and over 3000 project by 2050": 4; also Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, 
Press Release: IEA/CSLF Report to the Muskoka G8 Leaders' Summit (IEN PRESS, Paris, 14 June 
2010). 
769 Metz, above n 3, 42. Intellectual Property experts also note that the rapidity of financing, sharing 
and distributing CCS tech between the highest-emitting countries (US, China and India) will in part 
depend on the degree of trust and co-operation between these nations: P Drahos, 'Carbon Capture 
Still Elusive for China and US' The Australian Financial Review (13 August 2009). 
770 SD Levitt and SJ Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of 
Everything (Harper Perennial, New York, 2009). 
771 J Bennett, little Green Lies: An Expose of Twelve Environmental Myths (Connor Court 
Publishing, Ballan Australia, 2012). 
772 Bennet uses this argument to try to rebut nearly half of the environmental propositions or "little 
green lies" in his publication, namely: Proposition I: ' Peak Oil' has been reached; Proposition 2: 
Renewable energy production should be stimulated; Proposition 4: World population should be 
capped; Proposition 5: Economic growth and trade are bad for the environment; and Proposition 11: 
Agriculture and mining are always in conflict with the environment: ibid. 
773 Shu Land Bazerman M, Cognitive Barriers to Environmental Action: Problems and 
Solutions (Harvard Business School Working Paper 11-046, 20 LO), 8. The behavioural economics 
literature reveals certain cognitive biases in human decision-making that prevent humans from 
making 'rational' decisions. See eg: A Tversky and D Kahneman, ' Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases' in DJ Levitin (ed) Foundations of Cognitive Psychology: Core Readings 
(MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2002); C Jolls, CR Sunstein and R Thaler, 'A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics' (1998) 50(5) Stanford law Review 1471 ; MH Bazerman and D Moore, 
Judgment in Managerial Decision Making (Wiley, New York, 2008). One of these biases is that of 
'positive illusions', a sub-set of which is the ' illusion of control'. In relation to climate change, this 
illusion equates to the expectation that science w ill solve the climate problem through the invention 
of new technologies. See M Bowman, 'Nudging Effective Climate Policy Design' (2011) 35(2/3/4) 
International Journal of Global Energy Issues 242. 
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markets expeditiously so as to be competitive with fossil fuels within a few years, not a few 
decades. 774 
So the data reveal that leading banks have an evolutionary not revolutionary attitude to 
moving away from fossil fuels and toward a low-carbon existence. Yet this corporate 
attitude highlights macro complexities and failures. The world is currently dependent on 
fossil fuel s and most governments have not acted decisively to change that. A good test of 
political will arose during my first round of interviews. At the time of interviews in the 
USA and UK, the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster in the Gulf of Mexico was in 
its fourth week. That disaster is the world's largest accidental oil spill into marine waters 
with an estimated 35,000 to 60,000 baITels of oil released per day. 775 It flowed unabated for 
three months; it caused environmental and social carnage, which was captured vividly by 
international media; it created public outcry such that BP's chief executive resigned as a 
result. It was a perfect opportunity for governments around the world, but particularly those 
reliant on oil, to instigate changes to the status quo. However, and as noted by two bank 
interviewees in the USA, despite calls in the media and statements by government officials 
about the need to switch away from fossil fuels, the Obama Administration had still not 
brought a Bill before Congress to change the energy structure in the USA. Other 
interviewees noted that public outrage caused by the spill would not slow down oil 
consumption in the USA: "the ordinary person is horrified by the pictures on the news, but 
they are still gonna get into their car the next day and drive it." (case B2). 
Importantly, banks do not view themselves as de .facto regulators. The data showed no 
support for Matten and Crane's 'extended view of corporate citizenship', which posits that 
business can fulfill a similar role to government in voluntarily solving social problems. One 
of the reasons for the rejection of CSR by Levitt and also by Friedman was the view that 
corporations should not be regarded as governments, with Levitt in particular asserting that 
"government's job is not business, and business's job is not government". 776 Matten and 
Crane themselves acknowledge that a key shortcoming of their theory is a lack of 
774 Bowman, ibid, 249. Indeed, given the limited scope of CCS, the billions being spent on CCS 
research might be better invested in other technologies. 
775 C Robertson and C Krauss, 'Gulf Spill is the Largest of its Kind, Scientists Say', The New York 
Times (2 August 2010). 
776 Levitt, above n 569, 47; also Friedman, above n 294. 
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democratic accountability. 777 These concerns were similarly voiced by leading banks. For 
example, in response to NGO calls that banks cease funding new coal-fired stations, one 
interviewee in Australia stated: 
I said to them: You want four banks to make public policy? That is, 'we've got 
money so we'll make the decisions; we don 't care if we're a democracy with 
regulations in place'? You ' re asking us to use financial muscle to achieve what you 
want us to achieve. (case G4) 
My data make clear that banks will not fill governmental gaps if to do so means risking 
client service reputation and fee generation and/or compromising their perceived legitimate 
role in society. 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
In summary, the prevailing mind-set of leading banks comprises the following elements: (a) 
enhance and protect client service reputation in order to enhance and protect competitive 
edge and profits; and (b) make logical and conservative changes, not radical or irrational 
ones, especially in an uncertain climate. This mind-set, combined with the thesis that 
isomorphism arises from cognitive acceptance of persistent norms, indicates that it may 
take some time for climate-related strategies to become mainstreamed in the banking 
industry. Similarly, it can be deduced that bank industry change through purely voluntary 
means will be incremental and not transformational. 
Overall, we can see that the business case drives voluntary corporate change but, 
simultaneously, impedes change that is far-reaching and expeditious. Accordingly, in the 
context of stemming dangerous global warming within the next few years, if we relied 
solely on voluntary corporate mainstreaming motivated by business case logic and a 'wait 
and see' approach then we would miss a vital opportunity. Importantly, we would miss the 
opportunity to capture and leverage the full potential of the banking industry to facilitate 
climate change mitigation and the timely shift to a low-carbon global economy. Discussion 
of this opportunity, and how best to capture it, is the basis of the next and final chapter. 
777 Matten and Crane, above n 25 1, 176. 
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Chapter 7 Recommendations for Effective 
Climate Finance Regulation 
7.0 Summation and Overview 
We live in a world where we stand upon a precipice with the 2°C guardrail of dangerous 
climate change pressed against our collective chest. Looking over the edge into the chasm 
below, it is clear that we need to urgently engage a more radical and multi-sectoral 
approach to GHG emissions reductions in order to avert a cataclysm. Behavioural change is 
not enough. Addressing dangerous climate change requires an economic transfonnation on 
the scale of the industrial revolution. And this, in tum, requires the input and facilitation of 
financial intennediary actors, including the banking industry. Yet so little is understood 
about the relationship between banks and climate change: their mutual impacts; and the 
intrinsic modalities by which the banking industry can assist mitigation. Indeed, in recent 
years, any attention directed at banks by regulators and civil society has been noticeably 
adverse in the wake of the GFC. As such, very few decision-makers in industry or 
government have grasped the potential of banks as key intermediary players in the climate 
field. Ironically, the very entities that caused global upheaval due to the GFC could 
facilitate global salvation in the face of the climate crisis. Yet without a realistic 
understanding of banks' potential and the limitations that may impede attainment of that 
potential, we cannot hope to expeditiously transition to a low-carbon global economy. 
Against this backdrop, this dissertation set out to answer three questions. 
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(1) The central research question to this dissertation was why are early-moving bank<> 
making voluntary climate-related changes? This required empirical investigation. It 
was answered in Chapter 5 after reviewing three levels of literature on 'why 
companies go green' in Chapter 3. 
(2) Anterior to this central research question was the preliminary question of how can 
banks assist climate change mitigation? This anterior question was answered in 
Chapter 2 by consulting industry and theoretical bodies of literature in order to 
understand: (a) what climate-related business practices are being adopted by early-
moving banks, and (b) the importance of the industry's 'network change potential' 
for exponential corporate GHG emissions reductions. 
(1) A posterior question to the central research question was what implications can be 
drawn from these findings for: (a) the mainstreaming of climate-related uptake in 
the industry as a whole, and (b) effective climate finance policy-making? The first 
part of this question was answered in Chapter 6 by interweaving the empirical data 
with existing theory to locate and evidence limitations to business case logic, the 
likelihood of isomorphism, and incremental vs. transformational change. The 
second part of the question will be answered in this chapter by combining the 
findings from Chapters 5 and 6 with extant regulatory theory to create empirically-
grounded recommendations on how best to leverage banks for societal good. 
Methodologically, this dissertation sought to advance empirical understanding of these 
questions by using a multiple case study design to investigate seven early-moving or 
' leading' banks. Qualitative data were gathered in 2010-2011 from interviews with 
managers who head up the units responsible for climate-related bank practices at leading 
banks in Australia, the USA, and the UKJEurope. Interviews were also conducted with 
external respondents such as independent consultants and members of relevant NGOs. Data 
were gathered to examine a number of alternative explanations for why early-moving banks 
are adopting climate-related changes despite regulatory uncertainty on the issue at 
international and national levels. 
In broad terms, this study has shown that the overarching driver of climate-related 
initiatives by early moving banks is business case logic. The business case comprises two 
facets. First, profits are enhanced: directly via fee generation and indirectly via competitive 
edge. Second, risks (credit, investment, litigation, reputation, regulatory) are minimized: 
what is known as 'downside prevention'. Specifically, climate-related changes to bank 
business are driven primarily from three directions: bottom-up via clients seeking solutions; 
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top-down via senior management initiatives or support; and middle-out via mimicking of 
competitors' behaviour due to peer pressure. As such all three levels of theoretical lens -
meso, micro and macro - are evidenced and engaged to varying degrees by the data. 
However, this study has shown that the meso-level literature on the business case, 
particularly the theoretical sub-set of 'it depends' literature, provide the most convincing 
explanation as to why early-moving banks have ' gone green'. 
By undertaking empirical research to address the research questions, thi s dissertation has 
made original contributions to business and legal scholarship. These contributions are 
briefly summarised below and then detailed more fully in subsequent sections. 
Business Scholarship 
The empirical research and analysis in this dissertation has filled gaps in our knowledge 
about what motivates voluntary climate-related uptake by early-moving banks. In so doing, 
it contributes to scholarship in two business literatures. First, the findings inform the 
business strategy literature by identifying that business case logic drives banks, and that the 
business case comprises ' hard ' fee generation and 'soft' reputation. Importantly, a new 
taxonomy of corporate 'reputation ' has been created, which comprises a newly classified 
'client service reputation ' in addition to the well-established 'social reputation' as twinned 
drivers of corporate greening. Leadership and reputation are regarded in the business 
strategy literature as 'soft issues ', which are intangible, often unmeasurable, and therefore 
under-researched as factors relevant to a business case. Yet it is clear from my study that 
the components of 'reputation' can be disaggregated in order to better understand how 
(soft) reputation is as crucial as (hard) fee generation in driving corporate behaviour and 
innovation. 
Second, the findings inform the business and society literature by helping to elucidate the 
role of CSR and ethical imperatives as drivers of corporate behavior in actuality. This role 
was informed by subjective corporate conceptions of legitimacy and the self-perceived 
purpose of banks in society, as well as regulatory considerations in terms of both 
government and civil society interventions. Importantly, this study found that CSR 
considerations are subordinate and in some cases negligible. It demonstrates that, at best, 
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CSR is a limited explanatory tool for what drives actual corporate environmental-social 
uptake. In so doing, it challenges and casts doubt on the extant CSR literature which posits 
that ethical conceptions of 'doing the right thing' can and do drive corporate greening. 
Finally, thi s study elucidates the importance of regulatory contexts in shaping bank 
decision-making. Through jurisdictionally-specific findings it demonstrated how banks 
perceive climate change as a risk or an opportunity. This in turn helps predict whether 
banks will adopt reactive strategies ('BAU with a lemon twist') or proactive strategies that 
assist climate change mitigation. 
Accordingly, the theoretical contribution of this dissertation to business scholarship comes 
under Llewellyn's "level three" theorising using "concepts theories". 778 At thi s level of 
theorising, our understanding of existing concepts is refined and new concepts are 
introduced "so that practical developments in the world can be adequately discussed". 779 
Giddens points out the value of new concepts as theory contribution: 
Conceptual innovation (coupled to empirical research) is at least as important in 
social science as is the formulating of novel generalisations. For such innovation 
opens up 'ways of seeing' that do not exist within the perspectives of lay actors, 
disclosing unsuspected aspects of, and potentialities within, a given set of 
institutions. 780 
New concepts generated from the data analysis in this study, such as the 'network change 
potential ' of banks and the role of 'client service reputation ' in building a business case, 
reflect different ways of acting and thinking in the world. 781 In particular, the new concept 
of 'client service reputation' has been developed by comparing and contrasting it with the 
more-established concept of 'social reputation'. Llewellyn terms this process as " level two 
theorizing" through "differentiation theories'', which explore the dual.isms (oppositions) and 
dualities (dependencies) of two interrelated terrns to reveal different aspects of reality. 782 
Developing a new taxonomy of corporate ' reputation ' has helped, in Sayers' words, "to 
778 Llewellyn, above n 53 1, 672. 
779 Ibid. 
780 A Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology (Polity Press, Cambridge UK, 1987), 43. 
781 Llewellyn, above n 53 1, 672. 
782 Ibid, 670. 
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'explicate' problematic concepts; that is, give concise definitions to important but vaguely 
understood terms through re-working their relations with other terms in the network."783 
In particular, organisational practices - such as climate-related corporate decision-making -
represent a nodal point at which 'agency' and 'structure' meet and where a "struggle to 
make a difference in the world" takes place. 784 Importantly, rendering "more adequate 
conceptualizations of practice is part of this struggle". 785 By refining existing concepts and 
developing new ones, this dissertation has endeavoured to open up new ' ways of seeing' 
corporate environmental behaviour and the business-society relationship. 
Accordingly, theory generated by the data analysis may be termed 'modest': it is "novel" 
and "empirically valid" but "lack[ s] the sweep of [grand] theories". 786 However, Eisenhardt 
asserts that the strength of generating ' modest' theory from a multiple case study design is 
that the "intimate interaction with actual evidence often produces theory which closely 
mirrors reality." 787 It is contended that this strength resonates in my findings of why 
leading banks have 'gone green' and the implications of those findings for mainstreaming 
climate-related practices in the industry as a whole. 
Legal Scholarship 
Moreover, the empirically-generated concepts provide basis for this dissertation's 
contribution to legal scholarship. By combining the empirical findings with extant 
regulatory theory it makes recommendations on the issue of ' climate finance' regulation 
that will have particular importance for researchers, practitioners and policy-makers. Of 
importance here is coupling the banking industry's profit imperative with the new multi-
dimensional understanding of 'reputation'. Recommendations are based on the findings in 
the context of 'new governance' and ' nudge economics' theories, suggesting opportunities 
for policy-makers to harness banks in ways that are realistic, accurate and fruitful. This 
contribution is detailed full y in section 7.2 below. 
783 Sayer, above n 535, 81. 
784 Llewellyn, above n 531, 673. 
785 Ibid. 
786 Eisenhardt, above n 488, 545. 
787 Ibid, 54 7. 
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The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides 
detailed summaries of the findings and theoretical contributions of this dissertation to 
business scholarship. Section two discusses the implications of those findings and delivers 
theoretical and practical contributions to legal scholarship by making recommendations for 
policymakers on climate finance regulation. In so doing, that section contemplates both 
benefits and criticisms of two types of government intervention: first, direct (coercive) 
regulation and, second, indirect (nudging) regulation. The third section delivers the 
dissertation's heuristic significance by addressing the generalisability of the findings and 
considering fecund areas for further research. Final remarks are made in the fourth section, 
which conclude this dissertation. 
7. 1 Summary of Findings and Contribution to Business Scholarship 
7.1.1 A New Taxonomy of 'Reputation' as Driver 
This dissertation contributes to the business strategy literature by creating a new taxonomy 
of ' reputation' as a critical albeit nuanced 'soft' factor in the business case. In the literature, 
the terms 'social reputation' and 'corporate reputation' are often used interchangeably, 
which indicates that a company's 'reputation' has tended to be conflated with its social 
standing. Yet my findings reveal that corporate ' reputation' is a dichotomous concept in 
business practice: it comprises not only 'social reputation' but also a reputation for good 
business sense and delivering excellent service that helps large corporate clients to flourish, 
what was termed in this dissertation as 'client service reputation ' . As such, the role of 
'reputation' as an actual driver for corporate behavior is more complex and nuanced than 
envisaged in the literature. The existence and effects of this dichotomy on corporate 
greening have been largely unexplored in the business strategy literature to date. 
For all interviewees, regardless of their jurisdiction or unit, ' client service reputation' was a 
prime motivator to create climate-related products and services and to enter new markets. 
In nearly all of the cases studied, large corporate and/or wealthy individual clients had 
approached a bank to seek solutions: not only for mitigating regulatory risk associated with 
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extant or threatened carbon pricing, but even more so to capitalise on opportunities created 
by new markets. By responding to these requests, banks are well placed to help corporate 
clients survive and thrive in an increasingly carbon-constrained world. 
And by helping those clients, banks help themselves. Providing responsive and innovative 
client service creates two important benefits for films. The first consequence is direct: it 
generates fees. These fees are significant, coming from large corporate and/or affluent 
individual clients and they create profit for the bank and increase value for shareholders. In 
other words, fee-generation is a hard or measurable item that comprises an unambiguous 
business case. The second consequence is indirect and harder to quantify, yet it ties into the 
first. Excellent and innovative client service creates a reputation for the bank as the 'go to' 
bank in the space. This is crucial because the banking industry is highly competitive; banks 
are fighting for ' a fixed size of the purse'. So reputation as the 'go to' bank creates 
competitive advantage. The corollary is that each bank is working very hard to win clients 
from other banks whilst satisfying their own. 
Conversely, regard for 'social reputation ' - and the concomitant role of NGO pressure - as a 
driver for climate-related bank behavior is variable. Its meaning and manifestation for 
banks is consistent with the literature, that is, that 'social reputation' constitutes both the 
risk to a company if it is rejected by society and also the benefit to a company if it is 
accepted by the local community within which it operates. However its salience as a driver 
of bank behavior depends on certain factors. In summary, social reputation has most 
traction: (1) with banks that have a direct relationship with civil society, that is, private and 
retail banks that have individual or 'mum and dad' account holders; not investment banks 
that have only corporate clients; (2) with sustainability managers, as opposed to 
transactional bankers and analysts; and (3) in a regulatory context where (a) there is a lack 
of government regulation or industry standards and/or the regulator is weak, and (b) NGO 
campaigning is loud and hostile. 
Notions of 'trust' and 'good image management' were crucial to both social reputation and 
client service reputation, yet they manifested differently. In relation to client service 
reputation, trust manifested as 'good business sense'. So, under the impetus of client 
service reputation banks could be agnostic about climate change; their 'green ' driver was 
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the greenback not a desire to save the world. The aim is to help corporate clients (and 
therefore themselves) to keep up with and/or get ahead of the curve. As such, branding of 
banks as ' business partners' with ' good business sense ' is crucial to preserving and 
enhancing client service reputation. For social reputation, however, trust manifested as 
'good conscience'. Image management was equally vital to this dimension of reputation. 
However, the aim of 'social reputation' marketing and branding strategies is to create an 
emotional response in the hearts and minds of individual account holders. As such, 
concepts such as 'CSR', 'sustainability' and 'good corporate citizenship' are most relevant 
to bank branding at this level. 
7.1 .2 Climate Change as Risk or Opportunity? The Relevance of 
Regulatory Context 
There was interplay between the two types of reputation, regulatory context, and climate 
change mitigation efforts by banks. This interplay became clear by examining banks' 
perspectives of climate change as a risk or an opportunity. In large part, this perspective 
was jurisdiction-specific and shaped by regulatory context. The regulatory context includes 
not only government interventions - namely a carbon price, financial incentives for 
renewables, a GHG reduction target, or even direct coercive social regulation such as the 
CRA in the USA - but also social pressure from NGO campaigns and civil society unrest. 
Reflecting on the data, it is apparent that the more sophisticated the state interventions the 
more likely that banks will see climate change as an opportunity: they will leverage 
regulatory incentives to enhance their client service reputation and social reputation. It is 
against this regulatory background that banks can focus on profit enhancement. This was 
illustrated in Chapter 5 with European leading banks situated at the ' opportunity' end of the 
'climate change as risk-opportunity' spectrum. The weaker or less certain the state 
interventions, then (a) the more important NGO activity and voluntary industry standards 
become to mobilize better corporate behavior and (b) the more likely that banks will see 
climate change as a risk. The placement of Australian leading banks at the ' risk' end of the 
spectrum evidences this contention. ln such a regulatory context banks will focus on 
strategies for downside prevention, particularly for protecting their social reputation. 
235 
The interesting point here is that a threatened carbon pnce (not even an actual one) 
combined with financial incentives can help motivate banks to view climate change as 
more of an opportunity than a risk, as was evidenced by leading banks operating in the US 
jurisdiction. Comparing the USA to Australia, we see that inclusion of financial incentives 
in government regulation is crucial to mobilizing proactive bank activity toward climate 
change mitigation. 
7.1.3 CSR as a Non-Driver 
The findings in this dissertation challenge the extant CSR literature that promotes ethics 
and ' the care factor' as drivers of corporate environmental change. There are two points to 
make here. First, banks do not care about climate change; people in banks care about 
climate change. Second, CSR is conceived - if at all - heterogeneously. These two points 
together mean that there is no core 'care' philosophy around which CSR can coalesce 
within one firm. As such, it is inconceivable that CSR, on its own, could mobilize and 
motivate the whole industry. These two points are elaborated upon below. 
On the first point, it appears from the data that a firn1 needs a CEO or other high-ranking 
senior manager to be a charismatic 'green leader' and to set the tone for the bank, which 
then shapes bank policy. Equally, however, attention to climate change needs to be diffused 
throughout all bank units before the bank (and not just the CEO) can truly call itself 
'green ' . ft is also possible that passionate individual employees or middle managers might 
create new climate-related products and services, which fill a market gap. Yet it must be 
acknowledged that the data also show that individual ethical discretion is curtailed by 
perceived and actual structural constraints, particularly by business case imperatives. 
On the second point, just under half of all interviewees did not mention CSR at all; for 
these banks and/or individuals it is simply not a motivating force. Of those interviewees 
that did mention CSR, it is clear that CSR has varying labels and definitions: it means 
different things to different people and departments, even within the same bank. These 
different conceptualizations had created occasional friction between sustainability 
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managers and transactional bankers within the same bank, showing that CSR 1s still a 
contested concept within firms. 
Notably, the terms used most often by interviewees were 'CSR', 'good corporate citizen ', 
and 'sustainability'. Definitions of these terms were often specific to each bank and even to 
individual managers; and often those definitions were not consistent with the literature. For 
example, the overwhelming conception of 'sustainability' by interviewees equated to 
'economic longevity of the bank'. This is in stark contrast to the UNEP Finance Statement 
on Sustainability to which all leading banks bar one are signatories and which provides that 
economic imperatives must be balanced with human welfare and a healthy environment. 
Moreover, a number of interviewees stated that voluntarily taking radical steps toward a 
low-carbon economy by excising fossil fuel clients would be socially irresponsible as it 
would jeopardise fuel security. These interviewees had tied their conception of CSR to the 
perceived needs and wants of society, which gave it legitimacy, albeit with counter-
intuitive results for climate change mitigation. 
Finally, when reflecting on the data we see that corporate conceptions of 'CSR' and related 
terms incorporate social as well as environmental elements. The implication is that even if a 
bank considers itself to be a socially responsible corporation, and behaves accordingly, that 
does not necessarily mean its actions are directed at mitigation of climate change. For 
example, while climate or environmental issues were central to the CSR agenda at two 
banks, philanthropy and/or economic empowerment appeared prominently in the CSR 
activities at other banks. Strikingly, no interviewee used the term 'CER' when describing 
bank CSR activities or philosophies. 
In summary, this study found that CSR action 1s: (a) heterogeneously conceived; (b) 
multifarious, with attention to climate change being only one strand; (b) often dependent on 
the personal preferences of a senior officer such as the CEO; ( c) reactive to external 
circumstances, such as the decimation of bank balance sheets and reputations due to the 
GFC; and (d) not a motivating force for change on its own. Overall then, the diffuse and 
heterogeneous nature of CSR means that it cannot lead the charge to sustainability; it can 
create marginal change only. Accordingly, my findings support the conclusions of previous 
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scholars such as David Vogel who contend that although CSR exists, it is not central to 
business strategy and therefore of limited significance in driving meaningful change. 788 
7.1.4 Mainstreaming and the Limited Nature of Voluntarism 
If there is no ethical rudder by which business can steer a course then rational economic 
behavior is its compass. And yet, from the findings in Chapter 6 we see that change 
wrought by purely voluntary action based on business case logic is inherently limited. 
Overall, radical or entrepreneurial voluntarism was not evidenced by the data due to 
inherent limitations in business case logic and the current limited size of alternative energy 
markets. 
First, if there is no business case for a climate-related measure, or if there is a competing 
business case for non-green activities (such as continuing fossil fuel investments), then 
voluntary corporate environmental behavior is stunted. Nonetheless, by virtue of 
isomorphism as discussed in Section 6.2 above, mainstreaming of purely voluntary leading 
bank practices will probably occur over time via mimetic processes as espoused in neo-
institutional theory. The data reveal that banks will 'follow the leaders' due to the 
competitive nature of the banking industry, evidence of peer pressure, the high visibility of 
leading banks, and the uncertainty that comes with climate change. 
However, evidence from Chapter 6 raised concerns about how far and how fast purely 
voluntary corporate behavior can take us down a low-carbon path. Low benchmark-setting 
by leaders might embed an industry standard that is equivalent to 'BAU with a lemon 
twist' . The data show that leading banks could be doing more to ensure that their climate-
related practices are core to everyday business and facilitate real corporate progress toward 
a low-carbon economy as opposed to tweaking BAU. For example, in addition to enhanced 
due diligence processes and activity in carbon and clean tech markets, which are logical 
extensions of current practices, banks could be linking employee KPis to climate mitigation 
efforts, providing preferential lending rates, and redlining the most GHG-intense clients 
788 Vogel, above n 295. 
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and projects. Y ct this study shows that banks will not do so voluntarily because business 
case logic is a motivator and a barrier to corporate green uptake. Specifically, client service 
reputation is a double-edged sword: it is a strong motivator for banks to voluntarily drive 
action in a 'greener' direction, but it is a simultaneous brake on driving too far down that 
path. Importantly, the current size of renewable and clean tech markets is insufficient to 
entice banks to drop lucrative fossil fuel clients in favor of alternative energy clients. 
When reflecting on the empirical evidence and theoretical findings, it becomes apparent 
that banks' self-perceptions, their obsession with client service reputation, and the current 
size of low-carbon markets are all too limiting to incite voluntary entrepreneurialism. 
Accordingly, the 'network change potential' of the banking industry and its ability to 
facilitate exponential corporate GHG emissions reductions (as postulated in Chapter 2) 
cannot be realised without something more. 
7.2 Implications of Findings for Legal Scholarship: the 
Case for Regulatory Intervention 
At this point we may blame the banking industry for not being radical enough, or denigrate 
business case logic for its limitations, 789 or even curse capitalism just for being itself. 
However it is contended that, in market economies, these are the realities with which we 
need to work. Searle's ' direction of fit ' 790 is employed when making this contention. The 
theoretical ambition of this study is a ' theory-to-world' direction of fit, whereby if the 
world conflicts with our normative conceptualisations, it is our conceptualisations, rather 
than the world, that ought to give way. This approach would be labeled by van Oosterhout 
and Heugens as ' positive' not 'normative' (whereby the latter attempts to change the world, 
789 For example, Richardson argues that the business case approach is not radical enough and 
therefore international financial markets are unlikely at present to be the vanguard of change to a 
low carbon world. Instead, he advocates socially responsible investment as an alternative means for 
improving corporate social-environmental behaviour beyond legal mandate: Richardson 2009, 
above n 74, 3, 5. 
790 J Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge UK , 1983). 
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not our understanding). 791 Yet, the aim of this research is to understand the 'is' in order to 
get to the 'ought' . As such, the theoretical ambitions of this study are hardly neutral. 
While the findings in this dissertation might be disappointing for CSR protagonists, they 
have important policy implications. If NGO or government activity directed at the banking 
industry attempts to nurture, in Henry Bosch's words, a "wann cuddly glow"792 then it is 
unlikely to have any impact. Such an approach has no resonance with, and hence no 
motivating effect on, that industry. This realisation is especially timely given the frustration 
that civil society and regulators may feel toward banks for their role in the GFC, and any 
need by constituents to somehow make banks care. Instead, it is submitted that civil society 
and policy-makers can direct energy and resources to points of actual leverage with banks, 
namely 'risk/opportunity' and ' reputation'. 
Specifically, appreciating the difference between 'social reputation' and 'client service 
reputation ' has important pol icy implications. It allows NGOs, civil society and 
policymakers to focus their efforts more accurately, and hence more fruitfully, when 
leveraging bank motivations. In short, the social reputation of banks can be optimally 
leveraged by NGOs when a bank: (1) has consumer branches and/or (2) operates in a 
jurisdiction that has uncertain or no federal climate change regulation and/or weak 
regulators. Similarly, client service reputation can be leveraged by: (1) NGOs that wish to 
partner with banks and (2) clever government regulation, as discussed below. 
In this way, banks can be harnessed and best utilised in a way that is actually meaningful to 
them, not by pursuing what we think ought to be meaningful to them. It fits with banks' 
business case imperatives: make money, and do not lose money. It also fits with bank self-
perceptions of their role and purpose in society: they view themselves as economic leaders 
not environmental stewards. Nonetheless, their role in perpetuating or mitigating 
environmental harm, indirectly, is undeniable. Thus, it is vital to accurately leverage their 
strengths as economic leaders in order to harness their potential as environmental stewards. 
791 0 van osterhout and Heugens, above n 222, 199. 
192 B h osc , above n 255, 4. 
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This dissertation contends that the business case can provide an available and actionable 
modality of transformational change if it is harnessed by clever government regulation. 
However, the CSR literature is not overtly interested in the interaction between voluntary 
corporate action and government regulation. 793 Indeed, much of the point of CSR 
scholarship is to envisage business regulation devoid of or beyond state intervention, for 
example via self-regulation, public-private partnerships, and/or modes of social control. 794 
However, the findings in this dissertation provide fertile ground for theorising how 
government intervention and corporate voluntarism can interact and mutually enhance and 
reinforce each other as opposed to one being a substitute or surrogate for the other. In so 
doing, the following recommendations build on and extend previous work by scholars such 
as David Vogel, Benjamin J. Richardson, Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan and Dorothy 
Thornton. 
In particular, this dissertation posits that we need government intervention that is certain, 
consistent and specific to the issues of carbon, climate change, and clean energy. Moreover, 
it must tangibly guide and influence banks' decision-making in order to overcome inherent 
limits to both business case logic and CSR variability. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, focus is now on climate regulation at local , national and regional 
levels due to the current lack of an international agreement on climate change beyond the 
Kyoto Protocol. In particular, at the federal and regional levels there are two forms that 
government regulation of banks could take in order to facilitate climate change mitigation. 
The first is direct and coercive (or ' command-and-control') regulation, which is considered 
a high intervention option. 795 The second option is indirect or 'steering' regulation, which 
is less interventionist. Both of these regulatory modalities are explored in detail below. 
793 Notable exceptions include: Vogel, who concludes that: "by any conceivable measure, in both 
the United States and Europe, government regulation has been a far greater influence on corporate 
environmental performance over the past three year and one-half decades than has business self-
regulation": Vogel, above n 295, 133- 134; and Gunningham et al who reveal the interplay between 
regulatory, social and economic 'licences' : Gunningham et al, above n 21. There is also a pocket of 
business strategy literature, which contends that environmental regulation pushes companies to go 
beyond compliance, see eg: Porter and van der Linde, above n 302; and Reinhardt, above n 342. 
794 N Gunningham, P Grabosky and D Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 1998), ch 6. 
795 !hid. 
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7.2.1 Direct Government Regulation of Banks 
Legislation that directly regulates the banking industry appears to be en vogue m the 
aftermath of the GFC. Sweeping new regulatory schemes have been legislated m the 
USA 796 and Australia, 797 with a view to improving financial stability and sustainability via 
prescriptive measures. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
was signed into US Jaw on 21 July 2010. Its objective is to "promote the financial stability 
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system" 
which includes ending 'too big to fail', protecting American taxpayers by ending bailouts, 
and protecting consumers from "abusive" financial services practices. 798 This legislation 
has been described as embodying the "biggest overhaul of [US] banking regulation since 
the 1930s". 799 Similarly, the stated purpose of the Australian reform package is "to 
empower consumers to get a better deal in the banking system, to support our smaller 
lenders so they can put more competitive pressure on the big banks, and to secure the long-
tenn safety and sustainability of the financial system". soo Comparable legislative reform 
initiatives are underway in Europe801 and the UK. 802 
796 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub L 111 -203 , H.R. 4173) 
(hereafter Dodd-Frank Act). 
797 The banking reform measures include a ban on mortgage exit fees commencing July 20 I I (see 
National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment Regulation (No.2) 2011, passed into law on 23 
March 2011) and amendments to the Banking Act (Cth) 1959 to allow banks, and other financial 
institutions, to issue covered bonds (see Banking Amendment (Covered Bonds) Bill (No. I) 2011 ). 
798 Dodd-Frank Act, above n 796, preamble. 
799 BBC News, 'Q&A: US Bank Regulation' bbc.co.uk (25 June 2010). 
800 Australian Government, Competitive and Sustainable Banking System (Conm1onwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 20 I 0), 3. 
801 The European Commission proposed a draft law on 6 June 2012 for EU-wide rules for bank 
recovery and resolution. The proposal has two main objectives: First, "authorities will have the 
means to intervene decisively both before prohlems occur and early on in the process if they do"; 
and second, " if the financial situation of a bank deteriorates beyond repair, the proposal ensures that 
a bank's critical functions can be rescued whi le the costs of restructuring and resolving failing banks 
fall upon the bank's owners and creditors and not on taxpayers. See European Conm1ission, 'Press 
Release: New Crisis Management Measures to Avoid Future Bank Bail-Outs' Europa.eu (6 June 
2012). 
802 On 12 September 2011 the Independent Commission on Banking (!CB) delivered a final report 
on refonnation of the UK banking industry; the UK Government will incrementally legislate the 
ICB 's advice with the full package of reforms to be completed by 2019. The aim of the reformation 
is to ensure that "the UK's banks are sufficiently resilient to withstand excessive financial shocks, 
and sufficiently resolvable so as to fail safely without drawing on taxpayer support": HM Treasury, 
'Banking Reform: Delivering Stability and Supporting a Sustainable Economy (Crown, London, 
2012), 4-5. 
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Clearly, these regulatory reforms are directed toward the economic activities of banks -
interest rate hikes, salaries of CEOs, activities of ' too big to fail' - as opposed to their 
environmental or climate-related practices. Nonetheless, the CRA sets a precedent for 
direct regulation of banks in order to achieve social objectives. As such, it is plausible that 
coercive regulation could be similarly legislated to mandate how banks must facilitate 
climate change mitigation. This regulatory approach would be considered strongly 
interventionist. 
What might such legislation contain? In order to achieve the objective of climate change 
mitigation it would need to specify not only how banks must alter their own practices but 
also how they must influence the GHG-emitting practices of other corporate actors. For 
example, legislation could stipulate: that banks must lend at preferential rates to low-carbon 
industries/projects and at punitive rates to carbon intense ones; or that banks are prohibited 
from financially supporting listed carbon-intense industries. 
Alternatively, and much like the CRA, direct regulation could stipulate that defined 'banks' 
must tithe and funnel a specific percentage of their annual profits into listed initiatives that 
mitigate GHG-emissions. Indeed, a 20 l 0 Australia Institute poll found that 81 % of 
Australians wanted government consideration of a bank industry 'super profits' tax, 803 
which would require banks to tithe their annual profits once they reach a ce1tain threshold . 
Funds from this type of tax are usually funneled into a national sovereign fund; in the case 
of a ' green bank tax' , however, funds would be directed into climate change mitigation 
initiatives. 
The advantage of direct regulation is that, through any of the above means, a high 
minimum-standard of industry behaviour is set externally. This ensures that no bank is 
803 The Australia Institute, Media Release: Australians Want Bank Su.per Profits Tax 
On the Agenda (The Australia Institute, Canberra, 15 December 20 I 0). A 'super profits ' tax was 
first debated in Australia in the context of mining; the result is the Minerals Resource Rent Tax Act 
2012 (Cth), which commenced on I July 2012 and applies a tax rate of30% on the profit over 
AU$75 million for iron ore and coal mining projects. According to the Australia Institute poll, 
Australians want to tax banks more than they do mining companies. 
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acting alone and risking its precious client base by compromising client service reputation. 
It also ensures that 'BAU with a lemon twist' is not de rigueur. 
However, in recent decades, there has been criticism of traditional regulation that is top-
down, command-and-control or, in the US, 'new deal '. Most notably, scholars of 'new 
governance' theory have described traditional regulation as " inefficien[t] and stick[y]",804 
"sanctioned", 805 "hierarchical" 806 and "adversarial" 807 due to its coercive nature. For 
example, Hoffman and Ventresca write that the advent of wmmand and control 
environmental regulation in the 1970s created an adversarial relationship between 
government and industry on the issue of 'the environment'. 808 
Some background to new governance literature is relevant here. New governance theory 
has emerged from a myriad of extant scholarly theories, 809 including 'soft law', 810 
' responsive regulation' 811 and ' regulatory capitalism' , 812 'regulatory pluralism', 813 
804 JM Solomon, 'Book Review Essay: Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State' 
(2007-2008) 86 Texas Law Review 819, 822. 
805 0 Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought ' (2004) 89 Minnesota law Review 342, 344. 
806 Solomon, above n 804, 820. 
807 AJ Hoffman and MJ Ventresca 'The Institutional Framing of Policy Debates: Economics Versus 
the Environment ' (1999) 42 American Behavioral Scientist 1368-1 392, 1375. 
808 ibid. 
809 Lobel, above n 805 , 346. 
810 Eg OM Trubek and LG Trubek, 'Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The 
Role of the Open Method of Coordination' (2005) 11 European Law Journal 343, which explores 
the operation of non-binding objectives and guidelines in the European Employment Strategy. 
811 J Ayers and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1992), arguing that rule enforcers must evaluate ' when to 
punish and when to persuade' by being responsive to how effectively corporations and individuals 
are regulating themselves before deciding to escalate intervention. 
812 D Levi-Faur, 'The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism' (2005) 598( I) The ANNALS of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 12, presenting analytical and historical 
analyses of changes in the governance of capitalist economy. Sec also J Braithwaite, Regulatory 
Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas/or Making It Work Better (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008), 
arguing (inter alia) that what shapes the daily lives of most citizens is corporate governance more 
than state governance. 
813 Gunningham et al, above n 794; N Gunningham and D Sinclair 'Regulatory Pluralism: 
Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection' ( 1999) 21 Law and Policy 49. ' Regulatory 
pluralism' encompasses the use of multiple rather than single policy instruments, and a broader 
range of regulatory actors. Specifically, it includes conventional forn1s of direct (command-and-
control) regulation together with self-regulation and co-regulation, which are more flexible and 
innovative forms of social control that seek to harness not just governments but also business and 
third parties. See also: J Black, ' Decentring Regulation: Understanding The Role of Regulation and 
244 
'collaborative governance', 814 and 'neoliberal governmentality'. 81 5 Specifically, Solomon 
defines new governance regulation as: 
an umbrella term covering a kind of interaction between the state, regulated 
entities, and other stakeholders ... [It has] a number of desiderata - public 
participation, data provision, transparency, benchmarking, sharing of best 
practices, fora for deliberation on ends and means, and autonomy and flexibility 
for those subject to regulation. 81 6 
According to new governance theory, the democratic state is movmg toward a 'post-
regulatory' model, captured in the linguistic shift from 'government' to 'governance'.817 
The essence of this transition is a weakening (or "fermenting") 818of top-down government 
regulation in favor of regulatory power being diffused among multi-levelled networks and 
players. 819 These include both state and non-state actors, such as corporations and 
NGOs. 820 Estlund has recently called this a transition to ' regulated self-regulation'_ 821 
Several scholars have pointed to the heightened role of markets and market actors in this 
regulatory transition. For example, Vannier describes it as "a shift in governance from a 
Self-Regulation in a ' Post-Regulatory' World' (2001) 54(1) Current Legal Problems 103; and 
Coglianese C and Mendelson E, Meta-Regulation and Self Regulation (University of Pennsylvania 
Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-06, 2010). 
81 4 J Freeman, 'Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State' ( 1997) 45 UCLA Law Review 
I, arguing that ' collaboration requires problem-solving, broad rarticipation, public-private sharing 
of responsibility, provisional solutions, and a flexible, engaged agency. 
815 C Vannier, 'Audit Culture and Grassroots Participation in Rural Haitian Development' (2010) 33 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 282-305, showing how the processes of audit culture 
shape the meaning of 'participation' and 'bottom-up development ' for actors engaged in 
development practice. 
816 Solomon, above n 804, 834. 
817 Conley and Williams, above n 117, 545. For a thorough explication of 'new governance' 
especially in the US context see Lobel , above n 805. See also S Bun-is, M Kempa and C Shearing, 
'Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship' (2008) 41 Akron 
law Review I. For a collection of cross-jurisdictional empirical essays on new governance see G de 
Burca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon, 2006). 
818 B . I 'b 'd 1 urns c l a , 1 1 , . 
819 R Shamir, ' Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept 
of Corporate Social Responsibility' (2004) 38 Law and Society Review 635, 659. 
82
° C Scott, 'Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State' in J 
Jordana and D Levi-Faur (eds) The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulat01y Reforms for 
the Age a_( Governance (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2004); Slaughter AM, 'Global 
Govenunent Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy' (2003) 24 
Michigan Journal of International Law I 041. 
821 C Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2010). 
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direct supervisory role [for the state] to an indirect role premised on the organizational 
norms of the free market". 822 Cashore similarly highlights that these networks often use 
market forces to advance social and environmental goals. 823 
Accordingly, new governance theory is apt for evaluating direct banking regulation that 
coerces banks to assist the social objective of climate change mitigation. In so doing, it is 
arguable that direct regulation (on its own at least) is ill-equipped to deal with an emerging 
and dynamic area like climate finance. 
For example, climate finance regulation will need to be responsive to new information 
gained through implementation. In other words, "[!]earning by doing, embracing flexible 
responses to changing conditions and new knowledge, and revising to improve 
solutions"824 are key aspects of effective climate finance policy. In contrast, hard rules are 
not easily adjusted in light of experience 825 and lists of funding activities (whether 
proscribed or permitted) can become outdated and remain ' on the books' long past their 
use-by date. Climate finance regulation will need to allow for adaptation and adjustment 
given the complexity and newness of this area. 
Further, if regulators lack expertise to make rules for a highly specialised industry such as 
banking, then inefficiencies will manifest in implementation and enforcement. 826 New 
governance theory posits that collaborative processes help to "craft better policy ideas and 
implement them more effectively". 827 In other words, complex technical policy areas (like 
climate finance) require input from experts in the field, including those very entities that are 
the subject of the regulation (namely banks). Without collaboration, the text and 
822 Vannier, above n 8 15, 284. 
823 8 Cashore, 'Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State 
Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority' (2002) 15 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy , Administration, and Institutions 503. 
824 Strausser KA, Myths and Realities o_f"Business Environmentalism: Good Works, Good Business 
or Greenwash? (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 201 l), 74. 
825 Solomon notes that updating of rules in light of experience as well as consistent enforcement are 
less likely due to "scarce state resources": Solomon, above n 804, 822. 
826 Freeman notes that traditional regulation " is under attack from all quarters as inefficient, 
ineffective, and undemocratic": Freeman, above n 814, 3. 
827 Strausser, above n 824, 66. 
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implementation of technical legislation is likely to be inaccurate. In such a case, direct 
regulation will not achieve its goals. 
Moreover, new governance scholars argue that collaborative policy is more alive to 
problem solving than coercive regulation; and it is therefore more adaptable to changing 
economic, environmental and social demands. In pa1ticular, some scholars opine that 
command-and-control regulation " supports a belief that government regulators and industry 
decision makers cannot find solutions that offer mutual gain". 828 Therefore, mutually 
beneficial problem solving is less likely to occur within a context of coercive regulation. 829 
This situation would create a missed opportunity in addressing climate change: the problem 
is urgent and the finance sector has the expertise, resources, and self-interest to assist 
mitigation. Using new governance theory, it appears that policy-making that is less coercive 
and more collaborative encourages parties to be engaged, and to take ownership of the 
problem and the need for a solution. These aspects are key to effective climate finance 
policy. 830 
Finally, coercive regulation forces banks to become government-directed instruments of 
mitigation. It is not surprising that banks in market economies prefer to not be so regulated. 
Thaler and Sunstein opine that "(t]he sheer complexity of modem life, and the astounding 
pace of technological and global change, undermine arguments for rigid mandates or for 
dogmatic laissez-faire." 83 1 Certainly, as there are limitations with purely market-driven 
changes, as exemplified by the business case as driver in Chapter 6, so too there are 
limitations with sole reliance upon direct and coercive government regulation, as 
highlighted by new governance scholars above. 
828 Hoffman and Ventresca, above n 806, 13 76. 
829 0 Amir and 0 Lobel, 'Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and 
Policy' (2009) I 08 Columbia Law Review 2098. 
830 Strausser, above n 824 , 74. 
831 R Thaler and C Sunstein, Nudge: improving Decisions Ahout Health, Wealth, and Happiness 
(Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2008), 253. 
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Amir and Lobel assert that "policy can be improved dramatically by expanding the tools of 
regulation". 832 That is, for better problem solving in modem life, the regulatory toolbox 
needs to contain a screwdriver or even magic glue, not just a bunch of hammers. In this 
way, "economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing" and 
might redress the pervasion of both regulatory and market failures. 833 
In relation to banks and climate change, it may be more appropriate in a market economy 
for regulators to use indirect regulation to 'encourage' banks to do what they do best for the 
good of the planet. This proposition is elaborated upon in the next section using 'nudge' 
theory, as espoused by Thaler and Sunstein. 834 
7.2.2 Indirect Regulation to 'Nudge' Banks 
In their book Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein argue for self-conscious efforts by governments 
and private entities to influence people's behaviour in order to improve their lives. 835 
'Nudge' is both a verb and an acronym. The acronym ( UDGES) consists of iNcentives, 
Understanding mapping, Defaults, Giving feedback, Expecting errors, and Structuring 
complex choices, which are all tools with which policymakers can combat limited decision-
making. By using nudges, "choice architects" can "steer" choices to make people's lives 
"longer, healthier, and better" . 836 A choice architect "has the responsibility for organizing 
the context in which people make decisions." 837 ln other words, architects influence or steer 
best outcomes by nudging people in the right direction. Thaler and Sunstein clarify that 
" [n)udges are not mandates."838 
Nudge theory is relevant to banks, climate change and regulators for three main reasons. 
First, even though banks are not people, they still need nudging in the 'right' direction. 
Data in Chapter 5 showed that: banks copy each other at a cognitive level - and therefore 
832 Amir and Lobel, above n 829, 2127. 
833 Lobel, above n 805, 344. 
834 Thaler and Sunstein, above n 831. 
835 l bid, 5. 
836 Ibid. 
837 Ibid, 3, 83. 
838 !bid, 6. 
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without much 'thought' - for reasons of legitimacy; banks may not always do what is 'right' 
or 'best' of their own volition given their eschewal of ethical motivations and their 
obsession with client service reputation; and bank decisions are made by individual 
managers who are subject to cognitive biases, albeit within structural constraints. 
Moreover, previous studies have shown that even corporations are subject to ' bounded 
rationality' ; for example, that businesses have failed to adopt proactive environmental 
policies even when it is in their economic interests to do so. 839 
Second, it is apparent from Chapter 6 that volw1tary action alone by banks may not help to 
move us far or fast enough down the path to a low-carbon economy. As such, there is a role 
for indirect government intervention to increase the uptake by firms of economically 
rational measures that have positive environmental outcomes. 840 Specifically, regulators 
need to capitalise on drivers of climate-related actions by early-moving banks in order to 
raise the benchmark and encourage uptake across the whole industry. 
Third, government intervention cannot be avoided even in free and functioning markets, 841 
and markets alone cannot achieve the best environmental or social outcomes. 842 Indeed, 
markets contribute to environmental problems because incentives are not aligned properly 
and externalities exist. 843 As such, there is a nudging role for government to realign poorly-
aligned incentives by "put[ ting] the right incentives on the right people". 844 It is contended 
that the right 'people' are banks, and the right 'incentives ' are financial, as illustrated 
below. 
Elaborating upon an example provided in Nudge, 845 let us equate the climate field to a 
cafeteria and banks to school children. ln that cafeteria let us place healthy carrots 
(renewables/clean tech incentives) at eye-level and under bright light, and unhealthy 
839 Gunningham et al, above n 794. 
840 Ibid. 
841 Thaler and Sunstein, above n 831; Amir and Lobel, above n 829. 
842 Vogel, above n 295; Gunningham et al, above n 794. 
843 As Thaler and Sunstein write: "Those who pollute (meaning all of us) do not pay the full costs 
that we impose on the environment, and those of us who are harmed by pollution (again, all of us) 
usually lack any feasible way to negotiate with polluters to get them to clean up their acts": Thaler 
and Sunstein, above n 83 l , 184-5. 
844 Ibid, 97. 
845 Ibid, 1-14 ('the cafeteria'). 
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lamingtons (carbon price disincentives) on the floor where it is harder to reach, dirty, and a 
little embarrassing if one is seen handling them. In this way, the cognitive (rather than 
economic) cost of choosing the lamington has increased, which acts as a disincentive for 
choosing it. 846 Well-designed nudging regulation can increase both cognitive and economic 
costs for banks that associate with high OHO-polluting actors and projects. Yet it can also 
increase lucrative opportunities for banks that support and facilitate renewable and clean 
tech solutions. By strategically re-arranging the cafeteria, without necessarily changing the 
menu, we can increase consumption of 'healthy' options and decrease consumption of 
' unhealthy' ones. 847 In this situation, the government is the entity providing the nudges and 
is therefore the (choice) architect of the cafeteria layout. 
Regulation that sets a carbon price penalises high GHQ-emitting corporations and projects. 
lt is clear from the data that a carbon price also disincentivizes bank support for high-
polluting industries by affecting bank risk assessment, financing, lending and investment 
practices. 848 Yet my data reveal that some banks are very much driven by opportunity even 
more so than risk, and that other banks are beginning to seek out opportunities, especially 
as climate-related markets become ubiquitous and profits become concrete. Thus, equall y if 
not more importantly, we need incentivising regulation. That is, regulation that incentivises 
investment in and uptake of renewables and low-carbon technology - such as FITs, tax 
credits, subsidies - to stimulate bank activity in those areas. Indeed, Thaler and Sunstein 
opine that "some of the best nudges use markets; good choice architecture includes close 
attention to incentives." 849 As such, nudging regulation is a low interventionist option. 
Importantly, nudging regulation overcomes the limitations inherent to business case logic 
that were evidenced in Chapter 6. In relation to the first limitation, being the 'materiality' of 
the business case, Thaler and Sunstein note that decision-makers "may most need a good 
846 !hid, 8. 
847 Ibid, 2. 
848 Certainly, the CERCLA experience evidences that lenders will dramatically alter their financing 
of polluting industries in order to protect themselves from liability. See Richardson 2008, above n 
74, 349; DM Shaw, 'To Lend or Not to Lend - That Should Not Be the Question: The Uncertainties 
of Lender Liability under CERCLA' (1992) 41(4) Duke Law Journal l 2 1 I. 
849 Thaler and Sunstein, above n 831, 253. 
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nudge for choices that have delayed effects". 850 In other words, nudging regulation can help 
banks with long-term mapping of costs/benefits as well as short-te1m profit maximisation. 
Secondly, incentivising renewables and disincentivising high-carbon activities undermines 
countervailing business cases for bank involvement with fossil fuel projects. This is 
particularly necessary in coal-rich or dependent jurisdictions, such as the USA and 
Australia. For example, one interviewee noted how incentivising regulation creates 
necessary demand: 
In Australia we don't need renewable energy power because we have so much 
cheap coal. So we need regulation to make a demand for it .. . Right now coal is a 
cheap and reliable energy source for people. We need competing policy for solar. 
Without that, [renewable energy] plants will never get done voluntarily. (case G 1 ). 
Data show that when regulation covers market risk banks will shift their attention 
accordingly. 
In this way regulation can facilitate the finance necessary to start up and deploy clean 
technology on a scale sufficient to move us toward a low carbon global economy. As stated 
by a US banker: "Some [clean] technologies are still not economic. They need to be 
competitive with very cheap coal plants. Regulation can be helpful, it can pick up the true 
cost of energy, it can help to bridge the gap between starting up and getting returns" (case 
C3). As outlined in previous sections, attracting capital into alternative energy sectors - and 
the renewables market particularly - ensures their growth. Enlarging these markets is 
fundamental for the transition to a less carbon-dependent world. As evidenced in the 
previous chapter, this is not going to happen sufficiently or expeditiously by itself. 
An important effect of nudging regulation (both incentivising and disincentivizing) is that, 
in addition to influencing mainstreaming of green uptake by banks, it may also encourage 
innovation by them. This is because nudging regulation capitalises on the 'go to' motivation 
of banks born from [high competition and] client service reputation. This is evidenced in 
the data. For example, Bank A's innovative investment indices were created in response to 
a pension fund 's concern about portfolio risk from a carbon price. Similarly, US 
interviewees in the energy sector boasted how they created competitive edge for their bank 
850 ibid, 76-7. 
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by marrying tax credits for renewables with hedging practices to ensure lucrative returns 
for their clients. 
This in tum leads to the most important consequence of nudging regulation. By harnessing 
the bank industry's profit motive to influence bank choices, nudging regulation also 
harnesses banks' ability to enrol other corporate actors in climate change mitigation efforts. 
Specifically, through banks' day-to-day activities as risk managers, financiers, lenders, 
investors, and advisers, they have potential to influence choices by clients, which include 
large pension funds and fossil fuel entities. For example, climate investment indices 
influence how fund managers allocate investments into low-carbon companies; banking 
advice based on tax breaks and business case logic lures client capital into low-carbon 
spaces. The influential potential of banks is a key reason why they are an important and 
unique player in climate change mitigation and thus a clever focal point for effective 
climate policy. 
In sho1t, well-designed incentivising regulation simultaneously increases: (a) both cognitive 
and economic costs for banks that associate with high GHG-polluting actors and projects; 
and (b) cognitive and economic benefits for banks that associate with clean tech and 
renewable projects and industries. Indeed, and for maximum effect, the cognitive element 
of incentivizing regulation means that regulatory nudging can dovetail with 'social' 
nudges. 85 1 In the case of banks, 'social' nudges can leverage not only social reputation but 
also client service reputation. This is because social nudges include positive feedback from 
clients for good service (in the form of repeat business and/or industry awards) and from 
shareholders for high profits, as well as negative feedback from NGOs in the form of 'name 
and shame' campaigns. 
As such, nudge policy design leverages both 'hard' and 'soft' aspects of the profit-
imperative for banks as revealed through empirical investigation. Such regulation makes it 
more d ifficult for financiers to choose poor alternatives (such as providing support for 
fossil fuels) from the choice set, as opposed to eliminating those alternatives completely. It 
nudges the right choice by banks. 
851 !bid, 54, 191. 
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To date, only a few jurisdictions in the world have legislated to incentivise growth in low-
carbon technologies and/or to price carbon. However it is clear that such regulation can 
harness the profit-motive and business case logic of banks in order to spur capital 
deployment into low-carbon areas and away from carbon-intense ones. It can also harness 
the enrolment potential of the banking industry to influence ' right ' choices by other 
corporate actors. 
7.2.3 Critiques of 'Nudging' Regulation 
The previous section used nudge economics and new governance theories to recommend 
the harnessing of the banking industry's profit motivation, expertise, and network capacity 
to assist GHG emissions reductions. Specifically, it recommended indirect government 
regulation that can 'nudge' banks in the 'right' direction via financial incentives (such as 
FlTs, tax credits, guarantees) and disincentives (being a carbon price). 
In so doing, these recommendations do not propose to cure the defects of voluntarism or 
'un-make' inherent limitations in business case logic. Instead, it is suggested that we first 
acknowledge the defects and limitations, and then we harness them. Jn keeping with a 
world-to-theory ' direction of fit', the purpose of the research questions and findings in this 
dissertation is to understand the ' is'. Upon those foundations this dissertation has then built 
recommendations to assist timely attainment of the ' ought' . 
In short, my recommendations exhort policy-makers to: harness banks' self-limited 
voluntarism and drive it further; establish conditions that support a business case for 
renewable energy and clean-tech that surpasses a competing one for fossil fuels to bring 
low-carbon technology to scale; create a policy environment in which banks can choose 
renewables/clean tech clients and eschew fossil fuel clients on actual economic grounds not 
perceived moral ones. In sh011, let us harness banks accurately, and thus fruitfully, for 
societal good. 
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However, it must be acknowledged that there are limitations to nudge regulation. 
Regulatory nudging of climate finance is not a lone panacea for the climate crisis. lt is an 
important first step only. Thaler and Sunstein opine that replacing traditional regulation 
with nudges can result in better governance. 852 However, new governance scholars do not 
necessarily agree. For example, Strausser asserts that there is no serious discussion in the 
new governance literature of replacing 'old government'. 853 He states that the real 
enterprise of ' business environmentalism' is to work out "the most effective combination" 
of the two modalities. 854 Similarly, it is contended here that in order to address an issue as 
complex and far-reaching as climate change, a ' regulatory mix ' is required. Emissions 
reduction targets, renewable and energy efficiency targets, coercive regulation (for 
example, blacklisting certain fuel sources), incentivising and disinccntivizing regulation; all 
have a place in moving us to a low-carbon existence. 
Moreover, there are two main critiques of nudging regulation itself, which need to be 
considered when advocating for this type of regulation. The first is that incentives can have 
unintended and unexpected perverse consequences. The second is that a government may 
not know what is 'right' or ' best'. Each concern is discussed in turn below. 
Incentives can have unintended and unexpected perverse consequences 
Several authors have noted that although flexible regulation can be environmentally 
effective and cost-efficient, it is not flawless. 855 In particular, Bennear and Coglianese 
highlight how market-based regulatory approaches can be "susceptible to the law of 
unintended consequences" due in part to their very flexibility. 856 They provide the example 
of tradable permits in pollution reduction schemes whereby permits can create "so-called 
hot spots" if they are concentrated in one area, and ' banking' of permits can create early 
852 Ibid, 14. 
853 Strausser, above n 824, 80. See also Scott, above n 820, who "invites the reader not to wholly 
discard conventional conceptions of the state role in regulation": 146. 
854 Strausser, ibid, 81. See also Gunningham et al, above n 794, identifying a series of regulatory 
design principles which include a preference for 'complementary instrument mixes' over single 
instrument approaches: ch 6. 
855 Eg, Gunningham et al, ibid; Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 813; Bennear LS and Cogl ianese 
C, Flexible Environmental Regulation (University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law & Economics 
Research Paper No. 12-03, 2012). 
856 Bennear and Coglianese, ibid, 11 , 20. 
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achievement of environmental goals but at the expense of lower environmental standards at 
a later date. 857 
The Australian $1.5 billion Solar Flagships Program provides another example. In 2009 the 
Federal Government launched this Program with intent to "support the construction and 
demonstration of large-scale, grid connected solar power stations in Australia [that could 
operate] within a competitive electricity market". 858 Only two projects were selected at 
tender: one being a large-scale solar PY project (Moree Solar Farm project) and the other 
being a solar thermal venture (Solar Dawn). To date, neither project has even commenced 
because they have failed to obtain private funding. Financing has failed because the 
projects could not secure a power purchase agreement (PPA) with an energy retailer. The 
reason for that is multifold; however a large part of the problem is the low price and over-
supply of renewable energy ce1tificates. In a previous certificate scheme, a combination of 
factors created an excess of solar PV certificates, ultimately collapsing the scheme. 859 
Retailers 'banked' these excess ce11ificates, and subsequently there has been little need for 
retailers to enter into new PPAs with renewable energy generators. Under a PPA the 
generated electricity is purchased (usually by the retailer) for a set price and period of time. 
As such, a PPA provides investor certainty by ensuring the project's viability; without it, 
financiers will not support large-scale solar developments. Despite the recent reopening of 
the tender process by federal government, it is readily accepted by media and industry that 
the Solar Flagships Program has fail ed. 860 
Nonetheless, it is equally important to consider where and why incentivising regulation has 
succeeded. McConnell points to the success of FJTs as the alternative to a grants scheme, 
stating that in the same three-and-a-half year period during which the Australian federal 
solar program produced nothing, the German FIT has delivered over one hundred times the 
857 Ibid, 20-2 1 
858 Per Federal Department of Energy, Resources and Tourism at 
<http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/clcan/sfp/Pages/sfp.aspx> viewed 29 May 2012. 
859 D McConnell, 'Not Dead Yet: Flagship 'Collapse' Only Part of Australia's Solar Story' The 
Conversation (10 February 2012). 
860 Ibid; M Priest, ' Problems Flare As Solar Tender Reopened' The Financial Review (7 February 
201 2). 
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capacity of the proposed Moree Solar Fann project. 861 Although FITs are not flawless, 862 
McConnell argues that the Gennan experience illustrates how an efficient and 
programmatic FIT system can manage costs by adjusting tariffs as PY prices fall, instead of 
making ad hoc adjustments that create boom/bust cycles and investor insecurity. 
Whilst there have been no manifest perverse outcomes arising from Gennan FITs or US tax 
credits for renewables, it is certainly important to monitor the effects 'on the ground' of 
nudging regulation. Doing so is consistent with a new governance model of collaborative 
and responsive regulation. As posited in the previous section, climate finance regulation 
will need to be adaptive, particularly when new infonnation comes to light during the effort 
to implement solutions. 863 In particular, monitoring will need to check that "regulatory 
floors [do not] become ceilings". 864 That is, benchmarks are not set too low such that 
innovation is actually discouraged in practice. 
Governments may not know what is 'best' or 'right' 
The potential for perversity feeds into the second concern about nudging regulation: that a 
government may not know what is ' best' or 'right'. Indeed, a key ingredient of Thaler and 
Sunstein's nudge theory is the assumption that government knows best. In particular, they 
advocate a "new movement" called "libertarian paternalism". 865 Paternalism (on its own) is 
one of the main objections to direct and coercive regulation in market economies because it 
constrains individual choice. In contrast, by providing regulatory nudges within a 
libertarian paternalism construct, governments choose the architecture (the paternalistic 
part) within which individuals can then make decisions (pursuant to libertarianism). 
861 Being 15000 MW of PY or, on average, the equivalent to one Moree solar farm per week. ln 
addition, Australian state FITs have delivered almost ten times the capacity of the proposed Moree 
solar fam1: McConnell , above n 859. 
862 In particular, FITs have been criticised for the resulting charge levied across consumers, such 
that several Australian states have initiated reviews into their costs: ibid. 
863 Strausser, above n 824, 73. 
864 Conley and Williams, above n 117, quoting one of their interviewees on the Equator Principles 
who was an 'international banker': 565. 
865 Thaler and Sunstein, above n 831, 4-6. 
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However, several scholars have taken issue with the concept of 'libertarian paternalism'. 
Orly and Lobel describe it as an " ideologically loaded marketing formula" that may not 
accurately explain why improvements are made to safety, health or financial security. 866 
More specifically on the use of 'defaults' as nudges, Rajan has asserted that people rarely 
opt out of a default option that has been pre-chosen for them by the government or an 
employer; as such, the notion of choice in libertarian paternalism is illusory because " the 
paternalism [is] largely unconstrained". 867 He argues that this opens the door for 
"paternalistic mistakes". ff a government or employer has not chosen the ' right' or ' best ' 
default option, if instead they have nudged individuals into "prevailing fads" which they 
believe are good but may actually be bad, then the individual may end up worse off than if 
they had not been nudged in the first place. Rajan gives the example of superannuation 
allocation whereby an employer might co-ordinate employees into risky but popular asset 
investments (with potentially dire financial consequences) as opposed to "boring" 
allocations (which might be financially safer). 868 
Political history teaches us that it is not axiomatic that 'government knows best' . Indeed, 
critical evaluation of the Australian federal approach to climate policy in the last five years 
shows that there is plenty of room for government officials to 'get it wrong'. 869 The 
uncertain regulatory environment sun-ounding a carbon price and lack of stable financial 
incentives for renewables at the federal level has dimmed investor enthusiasm in this 
jurisdiction. 
European experiences prove that governments have a crucial role in ensuring stable policy 
environments that support 'green' markets. Deutsche Bank writes: "As investors, we 
essentially look for Transparency, Longevity and Certainty (TLC) in assessing the potential 
866 Amir and Lobel, above n 829, 2125-21 26. They prefer a new governance approach because it 
"embraces the normative nature of policymaking and unabashedly recognizes the values embedded 
in the range of regulatory tools" without being "misleading" about it: 2132. 
867 R Rajan, ' It's the 'Nudge', Stupid, the Key to Steady the Nerves' The Saturday Age (14 April 
2012) 12, 13. 
868 Ibid. 
869 This is especially so where powerful business interests are involved. For example, one could 
make similar claims about the government roll back of the Australian Mining tax due to staunch 
opposi tion from large mining companies despite clear instructions on its implementation in the 
Henry Report. 
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success of policies." 870 In other words, incentivising and disincentivising regulation must 
be long term and stable in order to create investment certainty, which then motivates 
private funding and business activity in renewable and clean tech sectors. Importantly, 
regulation cannot be repealed suddenly and retroactively. For example, in May 2010 the 
Spanish government threatened to change its renewable energy price guarantees "mid-
stream", which was described by one interviewee as "potentially disastrous" for the 
financing of renewables (case BJ). Similarly, a carbon price (whether in the form of an 
ETS or tax) must be set high enough to ensure markets can flourish whilst carbon emissions 
are actually reduced. 87 1 
Thaler and Sunstein acknowledge that governments are comprised of humans and that 
humans are intrinsically flawed decision-makers. 872 Indeed, it would be disingenuous to 
suggest that governments are somehow more 'enlightened' and accepting of climate change 
than corporate entities, or that politicians agree on the appropriateness and desirability of 
climate mitigation policy mechanisms. Given that politicians are subject to the usual suite 
of human cognitive biases, authors such as Rachlinksi and Farina 873 and Cooper and 
Kovacic874 have examined the effects of bounded rationality on policy-making, arguing that 
regulators themselves can be nudged to ' do the right thing'. On the issue of climate finance 
regulation, empirical studies such as this one can be communicated to regulators to steer 
their choices for effective policy-making. 
Moreover, it is useful to consider how and when government has managed to 'get it right'. 
At the time of writing, the UK and Australian Federal Governments have both just passed 
important initiatives that encourage private funding for low-carbon technology. In the UK, 
this takes the form of the Green Investment Bank (GIB), a public company that operates 
870 Deutsche Bank, above n 166. 
871 Thaler and Sunstein g ive advice on the thorny political problem of getting such bills passed. 
They suggest that revenues from a carbon price be paired with personal tax cuts, the provision of 
universal health insurance or social security funding. They opine that the "linking of costs and 
benefits might help the pill go down more easily": Thaler and Sunstein, above n 831, 187. This 
suggestion was illustrated in the passing of the Australian carbon tax: see Bowman, above n 773. 
872 Thaler and Sunstein, ibid, l 0. 
873 JJ Rachlinski and CR Farina, 'Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design' (2002) 
87(2) Cornell Law Review 549. 
874 JC Cooper and WE Kovacic, Behavioral Economics: Implications/or Regulatory 
Behaviour (21July2011) at <http://ssrn.com/abtract= l892078> viewed 12 August 2012. 
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independently of govemment. 875 The GIB's mission is to "provide financial solutions to 
accelerate private sector investment in the green economy", particularly m green 
infrastructure projects, and to work towards "a 'double bottom line' of both achieving 
significant green impact and making financial returns". 876 lt commenced a preliminary 
phase in April 2012 capitalised with £3 billion. 877 
The Australian initiative is the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC), 878 which is set 
to commence on 1 July 2013. It will be managed by an independent board comprised of 
experts in banking, finance, economics and energy, and will receive AU$2 billion of 
funding per year for the first five years. 879 The primary purpose of the CEFC is to " leverage 
private sector fi nancing for renewable energy and clean technology projects'' and "identify 
projects and remove barriers that would othcn.visc prevent the financ ing of large scale 
. ' xxo 
renewable energy pro_1ects'. 
Naturally it is too early to judge these in itiatives. However, their potential for leveraging 
private sector finance and facili tating transformational low-carbon change is enorrnous . x~i 
Moreover, the fact that they exist at a ll provides suppott for 'nudging' regul ation that can 
harness the profit-motive of banks to move the industry as a whole in the ' right' direction. 
875 The GIB has been established under the Companies Act. 
876 Per UK Department of Business Innovation and Skills at 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/greeninvestmentbank> viewed 29 May 2012. 
877 The GIB will be given full borrowing powers from April 2015 "subject to public sector net debt 
falling as a percentage of GDP and further state aid approval being granted": ibid. 
878 The Clean Energy Finance C01poration Bill 2012 (Cth) was introduced to the Lower House on 
23 May 2012. 
879 Plus funding to cover establishment and operations for 3 years. The CEFC will act as a 
complement to the Govenuncnt 's $23/tonne carbon price, which came into effect on I July 2012: 
<http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/clcan-energy-future/rcnewable-energy/ > viewed 30 July 
2012. 
880 Per Australian Government: ibid. 
881 Indeed, industry players have welcomed the CEFC. For example Baker & McKenzie described it 
as having "strong potential to play an important role in funding a challenging industry, as it has a 
lower targeted rate of return than other financial lenders, is able to factor in positive public policy 
externalities and has a certain source of funding" : Baker & McKenzie, Client Alert: Structure and 
approach of the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (Baker & McKenzie, Sydney, 24 April 2012). 
See also: Solar Choice Pty Ltd, Clean Energy Finance Corporation legislation lntroduced Into 
Parliament (24 May 2012) < http ://www. so larchoicc.net.au/ blog/ cl ean-energy-
fi nan ce-corporati on-legislation-introduced-in to-parl i amen ti> viewed 3 0 July 
2012; and N Perry (2012) 'The Clean Energy Finance Corporation: The Purpose and the 
Hypocrisy ofindustry ' The Conversation (23 April 2012). 
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7 .3 Generalisability and Further Research 
Generalisability 
In summary, private sector banks in market economies are motivated to adopt climate-
related strategies due to business case logic. Specifically, they seek to: enhance profits 
directly via fee generation and indirectly via client service reputation; and (b) mitigate risk 
to their financial positions and social reputations. While some commentators see 
environmental salvation in CSR, the findings of the present study suggest that it is a limited 
explanatory tool for what drives actual corporate environmental-social uptake. In particular, 
my findings cha11enge the extant CSR literature which posits that 'doing the right thing' 
drives corporate greening. Finally, this dissertation shows that regulatory environments 
(including both government intervention and NGO activity) shape bank perceptions of 
climate change as an opportunity or a risk, which in tum shapes climate-related bank 
behavior as either innovative or merely 'BAU with a lemon twist '. 
In adopting a case study methodology, my sampling logic was purposive and my goal was 
to engage in "analytic generalization" by expanding and generalising extant theories. 882 It 
was not my intent to enumerate frequencies by engaging in "statistical generalization". 883 
Accordingly, the findings of this study are generalisable to theoretical propositions; but can 
they also be generalised to populations other than 'banks in market economies'?884 
Are banks unique? 
There is a dearth of extant empirical research on what makes banks 'tick' let alone 'go 
green'. They are notoriously opaque, multi-celled creatures, requiring detailed empirical 
investigation. Indeed, even after spending time with managers in certain banks, I do not 
claim to have uncovered all or even any of their 'secrets'. But I have been able to analyse 
information that was revealed in interviews with managers at early-moving banks, and 
provide insights into specific aspects of their decision-making and motivations vis-a-vis 
882 Yin, above n 489, I 0, 32-33. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Ibid, I 0. 
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climate change. Given the importance of banks to one of our most significant economic 
transitions, this is a timely and necessary contribution. 
Yet, are the motivations of banks unique? On the one hand, the banking industry is a 
quintessential and unconstrained exemplar of capitalism. Through the inner workings of 
this industry we see capitalism in its most naked form, as illustrated by the GFC. It is not 
trite to emphasise just how important profit- and value-increase is to banks as revealed in 
the interviews. The sentiment 'banks are about making money' was reiterated frequently by 
interviewees regardless of the type of bank, employee or jurisdiction. Banks are the poster 
child for capitalism. As economic gatekeepers, banks literally deal in money; they are not 
just actors in a capitalist paradigm, they personify it. This sense of fiscal urgency and 
privilege, and the business case logic driving it, permeated all of the interviews. 
So the obvious question is this: how can the multiple case studies in this dissertation be 
used to make broader generalisations 885 such that the findings have value for scholarship in 
the fields of business strategy and business and society? 
Generalising the findings 
Yin w1ites that: "the description and analysis of a single case often suggest implications 
about a more general phenomenon". 886 Despite the 'poster child ' status of banks, it can be 
argued that their predilections are not unique within a market economy paradigm and that at 
least some of the insights generated by this thesis have broader application. 
Business case logic drives banks to adopt climate-related strategies; and they are not driven 
by ethical conceptions of ' doing the right thing' as posited in the CSR literature. In both 
respects, banks may be similar to any corporation operating in a capitalist economy. Indeed, 
when considering empirical studies with broader samples, such as Spence's investigation of 
CSR in UK companies or O'Dwyer's research into CSR conceptions by Irish managers, we 
see that the banking industry is not the only industry that privileges business case logic. It 
885 ibid, 9, 16, 31. 
886 Ibid, 144. 
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may simply be considered the brightest star in the capitalist constellation and the most 
'naked' example of capitalist business logic in action. 
Specifically, my findings are most readily generalised to other finance sector populations. 
In particular, institutional investors operate under long timcframes, require stable incentives 
to facilitate certainty, and seek to mitigate risk and capitalise on opportunities associated 
with climate change. Neuhoff et al. have previously argued that "a profound change in the 
portfolio of investors" must occur if we are to move to a low-carbon economy. 887 Yet, the 
business case is both a driver and a ban-ier to socially responsible investment by 
institutional investors in ways similar to that of banks. In particular, Richardson highlights 
the lure of a countervailing business case to invest in GHG-polluting companies. 888 As 
such, my findings on green drivers and my recommendations for government intervention 
have generalisability to these finance sector actors. 889 
Moreover, my findings can be potentially generalised to two other groupings of 
corporations: first, service industries; and second, corporate bank clients. The new 
taxonomy of 'reputation ', comprising both social reputation and client service reputation, 
may well be generalisable to the first grouping. For example, Steger's study found that 
corporate reputation is vital for industries that have "specialized products and brands that 
are in direct contact with the consumer". 8')0 These industries include financial services as 
well as food and beverage, automotive, hotel, and tourism industries. It may be that client 
service reputation, and not just social reputation, drives (and inhibits) green uptake in those 
industries. Second, corporate bank clients are also motivated by the business case, as 
evidenced by the fact that banks pitch their services to them at this level ('partner with us in 
order to make money and not lose money' ). Large pension funds, energy companies that 
develop renewable and clean techs, businesses in real estate and/or infrastructure, and 
transport companies all operate in a capital ist society pursuant to business case imperatives. 
887 Neuhoff ct al, above n 377, l 0. 
888 Richardson 2008, above n 74, 507. 
889 Neuhoff et al recommend regulation that provides guarantees to cover investment risk for new 
clean tech as well as direct money transfer to cover the incremental costs : Neuhoff et al, above n 
377, 10. 
890 Steger, above n 285, 43. 
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Arguably they are incentiviscd and disincentivised in relation to cl imate change in ways 
similar to banks. 891 
Non-transferability: banks in non-market economies 
Whilst my findings can be generalised to some other populations, there arc limits to their 
transferability to other contexts. This is because the findings in this study are contextualised 
within a capitalist paradigm. Accordingly, an important area for empirical investigation is 
the climate-related efforts of banks in non-market economies, such as India, China, and 
Islamic jurisdictions. 
ln particular, if we are truly serious about moving toward a low-carbon global economy, 
then it is essential to study Chinese banks. The reason is simple: China is transitioning to a 
consumer economy and its energy needs continue to grow. Jn 20 J 0 China became " the 
biggest energy consumer on the planet" when it consumed 20.3 per cent of the world's 
energy, effectively doubling its energy consumption in just ten years. 892 In order to satisfy 
its ever-growing energy demands, China is both (a) making significant investments in clean 
energy solutions, and (b) burning significant amounts of fossil fuel especially coal. 
Specifically, China's spending on wind energy in the second quarter of 20 I 0 amounted to 
approximately half of the global total of US$20.5billion893 and some commentators predict 
that China will spend US$440-$660billion on clean tech investment by 2020. 894 
Concomitantly, in 20 I 0 China accounted for 48.2 per cent of world coal use whereas in 
2000 it accounted for less than one third. 895 Accordingly, it is important to better 
understand what levers and ban-iers ex ist for Chinese banks and bankers in making low-
carbon business decisions. 
891 Indeed, a longitudinal study of General Motors reveals that in the 1920s it faced almost exactly 
the same macro pressures and meso logic as any leading bank in this dissertation: sec Dillard et al, 
above n 394, 529-531 . 
892 The Economist, 'Fossil Fuel Usage II its Global Record ' The Weekend Australian Financial 
Review, (11-12 June 20 11 ) 11 , 12. 
893 F Harvey, 'China Surges Ahead On Clean Energy Investment ' The Financial Times (29 
November 20 I 0). 
894 S Harrison, 'Clean tech Investment in Asia ' Financier Worldwide (February 20 I 0). 
895 The Economist, above n 892, 12. 
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Further Research: viewing change through an institutional lens 
This dissertation has self-consciously advocated for 'working with what we've got in order 
to make change'. It accepts the empirical findings that financial firms privilege business 
case logic; and it recommends that, instead of lamenting that reality, we harness it. This is 
not due to any lack of imagination. It is due to a practical desire to provide policy 
recommendations that can be adopted (relatively) quickly and easily in order to mobilise a 
full range of actors to assist climate change mitigation in a timely way. Nonetheless, it is 
acknowledged that the concept of ' reali ty' is a nebulous, multi-perspective one. As such, 
investigation of how reality is constructed - and can be reconstructed - around ecological 
norms instead of economic pressures merits further attention. Accordingly, a fecund area 
for future research is a more specific investigation of macro institutional (not corporate) 
change as an alternative approach to facilitating climate change mitigation. 
Hoffman and Ventresca propose two approaches to 'making change '. 896 First, work within 
the cunent values framework such that environmental issues are reframed as synonymous 
with economic imperatives; that is, focus on win-win or 'it depends' modalities. The 
second approach is to restructure the current values framework. The recommendations of 
this dissertation fit within the first approach. Yet, according to Ventresca and Hoffman, if 
we accept that 'the economics vs. envi ronment' debate is framed within the macro setting 
whereby systemic norms influence which actions and attitudes are - or become - acceptable 
and normal, then we need to investigate how to change the norms (causes). 897 Hoffman has 
specifically argued that in order to solve the climate problem, we need to change the 
institutions not the organisations. 898 
The driving research question behind this second approach would be: 'how is the business 
case shaped and by whom?' That is, the field of reference broadens out from organisational 
logic (meso level) to a discussion of the influences that shape organisational logic (macro 
level). The line of questioning would change from 'Will a corporation act if the business 
case is made out?' to 'How do items get on the business case agenda in the first place?'/ 
896 Hoffman and Ventresca, above n 806, 1374. 
897 ibid, 1384-1387. 
898 Hoffman, above n 396, 367-368. 
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'How do company activities shape prevailing ideas?' I ' How do certain behaviours become 
normal or acceptable?' A macro level approach recalibrates the lens of analysis to focus on 
social-cultural influences rather than their organisational outcomes. 899 
Scholars of institutional theory assert that industry or organisational field norms are a 
product of their macro political-economic context. 900 Organisations then allocate resources 
based on the prevailing macro norm(s), which in turn reinforces those norms and the 
symbolic framework. 901 The prevailing norm in capitalist societies is 'economic 
efficiency', the implementation of which is described as "value-free". 902 Indeed, data in this 
disse11ation show how banks refuse to choose clients on moral 'value ' bases but are happy 
to do so on rational risk/benefit 'value-free ' bases. As such, we see in practice that the 
meso and macro levels influence and inform each other and reinforce prevailing (economic 
efficienc y) norms through recursivity and reinforcing actions such as (financial) resource 
allocation. As Lundgren and Catasus note: "By combining what different stakeholders' 
demand from banks and the banks' perceptions of their role we largely arrive at what banks 
currently consider is the right thing to do."903 
Yet systemic norms can change. 904 Hoffman and Ventresca write that " the form of the 
debate over environmental issues such as climate change is determined by which actors are 
engaged, what kinds of problems are debated, how those problems are defined, and what 
kinds of solutions are considered appropriate."905 Specifically, Adams and Whelan point 
899 Higgins argues that: "In order to effect meaningful change in the business and society 
relationship, it is necessary to reclaim both the political dimension of CSR, and to consider more 
broadly the processes of organisational and social change" : C Higgins, 'Is a Responsive Business 
Also a Responsible Business?' (2010) 5(3) Journal of Business Systems, Governance and Ethics 23, 
29. See also Parker who argues that scholars need to investigate "the complex social process of 
norm formation" by using normatively-oriented approaches to case study research, action research 
(that engages with industry), and policy development: Parker, above n 216, 844. 
900 Eg Dillard et al, above n 394, 527; also Meyer and Rowan, above n 399. 
901 The means by which resources are allocated and controlled in and by indi vidual organisations 
occurs within "formal, hierarchical administrative structures with the primary evaluative criteria 
being profit maximization and economic wealth accumulation": Di llard et al, ibid, 528. 
902 ibid, 527. 
903 Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8, 188. 
904 As evidenced convincingly by a periodisation analysis of five theoretical trends in the last 30 
years of US social responsibility accounting to reveal that ' the middle ground ' is a contested terrain 
that shifts over time with social struggles and conflicts: Tinker et al, above n 270. 
905 Hoffman and Ventresca, above n 806, 1369. 
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out that societal rules can be changed by the conscious action of a host of actors including 
governments, academics, NGOs, media, the 'CSR industry',906 the scientific community,907 
and corporations themselves. 908 DiMaggio and Powell note that interaction between these 
actors can resemble institutional "war". 909 And it is at times of conflict that institutional 
(non-isomorphic) change can occur. 910 
Specifically, the climate field has many players. These include banks, governments, 
corporate clients, NGOs, civil society, Bankers Associations, and investors. As such, there 
is potential for competing or conflicting norms and institutions in the field, which 
"prescribe varying forms and activities for participants". 911 Moreover, government 
regulation on climate change lacks consistency at international and national levels. So 
arguably the organisational field is in upheaval: there is an institutional void where 
government leadership should be and a number of key players are jostling to ensure that 
their preferences shape the field. As such, there arc potential conflicts and tensions between 
not only actors in the climate fi eld but between institutions. Further research might focus on 
the political dynamics between actors in the climate field and the extent to which banks are 
influencing their institutional environment. 9 12 
But can radical systemic change occur when the players and the goals remain the same? 
How can capitalist values and beliefs be changed without changing the capitalist frame 
within which they are situated and reinforced? If business case logic dominates CSR 
906 being "a whole host of people and organisations ... who are selling the idea that socially 
responsible behavior. .. will enhance shareholder value" : Adams and Whelan, above n 2 16, 134, also 
128-1 37. 
907 Eg supplying evidence of cl imate change. 
908 Adams and Whelan state that companies can use corporate reporting as a means of influencing 
attitudes and legitimizing corporate behaviour: Adams and Whelan, above n 216, 128. 
909 DiMaggio and Powell, above n 418, 30-3 1, citing HC White, ldentity and Control: A Structural 
Theory of Social i nteraction (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1992). See also Hoffman, 
above n 401 , 202. 
910 Dillard et al , above n 394, 5 14-5 15. 
911 Scott,above n2l4,189. 
912 Particularly through a process of structuration, which encapsulates notions of duality, 
reciprocity, multi-level interaction and, ultimately, change. See Giddens A, The Constitution of 
Society: Outline qfthe Theo1y ofStructuration (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984). 
Dillard et al provide an excellent summation of structuration and use the social dynamics in 
structuration theory to create a more accurate (that is, political and dynamic) understanding of 
institutional change : Dillard et al , above 394. 
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discourse and if there is corporate capture of the meaning of CSR (as evidenced in this 
study) then what else is to be expected in a capitalist context? In advocating for 'systemic 
change', authors such as Hoffman and Ventresca appear to suggest the dismantling of 
capitalist ideals. Certainly, ' deep green ecology' scholars are keen to point out that if we 
want a different outcome from business then wc need a different paradigm for them to 
operate in. 913 And, in the wake of the GFC, a questioning of capitalism has occurred m 
media outlets as unlikely as the Financial Times. 914 
To be sure, a 'change the world (literally)' approach is quite exciting from a theoretical 
perspective, especially given the multiple and murky causes of global warming and its 
systemic (as opposed to atomistic) nature. However, the praxis of actually changing the 
world in this way is complex and challenging. Indeed, it is interesting to note that, after 
advocating for systemic change in 1999, Hoffman propounded a more modest case for 
strategic organisational change six years later. 915 
Part of the challenge is in answering the question ' what is it that society wants? ' This 
dissertation did not attempt to address this question. But the findings hint at multiple and 
potentially conflicting messages. In particular, there appeared to be two dominant 
normative pressures operating on banks during the period that the research was conducted. 
First, there was an entrenched expectation that banks fulfill their traditional role in society 
by providing excellent customer service and increasing shareholder value. That is, society 
expects banks to be profitable, not to take charge of environmental protection in the way a 
mandated Environmental Protection Agency should .916 A second expectation was emerging 
at the time of interviews: the GFC had instigated societal pressure regarding how banks 
make their money, with a call for more ethical and transparent business practices. Are these 
pressures conflicting on the subject of climate change? It depends. Perhaps yes, if banks 
913 See eg: Bucholz, above n 59; Kovel, above n 314. 
914 G Rachman, 'The West Re-Examines the Rat Race" The Financial Times (I June 20 I 0), 11 . 
915 Hoffman, above n 6, in which he stated that scholars and industry must shift their view of GHG 
emissions reductions "from a strictly environmental issue driven by regulatory or social pressures to 
a strategic issue driven by market pressures": 22. He exhorted companies to find their own business 
case for climate-related strategies without which it would not be in their self-interest to 'go green '. 
In other words, he was now very much advocating for organisational change within the existing 
capitalist-values framework. See also Hoffman, above n 441 . 
916 This was also highlighted by Lundgren and Catasus, above n 8, 188. 
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continue to heavily fund fossil fuels and other unsustainable industries. Perhaps not, if they 
support lucrative low-carbon markets and technology. Overall, however, what is 
'acceptable' or 'responsible' bank practice is inextricably linked with how society views 
the role of a bank, how banks view their role in society, and whether and to what extent 
those views can change. 
If further research on institutional change or CSR is to occur, then surely the "nature of the 
obligations and/or expectations the wider society wishes to impose on business" must be 
co-examined. 917 As Hoffman stated in 2001: 
To profess, as many do today, that industry is finally seeing the light is to argue 
that the light has always been there to see. In fact it has not. How companies 
define their responsibility toward the environment is a direct reflection of how we, 
as a society, view the environmental issue and the role of business in responding to 
it. 918 
In other words, do we care enough to change? 
7 .4 Final Remarks 
There is a Hollywood movie called 'Field of Dreams'. In this movie the main character, 
portrayed by actor Kevin Kostner, builds a giant baseball stadium on a farm so that ghosts 
of legendary baseballers-past have a venue to play at night after night while avid fans can 
enjoy the spectacle. The catchphrase of this movie is "build it and they will come", 
referring to the deliberate transition of a cornfield into a baseball stadium. Without the 
architecture, there is no game. 
There is a curious analogy between that movie and the findings in this dissertation. That is, 
if national/regional governments supply the basic architecture of the climate game then the 
skilled financial experts can play within it, doing what they do best but for the benefit of the 
rest of us. Indeed, the analogy is glimpsed in the response of one banker when asked what 
might induce whole-of-industry climate uptake: "All banks are pro.fit-driven. If the 
monetary incentives ... are there, then banks will come" (case B2). 
91 7 O'Dwyer, above n 242, 550-551. 
918 Hoffman, above n 401, 22. 
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In the context of SRI, Richardson describes a paradoxical situation whereby SRI "emerged 
as a form of surrogate market regulation to compensate for the lacunae of official 
regulation, yet [it is] sometimes dependent on the state to set environmental standards 
necessary to stimulate ... the market". 919 This paradox is similarly evident in the context of 
banks and climate change. The findings in this dissertation show that due to inherent 
limitations in business case logic and disinterest in CSR as a driver, banks will not 
necessarily do the 'right' thing for society and a low-carbon economy on their own or, if 
they do, they will not take green action far or fast enough to assist timely mitigation of 
global warming. So policy-makers need to nudge them in the 'right' direction via indirect 
government intervention, which can harness banks' devotion to the business case for the 
good of society. 
An external expert said thi s about mitigating climate change: "lt is not a blame or guilt 
game; let's just focus on solving the problem. We need people with lesser morals on board 
to fix the problem" (CCC-1 ). He was referring to finance sector actors. Private sector banks 
may not be driven by ethical imperatives or hold the same values as NGOs, and they may 
not be acting from a (purely) 'better the world' place; but they are economic gatekeepers 
with access to money and the innate ability to move it around. They are important entities 
to get on board to help mitigate climate change, which, as stated at the beginning of this 
dissertation, is as much an economic issue as an environmental or ethical one. 
We no longer need to assume what motivates banks, or project upon them some artificial 
conception of corporate ' care ' that we think should motivate them. We now know - from 
their own mouths - what drives them and why. We just need to capitalise on it. This 
dissertation has made some recommendations for how to help make ' the dream' a timely 
reality. Specifically, regulators in market economies might harness the greed and experti se 
of banks to better society. It is submitted that this is preferable to hoping banks will ' make 
good' voluntarily, or forcing them to do so through coercive regulation. This study 
highlights which areas can be leveraged and harnessed by policymakers to maximum effect 
919 Richardson 2008, above n 74, 507. 
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and, conversely, which areas will yield little reward. As such, the findings m this 
dissertation are not the end of the story but (hopefully) just the beginning. 
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